Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 463245V

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 463245V

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1619

September Term, 2019

PEDRO STEVEN BUARQUE DE MACEDO,

ET AL.

THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

COMPANY OF HARTFORD, ET Al.

Kehoe,

Gould,*

Eyler, Deborah S.,

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

JJ.

Opinion by Kehoe, J.

Filed: September 29, 2021

*Judge Steven B. Gould, now serving on the

Court of Appeals, participated in the hearing and

conference of this case while an active member

of the Court; he participated in the adoption of

this opinion as a specially assigned member of

this Court.

**This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion or other

document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the

rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. See Md. Rule 1-104.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 1 -

This appeal arises out of an automobile accident that claimed the lives of Michael

Buarque de Macedo, his spouse Alessandra Buarque de Macedo, and one of their children,

Thomas Buarque de Macedo. Their remaining child, Helena Buarque de Macedo, survived

but was seriously injured. We will refer to these members of the Macedo family by their

first names. We mean no disrespect.

Helena, in her own right, and Pedro Steven Buarque de Macedo, as her guardian and

next friend and as the personal representative of Alessandra’s and Thomas’s estates, sought

a declaratory judgment as to whether a household exclusion provision in an umbrella

insurance policy issued to Michael applied to the claims asserted against his estate by

Helena and Mr. Macedo in his representative capacities. The Circuit Court for Montgomery

County concluded that the household exclusion provision applied and entered judgment to

that effect.

Appellants present one issue to us:

Does Md. Code, Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-806 render the household exclusion

clause in an umbrella policy void, up to the limits of the motor vehicle

liability coverage, as to motor vehicle personal injury or wrongful death

claims of unemancipated children or estates of such children against their

parent?

We will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of February 27, 2016, Michael was driving his family to Helena’s high

school so that she could attend a play. While making a left turn across the westbound lanes

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 2 -

of River Road in Bethesda, the Macedo vehicle was struck by a BMW sedan travelling at

an extremely high rate of speed.

All four of the occupants of the vehicle were injured.

Michael, Alessandra, and Thomas died shortly thereafter. Helena survived but suffered

severe and permanent injuries.

At the time of the accident, Michael had a primary automobile liability policy issued

by The Travelers Indemnity Company and an umbrella liability policy issued by The

Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut. (These companies are affiliates

and we will refer to them collectively as “Hartford”). The primary policy had a liability

coverage limit of $500,000 for personal injuries and property damage for each accident.

The umbrella policy had a coverage limit of $2 million in excess of the automobile liability

coverage. The umbrella policy also had a household exclusion provision which stated in

pertinent part that the policy did not cover claims for

bodily injury or personal injury to any person who is related by blood,

marriage, or adoption to an insured and who is a resident of the household of

[an insured.]

(Quotation marks omitted.)

For the purposes of this appeal, the parties do not dispute that Thomas and Helena were

Michael’s children and that they resided in his household.

An accident report indicates that, moments before the collision, the BMW was

travelling at approximately 115 miles per hour. The speed limit on that part of River Road

was 45 miles per hour.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 3 -

After the accident, counsel for Helena and Mr. Macedo asked Hartford to settle

Alessandra’s, Thomas’s, and Helena’s negligence, survivorship, and wrongful death

claims against Michael for $2.5 million, that is, the combined policy limits of the primary

liability and the umbrella policies. Hartford paid appellants $500,000 under Michael’s

primary policy but the insurance company declined to make any payment under the

umbrella policy. Hartford asserted that the household exclusion applied to the claims.

Appellants filed a civil action asserting negligence, wrongful death and survivorship

claims against Michael’s estate and the State of Maryland, as well as a request for a

declaratory judgment against Hartford. As to the latter entity, the only relief sought by

appellants was a judgment declaring that the proceeds of the umbrella policy would be

available to satisfy a judgment against Michael’s estate in favor of Helena or Thomas’s

estate or to fund a settlement of such claims. The parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment on the household exclusion provision issue. After a hearing, the circuit court

concluded that the household exclusion provision was “valid and enforceable” and entered

judgment accordingly.

After the judgment was entered, appellants filed a motion asking the court to certify

the judgment as final for purposes of appellate review pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b).

Hartford and the State consented to the relief sought. The court granted the motion and

stayed proceedings as to other claims until the household exclusion provision issue was

resolved by the appellate courts.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 4 -

ANALYSIS

1. Appellate jurisdiction

As we have noted, appellants’ complaint contains eight counts. The declaratory

judgment disposed of only one of them and no judgment has been entered in any of the

remaining counts. “[U]nless otherwise provided by law, the right to seek appellate review

in this Court or the Court of Special Appeals ordinarily must await the entry of a final

judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties.” Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc., 402

Md. 673, 678 (2008). Md. Rule 2-602(b) permits a trial court to enter a final judgment “as

to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” if the court “expressly determines

in a written order that there is no just reason for delay.” The decision to enter final judgment

pursuant to Rule 2-602(b) is discretionary. The circuit court’s discretion is not

untrammeled—both this Court and the Court of Appeals have “not hesitated to

countermand the entry of judgment under Rule 2–602(b) and dismiss an appeal upon a

finding that the trial court had not articulated a sufficient reason why there was no just

reason for delay, sufficient to allow an immediate appeal.” Silbersack, 402 Md. at 680

(quoting Smith v. Lead Industries Ass’n, 386 Md. 12, 25 (2005)).

There is an additional complication in the present case. Other than noting that all

parties had consented to entry of judgment and that there was no just reason for delay, the

circuit court did not explain the basis for its decision. “When a trial court, after expressly

finding ‘no just reason for delay,’ directs the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2–

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 5 -

602(b), but fails to articulate in the order or on the record the ‘findings or reasoning in

support thereof, the deference normally accorded such a certification is nullified.’” Miller

Metal Fabrication. v. Wall, 415 Md. 210, 227 (2010) (quoting Braswell Shipyards v.

Beazer East., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993)). Under such circumstances, a Rule 2-

602(b) order will be upheld only “if the record clearly demonstrates the existence of any

hardship or unfairness sufficient to justify discretionary departure from the usual rule

establishing the time for appeal.” Miller Metal, 415 Md. at 228 (cleaned up).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion by entering final judgment on the declaratory judgment count. Counts 1 through

7 of the complaint assert negligence, wrongful death and survivorship claims against

Michael’s estate (premised on an assertion that Michael had been negligent in failing to

avoid the accident) and the State (based on the theory that it had been negligent in designing

and maintaining River Road, which is a State highway). Count 8 is the request for a

declaratory judgment against Hartford. The claim asserted in the declaratory judgment

count is legally and factually distinct from the claims presented in the other counts. Thus,

this case does not present one of the problems that Maryland’s final judgment rule is

intended to avoid, namely, the prospect of “piecemeal appeals [that] may cause the

appellate court to be faced with having the same issues presented multiple times[.]”

Silbersack, 402 Md. at 679.

Additionally, the parties asserted in their consent motion that a final resolution of the

declaratory judgment count might lead to a settlement of all of the claims. It is significant

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 6 -

that this assessment of the economic realities has been the consistent posture of the parties

since the beginning of the case. Immediately after the defendants’ answers were filed, the

parties requested that discovery be stayed until the coverage issue was resolved. The initial

(and only) scheduling order stated that a “modified schedule [was to be] set after the motion

for summary judgment” was decided.

Finally, there are Helena’s interests. Although we have not dwelt on the details of the

accident or the nature and extent of her injuries, the collision and its immediate aftermath

were truly horrific, and Helena’s injuries extremely severe. If the case is settled, she would

not have to testify at trial. The possibility that a final resolution of the declaratory judgment

count might spare her that ordeal factors in our analysis.

In summary, we conclude the record reveals a sufficient basis to support the circuit

court’s entry of a final judgment as to the declaratory judgment count pursuant to Rule 2-

602(b).

2. The parties’ contentions

In Maryland, a provision in a contract of insurance is unenforceable if it conflicts with

Maryland public policy, which is typically expressed by a statutory mandate or prohibition.

Wilson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, 395 Md. 524, 529–30 (2006); Jennings v.

The Maryland Association for Justice, Inc. (the “MAJ”) has filed an amicus curiae

brief in support of appellants’ positions. The arguments presented by the MAJ generally

track those raised by appellants.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 7 -

Government Employees Insurance Company, 302 Md. 352, 357 (1985). However, absent

a statutory prohibition, Maryland courts will uphold the validity of the exclusion because

“[a]s a general rule, parties are free to contract as they wish.” State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 307 Md. 631, 643 (1986).

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the household exception contained in the

umbrella policy issued to Michael violates Maryland public policy. The parties’ arguments

on this point center on two statutes.

The first is Md. Code, Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-806, which states (emphasis added):

(a) This section applies to:

(1) An action by an unemancipated child against a parent of the child; and

(2) An action by a parent against an unemancipated child of the parent.

(b) The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of

the parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child,

for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the

operation of a motor vehicle, as defined in Title 11 of the Transportation

Article, may not be restricted by the doctrine of parent-child immunity or by

any insurance policy provisions, up to the limits of motor vehicle liability

coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage.

The second statute is Md. Code, Ins. § 19-504.1, which states in pertinent part:

(a) This section applies only when the liability coverage under a policy or

binder of private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance exceeds the

amount required under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article.

[

]

Md. Code, Transp. § 17-103 sets out Maryland’s requirements for insurance coverage

for motor vehicles registered in this state. See Edwards v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore, 176 Md. App. 446, 466 (2007).

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 8 -

(b) An insurer shall offer to the first named insured under a policy or binder

of private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance liability coverage for

claims made by a family member in the same amount as the liability coverage

for claims made by a nonfamily member under the policy or binder.

* * *

(d)(1) An insurer may not refuse to underwrite a first named insured because

the first named insured requests or elects the liability coverage for claims

made by family members in an amount equal to the coverage provided for

claims made by nonfamily members.

* * *

The arguments presented by appellants begin with the proposition that the language of

Courts & Jud. Proc.§ 8-506 is clear and unambiguous. They state:

[T]he Maryland General Assembly has made clear that any provision in an

insurance policy which restricts motor vehicle liability coverage of an

unemancipated child’s claim against a parent is against public policy up to

the limits of coverage provided in that policy. MD Code, Courts and Judicial

Proceedings, § 5-806(b) states, in pertinent part: “The right of action . . . by

a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child, for wrongful death,

personal injury, or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor

vehicle . . . may not be restricted . . . by any insurance policy provisions, up

to the limits of motor vehicle liability coverage . . . .”)

(Emphasis and ellipses in original).

Appellants point out that it was Hartford’s position prior to the filing of the circuit

court action that the umbrella policy was not a primary motor vehicle liability policy and

§ 5-806 “does not prohibit application of the household exclusion.” According to them,

Hartford’s position is “unfounded” because § 5-806 is unambiguous. Appellants assert that

“the household exclusion in the Umbrella Policy in the case at bar is against the public

policy set forth in § 5-806(b), and cannot be applied to restrict the motor vehicle liability

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 9 -

coverage” that the policy otherwise provides. Finally, appellants posit that the phrase “up

to the limits of motor vehicle liability coverage” in § 5-806 was intended by the General

Assembly to prevent claims in excess of policy limits, thereby “protecting the interests of

unemancipated children, while at the same time ensuring that insurers only paid up to their

coverage limits based on amounts selected and paid for by the insured, whether under a

primary, umbrella, excess or any other type of policy offering automobile liability

coverage.”

In their reply brief, appellants assert that Hartford’s legislative history analysis is not

properly before us because Hartford did not present this argument to the circuit court. In

support of this contention, they point to Md. Rule 8-131(a), which states that appellate

courts will not decide an issue “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised

in or decided by the trial court.” (There are exceptions but none of them are applicable to

this appeal.)

Appellants misinterpret the rule. The issues before this court are the proper

interpretation of § 5-806 and how that statute applies to the umbrella policy. These matters

were certainly raised to the circuit court. Like every appellate litigant, Hartford is free to

provide additional authority to support its position. And there is certainly no prejudice to

appellants. As we will explain in part 3 of our analysis, the Court of Appeals often examines

a statute’s legislative history. See, e.g., Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 688 (2020)

(explaining that the “modern tendency” of the Court of Appeals is to “examine extrinsic

sources of legislative intent” to validate interpretations of statutes.) The Court of Special

Appeals frequently does the same. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Nadel, 248 Md. App. 594, 621–

24 (2020). No Maryland appellate court has previously interpreted § 8-506. Even if the

parties had not included discussions of the statute’s legislative history, we would have

analyzed it after giving the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the

subject.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 10 -

The MAJ elaborates on this last point. Focusing on the phrase “any insurance policy

provisions” in § 5-806(b), the MAJ argues that “any” in this context means “every” or

“all.” Therefore, MAJ reasons, the phrase “any insurance policy provision” in the statute

must include the umbrella policy “and any policy provision therein.” From this premise,

the MAJ reasons that § 8-506 “applies to every insurance policy but only to the limits of

motor vehicle coverage.” Because the household exclusion in the umbrella policy would

have the effect of precluding appellants from recovering under the umbrella policy, MAJ

says that it is void as violative of Maryland public policy.

For its part, Hartford argues that the meaning of § 8-506 is clear when it is read in the

in the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs. Hartford identifies that scheme

as Maryland’s law regarding requirements for primary coverage motor vehicle liability

policies, which is primarily set out in title 19, subtitle 5 of the Insurance Article and title

17 of the Transportation Article.

Hartford states that the phrase “up to the limits of motor

vehicle liability coverage” in the statute refers to the policy limits of the motor vehicle

policy and not the policy limits of the umbrella policy. It argues that this interpretation is

consistent with other relevant statutes, specifically, Ins. § 19-504.1, relevant caselaw, and

the legislative histories of the two statutes.

As previously noted, title 17 of the Transportation Article sets Maryland’s

requirements for insurance coverage for motor vehicles registered in this state. See note 3,

supra.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 11 -

3. Statutory interpretation

When courts interpret a statute, “[o]ur chief objective is to ascertain the General

Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” Berry, 469 Md. at 687. In so

doing, we “assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and

thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to

determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly.” Id. We undertake this through:

an examination of the statutory text in context, a review of legislative history

to confirm conclusions or resolve questions from that examination, and a

consideration of the consequences of alternative readings. ‘Text is the plain

language of the relevant provision, typically given its ordinary meaning,

viewed in context, considered in light of the whole statute, and generally

evaluated for ambiguity. Legislative purpose, either apparent from the text

or gathered from external sources, often informs, if not controls, our reading

of the statute. An examination of interpretive consequences, either as a

comparison of the results of each proffered construction, or as a principle of

avoidance of an absurd or unreasonable reading, grounds the court’s

interpretation in reality.’

Blue v. Prince George’s County, 434 Md. 681, 689 (2013) (quoting Town of Oxford v.

Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 585–86 (2012), aff’d, 431 Md. 14 (2013)); see also Berry, 469

Md. at 688 (“In addition to the plain language, the modern tendency of [the Court of

Appeals] is to continue the analysis of the statute beyond the plain meaning to examine

extrinsic sources of legislative intent in order to check our reading of a statute’s plain

language through examining the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and

archival legislative history of relevant enactments.” (cleaned up)). This practice is based

on the recognition that “some statutes that might initially appear to be unambiguous are, in

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 12 -

fact, ambiguous when considered in the context of the statute as a whole, the broader

statutory scheme, or the apparent purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the

statute.” Daughtry, 248 Md. App. at 613 n.9 (cleaned up) (citing Berry, 469 Md. at 687)).

We identify legislative purpose by considering the language of the statute “within the

context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy

of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421–22 (2010).

4. Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-806

Appellants and MAJ contend that § 5-806 is unambiguous. The relevant language is

contained in subsection(b), which reads:

The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the

parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child, for

wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the

operation of a motor vehicle, as defined in Title 11 of the Transportation

Article, may not be restricted by the doctrine of parent-child immunity or by

any insurance policy provisions, up to the limits of motor vehicle liability

coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage.

As we have explained, it is appellants’ and the MAJ’s position that the phrase “any

insurance policy provisions” means “every” insurance policy provision and the phrase

“motor vehicle liability coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage” refers to umbrella

policies as well as motor vehicle liability policies. We agree that, in the context of § 5-806,

Of course, the reverse is also true—there are statutes that appear ambiguous in

isolation but whose meanings become clear when they are considered in the context of the

relevant “statutory scheme” and/or legislative history.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 13 -

“any” equates with “every.”

However, the statute says “up to the limits of motor vehicle

liability coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage” and not “up to the limits of motor

vehicle liability coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage in any policy which affords

motor vehicle accident coverage.” For us to accept appellants’ proffered interpretation, we

would have to read additional language into the statute.

In our view, correctly construing § 5-806 requires us to read it in conjunction with Ins.

§ 19-504.1, which is another statute that addresses the scope of insurance coverage for

members of an insured’s household. Section 19-504.1 states in pertinent part (emphasis

added):

(a) This section applies only when the liability coverage under a policy or

binder of private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance exceeds the

amount required under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article.

[

]

(b) An insurer shall offer to the first named insured under a policy or binder

of private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance liability coverage for

See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (11th ed. 2020)

(defining “any” as “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,” with “every” as an

alternative meaning).

Title 17, subtitle 1 of the Transportation Article sets out Maryland’s requirements for

insurance coverage for motor vehicles registered in this state. See Edwards, 176 Md. App.

At 466. Prior to the enactment of Ins. § 19–504.1, such policies were required to provide:

unless waived, personal injury protection of at least $2,500 to cover medical,

hospital, and disability expenses for the insured, family members, guests and

authorized users without regard to fault, and protection against damages

caused by persons operating uninsured motor vehicles.

Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 204 Md. App. 679, 697 (2012), aff’d, 431 Md. 347

(2013) (“Stickley I”) (cleaned up).

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 14 -

claims made by a family member in the same amount as the liability coverage

for claims made by a nonfamily member under the policy or binder.

* * *

(d)(1) An insurer may not refuse to underwrite a first named insured because

the first named insured requests or elects the liability coverage for claims

made by family members in an amount equal to the coverage provided for

claims made by nonfamily members.

* * *

In Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 Md. 351, 347 (2013) (“Stickley II”), the

Court of Appeals considered whether the term “private passenger motor vehicle liability

insurance” in the statute included umbrella policies. In that case, Joan Stickley was a

passenger in an automobile operated by her husband which was involved in an accident

caused by her spouse’s negligence. Ms. Stickley was seriously injured, and her husband

was killed. Id. Just as in the case before us, the Stickleys had a primary automobile liability

policy and an umbrella policy. (In Stickley II, the primary policy limit was $100,000 per

person and the umbrella policy limit was $2,000,000.) And, just as in this case, the umbrella

policy contained a household exclusion provision.

Finally, just as in the present case, the

The umbrella policy stated in pertinent part:

EXCLUSIONS

There is no coverage under this policy for any:

13. bodily injury or personal injury to any insured as defined in part a. or b.

of the definition of insured, including any claim made or suit brought against

any insured to share damages with or repay someone else who may be

obligated to pay damages because of such bodily injury or personal injury[.]

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 15 -

insurer offered to pay Ms. Stickley the policy limit on the liability policy but refused to

make any payment on her claim under the umbrella policy. The insurer’s position was

based on the household exclusion in the umbrella policy. The circuit court entered

judgment on the insurer’s behalf. The court concluded that the term “private passenger

motor vehicle liability insurance” in § 19-504.1 did not include umbrella policies. Id. at

354. This Court affirmed the judgment in Stickley I, 204 Md. App. at 682. The Court of

Appeals granted certiorari to consider two issues:

1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that Insurance

Code § 19–504.1 does not apply to excess of umbrella policies.

2. Whether a personal liability umbrella policy that includes motor vehicle

liability insurance constitutes “private passenger motor vehicle liability

insurance” as contemplated by Insurance Code § 19–504.1.

The Court’s answer to each of these questions was no. The Court explained (emphasis

in original):

DEFINITIONS

6. “insured” means:

a. you and your relatives whose primary residence is your household;

b. any other human being under the age of 21 whose primary residence is

your household and who is in the care of a person described in 6.a[.]

12. “relative” means any person related to you by blood, adoption, or

marriage.

* * *

Stickley II, 431 Md. at 352–53 (emphasis in policy).

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 16 -

We begin by looking at the plain meaning of the phrase “policy or binder of

private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance.” By its terms, a private

passenger motor vehicle liability insurance policy refers to a specific type of

motor vehicle liability insurance policy. These insurance policies have been

held by this Court to attach to automobiles and not to individuals.” Neale v.

Wright, 322 Md. 8, 16 (1991). By contrast, a personal liability umbrella

policy includes coverage for a myriad of losses suffered by the insured. This

might include coverage for losses resulting in “personal injury,” such as false

arrest, wrongful eviction, libel, and defamation of character. The personal

liability umbrella policy might also include protection against excess

judgments of third parties with regard to the operation of a motor vehicle.

Therefore, umbrella policies attach generally to the insured, whereas private

passenger motor vehicle liability insurance policies attach to the motor

vehicle and protect against injuries and/or damages resulting from the

operation of the motor vehicle.

Additionally, a motor vehicle liability insurance policy is a type of primary

policy that is required in the State. For example, as explained by one scholar,

“an individual’s automobile liability and homeowner’s policies are [types of]

primary insurance policies.” Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An

Overview of General Principles and Current Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715,

716 (1989). Primary policies of motor vehicle liability insurance “attach

immediately upon the happening of the occurrence giving rise to liability,”

and have been required with a mandated minimum amount of coverage since

the General Assembly revised the State’s automobile insurance laws in

1972

[

]

. . . .

By contrast, an umbrella policy is a supplemental form of insurance that is

distinguishable from more specific primary policies, such as motor vehicle

liability insurance or homeowner’s insurance. For example, Black’s Law

Dictionary defines an “umbrella policy” as “[a]n insurance policy covering

losses that exceed the basic or usual limits of liability provided by other

policies.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 811 (7th ed.1999). Moreover,

“umbrella insurance” is specifically referred to as “insurance that is

In 1972, the General Assembly enacted legislation requiring motor vehicle liability

insurance for vehicles registered in Maryland. See State Farm, 307 Md. at 635–36.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 17 -

supplemental, providing coverage that exceeds the basic or usual limits of

liability.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (7th ed.1999). Under either

definition, therefore, umbrella policies are described not merely as an

extension of the primary policy, but rather as a distinct and different form of

coverage.

[

]

Stickley II, 431 Md. at 359–61 (some citations and bracketing omitted, emphasis in

original).

We conclude that the phrase “motor vehicle liability coverage or uninsured motor

vehicle coverage” in Courts & Jud. Proc. § 8-506 and the phrase “private passenger motor

vehicle liability insurance” in Ins. § 19-504.1 refer to the same concept, namely, primary

liability insurance policies. The distinction drawn in Stickley II between motor vehicle

liability policies, which “attach” to the insured vehicle, and umbrella policies, which

“attach” to the insured for purposes of Ins. § 19-504.1, appears equally valid for Courts &

Jud. Proc. § 8-506. This points to the conclusion that the latter statute does not apply to

umbrella policies. We will test the validity of this conclusion by considering § 8-506’s

legislative history as well as the interpretive consequences of the parties’ proposed

interpretations. Blue, 434 Md. at 689.

In a footnote, the Court also observed that:

An umbrella policy “generally provides two types of coverage: (1) standard

excess coverage; and (2) broader coverage than is provided by the underlying

insurance.” Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General

Principles and Current Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 718–19 (1989).

Stickley II, 431 Md. at 361 n.5 (ellipses omitted).

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 18 -

5. Legislative history

The legislative history of § 8-506 can only be understood in the context of Maryland’s

evolving doctrine of parent-child immunity.

In contrast to the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity,

whose conceptual

origins were deeply embedded English common law, “[t]here is nothing in the English

decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a personal tort.”

Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64 (1951). The principle that parents should be immune

from tort actions brought by their children originated in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss.

703, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891). The Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine of parent-

child immunity in Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23 (1930). The effect of Schneider

and later cases interpreting it was to “fashion[] a broad reciprocal immunity under which

parents and children could not assert any claim for civil redress” against one another in

Maryland. Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 622 (1994). In Mahnke, the Court held that the

doctrine did not apply in cases in which the defendant (the plaintiff’s father) was “guilty

of such acts [that] he forfeit[ed] his parental authority and privileges, including his

immunity from suit.” 197 Md. at 68. The next significant development for our purposes

The history of interspousal tort immunity in Maryland is summarized in Lusby v.

Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 337–46 (1978). Lusby was the first of a series of decisions by the

Court of Appeals in which the scope of the immunity was incrementally narrowed. This

process culminated in Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 496–97 (2003), in which the Court

abrogated the doctrine in its entirety after characterizing it as “a vestige of the past, whose

time has come and gone.”

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 19 -

came in Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 125-26 (1957), where the Court held that the

doctrine did not bar an action by or against an emancipated child.

In a series of decisions beginning with Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567 (1986) and

culminating in Renko v. McLean, 346 Md 464, 478–81 (1997), the Court of Appeals

considered whether Maryland’s requirement for mandatory motor vehicle liability

insurance required a modification of the parent-child immunity doctrine. In each case, the

Court declined to do so. Although the reasoning in the decisions varied, a recurring theme

was that any modification of parent-child immunity “should ‘be created by the General

Assembly after an examination of appropriate policy considerations in light of the current

statutory scheme.’” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 283 (2003) (quoting Warren,

336 Md. at 627).

In response to the Renko decision, the General Assembly “immediately renewed efforts

to create such an exception by statute.” Kim, 376 Md. at 283. These efforts came to fruition

in 2001, when the General Assembly enacted what was codified as Courts & Jud. Proc.

§ 5-806, which at the time stated (emphasis added):

The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the

parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child, for

wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the

operation of a motor vehicle . . . may not be restricted by the doctrine of

parent-child immunity or by any insurance policy provisions, up to the

mandatory minimum liability coverage levels required by § 17–103(b) of the

Transportation Article.

Kim, 376 Md. at 283.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 20 -

The next development occurred in 2004, when the General Assembly enacted Ins.

§ 19-504.1. In relevant part, that statute requires “that when liability coverage under a

policy of ‘private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance’ exceeds the requirements of

[Transp.] § 17–103, an insurer must offer as part of that policy liability coverage for claims

made by a family member in the same amount as the liability coverage for claims made by

a non-family member under the policy. Stickley I, 204 Md. App. at 684–85.

The effect of the enactment of Ins. § 19-504.1 was that, if an insured opted for coverage

for claims by family members equal to coverage by non-family members in the primary

motor vehicle policies, the insurance coverage in an action between a parent and an

emancipated child was for the policy limit. However, under the then-current version of

Courts & Jud. Proc.§ 8-605, if the action was between a parent and an unemancipated child,

the insurance coverage was limited to the amount of the mandatory minimum coverages

required by Transp. § 17-103.

In the 2005 session of the General Assembly, companion bills (House Bill No. 1081

and Senate Bill No. 683) were introduced to amend § 5-806. Neither bill attracted

opposition and they were approved by wide margins in each house.

Governor Ehrlich

vetoed SB 683 as duplicative and approved HB 1081. Each bill provided that the statute

would be amended as follows: (prior language stricken, new language in italics):

The Senate version passed unanimously and the vote in the house of Delegates was

131 yeas and 2 nays.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 21 -

The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the

parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child, for

wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the

operation of a motor vehicle, as defined in Title 11 of the Transportation

Article, may not be restricted by the doctrine of parent-child immunity or by

any insurance policy provisions, up to the mandatory minimum liability

coverage levels required by § 17–103(b) of the Transportation Article limits

of motor vehicle liability coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage.

Perhaps because of the absence of opposition and virtually unanimous support by both

houses, the legislative history is sparse. It consists of the Senate floor report, which is a

“key legislative history document.” Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 130 (2018);

Daughtry, 248 Md. App. at 622, n.19. In its floor report for HB 1081, the Senate Judicial

Proceedings Committee first noted that the bill was identical to SB 146, and then

summarized the purpose and effect of the then-current version of Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-

806. The Committee stated (emphasis added):

Testimony indicated that the bill would have little or no impact on auto

insurance premiums and would provide equal treatment for minor children

who may have been injured due to the driving negligence of their parents.

Another guide to legislative intent is testimony from a bill’s sponsor. See Blackstone,

461 Md. at 122–23. The sponsor of SB 683 was Senator Rob Garagiola. His written

testimony stated in pertinent part (emphasis added):

Under Maryland Common Law, minor children and their parents are barred

from suing one another. Unlike most common law immunities, which have

been abrogated by judicial decisions, the only change in the parent child

immunity occurred by legislative enactment several years ago.

Under that legislation, which went into effect October 2001, an

unemancipated child may file suit against a parent for injuries caused by the

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 22 -

parent’s negligence in operating a motor vehicle, up to the mandatory

minimum coverage of $20,000, but not above that amount.

• • •

It is clear that to pass SB 683 will have little or no impact on auto insurance

premiums, and will provide equal treatment to our minor children who may

be injured due to the driving negligence of their parents.

The Maryland State Bar Association also supported passage of the legislation. In a

memorandum to the House Judiciary Committee, Richard A. Montgomery III, the MSBA’s

director of legislative relations, referred to Ins. § 19-504.1 and stated that the proposed

legislation “will offer equal treatment to minors who may be injured as a result of their

parents’ actions[.]”

Although it is limited, the relevant legislative history supports our interpretation of the

2005 amendments to § 8-506. And equally to the point, there is nothing in the history that

provides even an iota of support for the proposition that the General Assembly intended

the phrase “any insurance policy provisions, up to the limits of motor vehicle liability

We recognize that “position statements by . . . interest groups are not infallible

guides to the intent of the Legislature.” Hayden v. Maryland Dep’t of Nat. Res., 242 Md.

App. 505, 532 (2019) (citing Jack Schwartz and Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of

Appeals at the Cocktail Party: the Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 MD. L. REV.

432, 463 (1995)). However, such statements can be useful in identifying the problem

confronting the Legislature. Hayden, 242 Md. App. at 533. The MSBA’s statement is

consistent with the other materials in the legislative history because it indicates that the

problem before the General Assembly was the disconnect between insurance coverage for

claims made by adult members of a household (the subject of Ins. § 19-504.1) and the

limitations imposed by the then-existing version of Courts & Jud. Proc. § 8-506.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 23 -

coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage” in the 2005 amendment to include coverage

contained in umbrella policies. See SVF Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy, 459 Md. 632, 653,

(2018) (commenting that when “there is no discussion of [a suggested interpretation of a

statute] in any of the legislative history,” the Court will “refuse to make [the] interpretive

leap” to the conclusion that silence is evidence of the General Assembly’s intent) (emphasis

in original); Warden v. Drabic, 213 Md. 438, 442 (1957) (“We are not at liberty to imagine

an intent [of the Legislature], and bind the letter of the act to that intent[.]”).

6. Consequences of the parties’ proposed interpretations

The final step in our analysis will be to compare the possible consequences of each

party’s proposed interpretation of § 5-806.

Accepting appellants’ reading of the statute would permit unemancipated children to

recover damages up to the combined limits of the primary motor vehicle policy as well as

any umbrella policy. As we have explained, the insurance coverage available to

emancipated children injured by a parent or sibling is limited to the amount of the primary

motor vehicle policy. See Stickley II, 431 Md. at 368. If the General Assembly’s intent in

enacting the 2005 amendment to § 5-806 was to equalize the way that insurance coverages

apply to emancipated and unemancipated members of a household—and it was—it would

be illogical for the Legislature to skew the balance in favor of unemancipated household

members. Interpreting the 2005 amendment to Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-806 in a way that

is consistent with the Court of Appeals’ analysis and holding in Stickley II makes eminent

sense.

— Unreported Opinion —

___________________________________________________________________________

- 24 -

Conclusion

We conclude that Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-806 is ambiguous when read in isolation.

However, when the statute is considered in the context of the statutory scheme of which it

is a part, its meaning becomes clear—the phrase “motor vehicle liability coverage” refers

to a primary motor vehicle liability policy and not to an umbrella policy. Any lingering

doubts as to the Legislature’s intent is laid to rest by a review of the statute’s legislative

history and a consideration of the consequences of accepting appellants’ proposed

interpretation of the statute. Although Helena has our deepest and most profound

sympathies, we cannot interpret § 5-806 in the manner that she seeks.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY

IS AFFIRMED. APPELLANTS TO PAY

COSTS.