WORKING PAPER Bioterrorism and Biocrimes

WORKING PAPER

Bioterrorism and

Biocrimes

The Illicit Use of Biological

Agents Since 1900

W. Seth Carus

August 1998

(February 2001 Revision)

Center for Counterproliferation Research

National Defense University

Washington, D.C.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied

within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the

views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any

other U.S. Government agency.

This study documents numerous instances in which someone claimed

that individuals or groups engaged in criminal conduct. The sources of the

allegations are documented in the text. Every effort has been made to

distinguish between instances in which the alleged conduct led to criminal

convictions and those that were never authoritatively proven.

This is a work in progress. The author welcomes comments,

especially those that correct errors, identify additional cases for research, or

identify additional sources of information on any of the existing cases.

Because additional research can change conclusions based on this data, the

author encourages readers to contact him before they use of any of the data

discussed in this manuscript. Please direct comments to the following

address:

Dr. W. Seth Carus

Center for Counterproliferation Research

National Defense University

Fort McNair, Building 62, Room 211

Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

Voice: 202-685-2242

Fax: 202-685-2264

E-mail: [email protected]

iii

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................................................................III

PREFACE..............................................................................................................................................V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................................VII

PART I: BIOTERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE............................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 3

What is Bioterrorism?.................................................................................................................... 3

Studying Bioterrorism .................................................................................................................... 4

CHAPTER 2 : THE PRACTICE................................................................................................................ 7

Experience of Bioterrorism............................................................................................................ 7

Trends in Bioterrorism................................................................................................................. 10

Acquiring Biological Agents ........................................................................................................ 12

Employing Biological Agents....................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER 3 : THE PRACTITIONERS .................................................................................................... 25

Nature of the Perpetrators ........................................................................................................... 25

Terrorist Group Characteristics .................................................................................................. 27

Operational Considerations......................................................................................................... 31

PART II: CASES................................................................................................................................. 33

CHAPTER 4 : CASE DEFINITION ......................................................................................................... 35

Sources of information ................................................................................................................. 37

Assessing the data ........................................................................................................................ 38

Organization of cases................................................................................................................... 39

CHAPTER 5 : USE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS....................................................................................... 42

Confirmed Use.............................................................................................................................. 42

Probable or Possible Use............................................................................................................. 76

CHAPTER 6 : THREATENED USE ........................................................................................................ 95

Threatened Use (Probable or Known Possession)....................................................................... 95

Threatened Use (No Known Possession) ................................................................................... 104

Threatened Use (Anthrax Hoaxes)............................................................................................. 122

CHAPTER 7 : POSSESSION................................................................................................................ 151

Confirmed Possession ................................................................................................................ 151

Probable or Possible Possession ............................................................................................... 154

CHAPTER 8 : OTHER........................................................................................................................ 161

Possible Interest in Acquisition (No Known Possession)........................................................... 161

False cases and hoaxes .............................................................................................................. 167

APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES .................................................................................................... 179

SOURCES.......................................................................................................................................... 199

INDEX .............................................................................................................................................. 205

ABOUT THE AUTHOR....................................................................................................................... 209

Preface

This is the eighth revision of a working paper on biological terrorism first released in August 1998.

The last version was released in April 2000. As with the earlier versions, it is an interim product of the research

conducted by the author into biological terrorism at the National Defense University’s Center for

Counterproliferation Research. It incorporates new cases identified through December 31, 2000, as well as a

considerable amount of new material on older cases acquired since publication of the previous revision.

The working paper is divided into two main parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the illicit

use of biological agents by criminals and terrorists. It draws on a series of case studies documented in the

second part. The case studies describe every instance identifiable in open source materials in which a

perpetrator used, acquired, or threatened to use a biological agent. While the inventory of cases is clearly

incomplete, it provides an empirical basis for addressing a number of important questions relating to both

biocrimes and bioterrorism. This material should enable policymakers concerned with bioterrorism to make

more informed decisions.

In the course of this project, the author has researched over 270 alleged cases involving biological

agents. This includes all incidents found in open sources that allegedly occurred during the 20

Century. While

the list is certainly not complete, it provides the most comprehensive existing unclassified coverage of

instances of illicit use of biological agents. Research into the cases is ongoing, and additional information will

be incorporated as further information is uncovered.

vii

Acknowledgements

This working paper could not have been prepared without the assistance of a large number Most

important were my colleagues at the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense

University. Ambassador Robert Joseph, director of the Center when the bulk of the work was conducted,

provided the author with the opportunity to work at the Center, which provided the time needed to research and

write this manuscript. He showed extraordinary forbearance and support for this project. In addition, his

careful editing substantially strengthened the manuscript.

Writing this study would have been impossible without the expert guidance provided by many people

who took the time to explain the arcana of biological warfare. To all of them, I express my appreciation. In

particular, I have benefited from the willingness of several people who have had first hand experience in the

development of biological agents to spend time explaining the esoteric art of biological warfare. This includes

the late Thomas Dashiell, William J. Patrick III, and Ken Alibek.

Detailed research into two of the bioterrorism incidents was supported in part by Jonathan Tucker and

the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Case studies based on that research were published in Jonathan

B. Tucker, editor, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Agents (Cambridge,

Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). In addition, the author benefited considerably from interactions with his

fellow authors, although the conclusions reached here sometimes differ from theirs.

The author is grateful for the assistance provided by the staff of the National Defense University

Library. In particular, the author is indebted to Jeannemarie Faison, Lorna Dodt, and Bruce Thornlow for their

expertise in performing electronic searches. Especially appreciated is the expert assistance of Katrina Elledge

provided valuable research assistance while serving as an intern at the Counterproliferation Center.

A considerable number of people have provided useful suggestions that corrected errors and otherwise

improved the manuscript. My thanks to Kathleen Bailey, Ph.D., Gordon Burck, LTC George W. Christopher,

USAF, MC, Joseph Goldberg, Ph.D., Ambassador Read Hanmer, Dave Huxsoll, D.V.M., Ph.D., Noreen A.

Hynes, M.D., M.P.H., Ambassador Robert Joseph, Ph.D., Shellie A. Kolavic, DDS, Cornelius G. McWright,

Ph.D., Dennis Perrotta, Ph.D., and Brad Roberts, Ph.D. I am indebted to them all. Any remaining errors are the

fault of the author.

Finally, the research and writing of this study was guided in many ways, more than she may realize,

by the sage advice and expert assistance of my wife, Noreen.

viii

PART I:

BIOTERRORISM IN

PERSPECTIVE

Chapter 1:

Introduction

During the past five years, the threat of bioterrorism has become a subject of widespread concern.

Journalists, academics, and policy analysts have considered the subject, and in most cases found much to alarm

them. Most significantly, it has captured the attention of policy makers at all levels of government in the

United States. Unfortunately, bioterrorism remains a poorly understood subject. Many policymakers and policy

analysts present apocalyptic visions of the threat, contending that it is only a matter of time before some

terrorist uses biological agents to cause mass casualties. In contrast, other analysts argue that the empirical

record provides no basis for concern, and thus largely dismiss the potential threat.

Neither approach is helpful. Imagining catastrophic threats inevitably leads to a requirement for

impossibly large response capabilities. In contrast, denying the potential danger altogether leads to the kind of

tunnel vision that led U.S. intelligence officials to totally ignore the emergence of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan,

despite its overtly hostile attitude towards the United States. This study takes an intermediate course. It

provides empirical evidence to support the views of those who argue that biological agents are difficult to use.

It also provides abundant evidence that some people have desired to inflict mass casualties on innocent

populations through employment of biological agents. Fortunately, these accounts also suggest that such

people lacked the capability to follow through with their plans. The research also casts considerable doubt on

our ability to predict which biological agents a perpetrator might employ. While some analysts assume that

terrorists will use those agents that proved of most interest to state weapons programs, bioterrorists and

biocriminals have acquired and used agents of little or no value as weapons of war. Ultimately, the evidence

supports the view that bioterrorism is a low probability, potentially high consequence event.

What is Bioterrorism?

There is no commonly accepted definition of bioterrorism. For purposes of this study, bioterrorism is

assumed to involve the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or groups motivated by political,

religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives. This definition, which emerged from the research

recorded in this volume, differs in several significant ways from many of the widely accepted definitions of

terrorism. Official definitions of terrorism generally emphasize that terrorism is intended to intimidate

governments or societies.

In essence, the core of terrorism is the ability to terrorize. The definition of

bioterrorism adopted here does not require such a motivation, although it also does not exclude it. A definition

that focuses on political intimidation fails to capture two significant motivations for bioterrorism.

First, some terrorists are attracted to biological weapons because they understand that pathogens could

cause mass casualties on an unprecedented scale. Official definitions appear to exclude groups with

apocalyptic visions who are uninterested in influencing governments and seek instead to inflict mass casualties.

Traditional terrorists use violence as a means to an end. In contrast, proponents of catastrophic terrorism view

mass killing as the desired end. Groups of this type are not common, yet they do exist.

Second, other terrorists are attracted to unique features of bioterrorism that have nothing to do with

the intended psychological impact of biological weapons use. They see biological agents as a tool for achieving

specialized objectives not necessarily intended to directly influence government actions. Virtually all

bioterrorists seek to keep their use of biological agents a secret, because in many instances success depended

on the lack of appreciation that a disease outbreak was intentional.

A bioterrorist can include any non-state actor who uses or threatens to use biological agents on behalf

of a political, religious, ecological, or other ideological cause without reference to its moral or political justice.

There are multiple definitions of terrorism. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or

threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally

political, religious, or ideological.” See Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as found at

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. In contrast, the FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or

property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social

objectives.” See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1995, as found at http://www.fbi.gov.

This includes non-state actors who operate in organized military units (as with guerillas) if biological agent use

was undertaken with covert, improvised delivery means.

Studying Bioterrorism

Despite all the attention devoted to bioterrorism, it remains surprisingly misunderstood. In part, this

reflects a lack of information about bioterrorism. Relatively little effort was devoted to its study, and the focus

of the small literature on the subject was largely theoretical.

Virtually nothing was written about past

examples of bioterrorism. Indeed, the first unclassified effort to systematically identify all bioterrorism

incidents was not conducted until 1995.

Given this apparent lack of interest, it is perhaps not surprising that

the first official account of the 1984 use of biological agents by the Rajneeshees was published only in 1997.

In the late 1990s, the gaps in our understanding of past terrorist interest in biological agents have been reduced

by several initiatives to explore the history of bioterrorism. The Monterey Institute for International Studies has

played a significant role in this process. It has created a comprehensive database of chemical and biological

terrorism incidents and has sponsored teams of scholars who have produced detailed case studies analyzing

terrorist resort to chemical and biological weapons.

In addition, several researchers have examined specific

instances of bioterrorism.

Study objectives

This volume reflects the result of a study initiated in early 1997 to address the lack of information

about bioterrorism. Part I provides a descriptive analysis of what is known about past instances of bioterrorism,

based on the comprehensive survey of all known bioterrorism incidents provided in Part II. Each of the

incidents included in Part II is described to the extent possible with the available information. In addition, the

data provided in this volume provides some insights useful for the debates about bioterrorism that erupted in

the late 1990s. In particular, it provides some insight into possible motivations for resort to bioterrorism and

the technical hurdles that face anyone attempting to use biological agents.

The result is a description and analysis of 54 alleged terrorist cases. The quality of the available

information, however, is such that only 27 of the cases can be substantiated.

Because it was clear that it would

be possible to identify few confirmed cases involving terrorist groups, the research included other types of

perpetrators, including criminals and covert use by governments.

These inclusions led to the addition of 82

criminal cases, of which there was confirmation on 56, and 113 cases where the perpetrators cannot be

characterized clearly as either criminals or terrorists (only 97 confirmed). Almost all of the confirmed cases

where a perpetrator cannot be identified are anthrax hoaxes. Most of these cases probably would be classified

as criminal incidents if more information about the perpetrators were available.

In addition, 20 of the cases

Among the past studies of bioterrorism are Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A

Discussion of Possibilities, RAND report R-3771-AFMIC, December 1989, p. 8, Jessica Eve Stern, “Will Terrorists Turn to Poison?,”

Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 393-410, and Raymond Allan Zilinskas, “Terrorism and Biological Weapons: Inevitable

Alliance?,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Autumn 1990), pp. 44-72. See also the essays in Brad Roberts, editor,

Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons (Alexandria, Virginia: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997).

The major exception was the survey of bioterrorism incidents by Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat

According to the Open Literature, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995.

Thomas J. Török, et al., “A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination of Restaurant

Salad Bars,” JAMA, August 6, 1997, pp. 389-395.

The case studies are contained in Jonathan B. Tucker, editor, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and

Biological Agents (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). They provide a more detailed look at several of the cases included in this

volume. However, the conclusions in this volume sometimes differ from those of the authors of the Toxic Terror case studies..

The criteria for inclusion are discussed in Chapter 4, while the individual cases are described in Chapters 5 through 8. The

cases are listed in Appendix A.

Criminals are distinguished from terrorists by motivation and objective. Criminals are motivated by objectives such as

personal revenge or financial gain. They may be driven by psychological pathologies. They do not have larger ideological objectives.

In some instances, it is difficult to determine if perpetrators were motivated by political or criminal motivations. Several

perpetrators who tried to extort money from governments also made political demands. Since such political demands could have been a

cover for financial motivations, when little is known about the perpetrator’s true objectives it is impossible to determine whether an

incident should be considered terrorist or criminal. Some widely reported cases fall into this category. For example, Thomas Lavy, a

survivalist living in Arkansas, was arrested in 1995 on charges related to the possession of the toxin ricin. His motivations for acquiring the

ricin were never clarified before he committed suicide. Nor is it clear why Larry Wayne Harris purchased Yersinia pestis, the organism that

causes plague. Although Harris had links to white supremacist groups, including the Aryan Nation and the Christian Identity movement, he

involve allegations of covert state activities, although the evidence is compelling in only 11 of then. In all, 269

cases were researched involving allegations that terrorists, criminals, or covert state operators used, acquired,

threatened use, or took an interest in biological agents.

Although there are differences between terrorist and criminal uses of biological agents, the

biocriminal faces many of the same obstacles as the bioterrorist. Both must acquire, develop, and employ

biological weapons, so the technical constrains that appear in criminal cases are likely to apply for terrorist

cases. In addition, it is possible that criminal cases will be a leading indicator of possible terrorist interest in

biological agents. Nevertheless, the differences between terrorists and criminals suggest caution needs to be

exercised in extrapolating from the experience of criminals to that of terrorists.

claimed that the cultures were needed to support research on the development of medical treatments for the disease. The law enforcement

investigation uncovered no evidence that he had a more nefarious objective.

Chapter 2:

The Practice

The unique characteristics of biological agents make bioterrorism fundamentally different from other

forms of terrorism. Not only do biological agents differ radically from other weapons available to the terrorist,

but biological weapons also are substantially different from other weapons of mass destruction, such as

chemical and nuclear weapons. Assessing the prospects for bioterrorism requires an appreciation of how

biological agents can be acquired and how they are disseminated. Because terrorists are likely to be confronted

with many of the same obstacles faced by criminals in the acquisition and use of biological agents, both types

of actors are included in this discussion.

Experience of Bioterrorism

A starting point for evaluating the challenge posed by bioterrorism is an examination of the evidence

regarding the extent to which terrorists have used or thought about using biological agents. Some caution must

be exercised in evaluating the empirical data, because it is possible that future patterns will differ significantly

from past patterns of behavior. Hence, the following should be considered in the context of the subsequent

discussion of the factors that might affect the propensity of terrorists to resort to biological weapons.

Bioterrorism or Biocrimes

Interest in biological agents is not confined to groups with known political agendas. Indeed, most

individuals and groups who have used biological agents had traditional criminal motives. Hence, it is essential

to separate the clearly criminal perpetrators from those with political agendas, whether the motive is sectarian,

religious, or ecological. The available evidence, in fact, suggests that the vast majority of cases involve

criminal motives.

Extent of interest

To date, few terrorists have demonstrated an interest in bioterrorism, and fewer still tried to acquire

biological agents. As mentioned previously, open source accounts mention at least 54cases in which a terrorist

group allegedly had an interest in biological agents, but there is little evidence to confirm most of the cases.

Thus, there are only 27 cases in which there is more than minimal evidence that a terrorist group possessed,

attempted to acquire, threatened to use, or expressed interest in biological agents. Even in some of confirmed

cases, there is no way to determine the seriousness of the interest in biological agents. Terrorist groups

apparently acquired biological agents in only eight cases.

Terrorists have used biological agents, but rarely and with relatively little effect. A review of the cases

researched for this study confirms only five groups that used or tried to use biological agents. Although there

may be other examples that have never been publicly identified, only one of these cases is known to have

resulted in harm to people.

Rajneeshees: According to the FBI, there is only one instance in which a terrorist group operating in

the United States actually employed a chemical or biological agent.

This incident took place in September

1984. The perpetrators were members of the Rajneeshee, a religious cult that established a large commune in

Wasco County, a rural area east of Portland, Oregon. The Rajneeshees used Salmonella typhimurium, which

causes salmonellosis or food poisoning, to contaminate restaurant salad bars. An estimated 751 people became

ill because of that attack, including about 45 who were hospitalized. There were no fatalities. This is the only

bioterrorism incident in which human illness has been verified.

Testimony of John P. O’Neill, Supervisory Special Agent, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

p. 238, in Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I.

Aum Shinrikyo: In addition to using sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system, Aum Shinrikyo

produced biological agents and tried to use them. According to press reports, the Japanese police discovered

that the Aum’s membership included skilled scientists and technicians, including some with training in

microbiology. The Aum expressed an interest in several biological agents, allegedly including B. anthracis,

botulinum toxin, C. burnetii (Q-fever), and even Ebola. The Aum tried to disseminate biological agents,

including B. anthracis and botulinum toxin, but there is no evidence that they actually managed to produce any

pathogens or toxins. The group allegedly targeted the U.S. Navy base at Yokosuka in one of its attempted

attacks.

Dark Harvest: This little known group protested the continued anthrax contamination of Gruinard

Island, which is where the British military tested an anthrax bomb during World War Two. The group took

anthrax-contaminated soil, apparently from the island, and dumped it on the grounds of Porton Down, the site

of Britain’s biological and chemical weapons research establishment. The anthrax was in a form that was

highly unlikely to cause harm.

Mau Mau: The British believe that in late 1952 individuals associated with the Mau Mau African

independence movement were responsible for using a plant toxin to poison livestock in what is now Kenya.

The full extent of these activities is not known.

Polish Resistance: Multiple reports suggest that Polish resistance organizations used biological agents

against German forces during the early part of the World War Two. At least one Polish official claimed that

200 Germans were killed in this fashion, but the claim was never confirmed.

Motives for use

The review of cases identifies a number of reasons that led terrorists and criminals to become

interested in biological agents:

Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” New York Times, May 26,

1998, pp. A1, A10, provides the most thorough reporting of Aum’s biological warfare activities. See page 47 for additional details.

Table 1: Confirmed cases of illicit biological agent activity

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/Uncertain Total

Cases

Acquire and Use 5 16 0 21

Acquire 3 7 2 12

Interest 6 4 0 10

Threat/Hoax 13 29 95 137

Total Cases 27 56 97 180

Source: Based on cases reviewed in Part II. A brief explanation for the decision to include or exclude

each specific case is provided in Appendix A.

Mass murder: At least two terrorist groups, motivated by apocalyptic, millenarian visions of creating

a better society, clearly wanted to kill large numbers of people. In principle, such groups also could be

motivated by desires for revenge against a specific political or ethnic group. Steven Pera and Allan Schwander

formed a group, which they called R.I.S.E., with the intention of killing most of the human race so that

mankind could start over again. Aum Shinrikyo also wanted to murder large numbers of people as part of their

efforts to seize control of Japan.

Murder: Several terrorist groups are known to have considered biological agents as weapons to kill

specific individuals. In general, the perceived attractiveness of biological agents results from the belief that the

victim will appear to have died a natural death. The perpetrators hoped that it would prove impossible either to

detect the biological agent (especially if it was a toxin) or to determine that the victim was deliberately infected

(especially if it was a pathogen).

Incapacitation: In at least two instances, the perpetrators wanted to incapacitate large numbers of

people without necessarily killing anyone. According to press accounts, the Weathermen attempted to obtain

biological agents to infect water supplies. They hoped the repressive reaction of the government to such an

incident would radicalize the general population and create additional supporters for their cause. The

Rajneeshees also wanted to incapacitate the citizens of The Dalles, Oregon, so that the people of the

community could not vote in an upcoming election. While the circumstances of that attack are unlikely to

reappear, the case demonstrated that biological agents have utility as mass incapacitants.

Political statement: In one case, the perpetrators used biological agents to make a political statement.

This was the objective of Dark Harvest, a group that apparently was uninterested in causing harm to people or

property, but was willing to “use” of biological agents to send a political message.

Anti-agriculture: This can mean either targeting livestock or crops.

As previously mentioned, the

Mau Mau apparently used a plant toxin to kill cattle as part of a concerted campaign that involved known use

of other poisons, including arsenic. Besides this instance, there are no confirmed cases of threats against

Lester C. Caudle III, “The Biological Warfare Threat,” pp. 459-461, Frederick R. Sidell, et al., Medical Aspects of Chemical

and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1997), provides a summary of the

biological warfare threat to animals and crops.

Table 2: Objectives for using biological agents

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/ Uncertain Total

Cases

Murder 4 17 0 21

Terrorize 6 9 22 37

Extortion 0 13 3 16

Disruption 0 5 0 5

Anti-animal/crops 1 2 0 4

Mass Murder 4 0 0 3

Revenge 0 3 0 3

Incapacitation 2 0 0 2

Political statement 1 0 0 1

Unknown 9 7 72 88

Note: Because some perpetrators had multiple objectives, the totals in this table may

exceed the total number of cases.

agriculture.

Numerous biological agents can be used to target crops and livestock. The viability of the threat

is demonstrated by the efforts by several countries to develop biological agents for use against crops. The

United States Army weaponized several agents for use against crops prior to the 1969 decision to dismantle the

U.S. offensive BW program.

The Soviet Union had a substantial program to agents for use against crops and

animals.

Iraq admits that during the 1980s it was developing at least one biological agent for use against

crops, wheat cover smut, which kills the affected plants.

Criminal motives: An examination of criminal use of biological agents reveals additional motives.

Many of the criminal uses of biological agents involved extortion. Extortion was the motive in about 9 per cent

of the confirmed cases. Generally, the target was a food or grocery company. In only one of these cases is the

perpetrator known to have had the capability to undertake the threatened contamination. There is no

documented case of a terrorist group using biological agents to extort money. However, several unidentified

individuals tied political agendas to extortion plots involving threats of biological weapons use. Many of the

cases appear to involve deliberate efforts to terrorize the victims. In most of these cases, the perpetrator

appeared to want to accomplish nothing more than to make the victims worry about their health. At least one

case, involving the Japanese physician Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki, appears to have been motivated by the desire for

revenge. Suzuki was angry about the treatment he was receiving as a resident in his medical training, and

allegedly retaliated by infecting other health care providers and patients. Suzuki’s motivations are complicated

by suggestions that he may have been creating clinical cases to further his academic research into S. typhi.

Trends in Bioterrorism

The available evidence indicates that there is an explosion of interest by criminals in biological

agents. Forty of the 56 confirmed criminal cases occurred in the 1990s. Similarly, 19 of 27 confirmed terrorist

cases occurred in the 1990s. This suggests growing interest in biological agents.

The most extensive official

comment on terrorist and criminal interest in biological weapons comes from 1997 testimony given by Director

Louis Freeh. At that time, he made the following observations:

The FBI has also investigated and responded to a number of threats which involved biological

agents and are attributed to various types of groups or individuals. For example, there have been

apocalyptic-type threats which actually advocate destruction of the world through the use of WMD

[weapons of mass destruction]. We have also been made aware of interest in biological agents by

individuals espousing white-supremacist beliefs to achieve social change; individuals engaging in

criminal activity, frequently arising from jealousy or interpersonal conflict; individuals and small

anti-tax groups, and some cult interest. In most cases, threats have been limited in scope and have

targeted individuals rather than groups, facilities, or critical infrastructure. Threats have surfaced

which advocate dissemination of a chemical agent through air ventilation systems. Most have made

little mention of the type of device or delivery system to be employed, and for this reason have

been deemed technically not feasible. Some threats have been validated.

According to 1997 testimony by DCI George Tenet, the intelligence community also has found evidence that

foreign terrorist groups are showing greater interest in biological weapons. “We are increasingly seeing

terrorist groups looking into the feasibility and effectiveness of chemical, biological, and radiological

weapons.”

Overall, the CIA concluded, “The current WMD terrorist threat is considered low but

There are documented instances of chemical contamination of food to prevent sale of agricultural produce. For example,

mercury was injected into oranges exported from Israel in 1978, causing a dramatic reduction in demand for its citrus crop. See Purver,

Chemical and Biological Terrorism, pp. 87-88, for a review of the literature discussing this event.

Specifically, the United States weaponized and stockpiled rice blast, rye stem rust and wheat stem rust. See Table 1 in George

W. Christopher, et al., “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” JAMA, Vol. 278, No. 5 (August 6, 1997), p. 412. The rice blast was

aimed at China, while the other two were targeted at the Soviet Union. For one view on the utility of such attacks, see J.H. Rothschild,

Tomorrow’s Weapons (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 121-131.

Judith Miller, “U.S. to Use Lab for More Study Of Bioterrorism,” New York Times, September 22, 1999, p. A25.

R. A. Zilinskas, “Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?,” JAMA, Vol. 278, No. 5 (August 6, 1997), p. 419.

This conclusion differs significantly from the author’s original views, when it appeared that only three of 12 terrorist cases

took place in the 1990s. New cases and additional research on old cases have resulted in an increase in the number of identified terrorist

cases from three to eight.

Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the United States Senate Appropriations

Committee Hearing on Counterterrorism, May 13, 1997.

United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 8.

increasing.”

In April 1998, Clinton Administration officials reportedly testified during a classified hearing

before the Senate Intelligence Committee that there was a “high degree of likelihood that such an attack would

occur in 10 years.”

There is also reason for concern that future bioterrorism attacks may be more deadly than past

incidents. Three factors account for the change. First, an increasing number of terrorist groups—foreign and

domestic—are adopting the tactic of inflicting mass casualties to achieve ideological, revenge, or “religious”

goals, often hard to understand. If such groups acquired an effective aerosol dissemination capability for

anthrax, for example, they could potentially kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people. The World Trade

Center and Oklahoma City bombings both were conducted by people who had no compunction about mass

killing and, in fact, sought to kill large numbers of civilians.

Second, the technological sophistication of the

terrorist groups is growing. We now know that some terrorists have tried to master the intricacies of aerosol

dissemination of biological agents. Perhaps more disturbing for the future, some terrorists might gain access to

the expertise generated by a state-directed biological warfare program. Finally, Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated

that terrorist groups now exist with resources comparable to some governments. Therefore, it is seems

increasingly likely that some group will become capable of using biological agents to cause massive casualties.

United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United

States, p. 94.

As characterized by Senator Carl Levin, reported by “Reno, FBI Head Warn Of Terrorism,” Associated Press, April 23,

1998, 4:44 A.M. feed. The FBI has issued some statistics that appear to indicate a trend towards greater use of nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons. In testimony before the same committee, Louis Freeh reported that the Bureau investigated 114 cases involving

chemical, biological, or other weapons of mass destruction during the last year. See Tim Weiner, “U.S. May Stockpile Medicine for

Terrorist Attack,” New York Times, April 23, 1998.

The significance of that figure is difficult to interpret. The Department of Defense defines a weapon of mass destruction to

include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, but the legal definition is different. “The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement

Act of 1994,” defines a WMD to include “any destructive device as defined in section 921” of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. According to

section 921, a destructive device is “any gun with a barrel larger than half an inch, any bomb, any grenade, any “rocket having a propellant

charge of more than four ounces.” In other words, to the FBI, a weapon of mass destruction is basically any destructive device, including a

great many that clearly cannot cause mass destruction and that have nothing to do with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Nevertheless, the Director’s statement apparently refers only to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons cases.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), pp. 92-94.

Table 3: Trends in bioagent cases

Terrorist Criminal Other/

Uncertain

Total

1990-1999 19 40 94 153

1980-1989 3 6 0 9

1970-1979 3 2 3 8

1960-1969 0 1 0 1

1950-1959 1 0 0 1

1940-1949 1 0 0 1

1930-1939 0 3 0 3

1920-1929 0 0 0 0

1910-1919 0 3 0 3

1900-1909 0 1 0 1

Totals 27 56 97 180

Acquiring Biological Agents

Biological agents are organisms or toxins produced by organisms that can be used against people,

animals, or crops. In contrast, chemical agents, poisonous substances that can kill or incapacitate, are man-

made materials.

Pathogens: Pathogens are naturally occurring microorganisms that cause disease. There are hundreds

of pathogens, including bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites. Among the pathogens often mentioned as

potential biological agents are Bacillus anthracis, the organism that causes anthrax, and Yersinia pestis, the

organism that causes plague.

Because pathogens are living organisms, they are self-replicating. Exposure to

even a small number of organisms can produce severe symptoms or even death. Thus, it is believed that the

for pneumonic plague is fewer than 100 Y. pestis organisms, while 8-10,000 B. anthracis spores will cause

inhalation anthrax.

Only some pathogens are transmissible from person to person. For example, someone suffering from

pneumonic plague can transmit Y. pestis organisms to others, creating a serious risk of epidemic spread. In

contrast, bubonic plague is communicable generally only if someone is exposed to pus from an infected

There is no standard definition of a biological agent. The definition used here follows the definition in Frederick R. Sidell and

David R. Franz, “Overview: Defense Against the Effects of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents,” pp. 4-5, in Frederick R. Sidell, et

al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army,

1997): “Biological agents are either replicating agents (bacteria or viruses) or nonreplicating materials (toxins or physiologically active

proteins or peptides) that can be produced by living organisms. Some of the nonreplicating biological agents can also be produced through

either chemical synthesis, solid-phase protein synthesis, or recombinant expression methods.”

The Department of Defense officially defines a biological agent as “a microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or

animals or causes the deterioration of materiel.” It separately defines a toxin agent as “a poison formed as a specific secretion product in

the metabolism of a vegetable or animal organism as distinguished from inorganic poisons. Such poisons can also be manufactured by

synthetic processes.” See Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as found at

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. A slightly different definition of toxins was offered in Medical Management of Biological

Casualties (Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, March 1996), p. 75: “Toxins

are defined as any toxic substance of natural origin produced by an animal, plant, or microbe. They are different from chemical agents such

as VX, cyanide, or mustard in that they are not man-made.”

The Biological Weapons Convention provides no specific definition. Article I requires adherents not to “develop, produce,

stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of

types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” Thus, the convention really

provides little guidance as to what is prohibited.

There is considerable misunderstanding of biological agents. In February 1998, federal officials alleged that some

perpetrators had “military grade anthrax”, a meaningless statement. There are many different strains of B. anthracis, but there is no

uniquely “military” type. Rather, biological agents used in biological weapons have been strains of naturally occurring organisms.

Similarly, there is considerable confusion about plague. Y. pestis, the plague bacillus, causes several different diseases, including bubonic

plague and pneumonic plague, but there is no bubonic plague or pneumonic plague organism.

The ID

is the dose (D) at which 50 per cent of those exposed will become infected (I). The LD

is the dose (D) that is lethal

(L) to 50 per cent of those exposed. With some diseases, the ID

might be identical to the LD

. The figures are from Medical

Management of Biological Casualties, Appendix.

According to one estimate, there are 10

B. anthracis spores (or 10 billion) in a milligram, which is one-thousandths of a gram

or one-millionth of a kilogram. Thus, a milligram contains roughly one million infective doses. Because the agent cannot be disseminated

perfectly, it could not infect anywhere near that number of people. According to one estimate, the accidental release of B. anthracis spores

from the Soviet biological weapons facility at Sverdlovsk killed at least 66 people and involved somewhere between a few milligrams and

a gram of agent. It appears that 1-3 per cent of those in the area covered by the B. anthracis cloud died. Thus, if only 6 milligrams were

disseminated, the agent cloud would have contained at least 6 million lethal doses, which is nearly 100,000 times the number of people

who actually died. See Matthew Meselson, Jeanne Guillemin, Martin Hugh-Jones, Alexander Langmuir, Ilona Popova, Alexis Shelokov,

and Olga Yampolskaya, “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” Science, Volume 266, Number 5188 (November 18, 1995), pp.

1202-1208. See also, Matthew Meselson, “Note Regarding Source Strength,” November 21, 1994.

Estimates of LD

should be treated cautiously. Generally, they are based on extrapolation of animal data. A recent review of

the published anthrax research reached the following conclusion on the susceptibility of humans to infection from anthrax.

The data available on human exposure to B. anthracis spores do not allow us to establish the minimum critical

dose required to establish any of the forms of the disease. From the information available, it can be said that

man appears to be moderately resistant to anthrax. It is crucial to note that any critical dose will depend very

heavily on the strain of B. anthracis, particularly the presence of the virulence factors, and on the health of the

individual host.

See A. Watson and D. Keir, “Information on which to base assessments of risk from environments contaminated with anthrax spores,”

Epidemiology and Infection, 113(1994), pp. 479-490.

person. Anthrax is not contagious, and only those exposed to the released B. anthracis spores are likely to

become infected.

Pathogens require an incubation period before symptoms of infection appear. For some diseases, the

incubation period is only a few days, while for others it might be several weeks. Typically, 3-5 days pass

before the acute symptoms of inhalation anthrax appear, while for Q fever (caused by the Coxiella burnetii

organism) the incubation period is two to three weeks, depending on the size of the dose.

Toxins: Toxins are poisonous chemicals produced by living organisms. Among the best known are

botulinum toxin, which is produced by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum, and ricin, which is extracted from

the seed of the castor bean plant. Unlike pathogens, toxins are not self-replicating, so their physical effects are

solely a result of the agent released.

While toxins share many characteristics with chemical agents, they also have some significant

differences.

Many toxins are more toxic than the most lethal of chemical agents. Thus, the LD

for botulinum

toxin when injected is 0.001 micrograms per kilogram of body weight. In contrast, VX, perhaps the most lethal

of the chemical agents, has an LD

of 15 micrograms per kilogram of bodyweight.

Toxins are not volatile,

unlike many chemical agents, and thus do not naturally generate a persistent threat. Generally, toxins are not

dermally active, meaning that contact with the skin is insufficient to produce disease. Rather, the agent must be

brought into the body, either by ingestion, inhalation, or through an opening in the skin.

The quantity of toxin required to achieve a desired effect is dependent on the lethality of the agent.

According to one estimate, eight tons of ricin would be needed to blanket an area to achieve the same effect

accomplished using only eight kilograms of botulinum toxin. For many toxins, the quantities of agent required

to produce a given effect are similar in size to that for the more lethal chemical agents.

Sources of agent

Only 33 of non-state cases involved actual acquisition of agent. Four different methods were used:

purchase from legitimate suppliers, theft, self-production, and use of material of natural origin contaminated

with biological agents. The data on acquisition routes are summarized in Table 4.

Gaining access to biological agents never appears to have been a significant limiting factor. In fact,

acquiring biological agents has usually proven to be relatively easy. In a few cases, pathogens were acquired

from culture collections, usually legitimately but sometimes not, while the perpetrators usually produced

toxins. Culture collections were a preferred source for pathogens even when the terrorists or criminals

possessed the skills to culture organisms acquired in nature. Reliance on such collections may be a result of the

relative ease with which the cultures can be obtained. Alternatively, perpetrators may prefer to obtain cultures

from standardized sources to ensure purity and avoid cross-contamination of cultures with unwanted

organisms. In addition, the effectiveness of biological agents depends heavily on the specific strain of the

organism, and it may be difficult to acquire the more dangerous strains relying on natural sources.

Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Disease Manual, 16

edition (Washington, DC: American Public

Health Association, 1995), pp. 20, 355.

Benenson, Control of Communicable Disease Manual, pp. 19, 380. Note, however, that in Sverdlovsk the incubation period

was 4 to 43 days and that a 9 to 10 day period was most common. See Meselson, et al., “The Sverdlovsk Outbreak of 1979,” pp. 1206-

1207.

A useful comparison of chemical and toxin agents is provided by David R. Franz, “Defense Against Toxin Weapons,” pp.

604-608, in Sidell, et al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

Medical Management of Biological Casualties, Table 1, Appendix. At least one authority argues that the LD

is significantly

greater than commonly reported. According to William Patrick, who developed biological weapons for the U.S. Army in the 1950s and

1960s, the LD

for botulinum toxin through the inhalation route is 4.88 micrograms (a microgram is one millionth of a gram) for a 70

kilogram man (assuming 50% pure toxin). This translates to about 0.035 micrograms of pure toxin per kilogram of body weight, not 0.001

micrograms as usually reported. See Frederick R. Sidell, William C. Patrick, III, and Thomas R. Dashiell, Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook

(Alexandria, Virginia: Jan’s Information Group, 1998), p. 179, and William C. Patrick III, “Potential Incident Scenarios,” p. I-60, in

Proceedings of the Seminar on Responding to the Consequences of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, July 11-14, 1995, sponsored by

the U.S. Public Health Service, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, Bethesda,

Maryland. Other authorities cite a figure of 0.003 micrograms per kilogram of body weight for inhaled botulinum toxin. See John L.

Middlebrook and David R. Franz, “Botulinum Toxin,” p. 647, in Sidell, et al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

At least one class of toxins, mycotoxins (the substances allegedly involved with the “yellow rain” attacks in Southeast Asia),

pose a dermal hazard because they can penetrate the skin. See Medical Management of Biological Casualties, pp. 75 and 100, and Robert

W. Wannemacher, Jr., and Stanley L. Weiner, “Tricothecene Mycotoxins,” pp. 658-659, in Medical Management of Biological Casualties.

Figure 30-1 in Franz, “Defense Against Toxin Weapons,” p. 606, in Sidell, et al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and

Biological Warfare.

Despite efforts to restrict the illicit acquisition of biological agents, it is likely that terrorists and

criminals will be able to obtain the agent that they want when they want it. If unable to acquire from a

legitimate culture collection or a medical supply company, they can steal it from a laboratory. If unable to steal

it, a group with the right expertise could culture the agent from samples obtained in nature. Many biological

agents are endemic, and a skilled microbiologist would have little difficulty culturing an agent from material

taken from nature.

Culture Collections: In 11 of the 33 cases involving acquisition, the non-state actors obtained

biological agents or toxins from legitimate suppliers. The American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) was the

source of the agent in at least two cases. Larry Wayne Harris obtained Y. pestis, while Kevin Birch and James

Cahoon acquired Clostridium botulinum and Clostridium tetani from this source. Benoyendra Chandra Pandey

obtained the Y. pestis from the stocks of a medical research institute that he used to murder his brother, but

only after several failed attempts to obtain it illicitly from the same source. The Rajneeshees purchased their

seed stock of Salmonella typhimurium from a medical supply company. Significantly, another group could do

the same today under current regulations, because the organism involved is not on any control list.

In any

case, the Rajneeshees had a state certified clinical laboratory, which gave them a legitimate reason to acquire

agents like the one that they used.

Theft: In four cases of the 33 cases involving acquisition, the perpetrators acquired their biological

agents by stealing them from research or medical laboratories. Almost all of the thefts involved people who

had legitimate access to the facilities where the biological agents were kept. J.A. Kranz, a graduate student in

parasitology, took the Ascaris suum eggs that he used against his roommates from the collections in the

university laboratory where he studied. Law enforcement officials believe that a laboratory technician removed

the Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 used to infect hospital laboratory technicians from the culture collection of the

hospital where she worked. Similarly, Dr. Suzuki stole S. typhi cultures from the Japanese National Institute of

Health, and reportedly used those cultures in preference to the ones he cultured himself from specimens taken

from typhoid patients. In only one of the reported incidents was an attempt made to infiltrate a laboratory to

steal a biological agent. It is alleged that the Weathermen group attempted to suborn an employee at the U.S.

military research facility at Ft. Detrick in order to obtain pathogens.

Self-manufacture: In six of the cases involving acquisition, the perpetrators manufactured the agent

themselves. In every reported case, the perpetrators produced ricin toxin by extracting it from castor beans. The

Minnesota Patriots Council, which produced a small quantity of ricin toxin, made it from a recipe found in a

book. In contrast, there were no successful attempts to grow C. botulinum to produce botulinum toxin.

Several readily available “how-to” manuals purport to describe techniques for producing botulinum

toxin or extracting ricin from castor beans. A considerable number of perpetrators have used The Poisoner’s

Handbook and Silent Death. Maynard Campbell’s Catalogue of Silent Tools of Justice, which is apparently no

The United States has implemented regulations that control the transfer of biological agents on a control list.

Table 4: Acquisition of biological agents

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/ Uncertain Total

Instances

Legitimate supplier 1 9 1 11

Theft 1 3 0 4

Self-manufactured 1 4 1 6

Natural source 2 4 0 6

Unknown 3 3 0 6

Total instances 8 23 2 33

Note: This table reflects the predominant method of acquisition; some individuals or groups

acquired agent through multiple paths.

longer in print, was used by the Minnesota Patriots Council in their ricin production. Long before the Internet,

perpetrators found it easy to obtain information about biological agents.

Natural: In six cases involving acquisition the biological agent was obtained from a natural reservoir

and transmitted without any processing. Some perpetrators apparently used castor beans, the seed containing

ricin, to poison people without attempting to extract the ricin from the bean. Similarly, in several cases the

perpetrators injected the victims with HIV-contaminated blood.

Types of agent actually acquired

Terrorists and criminals have shown an interest in both pathogens and toxins. In 129 of the 150 non-

state cases, the perpetrators threatened to use or considered pathogens. Note that few of these cases involved

actual possession. Some perpetrators considered multiple pathogens. In one instance, at least seven different

pathogens were involved.

Terrorists and criminals may not use the same agents as those selected by military biological weapons

programs. A comparison between the biological agents commonly considered suitable for military use and

those actually adopted by the perpetrators of the cases studied here is shown in Table 6. The objectives of the

terrorists will influence the selection of an agent, as will agent availability and the resources at the disposal of

the group for producing and disseminating the agent. This may lead to selection of unusual agents not

associated with state-sponsored biological weapons programs. Fortunately, many of the alternative agents are

unlikely to result in mass fatalities, even if they affect large numbers of people.

Bacterial agents: Approximately 125 of the cases focused on bacterial agents. B. anthracis appears

most often, and is associated with at least 113 cases, largely due to the growing popularity of anthrax threats.

Note that only three of cases involved possession of anthrax. Aum Shinrikyo may have had a stolen vaccine

anthrax strain incapable of causing harm to humans. Dark Harvest had anthrax-contaminated soil, but never

possessed the agent in a form likely to cause harm to people. Finally, the Polish Resistance apparently used

cultures stolen from laboratories with legitimate uses for the organism. Yersinia pestis, S. typhi, and Shigella

dysenteriae strains appear several times, while seven other pathogens appear no more than once.

Viral agents: Few perpetrators have considered viral agents, except when they can use it in a natural

state. HIV appears in 15 cases, including at least four murder cases. Six of the HIV cases involved extortion

threats in which in which there is no evidence of actual possession. In one case, the perpetrators employed a

viral agent, rabbit hemorrhagic disease.

Other pathogens: In only one case involved use of a parasite. In that case, the perpetrator

contaminated food with Ascaris suum, a worm that infects pigs and does not normally infect humans.

Toxins: In 27 of the 180 non-state cases, the perpetrators considered toxins. Ricin was considered in

14 cases. The next most common choice was botulinum toxin, which was an agent of choice in 9 cases.

Significantly, there is no reported example of successful production of botulinum toxin, despite claims that it is

easy to produce.

Other toxins include tetrodotoxin, an unknown mushroom poison, and an unspecified snake

toxin. In most cases, only a single toxin was involved. In one case, a group of murderers acquired the toxins

produced by Corynebacterium diphtheria and Vibrio cholerae.

Uncle Fester, Silent Death, Revised and Expanded 2

Edition (Port Townsend, Washington: Loompanics Unlimited, 1997),

pp. 93-106.

Table 5: Type of agent involved

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/ Uncertain Total

Cases

Pathogen 15 38 83 136

Toxin 9 15 2 26

Unknown 4 1 1 6

Note: Because some perpetrators considered multiple agents, the totals in this table

exceed the total number of cases.

Combinations: In six cases, the perpetrators considered use of both pathogens and toxins. In three of

the cases, the perpetrator was interested in both B. anthracis and botulinum toxin. In another case, the

perpetrators thought about HIV and tetanus in addition to both B. anthracis and botulinum toxin. The last two

cases involved combinations that are more unusual: tetanus and botulinum toxin in one case, and S. typhi and

an unknown mushroom poison in another instance. In only two of these cases did the perpetrator acquire a

viable biological agent.

Employing Biological Agents

A biological agent is not necessarily a biological weapon. Only if there is a mechanism for spreading

the agent is it transformed into a weapon. Thus, a pathogen growing on a petri dish is not a weapon, or even a

threat, because it is unlikely to infect anyone. In some cases, the release method need not be very sophisticated.

If the agent is highly contagious, infecting a single person or animal may be sufficient to start an epidemic.

Disseminating biological agents in theory

When the agent is not contagious, as with many pathogens and all toxins, it is necessary to have a

dissemination mechanism that spreads the agent to the intended target. While it is possible to infect people by

injecting them one by one with biological agents, such a method is unlikely to prove attractive to most

Table 6: Biological agents involved

Traditional Biological Warfare

Agents

Agents associated with biocrimes

and bioterrorism

Pathogens Bacillus anthracis*

Brucella suis

Coxiella burnetii*

Francisella tularensis

Smallpox

Viral encephalitides

Viral hemorrhagic fevers*

Yersinia pestis*

Ascaris suum.

Bacillus anthracis*

Coxiella burnetii*

Giardia lamblia

HIV

Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus)

Salmonella typhimurium

Salmonella paratyphi

Salmonella typhi

Shigella species

Schistosoma species

Vibrio cholerae

Viral hemorrhagic fevers

(Ebola)*

Yellow fever virus

Yersinia enterocolitica

Yersinia pestis*

Toxins Botulinum*

Ricin*

Staphylococcal enterotoxin B

Botulinum*

Cholera endotoxin

Diphtheria toxin

Nicotine

Ricin*

Snake toxin

Tetrodotoxin

Anti-crop agents Rice blast

Rye stem rust

Wheat stem rust

* These agents appear in both lists.

terrorists. More likely, a terrorist will seek a technique to infect the entire target, whether people, livestock, or

crops, at one time.

Aerosol dissemination: Of greatest concern is the possibility that a terrorist might disseminate

biological agents as an aerosol cloud. In the context of biological warfare, the aerosol cloud should consist of

particles of 1-5 microns (one-millionth of a meter) in size. Particles much larger than 5 microns do not

penetrate into the lungs, since they are filtered out by the upper respiratory tract. In addition, they tend to settle

out of the air relatively quickly. In contrast, smaller particles do not remain in the lungs, but tend to be breathed

out.

Several considerations account for the concern about aerosol delivery. Many diseases are most

dangerous when contracted in this fashion. Thus, cutaneous anthrax, which is contracted through the skin, has

a case fatality rate of 5 to 20 per cent, though antibiotic treatment is highly effective. In contrast, inhalation

anthrax is usually fatal, and if not detected early there is no effective treatment. Similarly, Y. pestis is

responsible for substantially different diseases, including both bubonic and pneumonic plague. Bubonic plague,

generally acquired from the bite of an infected flea, has a case fatality rate of 50 to 60 per cent if untreated, but

generally responds to medical treatment. Pneumonic plague is also generally fatal if untreated. Early treatment

is essential to save those infected. Pneumonic plague is considered highly contagious, while bubonic plague is

not.

Aerosol transmission also makes it possible to spread biological agents over a large area and thus

affect a large number of people in one attack. The Office of Technology Assessment calculated that 100

kilograms of anthrax spread over Washington could kill from one to three million people if disseminated

effectively under the right environmental conditions. In contrast, a one-megaton nuclear warhead would kill

Edward M. Eitzen, “Use of Biological Weapons,” p. 440, in Sidell, et al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological

Warfare.

Benenson, Control of Communicable Disease Manual, pp. 18-19, 353. A recent review of the anthrax threat, however, notes

that the survival data predates the creation of hospital intensive care units, and suggests that more people might survive under

contemporary conditions than usually stated. See James C. Pile, John D. Malone, Edward M. Eitzen, and Arthur M. Friedlander, “Anthrax

as a Potential Biological Warfare Agent,” Archives of Internal Medicine, Vol. 158 (March 9, 1998), pp. 429-434. Significantly, there were

11 identified survivors of inhalation anthrax from the Sverdlovsk release, suggesting a case fatality rate of only 85 per cent.

Table 7: Biological Agent Attack on City of 1,000,000 people

Disease Caused by Agent Number of People at Risk Deaths Incapacitated

Only

Anthrax 180,000 95,000 30,000

Brucellosis 100,000 400 79,600

Epidemic typhus 100,000 15,000 50,000

Plague 100,000 44,000 36,000

Q fever 180,000 150 124,850

Tularemia 180,000 30,000 95,000

Venezuelan equine encephalitis 60,000 200 19,800

Source: World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1970), pp. 95-99.

The WHO model assumes a city of 1,000,000 people in a developed country, and makes assumptions regarding the population distribution

around a high density urban core that may no longer be appropriate. The model also makes certain assumptions about the agent (50 kilograms of

dried powder containing 6 × 10

organisms disseminated in a line 2 kilometers long at a right angle to the wind direction. The model nominally

illustrates dissemination from an aircraft, but none of the calculations appears to depend on the type of the delivery vehicle involved. As an

example, the model assumes that the Venezuelan equine encephalitis will survive for only about 5-7 minutes, during which time it will travel

about 1 kilometer. About 60,000 people will be exposed to the agent. About 20,000 people will become incapacitated, including 200 who will

die. In contrast, anthrax will survive for more than two hours and will travel for more than 20 kilometers. At least 180,000 people will be exposed

to the agent, including 30,000 who will become incapacitated and 95,000 who will die.

from 750,000 to 1.9 million people.

An alternative set of calculations was prepared for a study by the World

Health Organization (WHO). According to estimates prepared by WHO’s expert panel, 50 kilograms of dry

anthrax used against a city of one million people would kill 36,000 people and incapacitate another 54,000.

Water contamination: Many pathogens that have had a significant impact on human life, such as

Vibrio cholerae (which is the organism responsible for cholera) and Salmonella typhi (which causes typhoid

fever), are water-borne. It is also possible to inject toxic substances into water systems, including toxins. Thus,

it is not surprising that some terrorist groups interested in biological agents have targeted municipal water

systems.

Fortunately, water systems are less vulnerable than often thought. Municipal water systems are

designed to eliminate impurities, especially pathogens. As part of this process, communities use filters to

remove particles from the water and add chlorine to kill any organisms that remain. In addition, the ID

for

diseases spread through water is often extremely high. One test indicated that only half of persons who

ingested 10

(10 million) S. typhi organisms became ill.

According to a Department of Defense biological

warfare analyst, it would require “trainloads” of botulinum toxin to contaminate the New York City water

supply to cause problems, simply because of the extent to which the toxin is diluted.

For all these reasons,

infecting a large population through deliberate contamination of water supplies is difficult to accomplish.

Food contamination: Terrorists also have spread biological agents by contaminating food. In

general, only uncooked or improperly stored food is vulnerable, because the heat generated during cooking

readily destroys most pathogens and toxins. This implies that a terrorist would need to target foods that are

commonly eaten uncooked, or that can be contaminated after being cooked. Alternatively, the terrorists would

need to rely on a toxin that survives cooking.

The dangers from deliberate contamination of food have probably grown due to fundamental changes

in food distribution systems. The food processing industry has become increasingly centralized, so that

contamination introduced at a single facility can affect large numbers of people. In addition, an increasing

amount of food is imported, raising the prospect that perpetrators operating in a foreign country might be able

to contaminate food eaten in the United States.

Direct application: The most reliable way to infect someone is to inject the victim with the

organisms responsible for causing a disease. This technique avoids most of the technical problems associated

with the dissemination of biological agents. Similar techniques can be used with toxins. In addition, some

toxins can cause harm even if applied on the skin.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-

ISC-559 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993), pp. 53-54.

This calculation assumes a 50 per cent reduction in fatalities due to prompt administration of antibiotics. It also excludes

people who might be infected more than two hours after agent release. World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and

Biological Weapons (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1970), pp. 98-99.

For a review of the risk to municipal water systems, see World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and

Biological Weapons, pp. 113-120.

World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 115.

Testimony by Dr. Barry Erlick, p. 38, in United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1990).

Janice Rosenberg, “Attack of the killer shellfish, raspberries, hamburgers, milk, poultry, eggs, vegetables, potato salad,

pork….” American Medical News, May 4, 1998, pp. 12-15.

Insect vectors: Many diseases are naturally transmitted by insects. For example, plague is transmitted

by certain flea species, yellow fever is carried by one specific mosquito species, Aedes aegypti, and typhus is

spread by the body louse, Pediculus humanus corporis. It is thus not surprising that biological warfare experts

have considered insects as potential vectors for biological agents. The Japanese biological warfare program

devoted considerable effort to this dissemination route. On at least a few occasions, the Japanese to have used

infected fleas to spread plague.

The United States considered use of mosquitoes to disseminate certain

agents, and established a facility to breed the needed mosquitoes.

Insect vectors posed problems: they were

difficult to control, and their use was likely to create disease reservoirs in the area where the insects were

released.

Dissemination in practice

There is a substantial difference between the theory and practice of bioterrorism. The technical

obstacles associated with the use and dissemination of biological agents are considerable, and should not be

underestimated. Even individuals with considerable technical expertise often find that it is difficult to work

with biological agents, even when using relatively simple dissemination techniques.

Aerosolization: Only two groups are known to have considered aerosolization of biological agents:

Aum Shinrikyo and R.I.S.E. Neither group mastered the requisite technology. According to published

accounts, the Aum Shinrikyo attempted to disseminate both B. anthracis and botulinum toxin on multiple

occasions. They are not known to have caused any casualties.

Water contamination: In six instances, the perpetrators threatened or planned to contaminate water

supplies. The quasi-Green group R.I.S.E. wanted to put S. typhi into the Chicago water supply with the

objective of killing hundreds of thousands of people. In contrast, it is alleged that the Weatherman organization

conceived of biological agents as something that could be used to contaminate water supplies to make a great

many people sick.

Food contamination: Ten of the 17 cases in which people were harmed by use of biological agents

involved contamination of food. The use of biological agents to contaminate food has resulted in the largest

Ed Regis, Biology of Doom: The History of America’s Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt and Company,

1999), pp. 18-19, 112-113.

Jeffery K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” p. 50, in Frederick R. Sidell, et

al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army,

1997)

Table 8 : Dissemination techniques

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/

Uncertain

Total

Cases

Aerosol dissemination 2 0 0 2

Direct injection/Topical

application

6 10 0 16

Contaminate food 1 20 1 22

Contaminate water 4 0 2 6

Insect/Natural vectors 0 1 1 2

None 10 13 79 102

Unknown 5 10 2 17

Total Cases 28 54 85

Note: Because some perpetrators considered multiple agents, the totals in this table exceed the total number

of cases.

number of casualties. The Rajneeshee spread S. typhimurium at salad bars and other places to affect a large

number of people. Several of the criminal cases also involved contamination of food to make multiple people

ill, including one case of contamination of donuts and muffins with shigella organisms.

Direct application: In 16 cases the perpetrators planned to directly apply a biological agent, either by

parenteral delivery (injection) or topical application. Injection has been used to deliver both toxins and

pathogens. Dr. Suzuki injected S. typhi, as did the French murderer Henri Girard. Several perpetrators have

injected their victims with HIV-contaminated blood. Topical application generally involves use of toxins,

although the Rajneeshees attempted to spread S. typhimurium by contaminating objects that people handle in

the hope that the intended victims would transfer the organisms to their mouth. The Minnesota Patriots Council

planned to use a mixture of ricin and DMSO, apparently hoping that the DMSO would transport the ricin.

More plausibly, Thomas Leahy mixed DMSO with pure nicotine to achieve the same result.

Insect vectors: In at least two cases, the threatened dissemination technique involved insects. In one

case, an individual sent letters containing ticks, threatening to spread infection in that way. There is no

evidence, however, that the ticks carried any pathogens. In any event, the insects were dead on delivery.

Consequences of use

Bioterrorism differs significantly from other forms of terrorism. In the typical terrorist attack, there is

immediate evidence that something has happened. In contrast, a biological agent attack is unlikely to generate

any visible signatures, and the first evidence of a biological attack is likely to be the onset of disease.

Thus, it

might be days or even weeks before the consequences of a biological attack become evident. It might be

impossible to determine that an outbreak resulted from an intentional act.

Numerous efforts have been made to calculate the potential impact that biological weapons might

have on population centers. In general, such estimates should be used with considerable caution. Models used

to calculate agent effects rely on numerous assumptions regarding the movement and infectiveness of the

agent, and the results may be extremely sensitive to changes in those variables. At best, the models provide an

illustration of the potential consequences of bioterrorism.

The World Health Organization has prepared the most authoritative estimates of the casualties likely

to result from the biological weapon use.

Although these estimates are highly dependent on the assumptions

built into the calculations, they provide a basis for understanding the potential consequences of biological

agent use. The impact depends heavily on the nature of the attack, including the method of dissemination, the

particular agents involved, the concentration of agent, and (in the case of aerosol dissemination) atmospheric

conditions.

Some of the WHO estimates are summarized in Table 7, which shows the potential impact on a city of

one million people of aerosol releases. In all cases, the attacks assume a release of 50 kilograms of dried

powder along a two-kilometer line at a right angle to the wind direction. As is evident, the impact varies

considerably depending on the agent involved. If the agent causes a disease resulting in few fatalities, such as

Q-fever, only a few hundred people might be killed, although tens of thousands of people might be

incapacitated. In contrast, a high lethality agent, such as anthrax, could kill 95,000 people and incapacitate

another 30,000.

Dan Crozier, William D. Tiggertt, and Joseph W. Cooch, “The Physician’s Role in the Defense Against Biological

Weapons,” JAMA, January 7, 1961, p. 99.

World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva: World Health

Organization, 1970).

There has never been a biological warfare attack of the type modeled by the WHO team of experts.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the consequences of biological agent use have been far less severe than

shown in Table 7. There are only 21 confirmed bioterrorism and biocrime cases involving use or attempted use

of biological agents. In 20 of these cases, there were human casualties, including deaths in seven cases. In all,

there were 881 victims, including 10 deaths. The outbreak caused by the Rajneeshees caused an estimated 751

casualties. Dr. Suzuki’s activities resulted in an estimated 66 victims. In other words, two cases accounted for

nearly 93 per cent of all the confirmed victims of biological weapons use. This information is summarized in

Table 9. The incidents leading to death are listed in Table 10.

The diseases inflicted by biological agents are not the only potential consequences of their use.

Threats of use also can cause considerable disruption. This was demonstrated during the B’nai B’rith incident

Table 9: Casualties from use of bioagents

Total Casualties Deaths

Bioterrorism 751 0

Biocrimes 130 10

Totals 881 10

Table 10: Confirmed deaths using biological agents

Perpetrator Victims Date/ Location Number

of Deaths

Agent Employed

Arthur Warren

Waite

Mrs. Hannah Peck New York City,

1916

1 Uncertain

O’Brien de Lacy

and Dr.

Pantchenko

Captain Buturlin Russia, 1910 1 Direct injection of

diphtheria toxin

Henri Girard M. Pernotte

Mme. Monin

France, 1909-

1918

2 Food contamination

and direct injection

using pathogen

Salmonella typhi and

unknown poisonous

mushroom

Benoyendra

Chandra Pandey

Amarendra Pandey India, 1933 1 Direct injection of the

pathogen Yersinia

pestis

Tei-Sabro

Takahashi

Hisako Inukai

Yoshiko Yanagida

Yorinobu Nakayama

Japan 1936 3 Pastries contaminated

with Salmonella typhi

Kikuko Hirose Ritsuo Kato Japan, 1939 1 Pastries contaminated

with Salmonella typhi

and S. paratyphi

(types A and B)

Graham Farlow Geoffrey Pearce July 1990 1 Injection of HIV-

infected blood

in Washington, D.C., which resulted in the shut down of a large part of Washington’s downtown. Thus, even in

cases where no agent was present, the perpetrators can achieve a disproportionate impact. The costs of the

required medical and public health response to an attack also could be disproportionate to the actual effects of

the dissemination. A single case of smallpox in Yugoslavia in 1972 eventually required the quarantine of

10,000 people for periods of at least two weeks, and the government was forced to immunize 20,000,000

people. The neighboring countries closed their borders with Yugoslavia, disrupting normal commerce. It was

nine weeks before the outbreak was over. This illustrates how even a small outbreak can have huge economic

and social consequences.

Finally, the psychological impact of even a small agent release should not be

underestimated. The concern that developed over the relatively small plague outbreak in India in 1996 is

indicative of the fear that certain infectious diseases can generate. Experience with Aum use of chemical agents

suggests that there will be lasting psychological consequences for many of the victims and initial responders.

Technical constraints on use

There is considerable disagreement among experts concerning the extent of the technical impediments

that may constrain use of biological agents.

Some argue that terrorists face few if any technical hurdles in

employing bioagents. For example, DCI George Tenet told Congress, “Terrorist interest in chemical and

biological weapons is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be

produced in simple laboratories….”

In contrast, Dr. David Franz, formerly Commander of the U.S. Army

Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), argued that “an effective, mass-casualty producing

attack on our citizens would require either a fairly large, very technically competent, well-funded terrorist

program or state sponsorship.”

Empirical evidence suggests that effective dissemination of some agents, and especially aerosolization

of agents such as anthrax, can pose significant technical hurdles. Every case discussed in Part II of this study in

which an individual became sick due to use of a biological agent was perpetrated by someone (a criminal or a

terrorist) who had basic scientific or medical training. In general, the level of expertise required appears to

depend on two factors: the quantity of agent involved and the dissemination technique.

As previously noted, access to bioagents has rarely posed a problem for terrorists or criminals. More

skill was necessary if the perpetrators sought to grow larger quantities of an agent, depending on the agent

involved. Some pathogens are easy to culture, while others are extremely difficult. For this reason, perpetrators

who adopted objectives that required significant quantities of agent usually selected biological agents easy to

culture. None of the perpetrators examined in this study successfully cultured any agent that required technical

skill to grow. Thus, there is no evidence that any managed to culture a virus, although several had success with

bacteria. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that any individual or group ever successfully cultured a virulent

strain of C. botulinum, although several have tried. In fact, one recent criminal perpetrator, Thomas Leahy,

may have inadvertently grown a non-virulent strain of the organism.

If a simple dissemination technique is employed, relatively little technical expertise is needed. For

example, limited skill is required if the perpetrators can inject agent directly into their victims or if they seek to

contaminate food. Moreover, dissemination of a highly communicable disease like smallpox would require

limited expertise. The use of highly contagious diseases may be the easiest way to cause mass casualties from a

technical perspective. However, such agents pose risks for the group using them and could have an impact on

people that the perpetrators do not want to affect. In contrast, spreading an agent through the air poses

D.A. Henderson, “Biological Terrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 4, No. 1 (July-September 1998), p. 400.

Harry C. Holloway, et al., “The Threat of Biological Weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social

Consequences,” JAMA, 278 (August 6, 1997), pp. 425-427.

Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division,

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International

Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, General Accounting Office,

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, April 23, 1998.

Prepared Statement of George J. Tenet, Acting Director, Central Intelligence, p. 8, in United States Senate, Select Committee

on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1997). Similarly, Richard Danzig, former Under Secretary of the Navy, argued, “Biological weapons are inexpensive and accessible. A

small pharmaceutical industry or even moderately sophisticated university or medical research laboratory can generate a significant

offensive capability.” See “Biological Warfare: A Nation at Risk—A Time to Act,” Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic

Studies, Number 58, January 1996.

Posture Statement by Colonel David Franz, Deputy Commander, United States Army Medical Research and Development

Command for the Joint Committee on Judiciary and Intelligence, United States Senate, “International Biological Warfare Threat in

CONUS,” March 4, 1998.

formidable difficulties. There is no known example of a terrorist or criminal successfully spreading a disease

through the aerosol route, at least one group—the Aum Shinrikyo—reportedly tried, and R.I.S.E. intended to

do so.

The central technical problems for bioterrorism arise when the objective is to cause mass casualties

through the aerosolization of an agent. The apparent failure of the Aum Shinrikyo to develop a biological

warfare capability is suggestive. The Aum drew on the skills of a relatively large cadre of trained people, and

apparently devoted considerable resources to their biological warfare efforts. It appears that the Aum failed to

produce an effective biological weapon. Unfortunately, too little is known about the Aum’s activities to

determine why they failed.

Aerosolization is a complicated process, and is subject to factors that are difficult to assess. Agents

that can be spread through the air can be in either liquid or dry form. The liquid form is relatively easy to

produce, but must be processed into a form suitable for dissemination. The processing must address both

physical issues (to ensure that the sprayer nozzles do not become clogged) and biological issues (to ensure that

the organisms survive once aerosolized). An agent in liquid form can be aerosolized using a modified

commercially available sprayer, but problems remain. Most of the agent dies during the spraying process

(estimates range as high as 99 per cent). In contrast, a dry agent is relatively simple to disseminate, but most

experts agree producing it is a dangerous process almost certainly beyond the capabilities of non-state actors.

As previously noted, biological agents disseminated through the air must be released in particles 1-5

microns in size. Smaller particles are not retained in the lungs. Particles larger than 10 microns fall out of the

air relatively quickly. In addition, the body filters large particles so that they do not reach the lungs. Moreover,

the size of the dose required to induce illness climbs substantially as the size of the particles grows. Producing

aerosol particles of the wrong size might reduce an attack to complete ineffectiveness.

In addition, the

particles must be released in the correct location to have the desired effect. Particles 1-5 microns in size act like

a gas. They settle from the air very slowly. If the agent is not released in an enclosed space, like a building or

subway, then considerable operational skill is needed to ensure that the agent infects the intended victims.

Finally, technical skills are required to overcome environmental conditions hostile to agent survival.

Biological agents die or lose virulence once released into the atmosphere. Thus, some disease-causing bacteria

lose virulence at a rate of 10 per cent per minute, while some viruses would decay at a rate of 30 per cent per

minute. A few organisms, such as the spores of B. anthracis, decay extremely slowly when not exposed to

ultraviolet radiation.

The implications of these variables will differ from one organism to the next. Perpetrators need to be

familiar with the factors that affect the agents they are using.

The rate of biological decay depends on a host

of factors, including ultraviolet radiation, temperature, humidity, and a phenomenon known as the Open Air

Factor (believed to be the presence of certain air pollutants).

There are other potential difficulties in effective

According to a press report, Japanese authorities believe that Aum may have used a “relatively harmless vaccine strain” of B.

anthracis. Similarly, it appears that Aum may have used a C. botulinum strain that was not prolific in the production of toxin. See Broad,

Miller, and WuDunn, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” New York Times, May 26, 1998, p. A10.

Franz, “International Biological Warfare Threat in CONUS.” See also World Health Organization, Health Aspects of

Chemical and Biological Weapons, pp. 93-95.

One study reported that guinea pigs became infected by only 3 tularemia organisms when the particles were of 1 micron.

When the particle size was increased to 7 microns, 6,500 organisms were needed. At 22 microns, 170,000 organisms were necessary.

Research reported in William D. Sawyer, “Airborne Infection,” Military Medicine, February 1963, pp. 90-92.

Aerosols consisting of particles of 1-5 microns have certain characteristics of significance for biological weapons use. Such

aerosol clouds tend to act as a gas, meaning that the particles will enter buildings. The particles also remain airborne for extended periods.

According to one calculation, a 1-micron particle settles out of the air at a rate of 0.21 centimeters per minute. This means that the particle

will take about 500 minutes, or more than 8 hours, to drop just 1 meter. In contrast, a 5-micron particle has a settling rate of 4.7 centimeters

per minute, so would take only 20 minutes to drop 1 meter. Charles L. Punte, “Some Aspects of Particle Size in Aerosol Studies,” Armed

Forces Chemical Journal, March-April 1968, p. 28.

A survey of our knowledge in this area is provided by Alan Jeff Mohr, “Fate and Transport of Microorganisms in Air,” pp.

641-650, in Christon J. Hurst, editor in chief, Manual of Environmental Microbiology (Washington, D.C.: ASM Press, 1997). See also

Linda D. Stetzenbach, “Introduction to Aerobiology,” pp. 619-626, in the same volume.

The WHO experts estimated that an aerosol cloud containing the organisms that cause Q fever would decay at a rate of 10

percent per minute. They estimated the decay rate for the organism responsible for yellow fever at 30 percent per minute, the rate decay for

the agents causing plague and tularemia at only 2 percent per minute, and the decay rate for anthrax is a mere 0.1 percent per minute. All

these figures assume that the agents were produced using special stabilizers to protect against adverse environmental conditions. World

Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 94. B. anthracis survives only in the spore form; the

vegetative organisms are not very hardy and die quickly in the outdoors.

dissemination of biological agents. Weather is particularly important. Poor atmospheric conditions can make it

virtually impossible to release an agent cloud likely to cause casualties.

These comments suggest that aerosolization of pathogens can be extremely difficult. Thus, while

aerosolization is the most dangerous way to disseminate agent, it is significantly more difficult to accomplish

than by the alternative methods. This is an important factor in assessing the sources of potential threats from

biological agents.

Yet, this threat is not theoretical. The potential was demonstrated during studies conducted by the

United States Army’s Chemical Corps in the 1950s and 1960s, before the United States abandoned its

offensive biological warfare program. These tests demonstrated—to the extent possible with the technology

then available—that biological agents could be disseminated as an aerosol cloud and cover a large area with

potentially lethal doses.

Particularly disturbing are the results of tests in the New York City subway

conducted during the 1960s. The U.S. Army released a simulant for B. anthracis, Bacillus globigii, into the

subway system. Based on the distribution patterns of the agent, Army experts estimated that 10,000 people

would have died if B. anthracis had been released.

Open Air Factor, which remains a poorly understood phenomenon, was first identified by British researchers in the late

1960s. They found that when E. coli organisms were exposed to air from outdoors the decay rate went from 0.2 per cent per minute to

between 1.5 and 20 per cent per minute, but normally between 3-10 per cent per minute. This effect was noted with many organisms,

including some with biological warfare potential, such as the organisms responsible for tularemia and brucellosis. See K.R. May, et al.,

“Toxicity of Open Air to a Variety of Microorganisms,” Nature, 221(March 22, 1969), pp. 1146-1147. Significantly, spore-forming

organisms such as B. anthracis were unaffected. Some researchers believe that the Open Air Factor is related to the presence of ozone and

certain kinds of hydrocarbons. See G. de Mik and Ida de Groot, “The germicidal effect of the open air in different parts of the

Netherlands,” Journal of Hygiene, 78(1977), pp. 175-187.

Some of the perpetrators of anthrax hoaxes have included powders in the packages sent to their victims. As this discussion

indicates, if the particles are larger than 10 microns they are unlikely to pose a risk to large numbers of people. In most cases, the

descriptions suggest the particles were considerably larger than 10 microns. Such large particles will fall out of the air relatively quickly,

so even if it turned out that the powder was composed of Bacillus anthracis spores few people would get exposed

These tests are reviewed in Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy: The Army’s Germ Warfare Tests over Populated Areas

(Savage, Maryland: Littlefield, Adams Quality Paperback, 1990).

Pile, et al., “Anthrax as a Potential Biological Warfare Agent,” pp. 429-434. A retired Army biological warfare expert has

calculated that as many as 3 million people would have been affected if F. tularemia had been used instead. See Patrick, “Potential

Incident Scenarios,” p. I-60, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Responding to the Consequences of Chemical ad Biological Terrorism.

Chapter 3:

The Practitioners

In this chapter, the characteristics of perpetrators who employed, acquired, or considered use of

biological agents are examined. The perpetrators included in this study were both terrorists and criminals.

Terrorists were groups who were motivated primarily by political objectives, while criminals were driven by

motives of financial gain, personal revenge, or some other non-political consideration.

Nature of the Perpetrators

Size of the perpetrating group

The size of the perpetrating groups was examined to gain some insight into the number of people

required to exploit biological agents. Anyone participating in the acquisition or use of biological agents,

whether in the planning, production, or distribution, was counted.

In three of the 180 confirmed non-state cases, the perpetrating group consisted of five or more

people. All of these groups attempted use. There were 19 cases in which small groups of two to four people

were involved. Generally, it appears that in small groups there was a single person with scientific or technical

skills. Other members directed or supported the efforts of the sole expert.

A single individual was responsible for perpetuating plots in 43 cases. Significantly, the lone

perpetrators successfully acquired biological agents in 19 of those cases, and used the agent in 12 of them. In

115 of 180 cases, there is not enough information available to estimate the number of people involved. In most

such cases, the alleged perpetrators have never been identified.

Geographical distribution

The perpetrators involved with biological agents have been located in countries around the globe.

About 82 percent (147 of 180) of the cases took place in North America, all but one in the United States.

Europe was the next most common location with 17 cases. Incidents occurred in Britain, France, Germany,

Poland, and Russia.

Table 11: Size of perpetrating group

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/ Uncertain Total

Cases

Lone 0 37 6 43

Small group (2–4) 5 12 2 19

Large group (5+) 3 0 0 3

Unknown 19 7 89 115

Totals 27 56 97 180

Scientific and technical expertise

The range of perpetrator expertise varies considerably. Technical expertise could include background

in medicine, microbiology, or pharmaceutics.

The perpetrators had some scientific or medical training in 23 cases. In 16 of the cases, a physician or

a Ph.D.-level microbiologist was involved. In several cases, individuals with medical training instigated use of

biological agents. A nurse, Ma Anand Puja, created the Rajneeshee biological warfare capability. She relied on

the expertise of a trained laboratory technician to culture the Salmonella typhimurium used to contaminate the

salad bars. Dr. Suzuki, a Japanese physician and bacteriologist with considerable laboratory experience,

infected at least 66 people with typhoid and dysentery before he was arrested in 1966.

In a few cases, the person who conceived the notion of using biological agents lacked the requisite

skills, and so enlisted the services of unscrupulous physicians. Benoyendra Chandra Pandey drew on the

medical skills of Dr. Taranath Bhatacharya, who was responsible for culturing the Y. pestis that was used in the

1933 murder of Pandey’s brother. Similarly, in 1910 Patrick O’Brien de Lacy’s brother-in-law was murdered

by an injection of diphtheria toxin given by a physician, Dr. Pantchenko, who obtained the agent from a

research laboratory in Russia.

The available evidence suggests that in 36 cases the perpetrators had no scientific or medical

expertise. Significantly, in only six cases is there any evidence that the perpetrators actually acquired biological

agents. Equally significant, there is only a single case of use involving perpetrators with no known technical

training, although this number might grow when more is known about some of the other perpetrators. In that

case, Graham Farlow, a prison inmate, murdered a guard by injecting him with HIV-tainted blood. A

perpetrator with no known professional training obtained a biological agent in only five cases. In three

instances they extracted ricin toxin from castor beans, in one case used HIV-infected blood, and in the last case

acquired the agent from a legitimate supplier. Eight of the 36 cases were extortion plots. Interestingly, only one

extortion case involved a perpetrator who actually possessed a biological agent. The perpetrator in that case,

Michael Just, had a Ph.D. in microbiology. He was convicted in 1996 for threatening to contaminate milk with

Yersinia enterocolitica.

Table 12: Geographic distribution

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/ Uncertain Total

Cases

North America 14 37 96 147

Europe 6 10 1 17

Asia 5 6 0 11

Africa 2 0 0 2

Australia/New

Zealand

0 3 0 3

Totals 27 56 97 180

In 121 cases, the available evidence makes it impossible to assess the expertise of the perpetrators.

Given that 91 of them were anthrax threats, all those cases probably involve people with no technical expertise.

Terrorist Group Characteristics

A number of studies have attempted to identify the characteristics of terrorist groups that could lead

them to consider acquisition and use of biological agents. A study by Jeffrey Simon argues that a terrorist

group inclined to use biological agents would demonstrate certain attributes:

• A general, undefined constituency whose possible reaction to a biological-weapons

attack does not concern the terrorist group.

• A previous pattern of large-scale, high-casualty-inflicting incidents.

• Demonstration of a certain degree of sophistication in weaponry or tactics.

• A willingness to take risks.

These criteria are largely consistent with the characteristics of groups inclined to inflict mass casualties using

biological agents. Simon’s list may be less useful in identifying groups with alternative motives, such as

harming agriculture, who may believe that they can deal with the risk of using biological agents that do not

cause loss of life.

Another effort to consider the types of groups potentially attracted to the use of biological agents

appears in a draft report on the threat of chemical and biological weapons prepared by the North Atlantic

Assembly. That report gave the following list of terrorist groups likely to resort to biological weapons.

• Those whose goals include vague notions about world revolution, universalistic

goals such as the Japanese Red Army and certain European radical left-wing

groups.

• Those unconcerned with the effects of public opinion such as neo-Nazi groups in

Europe and North America.

• Those with a history of high-casualty, indiscriminate attacks, such as Sikh

extremists, pro-Iranian Shiite fundamentalist groups such as Hezbollah, and

extremists within the Palestinian movement such as the Abu Nidal Organization.

• Those ideologically opposed to Western society in general.

• Those noted for their sophistication in weaponry or tactics, such as the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

• Those with state sponsors, especially where the sponsor is known to possess

chemical or biological weapons.

Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons, p. 17.

Draft report of the North Atlantic Assembly, Chemical and Biological Weapons: the Poor Man's Bomb, AN253 STC(96)8,

October 4, 1996.

Table 13: Perpetrator expertise

Type Terrorist Criminal Other/

Uncertain

Total

Cases

Medical or scientific expertise 4 17 2 23

No Known expertise 6 24 6 36

Unknown 17 15 89 121

Totals 27 56 97 180

This list is too inclusive to identify potential users of biological agents. It refers to groups that are not known to

have considered use of biological agents, yet provides no basis for predicting under what circumstances a

group might decide to adopt biological agents.

More recently, Professor Walter Laqueur has argued that terrorism is undergoing a profound change.

In contrast to the politically motivated terrorists who predominated in the 1970s, many of today’s terrorists

define their objectives in ethnic or religious terms. Many of these groups are infected by millenarian ideas,

believing that the world as we have known it is ending. Such groups may have few if any scruples about using

weapons to cause mass casualties.

Other terrorism experts believe that the perpetrators most likely to employ biological agents are

religiously motivated terrorists. Significantly, the two most significant bioterrorism incidents, involving the

Rajneeshees and the Aum Shinrikyo, were undertaken by religious cults with political agendas. A former Chief

of Counter-Terrorism at the FBI expressed a similar view of Middle East groups influenced by radical Islam.

The danger originating from Middle East terrorist groups infused with the dogma of Radical

Islamic Fundamentalism cannot be minimized. One of the principal concerns is the potential for

their use of weapons of mass destruction. Given their demonstrated disregard for limiting

casualties, indeed their apparent desire to inflict maximum damage, this scenario is one that has

occupied much of the thinking of counter-terrorism planners at all levels of government. Biological

and chemical weapons are certainly available to sophisticated terrorist organizations, especially

those, like many of the Middle East groups, that operate with the support of governments. These

weapons are both relatively easy to acquire and lethal in their application.

The essential consideration seems to be a combination of group’s interest in causing mass casualty coupled

with an ideology that would justify such operations. Such views are not necessarily unique to religiously

motivated groups.

Domestic groups

There is considerable evidence to suggest that terrorist groups based in the United States have actively

explored resort to biological agents. Experience suggests that interest in biological agents can come from a

broad range of terrorist groups espousing radically different political philosophies. In the 1960s, the leader of

the right-wing Minuteman group openly discussed the possibilities of biological agents, although there is no

evidence that there was any substance behind the rhetoric. In the 1970s, several left wing groups considered

bioterrorism. As noted earlier. The quasi-Green group R.I.S.E. was on the verge of disseminating several

biological agents when the Chicago police arrested the ringleaders. The left-wing Weather Organization may

have initiated a plot to acquire biological agents for use against municipal water systems. In the1980s, a

religious cult, the Rajneeshees, acquired and used biological agents. More recently, it appears that right wing

groups, many affiliated with the militia movement, have expressed the most interest in biological terrorism. In

some cases, the groups have acquired biological agents.

Fortunately, in the past there was more interest in bioterrorism than actual use. From this perspective,

an important question becomes the extent to which domestic terrorists might decide to resort to biological

agents. This involves two related considerations: to what extent could they acquire the capability to employ

biological agents, and under what circumstances might they decide to use them?

Although domestic groups could acquire some bioterrorism capability with little or no outside

assistance, as demonstrated by the experience of the Rajneeshees, there is reason to doubt the ease with which

such groups could cause mass casualties. For reasons discussed above, aerosol dissemination of biological

agents may be beyond the capabilities of groups developing their own dissemination technology. Such groups

would need to develop a considerable range of expertise, and it is likely that it would take some time before

they could effectively undertake wide area dissemination of agent of highly lethal agents. Consequently, the

initial uses of biological agents will probably involve small-scale actions with limited consequences. This

suggests that effective public health surveillance of unusual disease outbreaks coupled with vigilant law

enforcement activity could detect and respond to bioterrorism before the responsible groups develop a mass

casualty capability.

The ability of terrorists to employ biological agents effectively would be greatly enhanced if such

groups received external assistance from state-sponsored biological weapons programs. Such assistance could

Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, September-October 1996, pp. 24-36.

Steve Pomerantz, “Counterterrorism in a Free Society,” Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, Spring 1998,

p. 24.

come directly from a state biological weapons program, or from individuals formerly associated with such a

program.

State–sponsorship

A number of countries with records of supporting terrorist organizations also are believed to have

biological weapons programs. The Department of State names seven countries as state supporters of terrorism:

Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

Published reports issued by the Department of

Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggest that five of these countries, Iran, Iraq, Libya,

North Korea, and Syria, possess biological warfare programs.

Press reports have suggested that some Iraqi

scientists associated with biological weapons research may be working in Sudan, and that the Sudanese have

created a research institute for chemical and biological warfare funded by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden is the

former Saudi citizen who has become a major financial supporter for international terrorism.

U.S. intelligence

officials have reported that bin Laden has provided support for a Sudanese biological weapons program. This

allegation was confirmed by the British Minister of State for Defence, George Robertson, in an on-the-record

interview.

Since at least the late 1980s, press reports have claimed that Cuba has a biological weapons

program.

In early 1998, the Department of Defense expressed concern about Cuba’s potential for creating

biological weapons.

Thus, almost all the countries associated with support for international terrorism also

support efforts to develop biological weapons.

Relatively little publicly available information is available on the biological warfare programs of these

countries, except for Iraq.

What is known suggests that the sophistication of these programs varies

considerably. Iraq certainly had a relatively sophisticated program, and probably retains a capability to develop

biological weapons within a few weeks. Less is known about North Korea’s activities, but it has been

conducting research in the area of biological warfare for more than thirty years and probably has capabilities

equal to or greater than Iraq’s. Iran likely comes next in competence, followed by Syria and Libya.

If it exists,

Sudan’s program is certainly the least developed.

U.S. Department of State, 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, as found at http://www.state.gov.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements, 1996, as found at

http://www.acda.gov, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997.

Al J. Venter, “North Africa faces new Islamic threat,” Jane’s Pointer, March 1998, p. 11. Based on an October 31, 1997

report that appeared in an Arabic language newspaper published in Paris, Al-Watan al-’Arabi. For official confirmation of bin Ladin’s role

in supporting terrorism, see the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Toby T. Gadi, United States Senate, Select Committee on

Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, p. 21, and the reply for the record appearing on p. 128

of that report.

Background briefing on “Terrorist Camp Strikes,” August 20, 1998, as found at http://www.defenselink.mil, and “Britain Has

Bin Laden Evidence,” Associated Press, August 23, 1998,11:00 a.m. EDT.

John Barron, “Castro, Cocaine and the A-Bomb Connection,” Reader’s Digest, March 1990, p. 70, and Harvey McGeorge,

“Chemical Addiction,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, April 1989, p. 17. The allegation was repeated by Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart

(R-Florida), “Under the guise of genetic, biological and pharmaceutical research, Castro is developing a serious germ and chemical

warfare capability.” See, George Gedda, “U.S. Gen. Supports Some Cuba Ties,” Associated Press, April 25, 1998, 12:06 p.m. EDT.

The DIA assessment is that “Cuba’s current scientific facilities and expertise could support an offensive BW program in at

least the research and development stage. Cuba’s biotechnology industry is one of the most advanced in emerging countries and would be

capable of producing BW agents.” See DIA, “The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security,” May 6, 1998. Secretary of Defense William S.

Cohen noted, “I remain concerned about Cuba’s potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnology

infrastructure.” See his transmittal letter to Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Armed Services Committee, May 6, 1998. This material was

taken from the Department of Defense public affairs web site at http://www.defenselink.mil.

Zilinskas, “Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?,” JAMA, pp. 418-424, provides an excellent overview of the Iraqi

program.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, pp. 6, 27, 32-33, 34, 37, for

reporting on Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. See also the comments by DCI John Deutch, at the Conference on Nuclear, Biological,

Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, May 23, 1996, regarding North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya.

Under what circumstances might a hostile state provide biological warfare expertise to a terrorist

group? There is no evidence that such an exchange has ever taken place. In 1996, the Defense Intelligence

Agency made the following points.

Most of the state sponsors have chemical or biological or radioactive material in their stockpiles

and therefore have the ability to provide such weapons to terrorists if they wish. However, we have

no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to

terrorists.

Moreover, the Department of Defense asserted in 1997, “The likelihood of a state sponsor providing such

weapons to a terrorist group is believed to be low.”

In addition, it appears that terrorists now rely less on state-sponsorship than was true in the 1980s.

According to an unclassified CIA assessment, the primary threat increasingly comes from transient groups not

necessarily dependent on any particular country for support

International terrorist groups have developed large transnational infrastructures, which in some

cases literally circle the globe. These networks may involve more than one like-minded group, with

each group assisting the others. The terrorists use these infrastructures for a variety of purposes,

including finance, recruitment, the shipment of arms and material, and the movement of

operatives.

Potentially, the emergence of such transient groups has considerable significance. Such groups are less tied to

the strategic interests of any particular country, and thus are less likely to act in a manner that reflects the

guidance of specific countries. This makes them difficult to deter by exerting pressure on a state sponsor.

While the groups may have substantial resources, they usually lack a permanent infrastructure, which may

make it harder for them to generate an effective biological warfare capability. From this perspective, reports

that bin Laden has financed a Sudanese biological warfare facility becomes a source of serious concern.

Political and moral constraints

Some analysts have argued that moral constraints are likely to inhibit use of biological weapons,

either because the terrorists subscribe to moral tenets or because their supporters do. This is based on the

United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States

and its Interests Abroad, p. 213.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 49.

Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, p. 7. Some additional elaboration is provided in the

reply for the record on p. 93.

Table 14: State Supporters of Terrorism and BW Programs

State Supporters of Terrorism BW Program

Cuba Suspected

Iraq Confirmed

Iran Confirmed

Libya Confirmed

North Korea Confirmed

Sudan Suspected

Syria Confirmed

Sources: U.S. Department of State, 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report; Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements,

1996, as found at http://www.acda.gov, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:

Threat and Response, November 1997. Also, see the text.

argument, as articulated by terrorism expert Bryan Jenkins, that terrorists are usually not interested in mass

murder.

Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective. Terrorists want a lot of people

watching, not a lot of people dead. Most terrorists operate on the principle of minimum force

necessary. Generally, they do not attempt to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their

purposes.

Thus, Jenkins appears to argue that combinations of political and moral considerations have affected the

willingness of terrorists to employ weapons that could cause massive harm. The implication is that they would

be unwilling to employ biological weapons for the same reasons.

The Rajneeshees, for example, specifically rejected the use of a more dangerous pathogen, S. typhi,

which causes typhoid fever. However, in this case, the primary factor that militated against use of the agent

was not moral qualms, but rather concern that an outbreak of typhoid fever would attract too much attention.

The group believed that it could accomplish its intended objective, incapacitation, using a generally non-lethal

agent, S. typhimurium, which causes a common form of food poisoning.

In fact, in recent years there has been growing evidence that terrorist groups are interested in causing

mass casualties. This is reflected in the publicly expressed views of the CIA.

The emphasis on high casualty operations and the frequency of attacks on nonofficial targets have

been significant trends in international terrorism in recent years. These trends are reflected in the

statistics on international terrorism, which show that the number of terrorist incidents has declined

during the 1990s but casualties from terrorist attacks lately have been on the increase.

We expect these trends to continue. The newer breed of international terrorist, who seeks revenge

more than carefully defined political objectives, is interested in inflicting mass casualties.

Thus, there are growing concerns of erosion in the political and moral constraints that in the past kept most

terrorist groups from resorting to weapons of mass murder.

In general, however, the most serious constraint on the use of biological agents has probably been

operational rather than moral. For many purposes, biological agents are more difficult to use and less effective

than other weapons. Guns and bombs are probably more than sufficient if the objective is to murder one or

even several hundred people.

The fact that so many individuals and groups have considered using biological

agents is an indication of the fragility of the moral barriers.

Operational Considerations

The research highlights certain operational aspects in the use of biological agents. While these

observations should be considered tentative, because they are based on a small sample, they are derived from

real world experience.

Terrorists or criminals who possess or use biological agents almost never advertise their intent. In

only one case is it clear that perpetrators known to have possessed biological agents sent communiqués or

otherwise made known the fact of possession. In contrast, those who claimed to possess biological agents

almost never did. This tends to suggest that individuals or groups who do not claim credit will undertake most

cases involving actual use of biological agents.

This experience adds weight to the views of some experts that terrorists are increasingly unlikely to

claim credit for their actions. According to Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorists now deliberately seek to conceal their

responsibilities for attacks in hopes of avoiding identification and subsequent arrest.”

In Hoffman’s view,

Brian Michael Jenkins, Future Trends in International Terrorism, RAND Paper P-7139, December 1985, p. 4. For another

articulation of this statement, see Brian Michael Jenkins, The Future Course of International Terrorism, RAND Paper P-7139, September

1985, p. 4.

United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United

States, p. 94.

An unnamed intelligence official made these comments on this point: “The fertilizer bomb has demonstrated its capacity on

numerous occasions to inflict … mass casualties. We would consider those tried-and-true low-tech means of operation still to be the main

type of attack about which we have to worry.” See Jim Wolf, “First terrorist cyber-attack reported by U.S.,” Reuters, May 4, 1998, 3:17

PDT.

Bruce Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don’t Claim Credit,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1997), p. 4.

terrorists can obtain the publicity that they seek even without claiming credit for specific acts of terror.

Significantly, he argues that this anonymity may make them more likely to commit increasingly lethal acts.

Hiding biological weapons programs is easy. The efforts of the Rajneeshees to develop biological

agents were detected only when the cult fell apart and law enforcement agencies developed informers among

former members of the group. An intensive public health investigation of the outbreak failed to determine the

cause of the outbreak. In fact, an Oregon State official issued a report claiming that unsanitary practices by

restaurant workers caused the outbreak and dismissed allegations that intentional contamination was a factor. It

was only a year after the outbreak that law enforcement officials developed credible evidence that intentional

contamination was responsible.

The available evidence suggests that intelligence and law enforcement agencies are unlikely to learn

that a particular terrorist group is interested in acquiring and using biological agents. This is a concern of the

intelligence community, as reflected in the publicly stated views of the State Department’s Bureau of

Intelligence and Research.

The involvement of terrorist groups in WMD would be difficult to detect. This is particularly true

with regard to chemical and biological materials since the agents can be obtained fairly easily and

the production can be hidden.

There is no evidence that Japanese authorities were aware of Aum Shinrikyo’s interest in biological

agents. Only after the subway attack did Japanese law enforcement officials learn of the biological warfare

program and hear the allegations that Aum actually attempted to use biological agents. Moreover, the Aum was

virulently anti-American, and repeatedly accused the United States of waging chemical and biological warfare

on the cult.

Yet, the U.S. intelligence community was completely unaware of its activities. Neither the CIA

nor the FBI appears to have believed at the time that they had any responsibility for tracking such activities on

the part of groups like the Aum.

Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don’t Claim Credit,” p. 5.

United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United

States, p. 129.

See Staff Statement, “Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,” pp. 52-54

in United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I.

United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I, pp.

275-276.

PART II:

CASES

Chapter 4:

Case Definition

The survey included all publicly reported instances in which a non-state actor, either a terrorist or a

criminal, or an operative acting on behalf of a state, allegedly used, threatened to use, acquired, attempted to

acquire, or even expressed an interest in biological agents.

Agent involvement

The primary characteristic of the cases is the involvement of biological agents, as defined in the first

chapter of this study. This means that the agents can include a variety of microorganisms, such as bacteria,

viruses, fungi, and parasites.

• The involvement of biological agents can include use, threatened use, acquisition,

attempted acquisition, or an expression of interest in biological agents.

• The target of the biological agents can be people, animals, crops, or processed

foods. If animals or crops are targeted, the action or planned action must either

violate the laws of the jurisdiction involved or otherwise involve a prohibited

activity.

• Cases that involve animals, such as insects or poisonous snakes, are excluded unless

the animals were used as a vector for a pathogen.

• Cases involving transmission of disease directly from an infected person are not

included.

• Cases involving only chemical agents are excluded.

Perpetrators and activities

The perpetrators must meet one of several criteria.

Several cases discussed below do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the study. Such cases were researched based on

published claims that they involved biological agents. Descriptions of these cases are provided to explain the rationale for excluding them.

This excludes instances in which people deliberately engage in risky behavior, such as HIV carriers engaging in unprotected

sex. It also excludes cases where the perpetrators deliberately introduce infected individuals into the target population.

There are a surprising number of instances in which HIV-infected people have tried to deliberately infect others. According to

one account, by 1991 there had been more than 200 prosecutions of AIDS-related criminal cases, mostly for attempted murder. See

Jennifer Grishkin, "Knowingly Exposing Another to HIV,” Yale Law Review, 106(March 1997), p. 1617, citing sources dated to 1990 and

1991.

On January 15, 1998, George Howard Stewart was arrested by the Denver Police Department for violating an order to stay

away from his wife’s house. After being arrested, Stewart, who was HIV positive, reportedly spit at the arresting officer, including into his

mouth. Stewart is alleged to have had a history of threatening to infect people with his HIV. A District Judge ruled that he had to stand trial

for second degree assault. See Howard Pankratz, “Man with HIV to stand trial in assault case,” Denver Post, April 29, 1998, as found at

the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://denverpost.com. Similarly, in April 1998, a Clinton, Louisiana, jury convicted James

Houston of attempted intentional exposure to HIV. The incident occurred on October 15, 1997, when Houston, who had been diagnosed as

HIV positive in July 1997, was being moved to a new cell block. Houston tried to resist, and spat on the officers who were attempting to

control him. Louisiana has a law prohibiting the “throwing of blood or other bodily substances” to spread HIV. See James Minton, “Man

convicted in AIDS exposure case,” Advocate (Baton Rouge), April 14, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site,

http://www.theadvocate.com.

Also relatively common are convictions of HIV-infected individuals who put others at risk of contracting the disease through

unsafe sexual practices. For example, in late October 1998, Swedish police were searching for an HIV-infected man who called himself

James Patrick Kimball who had unprotected sex a large number of women. Swedish courts have convicted eight people for such behavior.

See “Sweden looks for American with HIV,” Associated Press, October 20, 1998, 5:45 p.m. EDT.

• If the perpetrators are non-state actors, then any involvement of biological agents

merits inclusion. Both terrorists, who use biological agents to further political

agendas, and criminals, who are motivated by more personal considerations, are

included.

• If the perpetrators are employed by a nation state, then the involvement of

biological agents must be outside the context of a declared or undeclared war with

another nation state.

• Excluded from the study are incidents in which health care providers poison patients

using biological agents with common medicinal uses, such as digitalis or curare.

Also excluded are instances of suicide.

Timeframe

The incident must have occurred on or after January 1, 1900.

Geographic scope

The incident could have occurred anywhere in the world.

Case identification numbers

The case identification numbers consist of the year in which the incident occurred and a sequence

number assigned as each newly identified case was researched. A case is dated to the point either when the

earliest date when the activity involving biological agents is known to have occurred, or, if that date is not

known, to the date when the activity way was discovered. Thus, the number 1996-05 indicates that the incident

took place in 1996 and that it was the fifth case from that year investigated. This means that the cases are not

necessarily numbered in chronological order. In many instances, a case was uncovered long after earlier cases

were researched. In such instances, the original case numbers were retained, and the new case inserted into the

working paper in the correct chronological order.

In some instances, the sources do not identify the exact year in which the incident took place. Such

cases are arbitrary assigned to the first year belonging to the same decade, which is defined to include every

year that has the same first three digits. Thus, cases believed to have occurred in the 1970s are assigned to

1970 and are given a sequence number for that year. When it is impossible to assign a case to a specific

decade, it was assigned to 1900. To indicate that the date is approximate, such cases are also marked with an X

at the end of the number.

Cases that have an M at the end of their identification number involve illicit use of a biological agent

with legitimate medicinal uses by a health care provider in a medical setting. While these cases are excluded

from the analysis for the reasons discussed above, several were researched during the course of the study.

This is an admittedly arbitrary exclusion. Health care providers have opportunities for using certain toxins not available to

other perpetrators. They often have legitimate access to toxins, or can easily steal it from facilities that have a legitimate need for the

substances. In addition, health care providers have routine access to victims that other perpetrators do not have. There are few other

settings in which people willingly allow a stranger to stick them with a needle. Thus, the activities of health care providers give little

insight into what a terrorist might be able to accomplish. Finally, there appear to be a significant number of cases of this type, so that

including them in the study would distort analysis of the data.

The drugs of choice today are rarely biological agents. According to Eric W. Hickey, Serial Murderers and Their Victims, 2

edition (Washington: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 219, 248-250, commonly used drugs are potassium chloride, pavulon,

succinylcholine, and digoxin. Only one of these could be considered a biological agent, digoxin, which is one of the active ingredients of

digitalis. See John Mann, Murder, Magic, and Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 170-171. While the true

incidence of murder by health care providers in medical settings is unknown, Hickey suggests that it is a growing problem. Three cases are

discussed in the text, case 1977-02M, Arnfinn Nesset, on page 60, case 1994-03M, Orville Lynn Majors, on page 76, and case 1966-01M,

Mario Jascalevich, on page 86.

Two cases of suicidal use of pathogens are discussed in the case studies: the first involves a physician who injected himself

with rabies (see Case 1930-02X on page 90); the second involves a woman who injected herself with HIV-infected blood (see Case 1990-

05X on page 77). Such cases are excluded from the analysis because the motivations and actions of such individuals differs significantly

from that of other perpetrators more relevant to the study of bioterrorism.

Comments on the case definition

The case definition was generated in order to serve the research needs of the project. Specifically, the

objective was to study incidents involving terrorists. Preliminary research indicated that there were few

instances in which terrorist groups used, acquired, or even considered using biological agents. In fact, the

author has been able to identify only 30 cases in which a terrorist group is thought to have been involved with

biological agents. In almost all of those cases, the perpetrators never actually possessed or used a biological

agent. This apparent lack of interest in biological agents is significant, and will be discussed further.

The small number of bioterrorism cases led the author to extend the study to cover other illicit

activities that might shed some insight into bioterrorism. Many of these added cases are criminal in character

(biocrimes). Such cases show what an individual or small group can accomplish using biological agents, and

thus provide some insight into what a terrorist group might be able to accomplish. Certain state-sponsored

activities also are discussed as well, including assassinations involving biological agents and sabotage

operations. The state-sponsored cases also provide some insight into the complexities of undertaking covert

biological activities, as well as giving some insights into what state support might mean for a terrorist group.

None of the cases involved use of biological agents by military organizations or other state entities in

the context of wars with other countries. Japanese use of biological weapons during the Second World War,

alleged Soviet use of biological agents in Southeast Asia, and other claimed instances of biological warfare in

the context of conventional military operations are excluded. In contrast, German use of biological agents

during World War One is included because of the covert use of such agents in neutral countries.

Sources of information

Identifying cases for research

This survey is as comprehensive as possible. It includes every case that the author has been able to

identify in the unclassified literature that meets the case definition of a biological incident. Several sources

were used to identify potential cases. An important source was the open source literature on biological

terrorism, which describes numerous incidents involving biological agents. Especially useful were the lists of

biological terrorism incidents compiled in 1995 by Ron Purver and in 1987 by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and

Neil C. Livingstone.

Bruce Hoffman shared data from the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, an

electronic database of international terrorism incidents, by providing an extract of “All Chemical/Biological

Incidents, 1968-1995.” Jason Pate of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Project at the Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, kindly shared a working copy of a

similar list that he was in the process of compiling. Finally, in 1971 the Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI) compiled a comprehensive survey of allegations of use of biological agents in

connection with wars, including several instances that appear to meet the case definition used here.

These

earlier studies identified approximately half the cases.

Several other sources also played an important role in uncovering cases. First, the author identified

additional cases through a survey of press reports, books, and other published accounts. Much of this effort

focused on regional newspapers, because the major national newspapers ignored most of the cases discussed

here. Books discussing the criminal use of poisons also were consulted, primarily to identify old cases. Second,

other analysts brought a number of cases to the attention of the author. The sources are credited in the notes.

Researching the cases

Five main sources of information were used to describe the cases. First, the bulk of the information

came from press reports. Most of the incidents received little coverage in major newspapers, such as the New

The primary source was Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature,

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995, supplemented by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Neil C. Livingstone, America the

Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company,

1987), pp. 183-187. Not all cases mentioned by these sources are included in this review. For example, Purver mentions cases involving

acquisition of some toxic fungi by a foreign scientist, which have been excluded here since they appear to refer to acquisition of biological

agents by a state biological weapons program. Similarly, Purver mentions some incidents involving people infected with infectious

diseases who were allegedly used as vectors to infect target populations.

SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons (New York: The Humanities

Press, 1971), pp. 214-230.

York Times, the Washington Post, or the London Times. For this reason, it was necessary to rely on regional

newspapers, such as the Chicago Tribune, the Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), the Dallas Morning News, the Las

Vegas Sun and the Las Vegas Review-Journal, the Portland Oregonian, and the Seattle Times. Second, some of

the accounts rely on descriptions that came from the bioterrorism literature. In a few cases, it appears that these

sources had access to intelligence or law enforcement information not available elsewhere. Third, a few of the

cases have been described in detail in the medical literature, including specialized forensic medicine

publications. Fourth, in some cases court records and other legal or law enforcement documents were used.

Finally, the author interviewed individuals associated with some of the cases, usually public health or law

enforcement officials.

Assessing the data

Because the data used in this research is of uneven reliability, a careful assessment of the quality of

data supporting the allegations associated with individual cases is essential. Research for this study identified

more than 100 instances in which it is alleged that terrorists, criminals, or state actors used, acquired, attempted

to acquire, or considered acquisition of biological agents. Reviewing the data presented in Part II of this study

reveals problems with at least half the cases. At the same time, any analysis may be skewed by the exclusion of

cases.

Criteria for inclusion

Each case was evaluated to determine if the supporting evidence met the case definition. Because

information about the activities of many of the alleged perpetrators is scanty, the quality of the supporting

material was carefully reviewed. With one exception, cases were included in the analysis only if verified by an

authoritative source, such as an official government document, or if at least two apparently independent

unofficial sources were found. The only exception applies to anthrax hoaxes, which are included if only a

single source refers to them. In most cases, those hoaxes are insufficiently serious to merit more extensive

press coverage. Cases are not included if controversy surrounds essential data related to the inclusion criteria.

Whenever there were serious questions concerning the accuracy of the allegations, the case was treated as

unconfirmed.

Lack of data: Many of the cases were excluded because there was insufficient evidence to confirm

the allegations. In some cases, the reports are extremely tenuous. Thus, the RAND-St. Andrews database

includes a report that an otherwise unknown organization calling itself the “Legion of Nabbil Kadduri Usur”

threatened to release bacteria if its demands were not met. The original source of the report is unknown, and all

that is known of the allegation is what appears in the database.

Under the circumstances, the data is too weak

to merit inclusion.

Faulty data interpretation: In some cases, it appears that allegations were made based on

misunderstanding of the available data. Thus, one source lists as a biological terrorism incident a 1973 case

involving contamination of the Naples water supply. A closer reading of the available data, however, indicates

that the episode involved criminal charges resulting from negligence on the part of municipal officials who

failed to prevent the spread of cholera-contaminated water. The episode had nothing to do with intentional

contamination. (See page 173 for details.)

False accusations: In a number of cases, authoritative sources erroneously believed that some illicit

activity had occurred. This is true for the well-publicized incident (discussed on page 167) in which the FBI

wrongly accused Larry Wayne Harris and William Leavitt of possessing a biological weapon.

Such cases are

interesting to study as part of an effort to understand responses to biological terrorism threats, but do not satisfy

the case definition.

Fabrications: Some incidents appear to be without any foundation. Thus, Steve Quayle, a survivalist

who produces a shortwave radio broadcast known as “Blueprint for Survival,” claimed that unspecified

“Middle East terrorists” had tried to mount a biological warfare attack on Ames, Iowa. The available evidence,

reviewed starting on page 110, suggests that there was no basis for the story.

Gaps in evidence: The difficulties entailed in identifying cases are exemplified by the allegations that

a Florida dentist, Dr. David Acer, deliberately infected at least six of his patients with HIV in the late 1980s

(see page 79). Despite an extensive investigation, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has

been unable either to exonerate Dr Acer or to confirm his culpability. Thus, while CDC believes that Acer’s

patients contracted HIV from him, it cannot demonstrate that the transmission was intentional rather than

For a description of this incident, see page 122.

accidental.

For this reason, the Acer case is excluded from the analysis, although it is possible that Acer

deliberately infected his patients.

Alternative case definition: The definition of a biological agent used in this study excludes insects,

unless they are a vector for a pathogen. For this reason, cases involving the deliberate spread of insects do not

meet the case definition used for this study. This leads to the exclusion of incidents such as the one reviewed

on page 173 involving “The Breeders”, a California group that allegedly was deliberately releasing Medflies.

Others, however, treat such cases as instances of biological terrorism.

How complete is the survey?

Despite efforts to make the research as comprehensive as possible, the list of incidents is clearly not

complete. Indeed, it is virtually a certainty that there are additional instances of biological agent use not

included in the study. It is impossible to ascertain, however, how many cases are not included. Nor is it

possible to estimate the number of people who might have been affected by bioagent use.

The circumstances surrounding the discovery of some of the cases reinforces the view that there are

additional unidentified cases. Several of the incidents became known only because of information obtained by

law enforcement agencies or other authoritative sources well after the event. The Japanese military reportedly

attempted to infect members of the League of Nations’ Lytton Commission in 1932, but information about the

incident did not become public until 1994, sixty-two years later. (See page 67.) It was a year after the

salmonellosis outbreak in The Dalles, Oregon, before law enforcement officials obtained information linking

the outbreak to use of biological agents by the Rajneeshees. (This episode is discussed starting on page 50.)

Similarly, Japanese authorities (see page 47) only learned of the efforts by Aum Shinrikyo to employ

biological agents after the cult collapsed and former members confessed to police.

In addition, the sources used in researching the cases also necessarily limit the comprehensiveness of

the study. Most of the sources consulted during the research originated in the United States, and almost all are

English language. It is likely that a thorough exploration of foreign language material would uncover

additional cases. In addition, the research relied on searches of electronic databases available in full text form.

Additional cases may be identified by searching through sources currently not on-line. At present, publications

in the United States are more readily available on-line than those published elsewhere, which probably leads to

over-representation of incidents that occurred in the United States. Finally, some cases have been described in

publicly available sources. Consequently, there is little doubt but that additional cases could be identified and

added to the list in the study.

Although it is difficult to estimate the impact of missing cases, the overall data set is so small that

even a few additional cases might significantly skew the results reported below. This is particularly true for

assessments of the consequences of biological agent use. The number of casualties associated with these cases

is relatively small, so that even a few additional cases involving illness would make a substantial difference in

the reported data. For this reason, caution should be exercised in using this data.

Organization of cases

The cases described in the following sections are divided into four categories: use of biological

agents, threatened use, possession, and other. These categories are then subdivided into sub-categories.

1. Use of biological agents

• Confirmed use: The use of a biological agent was confirmed by some authoritative

source, either a court, a law enforcement agency, or by a credible government

official in these cases.

• Probable or possible use: In these cases, the perpetrators may have used a

biological agent, but there is no authoritative confirmation. It also includes some

cases in which a biological agent was used, but there is no information to indicate

whether the perpetrator knowingly caused the infection. The probability of

intentional contamination for these cases ranges from highly likely to highly

unlikely.

Dennis L. Breo, “The dental AIDS cases—Murder or an unsolvable mystery,” JAMA, December 8, 1993, p. 2732.

Robert S. Root-Bernstein, “Infectious Terrorism,” Atlantic, May 1991, p. 48.

2. Threatened use

• Threatened use (confirmed possession): This category includes cases in which the

perpetrators threatened to use biological agents, and subsequent investigations

confirmed that they possessed or probably possessed biological agents. This

category includes cases in which the perpetrators never implemented planned

attempts to use biological agents, even if their intentions were kept secret.

• Threatened use (no confirmed possession): This category includes cases in which

the perpetrators threatened to use biological agents, but subsequent investigations

determined that they did not possess biological agents. This category also includes

cases in which it was never determined whether the perpetrator possessed a

biological agent.

• Threatened use (anthrax hoaxes): This category includes cases in which the

perpetrators threatened use of anthrax, or in which the recipient interpreted the

threat to involve anthrax. These cases were separated from those in the previous

category because of the substantial number of anthrax hoaxes.

3. Possession of biological agents (no use or threat to use)

• Confirmed possession: Cases in which authoritative sources confirmed that the

perpetrators possessed biological agents. In these cases, no attempt was made to use

the agents, and there was no known threat to use the agents.

• Probable or possible possession: There is no authoritative confirmation that the

perpetrators possessed biological agents. In these cases, no attempt was made to use

the agents, and no threats of use were made.

4. Others

• Interest in acquisition: The perpetrators expressed an interest in acquiring

biological agents, but never actually acquired the agent in these cases. In some

cases, the interest was slight, while in other cases the perpetrators actually attempted

to acquire the agent. In these cases, the perpetrators also never made threats to

employ biological agents.

• False cases: Some source incorrectly identified a case as an example of biological

agent use. In some instances, it is unclear if the alleged event ever took place. In

other cases, something may have happened, but a biological agent was not involved.

In yet other cases, law enforcement officials believed that perpetrators were

engaged in illegal activity, but the evidence failed to support the accusations.

The cases are discussed in reverse chronological order, starting with the most recent.

Chapter 5:

Use of Biological Agents

Confirmed Use

In these cases, the use of a biological agent was confirmed by some authoritative source, either a

court, a law enforcement agency, or by a credible government official.

Case 1997-06: Unknown New Zealand farmers, August 1997

On August 26, 1997, New Zealand’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) confirmed that it

had identified the presence of rabbit hemorrhagic disease (RHD) in areas of the country’s South Island.

According to MAF’s Chief Veterinary Officer, “It appears that this disease has been deliberately and illegally

introduced by people wanting to use it as a biocontrol tool.”

Australian farmers use RHD to kill feral rabbits

as an animal control tool.

Earlier in 1997, a group of agricultural organizations mounted an effort to gain MAF approval to

import RHD from Australia and use it to reduce the feral rabbit population on farms in New Zealand. This

application was rejected on July 2, 1997, after considerable scientific review.

An appeal was turned down on

August 19, 1997.

New Zealand authorities believe that someone smuggled RHD into New Zealand, probably from

Australia, and introduced it into rabbit population. Farmers apparently told journalists that the RHD had been

brought into the country two months before the release.

Some farmers indicated that introduction of RHD

into New Zealand was inevitable, whatever the government decided.

Government officials apparently

believed that illegal introduction was likely, and took steps to deal with such an eventuality. Significantly, no

attempts were made to address farmers’ concerns about the need for effective rabbit control that would

motivate such an illegal act.

Although it is not known who originally introduced the RHD, other farmers admitted to further

propagating the disease. According to press reports, farmers spent six weeks prior to the identification of the

outbreak perfecting their dissemination techniques. They mixed in a blender the liver, spleen, and hearts of

infected rabbits with 100 milliliters of water. Initially, the farmers injected this mixture into rabbits, but found

New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, “RCD Confirmed in South Island,” August 26, 1997, as it appears in the

ministry’s World Wide Web site, http://www.maf.govt.nz/. An interesting discussion of this episode is provided in notes prepared for a

presentation given at Plum Island by Graham Mackereth, “Rabbit Haemorrhagic Virus (RHDV)—The New Zealand experience,” National

Centre for Disease Investigation, New Zealand, August 1998. The author is grateful to Terrance M. Wilson, D.V.M., Ph.D., for providing a

copy of this paper.

Rabbit hemorrhagic disease (RHD) or rabbit hemorrhagic viral disease (RHVD) was called rabbit calicivirus disease (RCD) in

Australia and New Zealand. The Australian government adopted the name RCD because it claimed that the pathogen involved technically

did not cause a hemorrhagic disease. The government of New Zealand followed the Australian example. Others rejected RCD as a name

because this disease is not the only calicivirus known to infect rabbits, and thus lacks specificity. Australia has invested considerable effort

into a program to use RCD as a rabbit control tool, and some critics claim that the disease was renamed to make its use more palatable to

the public. For a description of the use of RCD as a rabbit control tool, see the web site maintained by the Australia and New Zealand

Rabbit Calicivirus Disease Program at http://www.csiro.au/communication/rabbits/qarabbit.htm. In 1999, governments decided to revert to

the name RHD after some European scientists discovered another organism that causes similar symptoms and named it rabbit calicivirus

disease. See “A disease by any other name,” The Press (New Zealand), February 11, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web

site, “The Press On-Line: New Zealand News,” at http://www.press.co.nz. All newspaper references were taken from this web site.

New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, “MAF Says "No" To RCD As Rabbit Control in New Zealand,” July 2,

1997, as it appears on the ministry’s World Wide Web site, http://www.maf.govt.nz/.

Michael Rentoul, “Govt likely to abandon RCD fight,” The Press (New Zealand), August 30, 1997.

“Farmers’ reaction,” The Press (New Zealand), July 3, 1997.

Mackereth, “Rabbit Haemorrhagic Virus (RHDV).”

that the disease spread too slowly. They then put the mixed the material with carrots and oats to attract rabbits,

and then spread the infected bait in areas heavily infested with rabbits.

After the presence of the disease was discovered, MAF made a largely ineffective effort to prevent the

organism from spreading. For about a week the ministry attempted to quarantine the infected area. The MAF

deployed 15 of its people to the area, and 30 police supported them. Roadblocks were established to prevent

the movement of any “rabbits or rabbit-related material” from the quarantine zone.

This effort collapsed,

however, as the ministry found that the disease was spreading more quickly than it could be contained. This

appears to have led to a reevaluation of government policy towards RHD.

The response of the New Zealand government to the illegal introduction of RHD was extremely

confused. There were substantial divisions within the New Zealand government. Some ministers wanted to

eradicate the disease. Others accepted that the disease had been introduced and advocated adopting it as an

animal control measure. There also appear to have been disagreements within the government over

interpretations of the laws that regulated biological agents.

Initially, the government threatened to prosecute anyone involved in the introduction or spread of the

disease. Subsequently, however, the government adopted a softer line. The MAF took the position that under

the terms of the Biosecurity Act, New Zealand could not prosecute those involved in spreading the disease by

using agent obtained from New Zealand rabbits. Consequently, the government decided to change its

regulations and legalize use of the disease under the terms of the Biosecurity Act.

MAF initially took the position that the government had no authority to prevent someone from

spreading a pathogen by using infected animal parts, as the farmers had admitted to doing. However, the

Crown Law Office reportedly determined that provisions of the Animals Act made any possession of RHD

illegal. In addition, the Crown Law Office also determined that the Biosecurity Act prohibited intentional

spreading of RHD. However, because of the contrary advice given by MAF, the government determined that it

could not prosecute violators of the laws.

MAF continued its efforts to identify the perpetrators, and signaled its intent to prosecute anyone

involved either in smuggling RHD into the country or in releasing the original agent.

To determine who was

responsible for introducing the agent into the country, MAF staff began interviewing “every rabbit-plagued

farmer” in the areas where the disease first appeared.

100

Despite the introduction of the disease into New Zealand, MAF continued to oppose importing RHD

from Australia. The ministry argued that the strains of the disease already present in New Zealand were

proving effective in killing rabbits. It also claimed that there was no evidence indicating that the RHD in New

Zealand could lose its virulence. Finally, the government asserted that it was impractical to rely on imported

Australian seed stock for logistics reasons.

101

In February 1998, however, the New Zealand government

decided to legalize the use of RHD for rabbit control.

102

As of late 1997, the government of New Zealand had not identified those responsible for introducing

the RHD virus into the country.

103

According to one press report, apparently relying on the statements of New

Zealand farmers, the person responsible for importing the disease was not from New Zealand.

104

Case 1996-05: Diane Thompson, October 1996

On October 29, 1996, twelve people who worked in the laboratory of the St. Paul Medical Center

hospital in Dallas, Texas, were deliberately infected with Shigella dysenteriae type 2, a rare strain of shigella

that causes diarrhea. Another person became ill after consuming a pastry brought home by one of the

John Keast, “Rabbit smoothies help spread virus,” The Press (New Zealand), August 30, 1997. These accounts are confirmed

by New Zealand government officials. See Mackereth, “Rabbit Haemorrhagic Virus (RHDV).”

“Outbreak dispatches from the RCD zone,” The Press (New Zealand), September 6, 1997.

New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, “MAF Clarified Legal Stance on RCD Prosecutions,” September 5, 1997,

as found on the ministry’s World Wide Web site at http://www.maf.govt.nz/. See also New Zealand Government, “Government Response

To The Outbreak of RCD,” September 9, 1997.

100

“MAF still investigating RCD,” Southland Times, September 17, 1997.

101

New Zealand Government, “Government Response To The Outbreak of RCD,” September 9, 1997, as found at

http://www.maf.govt.nz/.

102

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, “Pesticides Board Grants Experimental Use Permit for RCD,” February 26, 1998, as

found at http://www.maf.govt.nz/.

103

“Introduction Probe Continues,” The Southland Press, November 12, 1997.

104

John Keast, “Silence of the rabbits,” The Press, July 25, 1998.

laboratory workers. Four people became sufficiently sick to be hospitalized and five other victims went to

emergency rooms for treatment. There were no fatalities.

105

Reportedly, an e-mail message was sent to the laboratory personnel inviting them to eat some pastries

that were available in the laboratory’s lunchroom. There were two boxes of pastries with blueberry muffins and

an assortment of doughnuts. The lunchroom was always locked and was accessible only to those with the

combination. Eleven of the workers ate pastries between 7:15 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. The twelfth victim took a

muffin home and shared it at 7:00 p.m. The victims started to become sick at 9:00 p.m. All were ill by 4:00

a.m. on November 1. Everyone who ate a pastry became ill.

106

Clinical tests revealed that eight of the victims were infected with S. dysenteriae. Tests of a muffin

saved by one of the victims revealed that it was contaminated with the same pathogen. The muffin was given

to police investigating the case, and taken to a laboratory at the Texas Department of Health. Comparisons

indicated that there was an extremely high probability that the victims had the same strain of the organism as

was identified in the muffin. Investigators learned that the laboratory had a vial containing beads impregnated

with S. dysenteriae type 2 of the same strain. Some of the beads apparently were missing.

107

In addition to the epidemiological study, the St. Paul Medical Center Police also launched an

investigation into the incident. Their attention was focused on a 25-year old laboratory technician, Diane

Thompson, who had ready access to the laboratory’s shigella culture.

108

During the investigation in the shigella outbreak, hospital police learned that a year before a boyfriend

of Thompson, John P. Richey, had suffered from similar symptoms.

109

Richey met Diane Thompson in January

1994, when the two worked at the Harris Methodist Hospital in Ft. Worth, Texas. The two began dating.

Although Richey tried to end the relationship in September 1995, he continued to see Thompson because his

parents were fond of her. The next month, Richey became ill with what his physician diagnosed as strep throat.

He was treated with an antibiotic and initially seemed to get better. A few days later, however, he developed

diarrhea and a fever, and, on the night of October 20, he went to the emergency room at St. Paul’s Medical

Center after developing severe chest pains. Richey’s condition continued to worsen. On October 26, he was

admitted to the hospital suffering from severe dehydration. According to information subsequently uncovered

by investigators, Thompson falsified Richey’s laboratory tests. She apparently went to the hospital’s

microbiology laboratory and replaced Richey’s stool sample with one from someone who was not infected. In

this way, she hoped to ensure that the physicians treating Richey would not learn of his infection.

According to Richey’s statements to investigators, he became suspicious of Thompson’s behavior at

this time. She apparently brought him a glass of water while he was in the hospital, and became agitated when

he refused to drink it. After being released from the hospital, she brought him a bottle of Gatorade, which he

refused to use when he came to suspect that Thompson was trying to conceal that she had previously opened it.

A few days later, Thompson gave Richey some lasagna to take to work for lunch. Sometime after eating it,

Richey again became sick. As before, he was treated with antibiotics. The next night, Thompson convinced

Richey to allow her to take a blood sample so that she could analyze it at the hospital. Approximately an hour

later, his arm began to get sore. Later that evening Thompson’s hospital supervisor called to tell him that his

blood was filled with bacteria and that he should go to the emergency room. He was again treated with

105

The primary sources used in preparing this account are the Affidavit of Warrant for Arrest, St. Paul Medical Center Police,

November 8, 1996, as provided by Nancy J. Cutler, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas County District Attorney’s Office, and S. A.

Kolavic, et al., “An Outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 Among Laboratory Workers Due to Intentional Food Contamination,” JAMA

(Journal of the American Medical Association), August 6, 1997, pp. 396-398. An earlier presentation of the JAMA study was given in

“Outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae 2 among Hospital Laboratory Workers—Texas,” a presentation by Dr. Shellie A. Kolavic at the 46th

Annual Epidemic Intelligence Service Conference, April 18, 1997, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. The

hospital’s name is not given in the CDC reports, but is identified as the St. Paul Medical Center in the affidavit and multiple press

accounts. See “Spiking of doughnuts with rare bacteria probed by FBI,” San Diego Union-Tribune, November 12, 1996, p. A4, and the

Houston Chronicle, November 11, 1996. The Houston Chronicle citation was drawn from the newspaper’s World Wide Web site at

http://www.chron.com.

106

The e-mail was sent from a supervisor’s computer at a time when the supervisor was out of the office. See Kolavic, et al.,

“An Outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 Among Laboratory Workers Due to Intentional Food Contamination,” p. 397.

107

Kolavic, et al., “An Outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 Among Laboratory Workers Due to Intentional Food

Contamination,” pp. 397-398, and the Affidavit of Warrant for Arrest. The origin of the laboratory’s S. dysenteriae type 2 culture is not

known. Investigators believe that it may have been obtained from a patient and then used for training purposes at a time when the

laboratory was used as a training facility.

108

Published accounts do not indicate why investigators focused on Thompson.

109

The details of Richey’s involvement are taken from Affidavit of Warrant for Arrest, St. Paul Medical Center Police,

November 8, 1996.

antibiotics. Richey believed that Thompson contaminated a syringe with bacteria before using it to draw his

blood.

During the next month and a half, Richey had his tires slashed five times and sugar was put into his

car’s fuel tank. At that point, Richey moved to Corpus Christie to get away from Thompson. He told

investigators that he made the move to get away from Thompson, and that he was extremely afraid of her.

Richey claimed that Thompson subsequently admitted to him that she was responsible for his illnesses. This

statement was corroborated by statements made by two of Thompson’s co-workers at the hospital.

110

Because of the police investigation, Thompson was arrested on November 8, 1996 for allegedly

falsifying documentation related to the laboratory.

111

A Dallas County grand jury indicted her on counts of

tampering with a government document and aggravated assault on January 14, 1997.

112

At the time, authorities

claimed that she intentionally contaminated food eaten by her boyfriend with the shigella organisms. She was

released from jail after paying bail set at $15,000.

113

On August 28, 1997, Thompson was indicted by the State of Texas on three charges of tampering

with a food product. She was accused of infecting 12 people with Shigella dysenteriae Type 2. The maximum

penalty for each charge is life imprisonment. According to press reports, a federal criminal investigation was

also launched.

114

Thompson was found guilty on five felony assault charges and to falsifying documents related to the

infection of her boyfriend. She was sentenced to twenty years in prison.

115

Case 1995-02: Debora Green, August 1995

On April 17, 1996, Dr. Debora Green pleaded no contest to two charges of murder and two charges of

attempted murder. One of the attempted murder charges was based on a claim that she had tried to use ricin to

poison her estranged husband, Dr. Michael Farrar.

116

She had earlier pleaded not guilty to those charges. After

prosecutors indicated that they would seek the death penalty, she negotiated a plea bargain that eliminated any

chance she would be sentenced to death. Instead, she was sentenced to life with a provision that she will be

eligible for parole only after serving 40 years.

117

Farrar is a cardiologist, who was then in the process of getting a divorce from Green, an oncologist.

The two had three children. Green apparently was a heavy drinker, and appeared to suffer from a severe

psychiatric disorder. A psychologist who examined Green claimed that she was “a very, very immature

person” who had “the emotional capability of a 1-year-old.”

118

On August 17, 1995, Farrar was hospitalized with a mysterious illness that almost killed him. He had

come down with the symptoms about a week earlier. Initially, his physicians thought he might have contracted

an unusual tropical disease during a July 1995, trip to Peru, perhaps an unusual form of typhoid. He was

hospitalized twice more in the next few weeks.

119

110

Affidavit of Warrant for Arrest.

111

Charles Ornstein, “Lab bacteria put in pastry caused illnesses,” Dalles Morning News, November 11, 1996, p. 20A, and

Houston Chronicle, November 11, 1996.

112

“Grand jury indicts ex-lab worker in poisoning case,” Dallas Morning News, January 28, 1997, p. 14A.

113

Steve Scott, “Ex-hospital worker indicted: She’s accused of tainting muffins, doughnuts that made co-workers ill,” Dallas

Morning News, August 29, 1997, p. 28A.

114

Steve Scott, “Ex-hospital worker indicted: She’s accused of tainting muffins, doughnuts that made co-workers ill,” Dallas

Morning News, August 29, 1997, p. 28A.

115

“Ex-lab worker tainted food,” Houston Chronicle, September 12, 1998, p. A48. The sentence information comes from

Nancy Cutler in a telephone communication.

116

“Mother pleads in children’s murder,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 18, 1996, as found on the newspaper’s web site,

http://www.stlnet.com. For a lengthy account of this case, see Ann Rule, Bitter Harvest: A Woman’s Fury, A Mother’s Sacrifice (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).

117

Tony Rizzo, “Green gets life sentence,” Kansas City Star, May 31, 1996. These articles were found at

http://www.kcstar.com.

118

Tony Rizzo, “Green gets life sentence,” Kansas City Star, May 31, 1996.

119

Tony Rizzo, “Fire inquiry examined possible poisoning,” Kansas City Star, November 9, 1995, Richard Espinoza, “Mother

accused of arson is moved,” Kansas City Star, November 25, 1995. Additional details appear in Rule, Bitter Harvest, pp. 74-78. According

to Rule’s account, the first poisoning incident apparently occurred on August 11, when Green fed Farrar a chicken salad sandwich that

tasted “a little bitter.” Farrar became extremely ill, but appeared to be getting better until his symptoms worsened on August 18, when he

was hospitalized. He remained in the hospital until August 25. The second incident apparently occurred that same day after he ate a

spaghetti dinner served by Green. He was hospitalized again three or four hours after eating the meal. Finally, on the evening of September

4 he was again put into the hospital after the symptoms returned.

The cause of his illness was only clarified in late September. After a bitter argument with his wife,

during which she became extremely abusive, Farrar called police. She was taken into custody at that time, and

Farrar tried to have her committed. She was released after voluntarily spending four days at the Menninger

Institute.

At the time of her detention, Farrar gave the police eight packages of castor beans, which he had

removed from her purse. Some of the packages were empty. Only a few days before, on September 20 or 22, a

garden store sold her ten identical packages of castor beans. The store’s assistant manager remembered the

transaction because of the need to special order the beans. Because castor plants are quick-growing annuals,

they must be replanted every year. Normally, the seeds are purchased only at the start of the growing season,

and to obtain the seeds so late in the year meant getting them from the store’s main office.

120

On the night of October 24, after Farrar informed Green that he was seeking custody of their three

children, Green set fire to their house to kill the children. Two died in the fire, and the third escaped only by

climbing out of a second story window. Believing that the fire was arson, an investigation was launched, and

Green was arrested for killing her children. She also was charged with attempting to poison her husband.

Analysis by the FBI laboratory found antibodies in Farrar’s blood that proved he had been poisoned with

ricin.

121

Police apparently believe that he was poisoned on three occasions when Green served him meals

during August and September.

122

Farrar was hospitalized after each suspected poisoning. In addition, he required additional

hospitalization in the months following the attacks. According to Farrar’s doctors, the ricin perforated his

gastrointestinal tract, leading to metastatic infections of the heart (endocarditis) and brain (abscesses), both of

which required surgical intervention.

123

It is not known how Green prepared the beans prior to contaminating Farrar’s food. Despite pleading

guilty, Green has refused to describe how Farrar was poisoned. In fact, she now blames the poisoning on her

dead son.

124

The poisoning could have been done in one of two ways. If castor beans are eaten intact, they are

not poisonous, since the shell does not contain ricin and is sufficiently rugged to survive a passage through the

digestive tract.

125

Accordingly, either Green must have prepared the beans in a way that exposed the ricin

inside or she extracted the ricin from the beans and then added the toxin to the food. Any evidence of her

activities might have been destroyed when she set her house on fire.

120

From the testimony of Kyle Shipps and Leighann Stahl during Green’s preliminary hearing, State of Kansas vs. Debora

Green – 95CR5387, pp. 207-265. Paul J. Morrison, District Attorney, Tenth Judicial District, and his executive assistant, Terri L. Issa,

provided selected transcripts from these hearings. See also Tony Rizzo, “Green to stand trial in children’s death,” Kansas City Star,

February 2, 1996.

Green must have made at least one previous purchase of caster beans to use in August and early September when she

apparently poisoned Farrar. There is no indication that law enforcement officials were able to identify such purchases.

121

See the testimony of FBI supervisory special agent Drew Campbell Richardson at Dr. Green’s preliminary hearing, pp. 395-

402. According to Richardson (pp. 417-418), this may have been the first time that the FBI laboratory did an immunoassay of a blood

sample. He noted that during the 1980s, the laboratory did gain some experience in assaying solid ricin samples, but that different

techniques are needed to detect the antibodies created in response to an exposure to ricin. The FBI laboratory received technical advice

from the Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland.

122

Tony Rizzo, “Fire inquiry examined possible poisoning,” Kansas City Star, November 9, 1995.

123

Richard Espinoza, “Mother accused of arson is moved,” Kansas City Star, November 25, 1995, Tony Rizzo, “Green gets life

sentence,” Kansas City Star, May 31, 1996.

124

Telephone interview with Paul Morrison, Johnson County District Attorney, September 15, 1997. Green repeated this

allegation in her interview with Ann Rule. See Rule, Bitter Harvest, p. 343.

125

Julia F. Morton, “Poisonous and Injurious Higher Plants and Fungi,” p. 1502, in C.G. Tedeschi, William G. Eckert, and

Luke G. Tedeschi, editors, Forensic Medicine: A study in trauma and environment, Volume III: Environmental Hazards (Philadelphia: W.

B. Saunders, 1977). According to “Castor Beans (Ricinus Communis L),” pp. 1847-1849, in Matthew J. Ellenhorn, et al., editors,

Ellenhorn’s Medical Toxicology: Diagnosis and Treatment of Human Poisoning, 2nd Edition (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, A Waverly

Company, 1997), the lethal dose of ricin is about 1 microgram per kilogram (µg/kg) of body weight. This corresponds to about eight beans,

depending on the size of the beans. Other sources give different doses. Thus, Medical Management of Biological Casualties, Appendix,

estimates 3-5 µg/kg.

A distinctly different perspective on castor bean toxicity is offered by Albert Rauber and Julia Heard, “Castor Bean Toxicity

Reexamined: A New Perspective,” Veterinary and Human Toxicology, Vol. 27 (December 1965), pp. 498-502. These authors reviewed the

available data on castor bean poisoning, drawing on data from poison control centers. They collected reports discussing 751 cases, and

calculated that there was a 1.8 per cent fatality rate. Excluding the oldest cases, from a study published in 1906 that identified a 6 per cent

case fatality rate, leads to a fatality rate of only 0.8 per cent. Modern standards of medical treatment probably account for much of the

discrepancy. They conclude that while “capable of causing severe disease … a pessimistic prognosis will rarely be warranted.”

Case 1994-04: Richard J. Schmidt, August 1994

On October 23, 1998, a Lafayette, Louisiana, jury voted 10-2 to convict Richard J. Schmidt of

attempted second-degree murder. Schmidt could have received a prison sentence of between 10 and 50

years.

126

The trial judge sentenced Schmidt to 50 years in prison.

127

Schmidt was accused of injecting a former lover, Janice Trahan, with HIV-infected blood. Schmidt, a

married gastroenterologist, resisted efforts by the victim to end a ten-year-old affair. According to authorities,

Schmidt gave the injection on the night of August 4, 1994. Schmidt regularly gave vitamin B-12 injections to

Trahan. According to the prosecution, Schmidt made a quick visit that evening to the victim’s house after first

calling to determine that she was home. He found her already in bed, and offered to give her a vitamin

injection. She refused. District Attorney Michael Hanson gave the following account of what happened next.

“Before she could do anything more, he jab her in the left arm. She has never even sees the hypodermic. Next

thing, he’s leaving almost immediately.” That was the last time that the two had physical contact. Trahan

developed symptoms about a month later. Laboratory tests confirmed that she was infected with HIV. The

accused denied the charges and claimed that the alleged victim was trying to “ruin his life with this charge.”

128

The prosecution argued that laboratory tests demonstrated that Trahan contracted the same strain of

HIV as found in one of Schmidt’s patients. The defense attempted to keep the scientific data concerning the

DNA typing of the HIV strains out of the trial. Louisiana courts rejected the defense request, and allowed the

prosecutors to make use of it.

129

Case 1993-03: “Iwan E.”, June 1992

In May 1994, a Dutch man, identified in court only as “Iwan E.” was given a ten-year prison sentence

for injecting his former girlfriend, identified only as “Gina O.”, with 2-5 milliliters of HIV-contaminated

blood. The blood was drawn from an HIV-positive friend of the perpetrator. According to prosecutors, “Iwan

E.” acted in June 1992 after “Gina O.” broke up with him. The defense argued that the defendant was acting in

self-defense, because “Gina O.” had threatened to stab him with a knife during an argument. Three months

after the injection, she was diagnosed as HIV-positive. Following the trial, the District Court issued a statement

that said, “The defendant has attacked the victim’s life in an extremely aggressive way and has violated her

physical and mental integrity.”

130

Case 1992-05: Brian T. Stewart, February 1992

On April 22, 1998, Brian T. Stewart was arrested on charges of deliberately infecting his own son

with HIV. He was arraigned the next day in St. Charles County, Missouri, charged with first-degree assault,

and ordered to post a $500,000 bond to be released from jail. Stewart pleaded innocent to the charges, which

could result in a life sentence.

131

Prosecutors believe that Stewart injected the boy with HIV-contaminated blood on February 6, 1992,

when the then 11 month-old baby was being treated for a respiratory ailment at the St. Joseph’s Medical

Center-West in Lake Saint Louis. According to press accounts, he was seen carrying a lab coat into his son’s

room. It is alleged that he then injected the blood into his son. The coat was of a type not typically worn at that

time of year. According to St. Charles County Prosecutor Tim Braun, “The inference that we would have is

that he had blood in there, and if somebody looked in the pocket of the coat, he would say, ‘Oh, I had that left

over from my other job’ or ‘I forgot to take that out’.” Stewart allegedly told one witness something like, “You

don’t have to worry about me paying child support because the child won’t live long enough.”

132

126

Bruce Schultz, “Jury says physician tried to kill lover with HIV injection,” Baton Rouge Advocate, October 24, 1998, pp. 1-

b, 3-b [Acadiana edition].

127

Bruce Schultz, “Judge sentences Lafayette doctor to 50 years in HIV case,” Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), February

18, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.theadvocate.com.

128

“Doctor accused of Injecting His Girlfriend with HIV,” Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1996, p. A17.

129

“Appeals Court Takes HIV Case Under Advisement,” Sun Herald (Biloxi, Mississippi), May 5, 1997.

130

A medical account of the case appears in Jan Veenstra, et al., “Transmission of Zidovudine-Resistant Human

Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Variants Following Deliberate Injection of Blood from a Patient with AIDS: Characteristics and Natural

History of the Virus,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 21 (September 1995), pp. 556-560. “Man Jailed For 10 Years For Injecting

Girlfriend with HIV Virus,” Associated Press, AP Worldstream, May 26, 1994, 9:50 a.m. Eastern Time. See also, “Aids attack,” Times

(London), May 12, 1994, p. 10.

131

Michele Munz, “Stewart arraigned on charges of injecting son,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 23, 1998. Articles were taken

from the newspaper’s web site at http://www.stlnet.com.

132

“Mother in HIV case pleads for privacy,” CNN, April 24, 1998, as found at http://www.cnn.com.

Stewart worked as a phlebotomist, a medical technician who draws blood from patients. At the time

of the alleged incident, Stewart was working at Barnes Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. Authorities apparently

believe that he obtained blood from an HIV-infected patient, and took that blood to the hospital where his son

was being treated.

133

The boy was born thirteen months after Stewart met the mother in January 1990. The two were

married in July 1993, and divorced in 1996. Stewart apparently refused to pay child support for the boy after

the two separated, claiming that he had not fathered the boy. Subsequently, the courts were convinced by

laboratory tests that he was the father, and ordered him to pay child support.

134

The boy was extremely sick as a baby, but his physicians were unable to determine the cause. Finally,

in May 1996, when he was five years old and in extremely ill health, they determined that he was suffering

from AIDS. At that point, social workers at St. Louis Children’s Hospital informed police of the case, and an

investigation was launched. According to St. Charles County Sheriff Douglas Saulters, law enforcement

officials spent two years investigating the case. They ruled out alternative causes, but admitted that the

evidence was largely circumstantial.

135

At the end of a two-day hearing, held May 26-27, 1998, Judge Jon Cunningham ruled that the

prosecution had sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial. The defense attorney argued that the boy could

have contracted AIDS either because of the medical treatments that he received or by coming into contact with

an infected needle.

136

On December 8, 1988, a jury found Stewart guilty of the charges after deliberating for only seven

hours.

137

In early January 1999, the trial judge sentenced Stewart to life imprisonment, the maximum sentence

for first-degree assault. The case is currently under appeal.

138

Case 1990-04: Graham Farlow, July 1990

In July 1990, an Australian prison warder, Geoffrey Pearce, was injected with HIV-contaminated

blood by Graham Farlow, an inmate in a prison in New South Wales. Pearce was treated with zidovudine, also

known as AZT. Nevertheless, four weeks after the attack laboratory tests detected the presence of HIV in

Pearce’s blood. Farlow was asymptomatic at the time he injected Pearce. Nine months later, however, Farlow

was diagnosed with AIDS. He died two months later. Soon after the assault, Farlow was charged with assault

and malicious wounding. He could not be charged with murder because the then-existing law required the

victim to die within one year and one day of the alleged assault. Farlow died before he could be tried. Pearce

died in 1997.

139

Case 1990-01: Aum Shinrikyo, April 1990-March 1995

The Japanese group responsible for the 1995 dissemination of sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway

system, a religious cult known as the Aum Shinrikyo, also produced biological agents and tried to use them.

140

In fact, it appears that the group attempted to master biological agents before focusing on chemical agents.

133

Kristina Sauerwein, “Someone with access, intent can defy lab security,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 26, 1998.

134

William C. Lhotka and Lance Williams, “Man Accused of Giving Son HIV is Described as a Drifter,” St. Louis Post-

Dispatch, April 26, 1998.

135

Jim Salter, “Dad May have Injected Son with AIDS,” Associated Press, April 24, 1998, 2:29 a.m.

136

Michele Munz, “Trial is ordered for man accused of giving son AIDS,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 28, 1998, Michele

Munz, “Lawyer suggests other ways boy could have gotten AIDS,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 27, 1998, Jim Salter, Associated Press,

May 28, 1998, 12:57 a.m. EDT, and Jim Salter, Associated Press, May 26, 1998, 10:27 p.m. EDT.

137

Michele Munz, “Father is found guilty of giving his son an HIV-tainted injection,” ,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 6,

1998.

138

Jim Salter, “Father of AIDS-infected child is sentenced,” Associated Press, January 9, 1999.

139

Philip D. Jones, “HIV transmission by stabbing despite zidovudine prophylaxis” [letter], Lancet, Vol. 338 (October 5, 1981),

p. 884. According to Jones, he could find no previous reports in which the “malicious transmission” of HIV occurred through use of HIV-

infected blood in a syringe. For other press accounts, see “Prison Guard says he got AIDS virus after attack,” Los Angeles Times,

September 1, 1990, p. A24, “Prisoner charged with AIDS-poisoning of warder dies from AIDS,” Reuters North American Wire, April 27,

1991, PM cycle, Robert Milliken, “Sydney warders strike over HIV needle attacks,” Independent (London), September 17, 1990, p. 14,

“AIDS-attack victim prison officer dies in Australia,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 2, 1997, BC cycle, 02:42 Central European

Time, and Rob Taylor, “Prison officer dies after seven year AIDS battle,” AAP, September 1, 1997.

140

This account is based primarily on David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York:

Crown Publishers, 1996), supplemented by Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted

World,” New York Times, May 26, 1998, pp. A1, A10, which provides new details of alleged Aum activities. See also D.W. Brackett, Holy

Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996) and Staff Statement, “Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

A charismatic guru who called himself Shoko Asahara founded Aum Shinrikyo. Asahara built the cult

into a massive empire with a membership of approximately 10,000 with financial assets of at least US $300

million.

141

Aum was organized into Ministries and Departments, mimicking the structure of the Japanese

government. Of particular importance for the biological warfare activity was the Ministry of Science and

Technology, headed by Hideo Murai, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, headed by Seichi Endo. Murai

had graduated from Osaka University with a degree in astrophysics, and then worked for Kobe Steel doing

research and development. Endo had researched genetic engineering at Kyoto University’s Viral Research

Center.

142

According to one report, Endo first investigated Clostridium botulinum, which they obtained from

environmental samples acquired near the Tokachi River on Hokkaido, the northern-most of the main Japanese

islands.

143

By early April 1990, the Aum thought that it had made considerable progress in its efforts to develop

botulinum toxin as a biological agent. A production facility was built at the cult’s Mount Fuji facility.

Unfortunately, when Endo tested the toxin, it failed to affect test rats. Aum’s researchers also were attempting

to produce an antitoxin using horse sera. This work was conducted by the group’s Mount Aso laboratory. A

stable was built for the horses used in the research.

144

Sometime in mid-1993, the cult completed work on a new biological research facility, which was

located on the highest floor of an eight-story office building that Aum owned in the eastern part of Tokyo. At

this location, Aum worked on Bacillus anthracis. On the adjacent roof of the building, a larger industrial

sprayer was built to disseminate the anthrax.

145

In addition to botulinum toxin and anthrax, the Aum also was believed to have experimented with Q

fever and the spores from a poisonous mushroom.

146

In 1992, Aum sent a team of 40 people to Zaire to acquire

Ebola. Led by Asahara himself, the team included doctors and nurses. During an outbreak of Ebola in Zaire, a

Japanese tourist visiting that country may have contracted the hemorrhagic fever. This report, which received

considerable publicity in Japan, apparently inspired Asahara to mount the expedition to Zaire in October 1992.

Ostensibly, this trip was intended as a humanitarian mission, called the “African Salvation Tour.” It is not

known if Aum actually obtained Ebola cultures. A Japanese magazine quoted a former member of the group,

“We were cultivating Ebola, but it needed to be studied more. It can’t be used practically yet.”

147

Press accounts suggest that Aum attempted to use aerosolized biological agents against nine targets,

two with anthrax and seven with botulinum toxin.

148

• In April 1990, the Aum Shinrikyo outfitted three vehicles to disseminate botulinum

toxin. One vehicle was driven through central Tokyo, spraying the toxin, with the

Japan’s parliament, the Diet, the main target. Another vehicle reportedly was

directed against two targets: the town of Yokohama and the Yokosuka naval base,

the U.S. Navy’s most important facility in the east Pacific. The third vehicle

allegedly was used in the area of the Narita International Airport, one of Japan’s

most important airports.

• In early June 1993, the cult attempted to disrupt the planned wedding of Prince

Naruhito, Japan’s Crown Prince, by spreading botulinum toxin in downtown Tokyo

using a specially equipped automobile.

A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,” pp. 47-102, in Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

141

Kevin Sullivan, “Japan Cult Survives While Guru Is Jailed,” Washington Post, September 28, 1997, p. A21. Other sources

provide much larger estimates. According to Staff Statement, “Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the

Aum Shinrikyo,” pp. 54, 57-58, puts the membership at 40,000 to 60,000, including an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 in Russia, and the total

financial resources at about US $1 billion.

142

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, pp. 51-53.

143

WuDunn, Miller, and Broad, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” p. A10.

144

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, p. 97.

145

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, pp. 94-95.

146

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, p. 151.

147

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, p. 97. Staff Statement, “Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,” pp. 63-64, indicates that the Endo mentioned Ebola as a biological agent in a

December 1994 radio broadcast from Moscow.

148

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, pp. 58-59, 93-94, 94-96, and pp. 234-236, and WuDunn, Miller, and

Broad, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” p. A10.

• In late June 1993, the cult attempted to spread anthrax in Tokyo using a sprayer

system on the roof of an Aum-owned building in east Tokyo.

• Sometime in July 1993, an attempt was made to contaminate the area around the

Diet in central Tokyo using a truck modified to disseminate anthrax.

• Later in July 1993, another attempt was made to disseminate anthrax in the area

around the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. A truck-based system was used in this

operation as well.

• On March 15, 1995, the Aum planted in the Tokyo subway three briefcases

designed to release botulinum toxin.

149

Apparently, the individual responsible for

filling the botulinum toxin had qualms about the planned attack and substituted a

non-toxic substance. The failure of this attack led the cult to use sarin in its March

20, 1995 subway attack.

The Aum scientists apparently made mistakes either in the way they produced or disseminated the

agents, and all the attacks failed. Aum may have relied on a strain of C. botulinum that produced little or no

toxin, and thus may have been incapable of producing the desired effects. The quantities of toxin disseminated

may have been too small to cause lethal effects. The Aum also had problems with their anthrax. According to

Japanese officials, Endo discovered that Aum was using a vaccine strain of the organism, which was

“relatively harmless.” The Aum also had problems with the nozzles on their sprayers clogging. As far as is

known, no one became ill or died from the Aum attempts.

150

Finally, it is reported that the cult murdered some of its own members by feeding them food

contaminated with toxins and pathogens from Endo’s laboratory.

151

Case 1984-02: The Rajneeshees, August-September 1984

In August and September of 1984, a religious cult, known as the Rajneeshees, employed biological

agents against the inhabitants of The Dalles, a small town in Oregon.

152

Consequently, 751 people became sick.

According to an FBI official, this is the only confirmed instance of chemical or biological terrorism to occur in

the United States.

153

Despite its uniqueness, surprisingly little is known of this incident. While often mentioned

in the terrorism literature, the accounts are often inaccurate and always incomplete.

154

For these reasons, an

extended account of the incident is provided here.

149

Staff Statement, “Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 100, shows a drawing of the botulinum

dissemination system. The design appears relatively simple. A vent was cut into the side of the briefcase. There were three cylindrical

reservoirs filled with liquid and three small battery-powered fans above the cylinders. Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World,

p. 235, describe the device in the following way:

The bacillus was held in solution in vinyl tubes, which were mounted on a small ceramic diaphragm. Powered

by dry batteries, this device turned the solution into steam, which was then blown from the brief case by a small

electric fan. The whole system was ultrasonic. The vibration of a passing train was enough to trigger the

mechanism and release a fine spray of botulinus [sic] toxin.

150

WuDunn, Miller, and Broad, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” p. A10. See footnote 28 on page 13 for a discussion

of the quantities of botulinum toxin required to cause fatalities.

151

Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, p. 232.

152

This account is based on a longer paper, “A Case Study in Biological Terrorism: The Rajneesh in Oregon, 1984,” prepared

as part of a project on chemical and biological terrorism sponsored by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for

International Studies. The primary source of information for this account are primary documents obtained in Oregon. Records of the

Oregon Attorney General’s office relating to the legal proceedings against the cult brought by the state of Oregon are in the

Rajneeshpuram case files, 1981-1989, 91A-081, Oregon State Archives (cited as OSA files). In addition, the State of Oregon’s Attorney

General’s office provided copies of certain affidavits, sworn statements, and law enforcement records (cited as AG files). There is

additional material related to the court cases, including testimony in several criminal trials, in the records of the U.S. District Court,

Portland, Oregon (cited as US District Court files). Among the documentation obtained from these sources are statements by several

members of the group who participated in the attacks. Finally, several people provided additional useful material, including the

administrator of the Wasco-Sherman County Public Health Department. There remains a significant gap in the accounts of the cult’s

activities, however, since the key people responsible for the plot never admitted involvement, and never testified or gave statements about

what they did. Accordingly, we do not have accounts written from their perspective.

153

John P. O’Neill, Supervisory Special Agent, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, p. 238, in

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Global Proliferation of Weapons

of Mass Destruction, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

154

Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature, Canadian Security

Intelligence Service, June 1995, p. 39, summarized the published accounts of the incident. Relying on those versions of what happened,

The Rajneeshee cult was created by an Indian guru who called himself the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh.

Founded in the 1960s, by the early 1970s it began to attract a following among young upper middle class

people from Europe and the United States. The Bhagwan was highly charismatic, extremely intelligent, and a

master at manipulating people. By the early 1980s, the Bhagwan, called “Enlightened Master” by his

followers, had thousands of adherents around the world. Many of his followers were wealthy and donated

considerable sums to the group. In addition, the cult made a substantial income from the sale of books and

tapes about the Bhagwan’s teachings.

155

Because of the cult’s controversial beliefs, it became increasingly notorious in India. By 1980,

opposition in Poona, where the cult had its ashram, was growing. For these reasons, the Bhagwan wanted to

move the ashram to a new location. Under the influence of one of his followers, Ma Anand Sheela, an Indian

who went to college in the United States, in 1981 Rajneesh moved to the United States, where he planned to

establish a new ashram. Sheela acquired an Oregon property known as the Big Muddy Ranch, located in

Jefferson and Wasco counties. The most important parts of the ranch were in Wasco County, a largely rural

area with a population of about 20,000. The county seat of Wasco County was a small town, The Dalles, which

in 1985 had a population of about 10,000.

Once the cult settled in Oregon, it proceeded to build a town for its adherents, which they officially

named Rajneeshpuram and unofficially called Rancho Rajneesh. Rajneeshpuram was a legally incorporated

community. As a mark of the status the group obtained, it created a police force, known as the Peace Force,

whose members received training from the state government. For a time, the town even had access to law

enforcement computer databases.

The cult was run in a peculiar fashion. All power derived from the Bhagwan’s authority, even though

he had no direct involvement in the daily operations of the organization. In fact, he was secluded from the

other members except for his daily drive through Rajneeshpuram in one of his Rolls Royce’s. He relied on

Sheela to run the cult, and met with her privately every day to discuss important issues. Sheela controlled the

finances and directed the operations of almost all of the organizations created to administer the cult’s activities,

including the town of Rajneeshpuram. She relied on a small inner circle that directed the operations of Rancho

Rajneesh. Almost all of Sheela’s trusted aides were women, which led members of the cult to refer to the

group’s leaders as “moms”. The more senior of the “moms” were called the “big moms”, although at least one

disaffected Rajneeshee derisively called them the “Dowager Duchesses”.

156

Decision-making was a mixture of authoritarian and collegial. Sheela regularly held meetings in her

private quarters during which many critical decisions were made. She also made decisions on her own, or after

consultation with the Bhagwan, and brooked no opposition. Because she was accountable only to the

Bhagwan, members of the cult had to accept her decisions or risk being expelled from Rajneeshpuram. This

peculiar decision-making style had a significant impact on the group’s move to employ biological agents.

157

When the cult first moved to Oregon, it hoped to establish good relations with the local inhabitants.

Relatively quickly, however, it began to alienate people in the area. Some of the antagonism arose because of

Purver inaccurately reports that the Rajneeshees used the pathogen that causes typhoid fever, Salmonella typhi. In fact they used another

salmonella strain, Salmonella typhimurium, which is a common cause of food poisoning.

155

A considerable amount has been written about the Rajneeshees and their activity in Oregon. Lewis F. Carter, Charisma and

Control in Rajneeshpuram: The role of shared values in the creation of a community (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

provides the best scholarly study of the Rajneeshees in Oregon. Insight into the activities of the cult can be obtained from some of the

autobiographies written by former members of the cult, including Satya Bharti Franklin, The Promise of Paradise: A Woman’s Intimate

Story of the Perils of Life with Rajneesh (Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, 1992) and Hugh Milne, Bhagwan: The God That

Failed (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). Unfortunately, none of the key individuals involved in the use of biological agents has

penned an autobiography. Also useful are accounts written by outsiders who observed the activities of the cult during this period, including

Kirk Braun, Rajneeshpuram: The Unwelcome Society (West Linn, Oregon, Scout Creek Press, 1984), James S. Gordon, The Golden Guru:

The Strange Journey of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (New York: Viking Press, 1988), Donna Quick, The Rajneesh Story: A Place Called

Antelope (Ryderwood, Washington: August Press, 1995), and Bert Webber, Rajneeshpuram: Who Were Its People? (Medford, Oregon:

Webb Research Group, 1990).

156

Sheela’s top lieutenants were Ma Prem Savita, who managed the finances, and Ma Yoga Vidya, who was responsible for

personnel matters, deciding where people worked and lived. Under them was a third tier of five women. “The Dowager Duchesses,”

Oregonian (Portland), June 30, 1985, p. A10, and “Charged,” Oregonian (Portland), December 30, 1985, p. B2.

157

Sheela’s power was not absolute, however, and the presence of potential rivals was a serious threat to her position. The

Bhagwan’s personal household was a danger because it included the only people with more access to the Bhagwan than Sheela herself. It

included the Bhagwan’s personal physician, Devaraj, who Sheela believed was an incompetent who undermined the cult by satisfying the

guru’s drug habit. She also blamed Devaraj for failing to satisfactorily document the supposed health problems that constituted the main

justification for the Bhagwan’s continued presence in the United States. A second threat to Sheela was the so-called “Hollywood Crowd”

composed of wealthy individuals with direct access to the Bhagwan. Ma Prem Hasya, the divorced wife of the man who produced the

movie The Godfather led this group. By 1984 alliances were developing between these two groups. In 1985 Hasya and Devaraj got

married. Hasya became the Bhagwan’s chief of staff after Sheela fled the group in September 1985.

the religious beliefs of the group, which offended those with traditional Christian values. The most significant

problems, however, emerged because of Oregon’s stringent land use laws, which constrained development in

rural areas. To get around the land use laws that threatened to limit efforts to expand Rajneeshpuram, the cult

exploited Oregon’s liberal voter registration laws to seize control of a small town near Rajneeshpuram called

Antelope. This was the turning point in relations between the Rajneeshees and the inhabitants of Wasco

County, because it offended many people whom otherwise cared little about the group. Faced with growing

hostility from the locals, the cult reciprocated with its own aggressive responses, which included such tactics as

filing libel suits against people who spoke out against the group.

By early 1984, the cult was under considerable pressure. The U.S. Attorney’s office in Portland,

Oregon, had taken charge of an immigration investigation that threatened to lead to the deportation of many

cult members, possibly including the Bhagwan. In addition, the office of Oregon’s Attorney General was

conducting an investigation into the legal status of Rajneeshpuram that threatened the continued existence of

the community.

158

Sheela and the other senior Rajneeshees also had come to recognize that the hostility of the Wasco

County Court, the name of the county commission, was a problem. The cult had to obtain permits from the

county for many of its activities, and the county government was becoming increasingly hostile towards the

Rajneeshees. Although the cult could draw on a substantial team of skilled lawyers to contest any unfavorable

decisions by the county government, the opposition of Wasco County was a major impediment in the cult’s

ability to conduct its activities.

Wasco County Court consisted of three elected commissioners. Two commissioners hostile towards

the Rajneeshees were up for reelection in November 1984. In early 1984, Sheela and the Bhagwan decided to

gain control of the Wasco County Court in the November 1984 election. Initially, Sheela focused on the

prospects for large-scale voter, but eventually rejected that approach because investigators would find it too

easy to uncover the fraudulent activity.

159

The group tried to find someone sympathetic towards the cult to run

against the hostile commissioners. This effort failed when they were unable to get enough signatures to have

their preferred candidate placed on the ballot.

160

Finally, Sheela decided that they would make the voters of Wasco County sick before the election so

that they would not be able to vote. According to KD, after the meeting in which she raised this idea, Sheela

and Puja started looking at books that described “bacteria and other methods to make people ill.”

161

Furthermore, he claimed that Sheela said “she had talked with Bhagwan about the plot to decrease voter turn

out in The Dalles by making people sick. Sheela said that Bhagwan commented that it was best not to hurt

people, but if a few died not to worry.”

162

Sheela also decided that the group would bring thousands of homeless people to Rajneeshpuram from

cities around the country. Oregon had liberal voter registration laws, so that the homeless people would be

eligible to vote in the November election. Sheela was sure that these people could be induced to vote for

candidates favored by the Rajneeshees. This came to be known as the “Share-A-Home” program, which

brought thousands of homeless people to Rajneeshpuram, ostensibly to provide them with a home.

163

We know a great deal about the plot to employ biological agents, because of information provided by

former members of the cult. The most important source was Krishna Diva (the Rajneesh name for David Berry

Knapp), familiarly known as KD. He was the mayor of Rajneeshpuram and thus a part of the cult’s inner

158

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had been investigating the cults activities for several years with little

result. The INS believed that the group was violating U.S. immigration laws by arranging sham marriages between foreigners and U.S.

citizens to ensure that the non-U.S. members could remain at Rajneeshpuram. In addition, the group worried that the INS intended to expel

the Bhagwan because of irregularities in his visa application. The application focused on the Bhagwan’s need for medical treatment in the

United States, which he somehow never bothered to obtain. By 1984, the U.S. Attorney’s office had taken charge of the investigation, and

it had begun to produce results.

In addition, the cult knew that the Oregon’s Attorney General, David Frohnmeyer, was investigating possible violations of

church and state separation. He suspected that the town of Rajneeshpuram was run by the cult for the benefit of the cult, which was not

permitted under Oregon law. Successful prosecution of this case endangered the legal status of Rajneeshpuram and thus the ability of the

cult to operate the town. Without the legal status, the cult; had

159

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, FBI, AG files.

160

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, FBI, AG files.

161

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, FBI, AG files.

162

Report of Interview, Swami Krishna Deva, AKA David Berry Knapp, November 25, 1985, AG files.

163

According to KD, it was either Sheela or KD who came up with the original idea to bring in homeless people as voters. See

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files.

circle.

164

In addition, at least two other people who participated in the use of biological agents gave accounts of

their actions.

About a dozen Rajneeshees were involved in the plots to employ biological agents. At least eleven

people appear to have participated in the planning the operation. No more than four appear to have been

involved in the laboratory activities, although not all of them necessarily were aware of the nefarious

objectives behind the production of the biological agent. At least eight people distributed agent on at least one

occasion.

165

The person most responsible for Rajneeshee activities associated with biological agent acquisition

was a woman who went by the Rajneeshee name of Ma Anand Puja. Puja was closely tied to Sheela almost

from the time she joined the cult in 1979. Born in the Philippines, Puja was raised in California. She became a

family nurse practitioner in 1976 and received a license as a registered nurse the next year. After working in

oncology clinics in the Philippines and Indonesia in 1977, she became restless and began to travel. She joined

the cult after hearing the Bhagwan speak at the ashram in Poona. In April 1980, she became director of the

Shree Rajneesh Ashram Health Center.

166

Puja was secretary-treasurer of the Rajneesh Medical Corporation, and as such was considered a “big

mom”.

167

She had total authority over Rajneeshpuram’s medical facilities, including both the Pythagoras Clinic

and the Pythagoras Pharmacy. Her power also extended beyond the medical realm. For a time, she was a vice

president of the Bhagwan’s church, Rajneesh Foundation International (RFI). According to the Oregonian,

“Puja’s importance in the ranch hierarchy was greater than outsiders may have guessed from the modest post

she held with the medical corporation.”

168

People who encountered Puja found her a sinister figure. She was disliked by members of the

commune, who referred to her as “Dr. Mengeles” after the notorious Nazi concentration camp doctor.

According to a Rajneeshee who worked under Puja from February 1984 to January 1985, “Puja was feared and

disliked by personnel at the RMC. Puja behaved as a tyrant.”

169

Another Rajneeshee who clerked at the RMC

told authorities that Puja was a “loner” who socialized only with Sheela. She even ate her meals alone at her

house.

170

KD recalled that Puja “delighted in death, poisons and the idea of carrying out various plots.”

171

Another member of the cult, who joined in 1972 but was not involved in its illegal activities, had the following

reaction to Puja:

There was something about Puja that sent shivers of revulsion up and down my spine the moment I

met her. There was nothing I could put my finger on beyond her phony, sickeningly sweet smile; it

was years before she became widely-known as the Dr. Mengeles of the sannyas community, the

alleged perpetrator of sadistic medical practices that verged on the criminal; my reaction to her

seemed irrational. … Sheela trusted her implicitly.

172

At least some outsiders shared this impression of Puja.

173

Some former members suspect that Puja was involved in nefarious activities almost from the time she

joined the Rajneeshees. Rumors suggested that she was involved in the June 1980 death of Chinmaya, Sheela’s

first husband, who was sick with Hodgkin’s disease at the time. In addition, some former Rajneeshees believe

164

KD, however, was not in the inner most circles. KD was in the fourth tier of leaders.

165

Based on a review of all the available documentation.

166

“Interviews revealed Puja’s medical background,” Oregonian, October 4, 1985, p. D2. The Oregonian based its account on a

1984 interview with Puja and a 1983 letter that she sent to the INS. She claimed in the letter that for four years she was director of the Kern

County Medical Center outpatient clinic.

167

“The Dowager Duchesses,” Oregonian, June 30, 1985, p. A10.

168

“Profiles: The key Rajneeshees under indictment,” Oregonian, October 29, 1985, p. D3.

169

Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

170

Affidavit for Search Warrant, drafted by Lieutenant Dean Renfrow, Oregon State Police, October 1, 1985, OSA files.

171

From Exhibit E attached to David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, AG files.

172

Franklin, The Promise of Paradise, p. 136.

173

Carla Chamberlain, the administrator of the Wasco-Sherman Public Health Department, met with Puja and Sheela in a futile

effort to convince the Rajneeshees to notify the health authorities of cases of reportable diseases. She recalls viewing Puja as a sinister

figure, and hence was not surprised at subsequent reports of her involvement in the various poisoning cases. Interview, Carla Chamberlain,

Administrator, Wasco-Sherman Public Health Department April 11, 1997.

that others may have been poisoned by Puja.

174

It is known that she was fascinated with poisons. Among the

items discovered in her possession after she fled Rajneeshpuram in 1985 were numerous items reflecting an

interest in chemical and biological agents, including information on salmonella poisoning.

175

Puja considered several biological agents for the contamination scheme. The main agent she relied

upon was Salmonella typhimurium, a strain of salmonella that is a common cause of food poisoning. Puja’s

interest in salmonella apparently originated in the spring of 1984. Pretending that she needed to identify

poisons that could be used against the cult, Puja asked one of the Rajneeshee physicians about difficult to

detect poisons that would make people sick without killing them. Salmonella was mentioned as a possible

agent.

176

Puja also considered several other biological agents. One of these was Salmonella typhi, the organism

that causes typhoid fever. One of the Rajneeshees, Ma Ava, recalled hearing from her friend Parambodhi, who

was the laboratory technician at the Rajneesh Medical Clinic, that Puja wanted to culture the organism

responsible for typhoid.

177

This was confirmed by KD, whose recollections were recorded by the Oregon law

enforcement investigators.

Sheela and Puja talked about ordering typhoid in the name of the Rajneesh Medical Corporation

(R.M.C.) from a lab somewhere in the United States. K.D. objected, pointing out that the typhoid

cultures could possibly be traced back to the R.M.C. K.D. states Sheela told him not to be so

paranoid and not to worry about the typhoid cultures being traced back to RMC. Puja favored using

typhoid because it would cause a couple of weeks of fever. As far as Knapp [K.D.] knows, this plan

was never implemented.

178

There is no information in the available records about why Puja decided not to use S. typhi. It is

likely, however, that Sheela and Puja heeded KD’s advice and decided that causing a typhoid outbreak was too

risky.

According to KD, Puja also expressed an interest in hepatitis.

179

There are several forms of hepatitis,

and it is unclear which Puja wanted to use.

180

KD also claimed that Puja had some other ideas for spreading

infection in The Dalles.

Other ideas Puja had of making people sick in The Dalles including the putting of dead rodents,

especially “beavers” into The Dalles water system. Puja had explained that beavers naturally

contained bacteria in their bodies. There was some comment that beavers could not be put into the

water tanks in The Dalles because of screens over the tanks. K.D. recalls someone jokingly

suggesting that the beavers be put into a blender (and liquefied). Someone suggested rats or mice

could be injected with a substance and placed into The Dalles water system. K.D. heard Anugiten

talk of trapping mice. K.D. believes some of the traps were set in The Dalles so that the rodents

would be indigenous to the area.

181

The pathogen associated with beavers is Giardia lamblia, a protozoan that causes giardiasis, a

diarrheal disease.

182

It is commonly called “beaver fever” in the Rocky Mountains area, since most beavers are

infected with giardia. Due to the prevalence of giardia-infected animals in the area, it is considered unsafe to

drink water in the Rocky Mountains, even from freely flowing streams.

183

174

Franklin, The Promise of Paradise, pp. 136-137. KD claims that in 1985 he was told by Sheela during a trip to India that

Sheela had injected Chinmaya with a poison the night of his death. See David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files.

175

Affidavit for Search Warrant, drafted by Lieutenant Dean Renfrow, Oregon State Police, October 1, 1985, OSA files.

176

Mentioned in the Affidavit for Search Warrant, drafted by Lieutenant Dean Renfrow, Oregon State Police, October 1, 1985,

OSA files.

177

Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

178

Report of Interview, Swami Krishna Deva, AKA David Berry Knapp, Oregon State, November 25, 1985, AG files.

179

Report of Interview, Swami Krishna Deva, AKA David Berry Knapp, Oregon State, November 25, 1985, AG files.

180

There are several forms of hepatitis, including types A, B, C, and E. See Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of

Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 217-233.

181

Report of Interview, Swami Krishna Deva, AKA David Berry Knapp, Oregon State, November 25, 1985, AG files.

182

Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American

Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 202-204.

183

Stuart Warren and Ted Long Ishikawa, Oregon Handbook, third edition (Chico, California: Moon Publications, 1995), pp.

51-52.

According to KD, “Puja was always very excited about the disease AIDS.” He noted, “Puja talked

about culturing the AIDS virus and she was very secretive concerning her work in that area.”

184

According to

evidence given law enforcement officials, Puja questioned one of the medical people who worked with her

about culturing AIDS. She was told that the Rajneeshees lacked the equipment needed if the laboratory was to

grow AIDS. This led to a rush purchase of a “quick-freeze dryer” in September 1984.

185

Unconfirmed reports

indicate that she may have deliberately infected at least one individual with HIV to see if it was possible to

transmit the disease.

186

The Rajneeshee obtained their S. typhimurium from a commercial supplier. Some time between

October 1, 1983 and February 29, 1984, the Rajneeshee Medical Corporation obtained a set of what are known

as bactrol disks from VWR Scientific, a medical supply company located in Seattle, Washington. Some of the

disks contained S. typhimurium of a strain known as ATCC 14028, which is commonly used in medical

settings.

187

Puja apparently took samples of the S. typhimurium from this set of bactrol disks, which were used

by the RMC’s state-licensed medical laboratory.

188

The RMC had a legitimate requirement for the S.

typhimurium. It was one of the control organisms used by licensed clinical laboratories to satisfy quality

assurance requirements.

189

Puja apparently produced S. typhimurium in a covert laboratory at a secret location within

Rajneeshpuram. The laboratory was dismantled before law enforcement officials could search it, but Ava

reported that it contained ”a large freeze dryer with tubes and other equipment and an incubator.” There was a

large, green incubator the size of a “small apartment-type refrigerator” that was filled with petri dishes used to

cultivate the S. typhimurium. Puja eventually moved the laboratory to a relatively remote location within

Rajneeshpuram in what was known as the Alan Watts complex.

190

This complex was located in a canyon

northeast of the center of the community, and included about two dozen buildings.

191

According to KD, who

saw the Alan Watts laboratory on September 14, 1985, just before Sheela, Puja, and the others fled

Rajneeshpuram, it was in a building with boarded up windows.

When they entered the building, there was cardboard on the floor, and he described a long table on

the left, a long table on the right and two other tables in the room. On the left table, Knapp [KD]

described a piece of equipment which had a motor on it and rubber tubing coming out of it. Knapp

described this piece of equipment as being approximately two and a half feet long, one and a half

feet wide, and one foot high. He said that it was on a platform and described the hoses as being firm

as opposed to flexible. He said that the machine was gray in color. He asked Anujiten what the

machine was, and Anugiten said it was “Puja’s salmonella maker.” There were also two or three

small refrigerators which were empty and unplugged.

192

After Sheela fled the commune, Rajneeshee officials described it as a “germ warfare” laboratory.

193

Puja apparently learned how to culture S. typhimurium from the RMC’s laboratory technician,

Parambodhi. Puja apparently asked the laboratory technician to culture salmonella. He initially objected,

because he said the organism was dangerous, but eventually obeyed Puja’s orders and produced quantities of S.

typhimurium. One witness remembered receiving two large jars filled with a liquid containing salmonella.

194

184

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files.

185

Affidavit for Search Warrant, drafted by Lieutenant Dean Renfrow, Oregon State Police, October 1, 1985, OSA files.

186

Interview, Lynn Enyart, October 23, 1997.

187

Government’s Statement of Expected Testimony and Evidence, US v. Ma Anand Sheela, et al, CR. 86-53, June 21, 1986,

US District Court files. This statement was the presented by the US Attorney’s office to the judge in the case and summarizes the evidence

that the prosecutors intended to present if the case had gone to trial.

188

When law enforcement officials searched the clinic laboratory on October 2, 1985 they seized a culture of S. typhimurium

that proved to be the same strain as on the bactrol disks. See Government’s Statement of Expected Testimony and Evidence, US v. Ma

Anand Sheela, et al, CR. 86-53, June 21, 1986, US District Court files.

189

Elmer W. Koneman, et. al., Color Atlas and Textbook of Diagnostic Microbiology, 4

edition (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,

1992), pp. 55-58, 118-120. S. typhimurium is used to validate growth media used by clinical laboratories to diagnose infectious diseases.

Koneman specifically mentions five different growth media that can be tested using S. typhimurium as a control organism.

190

Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

191

James Long and Leslie L. Zaitz, “Lab reputedly used in germ experiments,” Oregonian, September 28, 1985, p. A1.

192

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files. See also,

Report of Interview, Swami Krishna Deva, AKA David Berry Knapp, November 25, 1985, AG files.

193

James Long and Leslie L. Zaitz, “Lab reputedly used in germ experiments,” Oregonian, September 28, 1985, p. A1.

194

Notes of Interview, Ava Kay Avalos (Ma Ava), October 7, 1985, Oregon Department of Justice, OSA.

The first clearly documented incident in which the Rajneeshees used biological agents occurred on

August 29, 1984, during a routine fact-finding visit to Rajneeshpuram by the three Wasco County

commissioners. The Rajneeshees gave S. typhimurium contaminated water to the two commissioners hostile to

the group, Judge William Hulse and Commissioner Ray Matthew. Both became sick; Judge Hulse required

hospitalization.

195

A second incident apparently did not result in any victims, occurred sometime in “late July/August,”

according to KD’s vague recollection. Puja gave KD an eyedropper filled with a “brownish clear liquid” and

told him to spread the liquid on doorknobs and urinal handles in the Wasco County Courthouse. KD believed

that the liquid contained salmonella, based on Puja’s subsequent account of how the material would work. KD

spread the liquid as directed, but no one got sick. Consequently, KD told law enforcement officials “Sheela

was frustrated and angry that Puja’s substance was not working.”

196

On another occasion, also reported to be sometime in July or August, but the recollections were

vague, a group of Rajneeshees, including Sheela, Puja, KD, and several other Rajneeshees visited The Dalles

to select targets for disruption attacks. During that trip, the Rajneeshees stopped at an Albertson’s supermarket

in The Dalles. KD gave a graphic description of this episode.

Sheela said to Puja “Puji lets have some fun”. K.D. says that Puja giggled and replied “oh boy” (or

words to that effect). K.D. recalls that Sheela, Puja, himself, Jayananda, and probably the others

went into the store. Both K.D. and Jayananda were Sheela’s bodyguard. While in the store, K.D.

recalls observing Sheela in the produce department sprinkling on the lettuce what he assumed to be

a similar substance he had been given by Puja to put on door knobs in the courthouse, and salad

dressing in the restaurant on an earlier date. K.D. said that Sheela had the container with the

substance up her sleeve, at the wrist and palm, to conceal what she was doing. Puja commented to

K.D. that she was thinking of injecting the substance into the milk cartons. K.D. objected to her

doing that saying it would be obvious that the carton had been tampered with because of the holes

in the carton. It was unknown to K.D. if Puja injected the substance into the milk cartons.

Comments were made by Sheela that the intent of putting the substance onto the lettuce was to give

people in The Dalles “the shits”. When they returned to their vehicle Puja was giggling and saying

that she had a good time.

197

Another Rajneeshee, Alma Peralta, was involved in two other attempts to spread salmonella, although her self-

described efforts were less than successful.

I was asked as one of the first projects to drive into The Dalles and visit nursing homes and schools

and to see Puja before I left. And Puja gave me a kit -- which then I inspected when I was in the car

and by myself.

So I went by myself that time. And because I knew what salmonella is and after I opened it then I

realized that’s what it was. And I realized that they actually were quite serious about the fact that I

needed to drive there alone and try and put that in the food in the nursing homes that I visited and

in the schools.

… I actually got there and went into the nursing homes and went into -- I found two schools, and I

believe one or two nursing homes and talked with the people and went through the whole thing ….

What happened is if I didn’t put it in because it -- thank god for the fact that those ladies were

really watching, you see. So I could at least get in the car and dump the stuff out on the street.

When I got back I lied, I said to them I had done it.

198

In addition to this abortive attempt, Yogini also participated in one additional operation. At a political

meeting in The Dalles, she put some of the salmonella-contaminated liquid on her hands and held hands with

an “older gentleman” that she sat with. It is not known exactly when these two incidents took place.

199

Starting in early September 1984, the Rajneeshees began to pour vials containing S. typhimurium into

food products at restaurants in The Dalles. According to CDC figures, 751 people became ill after eating at

195

Interview, Judge William Hulse, April 1997, and Interview, Ava Avalos, October 22, 1985, AG files.

196

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, FBI, AG files.

197

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, FBI, AG files.

198

Testimony, Alma Peralta, Grand Jury Testimony, May 21, 1990, US District Court files.

199

Testimony, Alma Peralta, Grand Jury Testimony, May 21, 1990, US District Court files. Ava recalled Yogini talking about

spreading salmonella by shaking hands with people. See Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

salad bars in ten of restaurants.

200

Our information about these attacks is limited to the accounts of two former

Rajneeshees, who apparently were involved in contaminations at only a few of the restaurants. KD admitted to

participation in one incident. According to his recollection, Puja gave him a plastic bag containing a test tube

filled with a “mostly clear” light brown liquid. He was ordered to spread the contents at a restaurant in The

Dalles during a trip to The Dalles. He arrived at a restaurant known as the Portage Inn after lunchtime, and

found that the salad bar was closed. Although the salad fixings had been removed, the salad dressing was still

there. He poured the contents of the vial into the salad dressing.

201

Another Rajneesh, Ma Ava, admitted to participating in contaminations at three restaurants. She

recalled, “Sheela and Puja told her that they wished to do an experiment in The Dalles which would make

people sick so they could not vote.” She and another Rajneesh replaced their distinctive Rajneesh clothes with

street clothes, took five or six vials containing salmonella, and drove to The Dalles. They put salmonella into

the coffee creamers at two restaurants. At a third restaurant, they put the liquid into the bleu cheese salad

dressing at the salad bar. Press reports suggest that there were victims at only two of the restaurants.

202

KD also said that he believed Puja was directly involved in contaminating the salad bar at one

restaurant. Another Rajneesh told him, “She described the fact that Puja was being very obvious about pouring

a substance in the salad dressing and salads. … Puja was wearing a wig.”

203

Sheela subsequently congratulated

Puja on making so many people sick. “Pujy (referring to Puja), you’ve done a good job making everyone sick.

Too bad you didn’t make more people sick.”

204

Ava also recalled hearing Puja claiming to have put salmonella

in “lots of places.”

205

Other Rajneeshees also may have been involved in the contamination.

206

The Rajneeshees also tried to contaminate the water system in The Dalles. Sometime during July or

August 1984, efforts were made to obtain maps of the town’s water system. Once the maps were obtained, the

Rajneeshees decided to contaminate a water tank that supplied the town. A Rajneesh who apparently visited

the water system reportedly told Puja that they would need considerably more “salsa” (an apparent reference to

salmonella) in order to contaminate the water system. Puja replied that she might not be able to produce

sufficient material in time for their return visit to The Dalles.

207

Two attempts were made to contaminate the water system with “salsa”. During one of the trips, a

police car showed up while the Rajneeshees were getting reading to contaminate the water tank and “freaked

them out.”

208

KD described what he had been told about the water poisoning in the following terms.

Julian described how he and Anugiten climbed up a hill to a water tank that overlooked a nearby

school. He recalled something being mentioned about trying to pry open the screen on the water

tank and hearing rushing water.

209

200

Thomas J. Török, et al., “A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination of

Restaurant Salad Bars,” JAMA, August 6, 1997, pp. 389-395, reviews the outbreak from the perspective of the federal and state public

health officials involved in the investigation.

201

KD told the story both to the FBI and to the Oregon state investigators. See Report of Interview, Swami Krishna Deva, AKA

David Berry Knapp, November 25, 1985, AG files., and David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, AG files.

This is the only time KD mentions involvement in a restaurant poisoning. He dates it to sometime in August, after the time that

he contaminated the Wasco County Courthouse. However, press accounts suggest that he was seen by an employee of the Portage Inn on

September 12 near the salad bar. Federal prosecutors eventually came to date this incident to sometime between August 16 and September

12. See Roberta Ulrich, “Indictment of Sheela, Onang applauded,” The Oregonian, March 20, 1985, p. E6.

202

Roberta Ulrich, “Indictment of Sheela, Onang applauded,” The Oregonian, March 30, 1985, p. E6.

203

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, FBI, AG files. One Rajneeshee saw Puja stop at the

Zorba the Buddha restaurant operated by the commune at Rajneesh (formerly Antelope) and change into a disguise during the time of the

outbreaks in The Dalles. See Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

204

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 13, 1985, FBI, AG files.

205

Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

206

Ava believed that another Rajneeshee, named Yogini, took part. Specifically, she recalled that Yogini may have placed some

salmonella at the “Tapadaro,” presumably a reference to the Tapadera Inn and Restaurant Lounge. Ava Kay Avalos interrogation,

transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files. The Tapadera was not mentioned in press accounts as one of the restaurants affected by the

contamination.

207

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files.

208

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files, and Ava Kay

Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

It is not altogether clear what was put into the water tank. KD believed that it was salmonella. On the other

hand, Ava believed that it might be a mixture of raw sewage taken from Rajneeshpuram and dead rodents.

According to her recollections, Puja contacted the woman who was Resource Manager at Rajneeshpuram to

obtain raw sewage. She also recalls that there were many empty cages at the Puja’s laboratory and thought that

Puja might have put dead rats in with the sewage.

210

Despite the success of the restaurant contamination, no follow-on attacks were made. The Rajneeshee

abandoned their efforts to take over Wasco County by early October, when the publicity and legal pressure

made it evident that their plot would fail.

Case 1981-02: “Dark Harvest,” October 1981

On October 10, 1981, a package of soil supposedly removed from Gruinard Island was discovered on

the grounds of the Chemical Defence Establishment located at Porton Down, Wiltshire, England. Tests of an

anthrax bomb were conducted at Gruinard Island in the Hebrides during 1941, and heavily contaminated soil

on the island. According to a press account, the soil was found in a paper package placed inside a bucket.

Because the bucket was located on the border of the Porton Down complex, alongside a railway line, police

speculated that the soil might have been thrown from a train.

211

An anonymous statement given to the press indicated that a group calling itself “Dark Harvest”

orchestrated the incident. According to the group, they were returning the “seeds of death” to their source. The

group claimed that microbiologists from two universities landed on Gruinard Island, and with the assistance of

locals had removed 300 pounds of contaminated soil. The group complained that Gruinard Island would

remain uninhabitable for 200 to 1,000 years. The statement called for a survey of the island to locate the

anthrax-contaminated soil and proposed burying the soil under several feet of concrete. The group threatened

to place additional packages at “appropriate places” during the next year.

212

Subsequent tests indicated that the soil contained anthrax in low concentrations (about 10 organisms

per gram of soil). The soil was consistent with other samples taken from Gruinard Island.

213

A second package was deposited at the site of a Conservative Party meeting on October 14, 1981. In

this instance, police received an anonymous tip about the presence of a metal box containing the soil, which

was located on the roof of the meeting site. Subsequent analysis indicated that the soil did not contain

anthrax.

214

The Ecology Party condemned the activities of “Dark Harvest”. According to the party’s general

secretary, “Although we agree with the object of the group, which is to bring public attention to the fact that

these experiments in germ and chemical warfare leave a deadly legacy for future generations, we cannot

condone their action.”

215

The British government subsequently agreed to decontaminate Gruinard Island, although it is not

known if the decision to eliminate the contamination resulted from the publicity engendered by “Dark

Harvest”.

Case 1978-04: Bulgarian Secret Police (Georgi Markov), September 1978

The death of the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov is one of the most infamous incidents of the Cold

War. At the time of his death, Markov was an announcer for Radio Free Europe (RFE), working out of

London. He had been a prominent writer in Bulgaria before his 1969 defection. In 1971, he moved to England,

where he worked as a commentator first for the BBC’s Bulgarian service and then for RFE.

216

Markov’s wife gave the following account of the attack during the inquest.

209

David Berry Knapp interrogation, transcribed November 15, 1985, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AG files. Law

enforcement officials confirmed that the metal screens were ripped open on one of the water tanks when they examined it in 1985.

Interview, Robert Hamilton, April, 1997.

210

Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, AG files.

211

“Anthrax soil claim doubted,” Times (London), October 13, 1981, p. 2.

212

David Nicholson-Lord, “Anthrax protest ‘puts whole country at risk’,” Times (London), October 12, 1981, p. 26.

213

Henry Stanhope, “Anthrax spores found in protest soil sample,” Times (London), October 14, 1981, p. 2.

214

David Nicholson-Lord, “Anthrax soil alert near Tory conference,” Times (London), October 15, 1981, p. 2, and Tony

Samstag, “Blackpool ‘anthrax’ cleared,” Times (London), October 27, 1981, p. 3.

215

“Ecologists condemn soil dumpers,” Times (London), October 16, 1981, p. 6.

216

Markov’s biography appears in his obituary. See “Mr Georgi Markov,” Times (London), September 16, 1978, p. 14.

He told me that while waiting for a bus on the south side of Waterloo Bridge he had felt a jab in the

back of his right thigh and, looking around, saw a man drop an umbrella. The man said he was

sorry and Georgi said that he got the impression that he was trying to cover his face as he rushed

off and hailed a taxi.

Georgi told me he thought the man must have been a foreigner because the taxi driver seemed to

have some difficulty in understanding him. He showed me some blood on his jeans and a mark like

a puncture, about the size of the tip of a ball-point pen on the back of his right thigh.

217

The next day, she took him to the hospital. Despite the medical care he received, Markov’s condition

grew progressively worse. He died four days after he was injured, on September 11, 1978.

218

Even before the

cause of death was ascertained, Markov’s friends suspected that the Bulgarians were involved.

219

The autopsy located a tiny metallic sphere in the wound. Subsequent analysis found that it was only

1.52 mm in diameter and was 90 per cent platinum and 10 per cent iridium. There were two holes, each 0.35-

mm in diameter, drilled all the way through the pellet. The volume of space in the holes was only 0.28 mm

Given the small quantity of material involved, and Markov’s symptoms, British experts were confident that the

poison used was ricin.

220

Revelations continue to emerge about the case, from both Bulgarian and former Soviet sources.

Unfortunately, most of the Bulgarian documents relating to the case were destroyed, and it is unlikely that we

will ever know the complete story of what happened to Georgi Markov.

Oleg Kalugin, a retired KGB official who was involved in the decision to provide the Bulgarians with

the ricin weapon, provided an extended account of the episode from a Soviet perspective.

221

According to

Kalugin, the Bulgarians approached the Soviets in early 1978 to obtain assistance in killing Markov. There was

some opposition to providing that support. Eventually, it was given with the provision that “there is to be no

direct participation on our part.” The Soviets proposed three alternative methods for murdering Markov: a

jelly-like material containing a poison that would penetrate the skin, poisoning food, and a poison pellet.

Kalugin does not mention what poisons were associated with the different methods.

Kalugin claims that several unsuccessful attempts preceded the September assassination. First, the

Bulgarians wanted to use the poison jelly, thought about putting it on the door handle of Markov’s car. This

idea was abandoned when it was realized that someone else might encounter the poison jelly, and thus warn

Markov about the plot to kill him. The second scheme emerged when the Bulgarians learned that Markov was

visiting an Italian beach resort. The Bulgarians thought that it might be possible for someone to rub the poison

jelly on Markov, but the beach was so deserted that their agent had no opportunity to unobtrusively encounter

Markov. Finally, the Bulgarians decided to use a food poison, and plotted to use it during a trip that Markov

made to West Germany. This attempt also failed.

It was only after the failure of these earlier efforts that the Bulgarians turned to the ricin pellets.

Kalugin indicates that when the Bulgarians acquired the pellet weapon, they tested it on a political prisoner.

The prisoner survived the attack with no ill effects, apparently because the pellet did not release the ricin. This

forced the KGB to make modifications to the weapon so that it would work.

Oleg Gordievsky, a defector from the KGB, provides another account of the Markov murder. First, he

claims that the Bulgarians requested assistance in eliminating defectors, not just in killing Markov. Second, he

appears to provide a somewhat different version of the unsuccessful attempts on Markov’s life. (He indicates

that the first victim was “a Bulgarian émigré living in England.” It appears from the context that this is meant

to apply to Markov, but that is not clear.) According to Gordievsky’s account, “While he was on a holiday on

the Continent, the DS smeared surfaces in the room where he was staying with a poison that, once absorbed

through the skin, would, according to the KGB laboratory, prove fatal and leave no trace. Though the target

became seriously ill, however, he survived.”

222

217

Guy Rais, “Markov poison ‘stronger than cobra venom’,” Daily Telegraph (London), p January 3, 1979, p. 1.

218

Bernard Knight, “Ricin--a potent homicidal poison,” British Medical Journal, February 3, 1979, p. 350. This account

mistakenly claims that Markov died three days after the attack.

219

Stewart Tendler, “Police inquiry into possible killing of defector in London,” Times (London), September 12, 1978, p. 4.

220

Bernard Knight, “Ricin--a potent homicidal poison,” British Medical Journal, February 3, 1979, pp. 350-351.

221

Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 178-186.

222

Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New

York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 644-645.

Press reports suggest that Bulgarian officials told British police in 1993 that Francesco Guilino, a

Danish citizen of Italian extraction, killed Markov. Guilino apparently was warned that he was going to be

arrested, and he fled Denmark.

223

As of 1996, police officials in both Bulgaria and Britain continue to investigate the case. Given the

destruction of documents in Bulgaria, however, it is believed that access to KGB material is essential to finally

resolving the case.

224

Case 1978-03: Bulgarian Secret Police (Vladimir Kostov), August 1978

On August 26, 1978, the Bulgarian secret police attempted to assassinate Vladimir Kostov, a defector

who had served as a Bulgarian news correspondent in France until 1977. He also was a major in the DS

(Darjavna Sigurnost), Bulgaria’s equivalent of the KGB. After Kostov’s defection, he broadcast reports

beamed to Bulgaria for Deutsche Welle, the West German radio service, and for the BBC’s Bulgarian

service.

225

According to Kostov’s account of the incident, he was attacked at the Arc de Triomphe Metro station.

“I felt a sharp pain in my back and heard a crack like a pistol. The wound started to hurt, and we stopped so my

wife could examine my back. My jacket and shirt had been pierced and there was a mark like a bee sting,

surrounded by blood.” Kostov suffered from a high fever, but never lost consciousness.

226

Hearing about the death of Georgi Markov, Kostov got in touch with British authorities and had an x-

ray that identified a small metal object in his back.

227

The pellet that was subsequently removed from Kostov

was identical to the one that killed Markov.

228

Subsequent tests apparently identified the presence of ricin

antibodies, which are formed by the body’s immune system to counter ricin toxin.

229

According to Douglass and Livingstone, the pellet “lodged in the subcutaneous fat layer and was

surgically removed in time to save his life.” They add, “the heat in the fat layer was insufficient to melt the

wax before the surgeons were able to remove the pellet.”

230

The British doctors who investigated the Georgi

Markov case expressed a different view in 1980. Dr. David Gall, a Research Medical Officer at Britain’s

Chemical Defense Establishment at Porton Down, performed the toxicological studies associated with the

investigation. He found that the pellets penetrated about the same distance in both the Markov and Kostov

cases, about a half-inch. Gall also noted that these were the first cases ever identified in which ricin was

injected. In previous cases, the ricin was ingested. Dr. Rufus Crompton, who performed the autopsy on

Markov, provided the following explanation for Kostov’s survival:

I do not think we really have any idea, except that there is a much bandied about phrase these days

in toxicology: called the ‘LD50’, which is a dose that will kill 50 per cent of the population. I can

only assume that they were working very closely on that.

231

Case 1977-02M: Arnfinn Nesset: May 1977

Arnfinn Nesset, who ran a nursing home for elderly people in Norway, was convicted in March 1983

of murdering 22 of his patients. He injected them with curacit, which is derived from curare. Some aborigines

223

Agence France Presse, January 29, 1997.

224

Eve-Ann Prentice, “Moscow ‘broke Markov promise’,” Times (London), March 31, 1994, p. 14, and Roger Boyes,

“Bulgarian leader pledges inquiry into Markov case,” Times (London), November 25, 1996, p. 17.

225

Vladimir Kostov, The Bulgarian Umbrella: The Soviet Direction and Operations of the Bulgarian Secret Service in Europe

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), and Times (London), September 15, 1978, p. 4.

226

Times (London), September 15, 1978, p. 4.

227

Times (London), September 20, 1978, p. 6.

228

Stewart Tendler, “Bulgarian death case police sent to Paris,” Times (London), September 27, 1978, p. 1, and Guy Rais,

“Markov poison ‘stronger than cobra venom’,” Daily Telegraph (London), p January 3, 1979, p. 1.

229

According to the testimony given by FBI supervisory special agent Drew Campbell Richardson, ricin was identified in a

tissue sample from one of the two Bulgarians attacked at the time. He was unable to recall from which of the men the positive sample

came. See Richardson’s testimony at Dr. Debora Green’s preliminary hearing, p. 417, State of Kansas vs. Debora Green – 95CR5387.

230

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, p. 84.

231

Dr. Rufus Crompton and Dr. David Gall, “Georgi Markov—Death in a Pellet,” Medic-Legal Journal, Volume 48 (1980), pp.

51-62.

in South America smear curare on the tips of arrows. The curare paralyzes the victim’s respiratory system and

cases suffocation.

232

Case 1970-01: Eric Kranz, February 1970

According to press reports, in February 1970 Eric Kranz, a postgraduate student in parasitology at

MacDonald College, a small agricultural institute affiliated with McGill University and located near Montreal,

Canada, contaminated food eaten by four of his roommates. Kranz was not getting along with his roommates,

who asked him to leave the house they shared “because he wasn’t paying his share of the rent.”

233

Some days after Kranz finally left the house, four of his five former roommates became seriously ill.

According to the New England Journal of Medicine, the victims became sick from 10 to 14 days after eating

the contaminated food, two of them suffering from acute respiratory failure.

234

Initially, the illness mystified

the attended physicians, who later told a reporter that the illness was life threatening. Examination of the

victim’s sputum, however, revealed the presence of large numbers of worms, which a professor of parasitology

at MacDonald College identified as Ascaris suum, a parasite found in pigs similar to one (Ascaris

lumbricoides) that infects people. According to the attending physician, the victims could have died from the

disease.

235

They were not released from the hospital until March 5. Following discovery of the parasites, an

arrest warrant was issued for Kranz charging him with attempted murder. He surrendered to police on March

10, and was tried on the charges on March 18.

236

Case 1964-01: Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki, December 1964-March 1966

On April 7, 1966, the Japanese police arrested Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki, a physician with training in

bacteriology, for infecting four of his colleagues with a sponge cake contaminated with dysentery.

237

Subsequent investigations linked Suzuki to a series of typhoid and dysentery outbreaks between December

1964 and March 1966. Suzuki confessed to the crimes one week after his arrest.

238

Japanese police estimated

that 200 people were affected, including four deaths. There is reason to suspect that they exaggerated the

number of people who Suzuki infected.

239

A tally of the specific incidents described below suggests that no

more than 120 people were affected, including four fatalities.

On December 26, 1964, Suzuki purchased a sponge cake from a store near the Chiba University

Hospital. He allegedly laced the cake with dysentery and offered it to four of his colleagues at the hospital that

night. All four became ill and needed hospitalization. This came to be described by police as the “sponge cake

incident.”

240

The “Calpis case” occurred on August 6, 1965. At the time, Suzuki was working part time at the clinic

of the Kawasaki Steel Corporation’s Chiba City factory. Suzuki apparently laced bottles of a milk-based

Japanese soft drank called “Calpis” with typhoid, and gave the contaminated drinks to 16 of his colleague’s at

the infirmary. All became sick, although it is unclear if the nature of the illness was diagnosed at the time.

Suzuki admitted to police, before his confession, that he was the person who made anonymous phone calls ten

days later to three hospitals in Chiba City warning the hospitals to report the typhoid outbreak “because they

232

“Nursing home chief killed 22 patients,” Times (London), March 12, 1983, p. 5, and Colin Wilson and Donald Seaman, The

Encyclopedia of Modern Murder 1962–1982 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1985), pp. 172-173.

233

“Four treated for parasitic worm as trail of student leads to U.S.,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 27, 1970, p. 1, and

Eddie Collister, “Student hunted as would-be ‘parasite killer’,” The Gazette (Montreal), February 26, 1970, p. 2.

234

James A. Phills, A. John Harrold, Gabriel V. Whiteman, and Lewis Perelmutter, “Pulmonary Infiltrates, Asthma and

Eosinophilia due to Ascaris Suum Infestation in Man,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 4, 1972, pp. 965-970, provides a complete

clinical review of the case. For additional details on Ascaris, see Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual,

Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 55-57.

235

Eddie Collister, “Student hunted as would-be ‘parasite killer’,” Gazette (Montreal), February 26, 1970, pp. 1, 2.

236

Leon Levinson, “Kranz sent to trial in ‘bug’ murder try,” Gazette (Montreal), March 19, 1970, p. 3.

237

“Deliberate spreading of typhoid in Japan,” Science Journal, Vol. 2 (1966), pp. 2.11-2.76. Dr. Shellie A. Kolavic brought

this case and this particular reference to my attention. See also “Doctor accused of spreading germs,” Times (London), April 30, 1966, p. 8.

238

“Suzuki Confesses Spreading Typhoid,” Japan Times, April 14, 1966, pp. 1, 3.

239

The estimate of 200 infected including four fatalities first appears on April 15, a day after Suzuki’s confession was reported.

Even after additional cases were reported, the number of victims remained constant, suggesting that 200 was only an estimate.

240

“Dr. Suzuki Indicted by Prosecutors,” Japan Times, April 30, 1966, p. 3. An earlier account provides slightly different

details. It asserts that Suzuki bought the cake on December 20 “last year,” contaminated at 9 p.m. the same night, and then offered it to his

colleagues eight days later. See “Dr. Suzuki Says Revenge Led Him to Spread Germs,” Japan Times, April 16, 1966, p. 4.

are acute and infectious typhoid cases.” Police believe that he made the telephone calls to find out the extent of

the outbreak.

241

Suzuki also confessed to injecting dysentery into four of the victims of the “Calpis” contamination

under the guise of giving them something “good for curing this kind of disease.”

242

Prosecutors charged that he

used a duodenal probe to force one of his patients at the Kawasaki Steel plant clinic to drink dysentery-

contaminated water.

243

On September 4, 1965, Suzuki gave a typhoid-contaminated cake to a member of the staff of the First

Internal Medicine Department at the Chiba University Hospital. The man shared the cake with two members of

his family, and all three became sick with typhoid. That same day, ten nurses and doctors became ill after

eating bananas that Suzuki contaminated with typhoid.

244

On September 5, 1965, Suzuki purchased ten bananas from a shop by the hospital. He took the

bananas to his laboratory. He put typhoid on the tip of a platinum probe normally used to clean syringes and

jabbed the instrument several times into each of six bananas. Suzuki offered the bananas to the five nurses

working on the night shift. All the nurses were infected with typhoid, as were two people related to one of the

nurses.

245

Immediately after Suzuki visited his uncle’s family in Gotemba, Shizouka Prefecture, on September

9, 1965, eight of the nine members of his uncle’s family came down with typhoid.

246

Suzuki apparently gave

them contaminated bananas.

247

In addition, 13 patients at the Chiba University Hospital became ill from typhoid after eating bananas

given them by Suzuki in September.

248

This came to be known as the “banana incident.”

249

On December 27, 1965, he gave typhoid-contaminated bananas to a nurse at the Mishima Hospital in

Shizuoka Prefecture. The nurse gave one of the bananas to the hospital’s deputy director, Dr. Masahisa

Matsuda, who died from typhoid in January 1966.

250

Suzuki also reportedly confessed that he gave medicines laced with typhoid to patients at the Mishima

Hospital, Shizuoka Prefecture. He apparently did this over a several month period starting in December 1965.

Reportedly, 42 patients became ill, and three died after taking contaminated medicines.

251

On January 1, 1966, Lt. Col. Toshikazu Yokoto became ill with typhoid after eating clams given him

by Suzuki. Police suspected that Suzuki might have infected the shellfish with typhoid.

252

On February 28, 1966, Suzuki was accused of putting S. typhi organisms into a barium solution given

to two outpatient clinics at the Mishima Social Insurance Hospital in Shizuoka. Investigators referred to this as

the “barium incident.” That same day, Suzuki allegedly used a typhoid-contaminated tongue depressor on a

patient.

253

241

“Dr. Suzuki Stays Silent At 2

Session of Trial,” Japan Times, August 9, 1966, p. 3. Earlier accounts gave fewer victims.

“Suzuki Admits Phoning Hospitals, Police Claim,” Japan Times, April 12, 1966, p. 4, claimed 13 victims, while “Suzuki Admits Tainting

Bananas With Typhoid,” Japan Times, April 17, 1966, p. 2, says 15 people infected.

242

“Suzuki Admitbs Giving Four ‘Dual Treatment’,” Japan Times, April 20, 1966, p. 2.

243

“Dr. Suzuki Stays Silent At 2

Session of Trial,” Japan Times, August 9, 1966, p. 3.

244

“Suzuki Confesses To Another Case,” Japan Times, April 27, 1966, p. 4.

245

“Suzuki Admits Tainting Bananas With Typhoid,” Japan Times, April 17, 1966, p. 2, and “Dr. Suzuki facing 2

Indictment,” Japan Times, May 3, 1966, p. 3. These two accounts differ somewhat. The first claims only four bananas were infected, while

the second says six.

246

“Suspect’s Relative Attempts Suicide,” Japan Times, April 24, 1966, p. 2.

247

“Suzuki Says He Fed Kin With Germs,” Japan Times, April 21, 1966, p. 3. This story also states that Suzuki gave

contaminated bananas to relatives “on several occasions from September last year to January this year,” but provides no details of the other

incidents.

248

“Police Continuing Suzuki Case Probe,” Japan Times, April 15, 1966, p. 3.

249

“Suzuki Says He Fed Kin With Germs,” Japan Times, April 21, 1966, p. 3.

250

“Suzuki May Face Murder Charge,” Japan Times, May 12, 1966, p. 2.

251

“Police Continuing Suzuki Case Probe,” Japan Times, April 15, 1966, p. 3. None of the patients who died is named. One is

described in this story as a “71-year-old Mishima man,” but nothing is said regarding the other two. Another account suggests that the

Mishima hospital outbreaks occurred in December and March. See “Suzuki Confesses Spreading Typhoid,” Japan Times, April 14, 1966,

p. 3. This report also places the total number affected at the hospital at 44, including both patients and staff.

252

“Police Arrest Doctor For Germ Spreading,” Japan Times, April 8, 1966, p. 3, and “Police Continue Quizzing Doctor in

Typhoid Case,” Japan Times, April 9, 1966, p. 3.

253

“Dr. Suzuki Again Refuses To Speak at Arraignment,” Japan Times, September 27, 1966, p. 3.

On March 15, 1966, three nurses at the hospital became sick after eating mandarin oranges left in the

nurses’ dressing room. The nurses proved to be carrying the same D2 strain that appeared in other cases

infected by Suzuki, and Japanese police believed that he was responsible for that incident as well.

254

Also in

March 1966, his brother and sister-in-law, who lived in Koyama, came down with typhoid, as did five of his

parent’s friends in Koyama.

255

Originally, Suzuki told police that he gave the dysentery-contaminated cake to his colleagues as an

experiment to test a new theory he had developed. He eventually changed his story and said that revenge was

what led him to infect people. Suzuki reportedly told the police, “It is true I wanted to see how a mass outbreak

of disease would develop from the planted bacilli, but I spread the germs out of my deep antagonism to the

seniority system which prevails in [Japanese] medical circles.”

256

He added, “I was unpaid and my status was

unstable … I thought I was being discriminated against as I am not a graduate of Chiba University.”

257

Suzuki

also said that he infected his relatives because they refused to provide him with financial support that he

needed to conduct research.

258

Prosecutors claimed that Suzuki created the typhoid cases to enable him to

complete his dissertation thesis, which involved studies of S. typhi organisms recovered from numerous

patients.

259

Subsequent investigations revealed that the hospital discovered Suzuki’s activities more than a year

before the arrest, but the discovery was suppressed to avoid embarrassment to the university. Only after the

Ministry of Health and Welfare received an anonymous tip did an official investigation start.

260

Suzuki apparently obtained his cultures from several sources. He cultured typhoid taken from a

Kawasaki Steel Corporation worker whom he treated on May 8, 1965.

261

In addition, Suzuki told police that he

obtained typhoid cultures by stealing them from Japan’s National Institute of Health. He worked at the institute

in September 1965 as a trainee. According to experts who examined his laboratory, several of the test tubes in

his possession clearly came from the National Institute of Health.

Forty of the 171 test tubes in his laboratory

contained the D2 strain of typhoid.

262

Press accounts do not indicate where he obtained the dysentery organism.

The Chiba District Public Prosecutor’s Office ultimately charged Suzuki with 13 separate cases

involving 66 infected people. He was charged with no deaths.

263

Case 1952-02: Mau Mau, 1952

British authorities discovered in late 1952 that the Mau Mau, operating in what is now Kenya,

poisoned 33 steers at a mission station located in the tribal areas that were reserved for the Kikuyu. British

authorities believed that a toxic plant, Synadenium grantii Hook, also known as African milk bush, was used in

the attack.

264

The Mau Mau apparently inserted the latex of the plant into incisions cut into the skin of the animals.

Eight of the animals died, six of them within five days. It was impossible to determine the cause of the

problem, and so the Veterinary Research Laboratory in Kabete, just outside Nairobi, was asked to investigate.

254

“Dr. Suzuki Says Revenge Led Him to Spread Germs,” Japan Times, April 16, 1966, p. 4.

255

“Deliberate spreading of typhoid in Japan,” Science Journal, Vol. 2 (1966), pp. 2.11-2.76. A slightly different account given

just after Suzuki made his original confession suggests that police believed that he was responsible for typhoid outbreaks that involved “six

members of his family in Oyama-cho, west of Mishima, three members of his brother’s family in Odawara and eight relatives in Gotemba,

Shizuoka prefecture. All were taken ill after eating fruit given them by Suzuki.” See “Police Continuing Suzuki Case Probe,” Japan Times,

April 15, 1966, p. 3.

256

“Dr. Suzuki Says Revenge Led Him to Spread Germs,” Japan Times, April 16, 1966, p. 4.

257

“Deliberate spreading of typhoid in Japan,” Science Journal, Vol. 2 (1966), pp. 2.11-2.76.

258

“Suzuki Says He Fed Kin With Germs,” Japan Times, April 21, 1966, p. 3.

259

“Dr. Suzuki Again Refuses To Speak at Arraignment,” Japan Times, September 27, 1966, p. 3.

260

“Police Continuing Suzuki Case Probe,” Japan Times, April 15, 1966, p. 3, and “Police Continue Quizzing Doctor in

Typhoid Case,” Japan Times, April 9, 1966, p. 3.

261

“Suzuki Admits Tainting Bananas With Typhoid,” Japan Times, April 17, 1966, p. 2.

262

“Dr. Suzuki Makes New Confession,” Japan Times, April 28, 1966, p. 3.

263

According to additional research conducted by Masaaki Sugishima, based on Japanese court documents.

264

P.W. Thorold, “Suspected Malicious Poisoning,” Journal of the South African Veterinary Medical Association, Volume 24

(December 1953), pp. 215-217. Thorold was an investigator working at the Veterinary Research Laboratory, which was under the

supervision of the Director of Veterinary Services, Kenya Colony.

Identifying the cause of the incident proved difficult. Researchers ruled out a range of potential causes,

including infectious disease.

265

When other possible causes were ruled out, the investigators focused on poisoning as a cause. At first,

they considered several common toxic plants, including the seeds of Abrus precatorius (also known as

jequirity, they contain the toxin abrin), Ricinis communis (better known as the castor bean, which contain the

ricin toxin), and Jatropha curcas.

266

Serologic tests, however, ruled out the involvement of any of these

poisons. The investigators then considered African milk bush, which was a plant known to the Kikuyu. They

gave subcutaneous injections of the plant material to guinea pigs, which developed symptoms similar to those

of the cattle. Based on this research, they concluded that the Mau Mau used latex from either S. grantii or

another plant in the same family.

In 1951, the Mau Mau, a nationalist liberation movement originating with the Kikuyu tribe, initiated

attacks on the British in colonial Kenya. At first, the attacks consisted mainly of sabotage actions directed at

British farmers. By October 1952, however, the violence had escalated and the British declared a state of

emergency. The revolt was finally suppressed in 1956, by which time an estimated 15,000 people died, almost

all people associated with the Mau Mau.

267

The British believed that the cattle poisonings were one part of a concerted campaign aimed at

livestock. In other instances, investigations demonstrated that the animals were killed using arsenic. At the

time, arsenic was easily available, because it was then common to routinely dip cattle in arsenic to kill insects

on the animals. According to a British investigator, in other suspicious cases it was impossible to discover the

cause of death. Researchers apparently suspected that the Mau Mau might have killed the animals using plant-

derived toxins.

268

This episode is not mentioned in histories of the Mau Mau revolt, suggesting that such incidents were

rare.

269

While poisoning apparently was uncommon, Mau Mau bands often killed or maimed cattle in their

raids. It seems likely that the instances of poisoning were associated with the medicine men who accompanied

Mau Mau guerrilla formations. Such men may have had access to traditional medicines and poisons.

270

The

African milk bush was common in the area where the Kikuyu lived.

271

265

Thorold, “Suspected Malicious Poisoning,” pp. 215-216. It appears that other accounts of this incident were based on

Thorold’s article. See Julia F. Morton, “Poisonous and Injurious Higher Plants and Fungi,” p. 1504, in C.G. Tedeschi, William G. Eckert,

and Luke G. Tedeschi, editors, Forensic Medicine: A study in trauma and environment, Volume III: Environmental Hazards (Philadelphia:

W. B. Saunders, 1977). Bernard Verdcourt and E.C. Trump, Common Poisonous Plants of East Africa (St. James’s Place, London: Collins,

1969), p. 62, gives the following account of this incident.

During the Mau Mau uprising Synadenium grantii Hook. F. was suspected of being used maliciously in a case

where thirty-three steers were poisoned and eight died. They developed oedematous swellings along the chest,

belly and upper part of the limbs; these lesions were assumed to be due to stabbing with a sharp instrument, thus

introducing the acute irritant.

Another account of this incident appears in John Mitchell Watt and Maria Gerdina Breyer-Brankwijk, Medicinal and Poisonous Plants of

Southern and Eastern Africa (London: E. & S. Livingstone, 1962).

In an outbreak of suspected malicious poisoning of bovines in Tanganyika, in which the affected animals

developed large oedematous swellings between the brisket and the near fore leg, extending in some cases to the

chest and abdomen, eight steers died, six within five days of the symptoms appearing. Post mortem the

swellings showed a gelatinous oedema with numerous petechiae and ecchymoses and the tissues presented a

slightly cooked appearance and were oily to the touch. Synadenium grantii came under suspicion.

Experimentally a similar type of lesion was produced in the guinea-pig by the subcutaneous and intramuscular

injection of 0.5 to 1 ml. of the latex, 40 per cent of the animals dying within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of

the administration. The survivors developed necrosis and sloughing in the area of the injection.

266

Descriptions can be found in Morton, “Poisonous and Injurious Higher Plants and Fungi,” pp. 1497-8 (Jatropha curcas L.),

pp. 1501-1503 (Ricinus communis L.), and pp. 1504-1508 (Abrus precatorius L.). See also Verdcourt, Common Poisonous Plants of East

Africa, pp. 59-61 and pp. 79-80. British investigations into the mysterious death of Georgi Markov considered the toxin abrin before

settling on ricin as the responsible poison.

267

There appears to be no comprehensive account of the Mau Mau’s activities. This discussion is based on Wunyabari O.

Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) and Robert B. Edgerton,

Mau Mau: An African Crucible (New York: Free Press, 1989).

268

Thorold, “Suspected Malicious Poisoning,” p. 215.

269

This observation is based on a quick scan of books written about the Mau Mau held by the National Defense University

Library.

270

On the important role of the traditional healers in Mau Mau military strategy and operations, see Maloba, Mau Mau and

Kenya, pp. 125, 127.

271

Thorold, “Suspected Malicious Poisoning,” p. 216.

The Mau Mau were highly decentralized, especially in the early days of the revolt, so the poisonings

may not have reflected general policy. According to one account, at least one Mau Mau group produced

quantities of a poison for use against the British. Fear that the British might retaliate with chemical weapons

led to a decision to refrain from using the poison.

272

There is at least one reported instance in which a Mau

Mau fired a poisoned arrow at a policeman. The constable was hit, but the arrow failed to penetrate the skin.

273

Case 1939-01: Kikuko Hirose, 1939

In April 1939, a Japanese physician, Kikuko Hirose, gave pastries contaminated with Salmonella

typhi and Salmonella paratyphi (types A and B) to her former husband, Mikio Kato. Kato shared with food

with his brother, Ritsuo, and sister, Fumi. Fumi in turn shared some of the pastries with nine of her colleagues

at the Kawaike Elementary School. All twelve of the people who ate the confectionery became sick. Ritsuo

died of his infections in May.

274

Hirose and Kato were married in 1931, but lived separately while Kato conducted research at Kyoto

Imperial University. She provided financial assistance. After Kato received his medical degree in 1936, and

began working as vice president at the Maiko Hospital in Hyogo Prefecture, he rejected Hirose’s request that

they begin living together. Ultimately, in March 1938 the two were divorced. Hirose remained angry, however,

and in April 1939 she acquired cultures from the Kimura Bacteriological Research Institute, located in Kobe.

The method by which she obtained the organisms is not recorded in the available documents, but it appears she

did so legitimately.

Authorities determined that Hirose was responsible for the infection through an epidemiological study

of the outbreak. The source of the infection was traced to the pastries supplied by the store, which indicated

that Hirose had ordered the pastries.

She was convicted of the crime, and sentenced to eight years. The final judgment against Hirose was

handed down by the Supreme Court on June 27, 1940.

Case 1936-01: Tei-Sabro Takahashi, 1936

The Saitama Prefecture Police Department in Japan arrested Tei-Sabro Takahashi on 8 May 1937 on

charges of using food contaminated with Salmonella typhi to infect 17 people, including three people who

subsequently died. He was convicted on 4 July 1938 and given a death sentence.

275

According to newspaper reports, Takahashi may have first tried to use S. typhi to inflict harm in

March 1935, when he provided some confectioneries laced with the organism to another physician, Tokio

Hojo. The physician did not eat the pastry, but someone else in his house allegedly did consume some and

become extremely ill. Similarly, Takahashi apparently sent confectioneries to another doctor, Chiyo-Saburo

Sato, in October 1936, but Sato did not touch it. It appears that Japanese prosecutors believed that the evidence

supporting these allegations was insufficient, and he was never charged with these acts. Takahashi was charged

in five other incidents, all involving food contaminated with S. typhi.

The first incident involved a competing physician, Kazukichi Tsukada. Takahashi was jealous of

Tsukada, and apparently hoped to undermine his practice. On March 7, 1936, Takahashi purchased some

cakes, which he proceeded to contaminate with S. typhi. That same day, he took the contaminated cakes to

Tsukada’s office, and gave them to a nurse as a gift to his rival’s children. The four children ate the cake, and

at least one was diagnosed with typhoid.

The second incident occurred in June 1936, and involved a competing physician, Tadanobu Ono. In

order to undermine his rival’s practice, Takahashi again contaminated some pastry with S. typhi. He brought

the contaminated pastries to one of Ono’s offices in early June 1936, and offered them to the staff working

there. Three people were infected, and one died. In addition, a fourth person became ill with typhoid, probably

from contact with one of the infected workers. He was never charged with the fourth victim.

The third incident involved his wife, Sekiko. Takahashi wanted to divorce his wife because she was

unable to conceive, and he thought that it would be easier to accomplish this under Japanese law if she were

disabled. To accomplish this he contaminated some pastries with S. typhi, and left them with her at a spa where

272

Edgerton, Mau Mau, p. 130, citing W. Itote, “Mau Mau” General (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 108.

Itote was a leading figure in the Mau Mau movement, who commanded 5,000 warriors using the name “General China.”

273

“Three Kikuyu Elders Missing: Murder Feared,” Times (London), December 11, 1952, p. 6.

274

This account is derived from an unpublished article by Masaaki Sugishima, Associate Professor at the Asahi University

School of Law, supplemented by electronic communications. His account is based on Japanese court documents and press reports.

275

This account is derived from two unpublished articles by Masaaki Sugishima, Associate Professor at the Asahi University

School of Law, who based his account on official court documents and newspaper reports.

he sent her to recover her health before undergoing an operation to correct her inability to conceive. Sekiko ate

the pastry, and became ill on October 23. Six days later she was admitted to the hospital. On November 10,

Takahashi tried to murder her by using an injection of morphine hydrochloride. This effort failed, largely due

to the skill of the hospital staff.

The fourth incident involved yet another physician, Masao Yanagida, who was a competitor and also

Sekiko’s physician. Takahashi apparently resented Yanagida’s prosperity, and also was angry at Yanagida’s

success in saving Sekiko. On 22 November 1936, he asked a department store to deliver some pastries to

Yanagida’s house, after having contaminated them with S. typhi. Six members of the family became ill,

including Yanagida’s wife, four of his daughters, and one of his sons. The wife died from the infection on

January 3, 1937. One of the daughters died on 4 February 1937, apparently of pneumonia after having

recovered from the typhoid infection. It appears that the court considered him response for the second death,

perhaps because the typhoid made the victim more susceptible to other diseases.

The final incident occurred on 23 November 1936, and involved several employees of the Do-Ai

Hospital, located in Tokyo. Takahashi apparently hoped to infect one of the members of the staff who he

disliked, Ei-ichiro Sato. At a party given in honor of one of the physicians at the hospital, Takahashi tried to

give Sato some salmon eggs contaminated with S. typhi. Sato refused the gift, but three physicians from the

hospital ate the eggs. All three became ill, and one died.

Dr. Yanagida was responsible for uncovering Takahashi’s activities. Yanagida apparently looked into

the foods eaten by his family, and discovered that everyone who became sick had eaten some of Takahashi’s

confectioneries. He took the remaining pastries to the Hygienic Laboratory operated by the Ministry of

Interior, which determined that they were laced with S. typhi. The laboratory notified the local authorities.

Apparently, the officials became convinced that intentional contamination was responsible for the presence of

the S. typhi, after an investigation of the confectionery identified no likely source and uncovered no other

typhoid cases that could be linked to the producer. This led the police to open an investigation, which began to

focus on Takahashi. A local court judge found Takahashi guilty in all five incidents on 4 July 1938, and

condemned him to death. The sentence was upheld by an appeals court the following year.

Takahashi reportedly told authorities that he thought his use of S. typhi would go unnoticed. He

believed that it would be difficult to identify the source of the infection, given that S. typhi has a lengthy

incubation period and people might forget what they ate at the time of infection. He also thought that other

physicians might misdiagnose the disease. Finally, there was considerable typhoid in Japan at that time, so

cases of infection would not be considered so unusual.

Case 1933-01: Benoyendra Chandra Pandey, 1933

On February 16, 1935, Benoyendra Chandra Pandey and Dr. Taranath Bhatacharya were sentenced to

death by hanging for murdering 20-year old Amarendra Pandey, Benoyendra’s half-brother.

276

According to

the court, the two conspired to infect Amarendra with a lethal dose of the plague (Yersinia pestis) organism.

The two brothers had feuded over the division of their father’s estate.

277

After reviewing the case, an appellate

judge asserted that this case was “probably unique in the annals of crime.”

278

Benoyendra, eleven years older than Amarendra, was an unsavory spendthrift who consorted with

people of questionable character. The feud appears to have begun once Amarendra became eighteen and began

demanding his share of the estate.

279

On November 19, 1933, Amarendra arrived in Calcutta, having been lured

there by a telegram written by Benoyendra but falsely sent in the name of their aunt. The two half-brothers

again fruitlessly discussed dividing the estate. Finally, on the 26th, Amarendra decided to leave Calcutta.

Uncharacteristically, Benoyendra went to the train station to say good-bye. While Amarendra was walking to

the train platform, he was bumped by “a black man in khaddar [cotton homespun clothing] who was not a

gentleman.” At the time, Amarendra felt a prick in his arm, and told his companions, “Someone has pricked

me.” Although some of Amarendra’s relatives were suspicious, and begged him to stay in Calcutta and visit a

doctor, Amarendra decided to continue with his trip.

276

The best single source for this case is Dr. D.P. Lambert, “The Pakur Murder,” Medico-legal and Criminological Review,

vol. 5, July 1937, pp. 297-302. Shellie A. Kolavic brought this case to my attention.

277

According to “Two Indians Sentenced to Death,” Times (London), February 18, 1935, p. 11. The estate was worth £2,500

per year. In addition, Amarendra was heir to an estate of equivalent value (presumably that of his aunt), but Benoyendra stood to inherit in

the event of Amarendra’s death.

278

“Death sentences not confirmed,” Star of India (Calcutta), January 10, 1936, p. 1.

279

S.J., “Homicide By Means of Plague Bacilli,” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, September 1967, pp. 850-851,

Dr. D.P. Lambert, “The Pakur Murder,” Medico-legal and Criminological Review, vol. 5, July 1937, pp. 297-302, and Hokay El Kay,

“Murder by Black Death,” n.d. Shellie A. Kolavic provided copies of this material.

Amarendra returned to Calcutta on November 29 to consult with a physician, who noted that the

pricked spot looked “something like the mark of a hypodermic needle.” The next day, Amarendra became

feverish, felt pain in his armpit, and a small weal developed at the site of the prick. A blood sample was taken

for testing at that point and sent to the Bacteriology Department of the School of Tropical Medicine. On

December 1, Amarendra became sicker, and by December 3, he lost consciousness. Amarendra died on the

morning of December 4, just over seven days after he had been pricked. The body was cremated.

A few days after the death, the laboratory identified the presence of Y. pestis in the blood sample, and

notified the family and the Calcutta Public Health Department. The family attorney made investigations, and

discovered that Benoyendra had developed a friendship with Dr. Taranath, a physician with training in

bacteriology. The lawyer also found out about the efforts to acquire plague organisms from the Haffkine

Institute. Accordingly, the police were notified, a criminal investigation was initiated, and Benoyendra was

arrested.

The police discovered that the two conspirators made several attempts to acquire plague cultures. At

the time, the only place that kept cultures of Y. pestis was the Haffkine Institute, located in Bombay. Dr.

Taranath first tried to obtain plague on May 12, 1932. It was not until July 7, 1933, after five previous failures,

that Dr. Taranath finally had a viable culture of plague organisms. Dr. Taranath spent the next five days testing

the virulence of the culture by infecting white rats.

The defendants appealed their conviction on February 25, 1935 to the Criminal Appellate Side of the

High Court. On January 9, 1936, Their Lordships dismissed the appeal, but set aside the death penalty and

instead sentenced the defendants to transportation for life. The justices ruled that the Crown had proved beyond

a reasonable doubt that the victim was murdered by plague organisms injected into his arm, and that the two

defendants were connected to the crime.

280

The justices gave three reasons for their decision to overturn the death sentence. First, the length of

time required to handle the appeal was considered unreasonable, since all of ten months passed between the

time of their conviction and the date of the appellate court’s ruling. Second, the justices noted that the evidence

was entirely circumstantial. Finally, the justices hoped that the defendants might be convinced to give evidence

enabling the authorities to apprehend the individuals who actually committed the crime.

281

Case 1932-01: Japan, 1932

According to a 1944 document prepared by Prince Mikasa, younger brother to Japanese Emperor

Hirohito, the Japanese military attempted to poison members of the Lytton Commission. The League of

Nation’s General Assembly established the Lytton Commission in December 1931 to investigate Japan’s

conquest of Manchuria. Prince Mikasa claimed that a “senior Japanese medical officer in Manchuria” told him

that when the commissioners visited Manchuria they were served fruit “laced” with cholera. For unknown

reasons none of the commissioners became sick.

282

Press reports indicate that the commission spent about six

weeks in Manchuria from April 22 through June 5, 1932.

283

Case 1916-01: Arthur Warren Waite, March 1916

The New York Times called Arthur Warren Waite, a dentist, “one of the most remarkable individuals

in criminal history.”

284

He was convicted on May 27, 1916 of poisoning his wife’s parents. He infected both

with potentially lethal pathogens, although it appears that he ultimately relied on other means to kill the two.

The story received extensive front page coverage in the New York newspapers at the time.

On March 22, 1916, the New York City District Attorney’s office was notified that the March 12

death of John E. Peck, a wealthy businessman, was due to arsenic poisoning. Because Peck died in New York

City, the case was under the jurisdiction of New York City officials. After the body by returned to Peck’s home

in Grand Rapids, the authorities in Michigan performed an autopsy based on a mysterious telegram claiming

that Peck’s death was suspicious. The autopsy identified the presence of a lethal dose of arsenic, which led the

280

“Death sentences not confirmed,” Star of India (Calcutta), January 10, 1936, p. 1.

281

“Death sentences not confirmed,” Star of India (Calcutta), January 10, 1936, p. 1.

282

Gwen Robinson, “Hirohito’s brother tells of war crimes by army,” Times (London), July 7, 1994, p. 15.

283

Times (London), April 23, 1932, p. 11, reports the arrival of the commission in Mukden, while “Lytton Commission in

Peking,” Times (London), June 6, 1932, p. 11, reports its return to Beijing.

284

“Dr. Waite, Calm, Goes to his Death,” New York Times, May 25, 1917, pp. 1, 20. I am indebted to Jason Pate, Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for bringing this case to my attention.

Michigan authorities to alert officials in New York City. A team was sent to Grand Rapids, including the

Coroner’s Physician, who performed a second autopsy and confirmed the results of the first.

285

Peck died while staying at the 435 Riverside Drive apartment of his daughter and son-in-law

following the death of his wife. He was in good health, until he became ill on the night of March 11, 1916. He

died at 3 a.m. the next morning.

According to Schindler, “Waite always said ‘he’ or ‘the other fellow’ in talking about the murders of

Mrs. Peck and Mr. Peck.” Schindler reported that Waite made the following statement while reviewing his

confession.

The other fellow killed Mr. Peck, but I don’t believe he really was responsible for the death of Mrs.

Peck, although he tried to kill her. He gave her germs, first one kind and then another, but they

didn’t seem to have much effect. She was already sick, but the germs didn’t seem to make her any

sicker. Finally he got impatient, and one night he gave a lot of cocaine. She did soon after that, but I

believe she died from her disease, and not from the germs or cocaine which he gave her.

286

Investigators subsequently discovered that Waite made serious efforts to learn about pathogens. He

began his studies in September 1915 under the tutelage of a Dr. Louis Heitzman, a pathologist at the Flower

Hospital in New York City. Subsequently, he worked with Dr, P. L. De Nyse, an associate pathologist at the

hospital. Dr. De Nyse turned over “a large quantity of virulent disease germs” that Waite had left at the Flower

Hospital to the District Attorney’s office. According to the District Attorney’s office, Dr. De Nyse reported

that Waite was always trying to obtain the most virulent organisms possible. After complaining that the

organisms available to him were not “live enough,” Dr. De Nyse directed Waite to obtain more virulent

organisms from a commercial suppler, the Parke Davis & Company, then a Detroit corporation.

287

Sometime in November, Waite also began studying under Dr. David Nye Barrowes, a physician on

the staff of Cornell Medical School. Barrowes told investigators that Waite was especially interested in the

symptoms produced by the organisms responsible for typhoid. To learn more about the disease, Waite infected

himself and experienced a mild case.

288

The private detectives hired by the family discovered further evidence of Waite’s interest in biological

agents in his apartment. Hidden in a closet and elsewhere, they found about 180 glass slides containing

samples of different microorganisms. There were slides labeled tetanus (lockjaw), Asiatic cholera, pneumonia,

tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, and anthrax. In addition, the detectives apparently found approximately 100 test

tubes. There is no indication of what was in the test tubes.

289

During his trial, Waite admitted that he murdered both his in-laws, and that he tried to murder his

father-in-law’s sister. He also provided some details of his murder plots. According to his courtroom

testimony, his murder attempts involved pathogens, arsenic, chloroform, powdered glass, chlorine gas, burned

flypaper, colomel, and varinol. According to his testimony, he infected his in-laws with several pathogens,

including typhoid, influenza, diphtheria, pneumonia, tuberculosis, streptococcus, “and some others.”

290

He had considerable success against his mother-in-law. She came to New York to stay with Waite and

his wife. The first time she ate at their house, he put pathogens into her food. She was dead within a week. It is

unclear which pathogen he used or in what quantities. He initially tried to repeat this process with his father-in-

law, because the pathogens left no implicating evidence. Unfortunately for Waite, his father-in-law failed to

become sick. Waite then tried an experiment. Press reports about the fighting in France indicated that soldiers

exposed to chlorine gas became more susceptible to pathogens. To test this, he opened bottles of chlorine gas

in his father-in-law’s bedroom, and then put dosed his food with pathogens in the next day. For several weeks,

he contaminated his father-in-law’s food with a test tube of pathogens daily. Waite finally gave up on the

pathogens, and purchased a large quantity of arsenic, which he put into Mr. Peck’s food.

291

Waite also admitted that he made several attempts before his marriage to murder his future father-in-

law’s sister. He expected that his wife would inherit substantial amounts of money. On one occasion, he tried

to extract the arsenic from flypaper by burning the paper and collecting the residue. The substance had no

effect. He also tried other ways to kill her. He put powered glass in her food, arsenic, and experimented with

285

“Arsenic in Body of John E. Peck, Autopsy Shows,” New York Times, March 23, 1916, p. 1.

286

“Waite in New Story Names Another Aid,” New York Times, March 30, 1916, p. 8.

287

“New Waite Letter Uses Kane’s Name,” New York Times, April 7, 1916, p. 7.

288

“Waite Once Victim of His Germ Study,” New York Times, April 8, 1916, p. 22.

289

“Dig Up the Money Waite Gave Kane,” New York Times, April 1, 1916, p. 20.

290

“Murdered Two, Tried for a Third, Waite Tells Jury,” New York Times, May 26, 1917, p. 1.

291

“Murdered Two, Tried for a Third, Waite Tells Jury,” New York Times, May 26, 1917, p. 1.

several pathogens, including anthrax, tuberculosis, typhoid, and some others never named. It was his apparent

lack of success with the pathogens that led Waite to try to obtain more virulent organisms.

292

Waite also

admitted that he planned to murder his wife, according to his attorney.

293

Waite was sentenced to death. He unsuccessfully appealed the conviction. Waite was electrocuted at

Sing Sing prison on May 24, 1917.

294

Case 1915-01: German Secret Service, 1915-1917

The Germans mounted a covert biological warfare campaign in the United States during the early part

of World War I, while the United States was still neutral. The target of the effort were draft animals, horses and

mules, that the Allies purchased in the United States for use by their military forces in Europe. The Germans

devised a plan to infect the animals with glanders and anthrax organisms. Glanders, caused by Burkholderia

mallei (once known as Pseudomonas mallei), is a highly contagious disease that affects horses, mules, and

donkeys. It rarely affects humans, except those who work closely with the animals.

295

The first effort to implement this plot involved a German naval officer, Captain Erich von Steinmetz,

who illegally entered the United States dressed as a woman. He brought with him a vial containing glanders

cultures. Attempts to use the pathogen failed, and von Steinmetz discovered his organisms were dead when he

took the risk of bringing the culture to a laboratory for analysis.

296

The effort was resumed in late 1915. A German agent, also involved in other sabotage activities,

organized operations to infect horses being kept in pens in Van Courtland Park in New York City. Long after

the war, he described these operations to U.S. officials.

The germs were given to me by Captain Hinsch in glass bottles about an inch and a half or two

inches long, and three-quarters of an inch in diameter, with a cork stopper. The bottles were usually

contained in a round wooden box with a lid that screwed on the top. There was cotton in the top

and bottom to protect the bottles from breaking. A piece of steel in the form of a needle with a

sharp point was stuck in the underside of the cork, and the steel needle extended down in the liquid

where the germs were. We used rubber gloves and would put the germs in the horses by pulling out

the stopper and jabbing the horses with the sharp point of the needle that had been down among the

germs. We did a good bit of work by walking along the fences that enclosed the horses and jabbing

them when they would come up along the fence or lean where we could get at them. We also

spread the germs sometimes on their food and in the water that they were drinking.

Captain Hinsch gave me the instructions as to where I would find the horses and also gave me

bottles of germs and the money [to pay his associates]. I used a good many of the same men on this

work that I did in starting the fires. I had about ten or twelve men working on these matters with

me. We would work at it sometimes at night and sometimes in the daytime. A good many of the

men were also doing other work and they made this extra money on the side. Captain Hinsch was

accustomed to giving me brown paper bags filled with these tubes and with the fire things….

Captain Hinsch spoke often when I met him of different fires that had occurred and of outbreaks of

disease among horses and would make remarks about how well things were going.

297

The operation was expanded in 1916 with the creation of a laboratory in Chevy Chase, Maryland, a

town just outside Washington, D.C. Dr. Anton Dilger was put in charge of the new lab, which was given the

name “Tony’s Lab.” Dilger joined the German army in 1914 at the start of the war. He was sent to the United

States, ostensibly to recuperate from a nervous breakdown brought on by a bombing raid on a hospital that

killed a considerable number of children. On the trip to the United States, he carried with him “E and B

cultures,” codenames for anthrax and glanders cultures. Working with his brother Carl, Dr. Dilger produced

cultures of the organisms for Hinsch, who then distributed them to the men actually involved in the inoculation

292

“Murdered Two, Tried for a Third, Waite Tells Jury,” New York Times, May 26, 1917, p. 3.

293

“Waite Now Admits Intent to Kill Wife,” New York Times, April 3, 1916, p. 1.

294

“Dr. Waite, Calm, Goes to his Death,” New York Times, May 25, 1917, p. 1.

295

Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American

Public Health Association, 1995), p. 301.

296

Jules Witcover, Sabotage at Black Tom: Imperial Germany’s Secret War in America, 1914-1917 (Chapel Hill, North

Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1989), p. 92. Witcover’s account is based on archival material and on memoirs written by

participants.

297

Witcover, Sabotage at Black Tom, pp. 126-127.

of the draft animals. The Germans explored setting up a second laboratory in St. Louis, but decided that the

cultures would die in the cold Midwestern winters.

298

The Germans conducted similar operations elsewhere, which the British discovered through reading

decoded German cables.

299

According to various reports, the Germans tried to introduce plague cultures into St.

Petersburg in 1915, sent anthrax and glanders cultures to Romania in August 1916 to infect sheep being

shipped to Russia, tried to infect Norwegian reindeer with glanders organisms in January 1917, infected 4,500

mules used by British forces in Mesopotamia during 1917 with glanders organisms, infected sheep, cattle, and

horses being shipped from Argentina to Britain and to the Indian Army with glanders and anthrax during 1917

and 1918, and tried to infect advancing Allied forces with glanders and cholera organisms during the German

retreat in October 1918.

300

The Germans also infected horses being shipped from Argentina to France and Italy.

They believed the operation was so successful that it ended all such shipments.

301

Another report suggests that

the Germans attempted to introduce cholera organisms into Russia.

302

In addition, decoded German cables suggest that the Germans undertook other operations using

biological agents. First, German operatives tried to spread a wheat fungus. One cable sent by the German

General Staff to Germany’s Military Attaché in Madrid, ordered that “work against grain is to be suppressed as

it promises little success.” Second, the Germans apparently attempted to contaminate food produced at “meat

factories.” The British intercepted one message, directing that such operations were to be “held in abeyance,”

apparently because the operations were considered too risky.

303

298

Witcover, Sabotage at Black Tom, pp. 136-137.

299

W. Reginald Hall and Amos J. Peaslee, Three Wars with Germany (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1944), pp. 85-88. Then

Captain Hall was the Royal Navy’s Director of Naval Intelligence. In this capacity he directed OB40, Britain’s code breaking organization

at that time.

300

Martin Hugh-Jones, “Wickham Steed and German Biological Warfare Research,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 7,

No. 4 (1992), pp. 379-402, and LCDR Andrew G. Robertson, RAN, “From Asps to Allegations: Biological Warfare in History,” Military

Medicine, August 1995, pp. 370-371. Hall and Peaslee, Three Wars with Germany, p. 85, claims that 5,400 mules being shipped to

Mesopotamia from Argentina were “thoroughly treated.” A recent detail concerning the Norwegian operations became known in June

1997, when a vial of viable anthrax was discovered in the Norwegian Police Museum in Trondheim. The vial was taken from a German,

Baron Otto Karl von Rosen, in January 1917. The baron was in Karasjok, apparently attempting to infect reindeer that the Germans

thought were being used to transport supplies from through Norway to Russia. See Doug Mellgren, “Potent anthrax capsule found,”

Associated Press, June 30, 1997, 2:03 p.m. feed.

According to R.V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1990), p. 181, British intelligence

discovered many of these plots during the war. R.V. Jones was director of scientific intelligence for the Royal Air Force during World War

II.

Berlin did decline to a proposal to infect the rivers of Portugal with cholera to cause human casualties and thus

seal the Spanish frontier; but it did approve a proposal to employ anthrax against reindeer sledging British arms

through north Norway to the Russians, against Romanian sheep being supplied to Russia, and Argentinean

sheep, cattle and mules being supplied to Britain and the Indian Army. Most of these moves were uncovered by

the cryptographic efforts of Room OB40, and confirmed by on-the-spot investigations by agents both from

Britain and from neutral countries being attacked. Thanks to their surveillance, the only German success

appears to have been 200 mules that were being shipped from the Argentine. The means of infection were

ampoules inside sugar cubes, taken to Buenos Aires by U-Boat.

301

Hall and Peaslee, Three Wars with Germany, p. 85.

302

Dr. G. Woker, “Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare,” pp. 388-389, in Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, What Would Be

the Character of a New War (London: Victor Gollancz, 1933).

He made the following remarks about this incident:

[I]t was only the collapse of one of the great Powers and the merest chance which prevented that Power from

attempting to spread infection among the civilian population of an enemy state. Anarchist elements in the latter

State had already been hired to carry bacteria cultures, such as cholera bacteria, from the neutral state in which

the discovery was made to the intended victim State, where they would have distributed them. The collapse

came before this diabolical crime could be accomplished. The consul-general in whose office the cultures were

stored, fearing discovery, instructed a porter to throw the incriminating evidence into the river. Fortunately the

porter was suspicious and informed the police. Such was the origin of the notorious Zurich bomb and baccilli

case, the documents of which, along with the instructions of the Ministerial Department in question, must

contain valuable information as to the possible application and effects of bacteriological warfare at the end of

the Great War. A study of the relevant documents should also show whether the alleged attempt to send cholera

cultures to Russia in fountain pens was ever actually made, and if so with what success.

303

Hall and Peaslee, Three Wars with Germany, pp. 86-88. Hall suspected that certain disease outbreaks on troop ships carrying

U.S. soldiers to Europe in 1918 might have resulted from contaminated meat, but no investigation was conducted at the time.

Case 1913-01: Karl Hopf, 1913

In January 1914, a German court tried Karl Hopf on charges that he murdered his father, two of his

children, and his first wife. He also was accused of attempting to poison his second and third wives and his

mother. Arsenic was used in all of the poisonings. In addition, he admitted that in 1913 he infected his third

wife with cholera and typhus organisms, “because he wanted to see how they worked.” He was convicted of

poisoning his two children and his first wife, and of attempting to poison his second and third wives, and was

sentenced to death.

304

It appears that Hopf benefited financially from many of these deaths, although it is unclear whether or

not that was the only motivation for his actions. He had some training in handling drugs. From 1884 to 1888 or

1889, he worked in a chemist’s shop in London. Among the poisons found in Hopf’s house were “morphia”,

opium, and arsenic, and he apparently had other pathogens besides typhus and cholera. The cultures were

acquired from a supply house in Vienna. According to press reports of the trial, he complained to the supplier

about the quality of the cultures. This led him to order cholera obtained from the battlefields in Bulgaria.

305

According to Frankfurter Zeitung, this was the first known case in Germany in which someone used

bacteria for murder.

306

Case 1912-01: Henri Girard, 1909-1918

On April 21, 1921, Henri Girard was committed for trial by the French examining magistrate charged

with investigating suspicions that Girard had poisoned several people using Salmonella typhi, the organism that

causes typhoid fever, and poisonous mushrooms. He was arrested in August, 1918, but the magistrate needed

32 months to investigate the case.

307

Girard died in June before the start of his scheduled July 1921 trial.

308

Girard reportedly confessed to his crimes before dying.

309

Police also seized a diary that recorded his activities,

including his acquisitions of S. typhi cultures, poisonous mushrooms, the purchase of laboratory equipment,

and scientific and medical literature. On one occasion, Girard reportedly recorded in his diary, “Poisons;

prepare bottle, tubes, rubber gloves; buy microbe books.”

310

Girard eventually enlisted four people into his activities, including his wife, his mistress Jeanne

Douétèau, a chauffeur named Bragnier and a wine merchant named Rieu. All four were subsequently convicted

for roles in his crimes. His wife received a life sentence with hard labor, his mistress was sentenced to 20

years, and the other two were given sentences of two years.

311

Girard was an Alsatian born into what was called a “good family.” He was trained as a druggist, but

abandoned that field for work as an insurance broker.

312

According to one newspaper account, “he liked good

304

“The Hopf Poisoning Case,” Times (London), January 19, 1914, p. 7. The author first came across a reference to this case in

Georges Claretie, “L’affaire des poisons: II,” Le Figaro, October 24, 1921, p. 2. The full account reads, “En 1914, à Berlin, un boucher

nomme Hoff, avait déjà donne sa femme la fièvre typhoïde au moyen de bacilles mêlés aux aliments.” A search of the London Times index

indicated that it had four stories on the case. The Frankfurter Zeitung appears to have published more than a dozen stories on the trial in

January 1914, but the author is awaiting an English translation of the text.

305

“German Poisoning Case: Administration of bacilli,” Times (London), January 13, 1914, p. 8. For additional coverage, see

“The German Poisoning Case,” Times (London), January 16, 1914, p. 49, and “The German Poisoning Case,” Times (London), January 17,

1914, p. 7.

306

“The Hopf Poisoning Case,” Times (London), January 19, 1914, p. 7.

307

There is no really satisfactory English-language account of this case. The accounts disagree on certain key facts, and none of

them provides a complete version of the case. There is a short account in C.J.S. Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners: With Historical

Accounts of Some Famous Mysteries in Ancient and Modern Times (London: Harold Shaylor, 1940), pp. 369-371. English-language

newspaper stories appeared in the Times (London), the New York Times, and the New York Herald (European Edition–Paris). The story

was extensively reported in the French papers, including Le Figaro, which published a four part account of the case by Georges Claretie,

“L’affaire des poisons,” on October 22, 1921, p. 2, October 24, 1921, p. 2, October 25, 1921, p. 2, and October 27, 1921, p. 3. On Girard’s

arrest, see “Le courtier empoisonneur,” Le Figaro, April 21, 1921, p. 2, “Life Insurance Crimes Charged Against Girard,” New York

Herald (European Edition—Paris), April 22, 1921, p. 3, “Insures his friends, then poisons them,” New York Times, April 22, 1921, p. 17,

and “Fatal luncheon parties,” Times (London), April 22, 1921, p. 10.

308

“Gentleman Girard Dead: Paris Deprived of Sensation,” Times (London), June 14, 1921, p. 9. He died of tuberculosis,

according to “La Mort de l’empoisonneur,” Le Figaro, June 14, 1921, p. 1.

309

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 371.

310

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 369.

311

“Girard poisoning case,” Times (London), November 2, 1921, p. 9.

312

“La Mort de l’empoisonneur,” Le Figaro, June 14, 1921, p. 1.

living without working too hard for it.” He was convicted in 1914 of a fraud connected with the lottery, and

served time in 1917 for theft.

313

The investigation of this case was lengthy and difficult. The investigators employed a number of

bacteriologists, and several autopsies were performed on suspected victims. Police investigations determined

that Girard was studying bacteriology at the time of his first suspected murder. The prosecution was aided by

Girard’s diary, which referred to at least some of his activities. In addition, a search of Girard’s apartment

revealed a considerable number of medical texts, cultures of S. typhi, the organism responsible for typhoid,

and, according to one account, other “toxic organisms and toxins.” He is known to have purchased cultures of

S. typhi, reportedly from wholesale drug suppliers. In addition, he created a laboratory in a house where his

mistress, Mlle. Douétèau, lived.

314

Girard’s first victim is believed to have been a man by the name of Pernotte. The two met in 1910.

Girard quickly became extremely friendly with Pernotte and convinced him to purchase two life insurance

policies from separate companies, and to make Girard a beneficiary of the policies. Some time after purchasing

the policies, Pernotte, his wife, and two children contracted typhoid. Fortunately, all recovered from the illness.

After recovering from the immediate effects of the illness, the entire family left for a vacation. Pernotte

apparently was still suffering from his exposure to typhoid. Girard reportedly convinced Pernotte to take an

injection of a medicine that Girard possessed. Soon after that injection, Pernotte died. On November 3, 1912,

Girard recorded in his diary, “Pernotte innocu…,” apparently a reference to the fatal injection.

315

In April, 1913, Girard became acquainted with M. Godel. He agreed to purchase insurance policies

worth 200,000 francs to be paid to the survivor. Sometime after the policy was purchased, Godel had lunch

with Girard. Soon thereafter, he contracted typhoid. He recovered from the disease, but became suspicious of

Girard and completely severed his connections with him.

316

During the First World War, Girard served in the Paris ambulance service. In 1915, he met and

became friendly with Delmas, a French soldier. Girard apparently obtained copies of Delmas’ papers and used

them to purchase insurance with a death benefit of 40,000 francs. From the beginning of March, 1915, Delmas

began to feel sick. By early April, he was diagnosed with typhoid. Just before he had to pay the second

premium on the policy, Girard invited Delmas for dinner at his mistress’ house. During that meal, Girard

infected Delmas using a S. typhi culture that he had recently purchased. Delmas subsequently contracted

typhoid, and was hospitalized. Accounts of the event report that he was sick with “abnormal typhid fever,

criminal contamination.” The basis for that judgment is unclear from the press accounts. Having survived his

illness, Delmas became suspicious of Girard and broke off the relationship.

317

It appears that at about this time, Girard began to focus on poisonous mushrooms. Girard purchased

several large life insurance policies worth 40,000 francs in the name of Michel Duroux, a postal employee.

Duroux knew nothing of policies, which designated as beneficiary a man named Emile Ramon, which was one

of Girard’s known aliases. Girard apparently gave Duroux aperitifs contaminated with typhoid, but Duroux

never got sick. Girard then tried to kill Duroux at a dinner by putting poison mushrooms in one of the dishes, a

possibility suggested by some comments recorded in his diary on three occasions in May, 1917. Duroux

survived the episode with no ill effects. On two occasions during December 1917, Duroux became ill after

eating with Girard at a café. Although he had not eaten any mushrooms, the doctors who treated him diagnosed

mushroom poisoning. Duroux was advised to break off the relationship with Girard.

318

Girard’s last reported victim was a widow, Madame Monin, who worked at the Ministry of Pensions.

She supplemented her income by making hats. Jeanne Drouhin met Mme. Monin at a small restaurant, and

apparently told Girard about her. It appears that at the beginning of April 1918, Girard paid a visit to Mme.

313

“Fatal luncheon parties,” Times (London), April 22, 1921, p. 10.

314

“Insures his friends, then poisons them,” New York Times, April 22, 1921, p. 17, and Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p.

370-371. Jeanne Douétèau destroyed some papers of his before police were able to seize them.

315

“Four accomplices of dead poisoner in court today,” New York Herald (European Edition–Paris), October 28, 1921, p. 6, and

“Gentleman Girard,” Times (London), October 29, 1921, p. 7. Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 369, claims that £8,400 was involved.

Two accounts date the events to 1912, not 1909. See are “Insures his friends, then poisons them,” New York Times, April 22, 1921, p. 17,

and “Girard poisoning case,” Times (London), November 2, 1921, p. 9. The accounts vary on when this episode took place. Some claim

that the two met in 1909, while another states 1910. There is also some dispute about the date of the events.

316

“Four accomplices of dead poisoner in court today,” New York Herald (European Edition–Paris), October 28, 1921, p. 6, and

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 370.

317

“Four accomplices of dead poisoner in court today,” New York Herald (European Edition–Paris), October 28, 1921, p. 6, and

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 370.

318

“Four accomplices of dead poisoner in court today,” New York Herald (European Edition–Paris), October 28, 1921, p. 6,

“Insures his friends, then poisons them,” New York Times, April 22, 1921, p. 17, and Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 370.

Monin, posing as a genealogist, and, claiming that there was an inheritance at stake, obtained personal

information from her. On April 8 and 9, 1918, Girard visited four life insurance companies accompanied by a

woman who identified herself as Mme. Monin. Three of the policies, each worth 20,000 francs, named

Drouhin as the beneficiary, and the fourth, also worth 20,000 francs, named Girard. The two made the initial

payments on the policies; the next installments were owed July 9 to 11. To ensure that the bills were not sent to

Mme. Monin, they either had to pay them in person at the company offices or make sure that she was dead

before July.

Sometime in April, Drouhin gave Monin a hat to repair. Monin was asked to deliver it to the residence

that Drouhin shared with Girard. During this visit, Girard offered Monin an apéritif containing a mushroom

poison. Soon after Monin left to return home, she became so ill that some policeman had to help her get home.

Within three hours, she was dead.

Eight days after Mme. Monin’s death, Girard claimed the death benefit from the policy for which he

was the beneficiary. Similarly, Mlle. Drouhin was paid by one the companies that held policies naming her a

beneficiary. However, when she attempted to claim money from the third company, it refused to pay and

accused the pair of fraud. This led to a criminal investigation that culminated in Girard’s arrest in August.

Worried that they might be prosecuted, the two married in July.

An autopsy was not performed for six months. The expert who performed the autopsy was unable to

find any traces of poisoning. At the same time, he was also unable to identify a cause of death. Based on the

symptoms Mme. Monin reportedly suffered, he concluded that she had been poisoned.

319

It appears that Girard was responsible for killing two people, M. Pernotte and Mlle. Monin. Six other

people recovered after Girard infected or poisoned them, including Pernotte’s family, Godel, Delmas, and

Duroux.

Case 1910-01: Patrick O’Brien de Lacy and Vladimir Pantchenko, May 1910

On February 16, 1911, Patrick O’Brien de Lacy, and his accomplice, Vladimir Pantchenko, were

convicted by a Russian court in St. Petersburg, Russia, of murdering Captain Vassilli Buturlin, de Lacy’s

brother-in-law. A third defendant, Yekaterina Muravieff, was acquitted. According to evidence offered at their

trial, Pantchenko, a physician, injected Captain Buturlin with diphtheria toxin at the instigation of de Lacy. De

Lacy was sentenced to life imprisonment and Pantchenko was given fifteen years.

320

De Lacy was a Polish nobleman who claimed to be a descendent of Irish kings. In 1906, de Lacy, then

in his second marriage, met Ludmilla, the married daughter of General Dmitry Buturlin. Despite the General’s

objections, Ludmilla divorced her husband and married the now divorced de Lacy in December 1908.

According to one newspaper account, he was “said to have been a ne’er-do-well” who wasted the fortune of his

first wife.

321

De Lacy apparently lost his fortune in the shipbuilding industry. He reportedly owned a shipyard in

Poland and built a shipyard in Finland that built two ships for the Russian fleet. He once had sufficient wealth

to donate two ships to the Russian fleet that fought Japan. The failure of these businesses left him financially

ruined. Even a wedding gift from General Buturlin of two estates and mill was insufficient to cover his debts.

Nor was an allowance of 500 rubles a month sufficient for a man of his ambitions.

322

Ludmilla’s parents were extremely wealthy. General Buturlin was worth 1,400,000 rubles (apparently

about $700,000). His two children were the heirs to this fortune. His son, Captain Buturlin, was to receive

1,000,000 rubles ($500,000), while Ludmilla was to get 400,000 rubles ($200,000). De Lacy reportedly

resented this distribution, believing that his wife was not to receive her fair share of the estate. In addition,

Ludmilla’s mother, the former Countess Bobrinsky, had a fortune of 1,000,000 ($500,000), which she intended

319

The best account is “L’affaire des poisons IV,” Le Figaro, October 27, 1921, pp. 3-4. See also “Four accomplices of dead

poisoner in court today,” New York Herald (European Edition–Paris), October 28, 1921, p. 6, “Insures his friends, then poisons them,”

New York Times, April 22, 1921, p. 17, and Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 370-371.

320

“Russian Poisoners Are Found Guilty,” New York Times, February 17, 1911, p. 4. The most complete accounts of this case

are Herman Bernstein, “The Doctor Who Killed His Patients With Germs,” New York Times, February 19, 1911, section five, p. 1, and

“Criminal Poisoning with Bacteria: The Remarkable Case of O’Brien de Lacy and Panchenko,” pp. 213-219, in C.J.S. Thompson, Poisons

and Poisoners: With Historical Accounts of Some Famous Mysteries in Ancient and Modern Times (London: Harold Shaylor, 1940).

Bernstein appears to have attended the trial, while Thompson provides no indication of his sources of information. The spelling of names

follows those used in the Times (London).

321

“A Russian Murder Trial,” Times (London), January 11, 1911, p. 7.

322

Bernstein, “The Doctor Who Killed His Patients With Germs,” New York Times, February 19, 1911, section five, p. 1. De

Lacy apparently depended on receiving orders to supply ships to the Russian Navy, and it was a decision of the Marine Ministry to cancel

orders from his shipyard that led to his financial troubles. See “Experts in Clash at Russian Trial,” New York Times, February 7, 1911, p. 4.

to give to her two children. (She had divorced the General some twenty years earlier, and in 1910 lived in Paris

married to a man called Lizardi.)

323

De Lacy decided that he could solve his financial problems by murdering his in-laws. He apparently

did not want to wait for his in-laws to die natural deaths, and wanted his wife to inherit the bulk of their estates.

There is some evidence that he embarked on this plan even before his marriage to Ludmilla.

To accomplish his objectives, de Lacy recruited the services of Pantchenko, an indigent physician

with a dubious reputation.

324

Pantchenko was a purveyor of quack medicines. While living in Paris in 1895, he

reportedly sold poison used in a suicide. He also was implicated in other dubious activities, including faking

death certificates and producing pornography. In early 1911 one of his patients died due to Pantchenko’s use of

dirty needles.

325

Pantchenko first encountered Captain Buturlin in the fall of 1908, when his future victim inquired

about an anti-cholera injection that Pantchenko peddled. The two met periodically after that. In February 1910,

Pantchenko convinced Captain Buturlin of the beneficial effects of a compound known as spermin, and began

to give him regular injections.

326

According to one account, de Lacy approached Pantchenko in the fall of 1908, even before his

marriage to Ludmilla. In their first meeting, de Lacy offered Pantchenko 1,500 rubles to perform an abortion.

A few days later, de Lacy told Pantchenko what he really wanted: the murder of his in-laws through use of

biological agents. He offered Pantchenko 10,000 rubles for the death of Captain Buturlin, 50,000 rubles to kill

General Buturlin, and 500,000 rubles to go to Paris to dispose of the mother.

327

De Lacy told Pantchenko that he wanted his brother-in-law killed by infecting him with cholera. The

disease was endemic in St. Petersburg at the time, and de Lacy hoped that people would believe that his

victims had died of natural causes.

Now that cholera is raging, it would seem the safest way of removing him. When he dies, as a

victim of the epidemic, he will be buried immediately. And even if he should be exhumed, they will

find that he died of cholera.

328

Pantchenko, however, was doubtful about relying on cholera, and instead suggested diphtheria toxin, which he

obtained from two different research laboratories. Ultimately, Pantchenko found an opportunity to inject

Captain Buturlin with the diphtheria toxin, which killed him.

There were questions about Captain Buturlin’s death almost immediately. General Buturlin was

suspicious and demanded a post-mortem, a request seconded by the dead man’s wife. At the same time, a man

approached the police with a story suggesting that Buturlin had been murdered. Apparently, the man rented a

room from Mme. Muravieff, who was Pantchenko’s lover. This sparked a police investigation. Pantchenko and

de Lacy initially denied any complicity in the death, but the two were arrested, as was Mme. Muravieff.

329

Following his arrest, Dr. Pantchenko confessed to his involvement in the crime. (According to one

account, “the Russian legal procedure for worming avowals out of prisoners resembles the so-called American

‘third degree’.”

330

Although he retracted the confession during his trial, the jury found it credible in their

deliberations.

331

This is a unique document, since it describes one man’s account of his involvement with the

use of biological agents.

Patients were brought to me occasionally by a friend named Raffoff, who acted as a tout, receiving

a share of the profits. One day he introduced me to O’Brien de Lacy. We adjourned to a private

room in a restaurant, where, in Raffoff’s presence, he asked me if I would perform a certain illegal

operation [an abortion] for 1,700 rubles. I assented. O’Brien de Lacy seemed pleased and gave me

323

Bernstein, “The Doctor Who Killed His Patients With Germs,” New York Times, February 19, 1911, section five, p. 1.

324

“Pantchenko’s Many Crimes,” New York Times, February 8, 1911, p. 4.

325

“Poison Trial Drags On,” New York Times, February 12, 1911, Section 3, p. 4.

326

Bernstein, “The Doctor Who Killed His Patients With Germs,” New York Times, February 19, 1911, section five, p. 1.

327

Bernstein, “The Doctor Who Killed His Patients With Germs,” New York Times, February 19, 1911, section five, p. 1.

328

Bernstein, “The Doctor Who Killed His Patients With Germs,” New York Times, February 19, 1911, section five, p. 1.

329

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, pp. 214-215.

330

“Doctors Gave Fatal Germs to Poisoner,” New York Times, February 4, 1911, p. 1.

331

He told the court, “When I gave evidence to the examining magistrate and denounced de Lacy I was simply investing a tale

of the Arabian Nights. Had I really been guilty I could easily have fled before my arrest.” See “The Russian Murder Trial,” Times

(London), February 10, 1911, p. 5.

100 rubles. I asked him to visit me in my own study. I was a physician of the Petrograd district of

the North Railway.

Subsequently O’Brien intimated that he would prefer to talk with me without a witness. I

acquiesced. He told me he had just become a bridegroom, and the operation he really wanted was

to have his future brother-in-law made away with. For this service he would pay 10,000 rubles.

After that it would be necessary to remove the father-in-law. For that riddance I would be paid

50,000 rubles, and lastly, the old man’s divorced wife must be launched into eternity. For this job

he would not grudge 500,000 rubles. He impressed upon me the necessity of extreme

circumspection, and advised me to begin with young Buturlin, to whom he proposed I should

administer cholera germs on bread, buttered and covered with caviar. Death by cholera, he

explained, would evoke no surprise at a moment when that epidemic was making havoc in

Petrograd. Therefore he had much to say in favor of cholera germs, and informed me that young

Buturlin was using anti-cholera subcutaneous injections.

By this time I had extracted 2,000 rubles from O’Brien de Lacy. At last he introduced me to

Buturlin, on the ground that were interested in founding a sanatorium, but I was to whet his

curiosity about a certain drug and get him as a patient. Then, instead of the drug, I was to inject

some poison or other, and having done the job, to abstain sedulously from writing or telegraphing,

as a kinsman of his, Count Roniker, who had been charged with murder in Warsaw, had been

tripped up by a telegram. The plan was successful; I treated young Buturlin, substituting diphtheria

toxin for the other drug.

I received the germs from a chemist, who believed my story that it was required for experiments on

rabbits. I injected two large doses into the victim’s thigh. Later, I learned he was very ill, and, being

conscience smitten, I wired for O’Brien de Lacy, who was furious that the telegram should have

been sent. He exclaimed: ‘You may as well give yourself up now.’ I visited young Buturlin after

this, and learned from his own lips that he had had high fever and sharp pains, but was now much

better. The other physician who was called in did not diagnose the malady. Then I read of

Buturlin’s death in the papers. It occurred exactly as had been calculated, seven days after the

injection. When I read that the day of the burial would be announced later, I knew it boded evil.

Meanwhile, General Buturlin arrived ad demanded a post-mortem. O’Brien de Lacy supported the

demand, convinced that the examination would be fruitless. I, too, was of the same opinion,

because throats are never analyzed during such investigation, and few symptoms of diphtheria

infection would be visible in the throat.

332

Pantchenko subsequently made the following statement about the injections given to Captain Buturlin.

On May 16

[1910] I visited Buturlin, and injected a pure drug [of anti-cholera serum] from a

phial. I repeated the injection on the following day. Before my evening visit to Buturlin on the

same day, I broke the necks of the two drug-phials in my own lodging that nobody should notice it.

Having emptied the contents, I filled the phials with diphtheria poison by means of a paper funnel.,

plugging them with wadding, and putting them into my waistcoat-pocket, set out for Buturlin’s.

Before starting I gulped down vodka for courage.

I got to Buturlin’s about eight or nine in the evening, with trembling in my legs and throbbing

waves of darkness filling my eyes and fitfully blotting out my sight. I had been wont to break off

the necks of the phials in Buturlin’s presence, first putting them in a handkerchief to avoid cutting

my fingers. That is why he could not notice that this time the necks were already snapped off. I

made two incisions in Buturlin’s body, injecting each time the contents of one phial of the

diphtheria poison. Each vessel held about two cubic centimeters, but as the effects of the diphtheria

poison had not been tested on human beings, I injected two phials full in order to be quite sure of a

deadly issue, and I quivered in every limb. I was in dread that Buturlin might discern my state.

Pulling myself together, and mastering my failing voice, I asked him whether it hurt. He answered,

‘not at all.’ I then left for home and threw the phials into the street. The livelong night I could not

close an eye. Conscience-ache racked me ruthlessly.

333

Court testimony revealed that Pantchenko obtained both diphtheria toxin and cholera endotoxin. Dr.

Heinrich, assistant director of a medical laboratory, testified that Pantchenko requested cholera endotoxin and

was provided with two tubes containing the substance. He returned several months later, and asked for more,

since he said that he had used the first batch experimenting on guinea pigs. He was provided with additional

332

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, pp. 215-216.

333

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, pp. 217. Thompson appears to imply that this statement was given at the time of the trial.

toxin.

334

Pantchenko admitted to acquiring the cholera endotoxin, but claimed that he sold it to O’Brien de

Lacy for 25 rubles. The material was apparently to be used to kill General Buturlin.

335

Pantchenko subsequently approached Professor Zabolotny, a microbiologist, who gave the physician a

small quantity of diphtheria toxin for what Pantchenko claimed was research into its effects on the nervous

system. Zabolotny testified that he subsequently learned that his toxin was not virulent, although he never

informed Pantchenko.

336

After supplying Pantchenko, Zabolotny suggested that he approach the Institute of

Experimental Medicine to obtain additional quantities of the toxin. Professor Zdrjekoffski, a chemist at the

Institute of Experimental Medicine, testified during the trial that, “I gave him, I forget whether one or two

phials of diphtheria toxin, each containing thirty or forty cubic centimeters. I explained to Dr. Pantchenko the

action of this toxin and the minimum dose that would cause death.” A prisoner who shared a jail cell with

Pantchenko subsequently claimed that the physician told him about experiments with a guinea pig to test the

toxin.

337

Probable or Possible Use

In these cases, the perpetrators may have used a biological agent, but there is no authoritative

confirmation. It also includes some cases in which a biological agent was used, but there is no information to

indicate whether the perpetrator knowingly caused the infection. The probability of intentional contamination

for these cases ranges from highly likely to highly unlikely.

Case 1994-03M: Orville Lynn Majors, January 1994

Orville Lynn Majors was arrested on December 29, 1997 on charges that he poisoned at least six

people at the Vermillion County Hospital from 1993-1995. In addition to use of potassium chloride, a

chemical, Majors is alleged to have used epinephrine, also known as adrenaline. He was suspected of

involvement in as many as 100 deaths, and police investigators performed autopsies on 15 people.

338

November 1998, a seventh murder charge was filed against Majors, although it is unclear whether the

substance involved was a chemical or biological poison.

339

Case 1993-04: Animal Liberation Front, December 1994

A spokesman for the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) claimed that several bombs placed by ALF

activists at several Boots pharmacies in the United Kingdom were contaminated with HIV. Authorities

discounted the claim, but also suggested that even if true the HIV was unlikely to pose a hazard.

340

Case 1992-06: Marilyn Tan, June 1992

Authorities in Alberta, Canada, alleged that Marilyn Tan deliberately injected Con Boland with HIV-

contaminated blood during a sexual encounter. Prosecutors claimed that Tan got the idea from an episode of

the television series Murder, She Wrote. She allegedly obtained the HIV from her sister, a nurse who lived in

the United States. Although Tan allegedly admitted the plot to a friend, the presiding judge found that witness’

testimony less than credible. In addition, the judge noted that the prosecution could provide no convincing

evidence that Boland acquired his HIV through injection. The judge believed that Boland’s promiscuous

lifestyle opened the possibility that he was infected in other ways. For this reason, the judge acquitted Tan.

341

334

“The Russian Murder Trial,” Times (London), February 4, 1911, p. 7, and Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, pp. 215-216.

335

“The Russian Murder Trial: History of the Case,” Times (London), February 17, 1911, p. 5, and Thompson, Poisons and

Poisoners, p. 218.

336

“Doctors Tell of Autopsy,” New York Times, February 4, 1911, p. 2.

337

Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners, p. 218, and “The Russian Murder Trial,” Times (London), February 4, 1911, p. 7.

338

See Charles Hoskinson, “Indiana Nurse Pleads Not Guilty in Hospital Deaths,” Washington Post, December 31, 1997, p. A6,

Charles Hoskinson, “Former Nurse Charged in Six Deaths,” Washington Post, December 30, 1997, p. A7, and Dirk Johnson, “Nurse Held

in Six Killings,” New York Times, December 31, 1997, p. A10.

339

Amy Cahill, “Seventh murder charge filed in Majors case,” Brazil Times (Indiana), November 3, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://braziltimes.com.

340

Chris Court, “Police Seek Woman in Firebomb Inquiry,” Press Association, January 4, 1994. I am indebted to Jason Pate of

the Monterey Institute for International Studies for bring this reference to my attention.

341

“Model accused of injecting lover with AIDS virus,” Agence France Presse, May 17, 1995, 13:11 Eastern Time, “HIV Trial

Told of Strange Thigh Bruise”, Toronto Globe and Mail, May 4, 1995, p. A11, and Alanna Mitchell, “Tan Not Guilty of Injecting Lover,”

Toronto Globe and Mail, May 24, 1995, p. A4.

Case 1990-05X: Suicide using HIV-infected blood (1990?)

In early 1991, several French physicians reported on a case in which a 41-year-old woman tried to

commit suicide by injecting herself with two to three milliliters of HIV-contaminated blood taken from a friend

who had AIDS. Two hours after the event, she went to a hospital emergency room, where she was treated with

zidovudine. Despite the treatment, three months after the injection laboratory tests indicated that she was

infected with HIV.

342

Case 1990-02: Giardia in Scotland, June 1990

According to a report that appeared in The Lancet, a British medical journal, during June 1990 nine

people living in an apartment building in Edinburgh, Scotland, became sick with a diarrheal disease caused by

Giardia lamblia. Investigators discovered that the one of the tanks that supplied water to the building had been

broken into and deliberately contaminated with Giardia-containing fecal material.

343

The identity of the perpetrator was not reported, and the motivation for the contamination is not

known. It is not known if the perpetrator knowingly intended to cause giardiasis, or was even aware that the

feces were contaminated with Giardia.

Case 1989-04M: Efren Saldivar

In March 1998, a respiratory therapist named Efren Saldivar confessed to having murdered between

40 and 50 patients at the Glendale Adventist Medical Center in Los Angeles. According to the confession, he

killed the patients over a nine year period starting in 1989 by smothering them or by injecting them with lethal

substances. He claimed to have used morphine, Pavulon, or succinylcholine chloride. Pavulon and

succinylcholine chloride are both muscle relaxants. He subsequently retracted the confession, claiming that he

was suicidal at the time of his confession but lacked the will to kill himself.

344

The case is currently under investigation. Press reports suggest that law enforcement officials believe

that at least one patient was murdered, but lack the evidence needed to make an arrest.

345

As of March 1999,

the case was still under investigation.

346

Case 1989-03: South Africa, August 1989

In May 1990, a South African newspaper, Vrye Weekblad, reported that a South African government

covert operations unit, known as the Civilian Cooperation Bureau (CCB), employed biological agents against

SWAPO, the South West African People’s Organization. The CCB had nearly 300 people working for it, and

reportedly consumed about 0.28 per cent of the entire South African defense budget. The group had authority

to operate inside South Africa and in neighboring countries. It was apparently disbanded around April 1991.

347

The claim that South Africa used biological agents is based on the statements of Petrus Jacobus Botes,

who claimed to have directed operations by CCB in Mozambique and Swaziland. According to his account, in

May 1989, he was ordered to contaminate the water supply at Dobra, a refugee camp located in Namibia, with

cholera and yellow fever organisms provided him by a South African army doctor. The attempt to contaminate

the water supply was made in late August, but apparently failed to have any effect because of the high chlorine

content of the treated water at the camp.

348

A Namibian health official subsequently confirmed that the water

342

Eric Durand, Claire Le Jeunne, and François-Claude Hugues, “Failure of prophylactic zidovudine after suicidal self-

inoculation of HIV-infected blood” [letter], New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 324 (April 11, 1991), p. 1062.

343

C.N. Ramsey and J. Marsh, “Giardiasis due to deliberate contamination of water supply,” Lancet, Vol. 336 (October 6,

1990), pp. 880-881. This incident was brought to my attention by Robert S. Root-Bernstein, “Infectious Terrorism,” Atlantic, May 1991, p.

48.

344

Buck Wargo, Donna Huffaker, and Julie Marquis, “Hospital Worker Says He Killed Up to 50,” Los Angeles Times, March

28, 1998, p. A1.

345

T. Christian Miller, “Possible Victims of Alleged Mercy Killer Identified,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1998, Valley Edition,

Metro section, p. 1.

346

Scott Glover, “Critics Lament Slow Pace of ‘Angel of Death’ Investigation,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1999, as found

at http://www.latimes.com.

347

For a short discussion of the role of CCB, see Jacques Pauw, In the Heart of the Whore: The story of apartheid’s death

squads (Halfway House, South Africa: Southern Book Publishers, 1991), pp. 150-155. Pauw is a South African journalist who investigated

efforts by the apartheid regime to forcibly suppress dissent. Bruce Hoffman and The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology brought

this incident to my attention.

348

Pauw, In the Heart of the Whore, pp. 187-188. See also “Dirty Tricks and Dirtier Germs,” CovertAction Quarterly, Winter

1998, p. 29, citing Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball

Publishers, 1997).

supply was treated, and that the camp’s water was monitored during that period. No evidence of cholera was

ever found.

349

Sketchy details of South Africa’s biological weapons program emerged following the arrest of Wouter

Basson in January 1997. Basson, a physician, was the project leader for Project Coast, the codename for South

Africa’s covert biological and chemical weapons program. In that capacity, he is thought to have had

comprehensive knowledge of South Africa’s entire biological weapons program. Four trunks full of material

related to Project Coast were seized by law enforcement officials at the time of his arrest, providing the first

real insight into the full dimensions of the program. Only a limited amount of information was made public,

however, because of four separate investigations into Project Coast: South Africa’s Commission on Truth and

Reconciliation; the Office of Economic Offences; the Gauteng Attorney-General’s Special Investigation Team;

and, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA).

350

Additional details of the program were provided in the course of hearings held before the

Commission’s Human Rights Violations Committee during June and July 1998. Scientists involved in the

biological weapons program provided details of their activities to the committee. According to the researchers,

pathogens and toxins were developed for use against opponents of the apartheid regime. One operation

associated with the program was the Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL). Schalk van Rensburg, formerly

a director of the facility, told the Committee, “I would say that 95 percent of what went on was covert work.

Over the five year offensive period at RRL, some 500 products were issued, many in small quantities capable

of killing just a few people.”

351

Significantly, the company reportedly produced 32 bottles containing cholera

cultures. In addition, the laboratory produced chocolates and cigarettes laced with anthrax, beer contaminated

with botulinum toxin, and sugar containing an unidentified salmonella species.

352

Another person who testified

before the Commission, Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, claimed that the South Africans infected three Russians

advising the African National Congress with anthrax, and that one died.

353

No evidence was presented to the Commission confirming allegations of use of cholera against

SWAPO.

Case 1988-01: Poisoner of Colonel Jean-Claude Paul, November 1988

On November 6, 1988, Colonel Jean-Claude Paul, the recently retired commander of Haiti’s elite

Dessalines Battalion, died after eating a bowl of pumpkin soup for lunch. Paul was a leader of the notorious

Tontons Macoutes, essentially the terror squad created by the Duvalier regime to maintain its power. Even

after the President Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier was forced from power in 1986, the Tontons Macoutes

remained a power in the country. Until he was retired from the military following a September 1988 coup, Paul

was considered one of the most powerful figures in Haiti. At the time of his death, the United States

government was attempting to extradite Paul for his alleged involvement in smuggling drugs from South

America to the United States.

354

Following Paul’s death, the Haitian police arrested Paul’s wife, Mireille Deinois, and two of their

servants, based on suspicions that they might have poisoned him. They were subsequently released.

355

Some

accounts suggest that Paul’s wife was arrested to protect her from vengeful members of his family.

356

349

“South African paper reports cholera plot,” San Jose Mercury News, May 11, 1990, p. 21A, and San Jose Mercury News,

May 12, 1990, p. 7F.

350

These details are from Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 6, as found (at the time)

at the Commission’s World Wide Web site, http://www.truth.org.za.

351

Jeremy Lovell, “S. African panel told of secret murder factory,” Reuters, June 9, 1998, 05:18 p.m. EST feed.

352

Suzanne Daley, “In Support of Apartheid: Poison Whisky and Sterilization,” New York Times, June 11, 1998, p. A3.

353

David Beresford, “Mandela on apartheid's poison list,” Age (Melbourne, Australia), June 11, 1998, taken from the paper’s

World Wide Web site, http://www.theage.com.au/.

354

Alan Tomlinson, “Poison suspicion after Haiti colonel on drug charges dies,” Times (London) November 8, 1988, p. 7,

“Haitian Officer Charged by U.S. Is Reported Dead,” New York Times, November 7, 1988, p. A11, and “Possibility of Poisoning Is Raised

In the Death of a Haitian Colonel,” New York Times, November 8, 1988, p. A14. See also Christine Toomey, “Tontons’ terror lives on as

boss dies from poison,” Sunday Times (London), November 13, 1988, p. A24. Bruce Hoffman and The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism

Chronology brought this incident to my attention.

355

“Haiti police seize wife, two servants in Colonel’s death,” Miami Herald, November 8, 1988, p. 3A, and “Haiti colonel

poisoned,” Sunday Times (London), December 4, 1988, p. A20.

356

“Indicted Haitian Colonel dies,” Miami Herald, November 7, 1988, p. A1.

Initial press reports indicated that Paul died of a heart attack. It was generally assumed, however, that

he was poisoned, and the press soon indicated that “poisoning is suspected.”

357

The Haitian press noted that his

lips were suspiciously dark. According to one newspaper, it had information that his table salt was

contaminated with cyanide. A sample of the pumpkin soup that he was eating just before his death was sent to

a laboratory in Miami, Florida.

358

Tests of the soup did not identify any poisons. According to press accounts,

however, the autopsy suggested that he had been poisoned. It is not known if the poison was ever identified.

359

The Port-au-Prince police chief, Colonel Georges Valcin, asserted that Paul died after “absorbing a toxic

substance,” but he never identified the substance involved.

360

It is possible that Paul was poisoned using any one of several toxins known to Haitian practitioners of

voodoo. For example, they employ tetrodotoxin in the preparations supposedly used in the process of

zombification. Similarly, it appears that the plant-derived drug datura, another powerful toxin, is used to

counter the effects of the tetrodotoxin. It appears that Haitians are also familiar with other toxins derived from

plants and animals.

361

There is some evidence suggesting that some of the compounds used by traditional Haitians in their

rituals have made their way to the United States. In February 1986, a fireman in Delray Beach, Florida, was

hospitalized after entering a burning house where it is believed certain of these preparations were stored.

362

Case 1987-01: Dr. David Acer, December 1987-1990

According to the Centers for Defence Control and Prevention (CDC), a Florida dentist infected with

HIV, Dr. David Acer, transmitted the disease to six of his patients. It is not known how the patients became

infected. For several reasons, the Acer case has been the focus of intense controversy. CDC was concerned due

to fears that health care providers might transmit the disease to their patients. In fact, this was the first known

instance in which a health care provider appeared to have transmitted HIV to a patient.

363

Both the infected patients who sued Acer’s estate and his malpractice insurance company, and the

insurance companies, have had an interest in determining whether Acer transmitted the disease to his patients,

and, if he did, how it happened. Because of the controversy, CDC has spent more than $1 million on the Acer

investigation. More than two dozen CDC personnel have been involved.

364

A senior CDC official, Harold Jaffe, has offered three alternative explanations of how Acer

transmitted the disease. First, Acer could have contaminated his own dental instruments and then failed to

sterilize them before using them on his patients. Second, Acer might have cut himself in some fashion and his

blood could have infected the patients when he performed dental work on them. Third, Acer might have

intentionally infected the patients. According to Jaffe, “There is no direct evidence for any of these three

theories.”

365

The first of Acer’s victims became known on July 27, 1990, when the CDC reported the case in its

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. According to CDC, the victim had no obvious risk factor for AIDS,

357

“Haiti police seize wife, two servants in Colonel’s death,” Miami Herald, November 8, 1988, p. 3A.

358

Christine Toomey, “Tontons’ terror lives on as boss dies from poison,” Sunday Times (London), November 13, 1988, p.

A24.

359

“Haiti colonel poisoned,” Sunday Times (London), December 4, 1988, p. A20.

360

Miami Herald, December 3, 1988, p. 25A.

361

Wade Davis, The Serpent and the Rainbow: A Harvard Scientist’s Astonishing Journey into the Secret Societies of Haitian

Voodoo, Zombis, and Magic (New York: A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Shuster, 1997). On the role of tetrodotoxin in

Haitian rituals, see pp. 116ff and 165ff. On datura, see pp. 35ff and 164-165. Among the other toxins that the Haitians appear to employ

are bufogenin and bufotoxin (see p. 114 in Davis), derived from the Bufo marinus toad, and saponin extracted from the plant Albizzia

lebbeck (p. 111).

362

“Haiti poisons pose problem in a new land,” Orlando Sentinel, July 19, 1987.

363

There is a considerable literature on this case. It has received enormous press coverage, and there have been numerous

scientific articles reviewing aspects of the case. In addition, it has been the subject of several books, including Mark Carol Rom, Fatal

Extraction: The Story Behind the Florida Dentist Accused of Infecting His Patients with HIV and Poisoning Public Health (San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997). For a shorter review of the case, see “CDC Closes the Case of The Florida Dentist,” Science, May 22, 1992,

p. 1130.

364

Dennis L. Breo, “The dental AIDS cases—Murder or an unsolvable mystery,” JAMA, December 8, 1993, p. 2732.

365

Breo, “The dental AIDS cases,” p. 2732.

and had a strain of HIV genetically identical to Acer’s.

366

The young woman involved, Kimberly Bergalis,

subsequently sued Acer’s estate, and mounted a public campaign to force mandatory HIV testing of medical

workers. Over time, five additional cases surfaced. The last of the victims was identified in May 1993.

Almost from the beginning, there have been attacks on the CDC research. Some critics have argued

that the victims had risk factors not identified by CDC, and that the methodology used by CDC to compare the

HIV strains was flawed. These arguments were publicly aired in a segment broadcast by 60 Minutes, the CBS

television program.

367

Most scientific experts, however, appear to agree with CDC that Acer somehow infected

his patients.

368

Most of the controversy centers on whether or not Acer infected them deliberately.

369

Edward Parsons, a friend of Acer’s, came to suspect that the dentist might have deliberately infected

his patients. Parsons recalled in 1992 comments that he heard Acer make in 1988, “When it starts affecting

grandmothers and younger people, then you’ll see something done.” For Parsons, this seemed to convincingly

suggest Acer’s guilt, given that two of the first victims were Bergalis, a young woman, and Barbara Webb, a

grandmother.

370

According to Jaffe, however, Parsons gave a different account in his sworn testimony, which

casts doubt on his subsequent statements.

371

Many of those who have looked into the case believe that Acer deliberately infected his patients.

According to one expert, “Whether it’s scientifically valid or not, it is definitely the most prevalent theory

today—at least in the dental community.”

372

For example, one scientist who looked into the case claims, “It

was murder … simply because we’ve eliminated everything else.”

373

Other investigators have taken CDC to task for failing to properly investigate the case. They argue

that CDC focused too much on the victims, and insufficiently on the activities and character of Dr. Acer. For

example, CDC spent three months investigating the first known victim, Bergalis, before looking into Acer’s

activities. One critic argues that strong similarities can be identified between Dr. Acer’s behavioral patterns

and those of known sexual criminals. This critic contends that CDC’s investigation of the case was flawed

from the beginning, and consistently overlooked evidence supporting the intentional contamination theory.

374

Experts at the CDC, however, do not believe that there is compelling evidence to support the

deliberate contamination theory. Similarly, an investigator in the Florida Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services told a reporter, “The only evidence we have to support the theory of criminal intent is

the lack of evidence supporting any of the other theories. We will probably never know the answer.”

375

Case 1985-02: Unknown, 1985

According to an official of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Mexican contract workers involved in

a screwworm eradication program may have deliberately spread that pathogen among livestock. Although the

perpetrators were never charged, the workers apparently spread the screwworm because they were seeking to

protect their jobs, which would have disappeared once the parasites were eliminated. The releases apparently

took place in an area of Mexico about 50 miles south of the border with the United States.

376

366

“Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient during an Invasive Dental Procedure,” Morbidity

and Mortality Weekly Report, July 27, 1990, p. 489-493. Dr. Shellie A. Kolavic provided me with copies of this and other articles on the

Acer case.

367

“AIDS From Dentist Disputed: 60 Minutes Raises Doubts in ‘80s Cases,” Miami Herald, June 18, 1994, p. 5B. The

arguments advanced in the 60 Minutes segments are reviewed and generally dismissed in Stephen Barr, “The 1990 Florida Dental

Investigation: Is the Case Really Closed?,” Annals of Internal Medicine, January 15, 1996, pp. 250-254.

368

David Brown, “The 1990 Florida Dental Investigation: Theory and Fact,” Annals of Internal Medicine, January 15, 1996, pp.

255-256.

369

David Kidwell, “AIDS dentists lethal weapon? Accidental transmission unlikely in latest case, experts say,” Miami Herald,

June 6, 1993, p. 1A.

370

“Friend dentist may have spread AIDS on purpose,” Miami Herald, June 11, 1992, p. 2B. See also Hal Boedeker, “AIDS

dentist will be focus of 20/20 segment on Friday,” Miami Herald, September 30, 1993, p. 5B.

371

Breo, “The dental AIDS cases,” p. 2733. According to Jaffe, “He said under oath only that Acer was angry about his AIDS

infection, and he specifically said that Acer did not tell him that he was going to intentionally infect patients.”

372

David Kidwell, “AIDS dentists lethal weapon? Accidental transmission unlikely in latest case, experts say,” Miami Herald,

June 6, 1993, p. 1A.

373

Hal Boedeker, “AIDS dentist will be focus of 20/20 segment on Friday,” Miami Herald, September 30, 1993, p. 5B.

374

Leonard G. Horowitz, “Murder and cover-up could explain the Florida dental AIDS mystery,” British Medical Journal,

December 1994, p. 423-427.

375

Hal Boedeker, “AIDS dentist will be focus of 20/20 segment on Friday,” Miami Herald, September 30, 1993, p. 5B.

376

Judith Miller, “U.S. to Use Lab for More Study Of Bioterrorism,” New York Times, September 22, 1999, p. A25.

Case 1981-01: Unknown (Boris Korczak), September 1981

We have two distinctly different versions of what happened to Boris Korczak in September 1981.

These two accounts are totally inconsistent, and while one appears to originate with U.S. intelligence agencies,

it is the other version that appears more credible.

The first version was initially reported by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Neil C. Livingstone in their

1987 book America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare. According to Douglass and

Livingstone, Korczak was killed using a technique similar to that used on Georgi Markov and Vladimir Kostov

in 1978.

Intelligence sources in the West say that a similar pellet-firing weapon has been responsible for at

least six assassinations in recent years, including a CIA double agent, Boris Korczak, who was hit

at Tyson’s Corner, Virginia. Korczak was rushed to Fairfax hospital, where a major fight developed

between the CIA and the Soviets over custody of the body. The CIA held off the Soviets until the

cause of Korczak’s death was fixed, which turned out to be a small platinum-iridium pellet, which

presumably contained ricin. The CIA got the pellet; the Soviets got the body, which they

immediately shipped to Russia on an Aeroflot plane from which all passengers were excluded.

377

Dr. Benjamin C. Garrett, a scientist specializing in chemical and biological agents working at EAI Corporation,

wrote a similar version of this story, which he attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency.

378

A totally different account emerges from other sources, including a review of press articles published

in 1981 and 1996 and interviews with the alleged victim. According to newspaper accounts, in October 1981

Boris Korczak, a Lithuanian-Pole who had acted as a double agent for the Central Intelligence Agency in the

1970s, claimed that the KGB attempted to assassinate him with ricin pellets. Korczak had lived in Denmark

while working for the CIA, but came to the United States in 1979 when he came to believe that the KGB had

discovered his CIA connections.

According to the newspaper report, the Senate Intelligence Committee

confirmed that Korczak had worked for the agency.

379

Korczak claims that in mid-September 1981 he was attacked while shopping at the Tyson’s Corner

shopping mall. He told a reporter, “My friends say they saw a blond man, wearing British clothes, who seemed

to be following us around the shopping center. I believe he shot the pellet at me.” At that time, he felt

“something like a mosquito bite” on his back near his kidneys. A few hours later, his temperature climbed to

106° F, and he became delirious. He recovered after three days. He claims that several days later he excreted a

metal ball about one-five hundredth of an inch in size. “That ball has a niche that was filled with some deadly

poison which got into my kidneys when the ball lodged there.” Korczak made his allegations public because he

believed that the CIA had refused to protect him, despite his previous work for the agency.

380

According to a February 1996 Associated Press report, Korczak had just filed a lawsuit against the

CIA in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In that suit, he claimed that he was owed $725,000 by the CIA, and

asked for a $25,000 annuity. At that time, he told journalists that in 1981 he was struck with a poisoned pellet

while grocery shopping. According to this account, he provided reporters with copies of his medical records

describing a “tiny … pellet” removed from the wound.

381

It is impossible to ascertain the truth of the Korczak’s story, given that there has never been an official

investigation into his allegations. Moreover, it is clear that Korczak had a strong motivation to invent the story,

given his dispute with the CIA. At the same time, however, the medical records that he has shown researchers

indicate that he did become quite ill at the time of the alleged incident, and he did show a small pellet to

reporters soon after the incident. In addition, his account of what happened has remained consistent over the

years, although he has given various explanations for why he was attacked.

The most unusual feature of this case is the discrepancy in the two accounts of what happened. The

story attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency is clearly specious. If Korczak had been murdered, there is

no question but that U.S. law enforcement officials could have performed an autopsy and taken any other steps

necessary to prosecute an investigation. The fact that certain people within the intelligence community

allegedly have spread what is clearly a specious story is in itself high suspicious. It is possible that the conflict

377

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, pp. 84-85. In another place (p. 185), the authors date the assassination to

1980, and describe the incident as follows: “Assassination of CIA agent Boris Korczak in McLean, Virginia (Tyson’s Corner), using ricin

weapon, possibly in umbrella configuration.”

378

Benjamin C. Garrett, “Ricin: A Case Study for the Treaty,” ASA Newsletter, No. 92-2, April 3, 1992, pp. 1, 10.

379

Joseph Volz, “Ex-Agent Says KGB Trying to Kill Him, CIA Refuses Help,” Washington Post, October 4, 1981, p. A14.

380

Joseph Volz, “Ex-Agent Says KGB Trying to Kill Him, CIA Refuses Help,” Washington Post, October 4, 1981, p. A14.

381

See “Double Agent for the CIA sues ‘the big bully’,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 25, 1996.

between Korczak and his CIA handlers may have motivated the false account, but, in the absence of additional

information, any such conclusion is at best speculative.

Case 1970-04: Additional East Bloc bioassassinations, 1970s-1980s?

According to Douglass and Livingstone, intelligence officials believe that at least six other people

were victims of “a similar pellet-firing weapon,” besides Markov and Kostov. They mention Boris Korczak, as

well as the Algerian leader Houari Boumedienne. They claim that Boumedienne

was killed using a pellet gun

identical to the type used against the Bulgarians.

382

According to press accounts, Boumedienne was diagnosed as suffering from a rare disorder known as

Waldenstrom’s macroglobulinemia, a blood disease characterized by an enlarged spleen and liver. He became

ill in the period September 19-24, 1978, during an Arab summit in Damascus, Syria. At the time, he was

suffering from fever, chills, malaise, anemia, and blood in his urine.

383

Around October 4 or 5, he was flown to

Moscow for treatment of what was by then thought to be a kidney infection.

384

The Soviets continued to treat

him until mid-November.

385

After Boumedienne returned to Algiers, the Algerians brought in additional

specialists, and he was diagnosed with Waldenstrom’s macroglobulinemia. During this period, Boumedienne

was attended by a medical team that at one point included 62 physicians drawn from 14 countries. Among

those attending were 14 doctors from the United States. The Algerians also brought in Dr. Jan Waldenstrom,

the Swedish doctor who first characterized the disease.

386

These accounts cast doubt on the theory that

Boumedienne was assassinated.

Another source claims, “U.S. intelligence figures privately indicated there had been other suspicious

attacks and at least two deaths involving other exiles, including a Bulgarian and a Croat.”

387

British authorities

might have looked into other such attacks during their Markov investigation. For example, The Times (London)

reported in November 1978 that British police had already traveled to West Germany on three occasions to talk

with Bulgarian dissidents, and that the police were interviewing a doctor in Munich. However, the subject of

the conversations was not specified, so it is only speculation that it may have involved other attacks on

dissidents.

388

During a March 13, 1980 discussion, Dr. Rufus Compton, the pathologist who performed the autopsy

on Georgi Markov, recounted the story of Mrs. Angela Hoppett, who traveled to the Soviet Union with her

father, apparently soon after the Markov murder. She reported that the Russians attempted to incriminate her

father by tricking him into reading anti-Soviet material. Crompton describes what happened next in the

following way:

… she felt a sting or a blow at the back of her neck, and noticed a small puncture mark there. She

described symptoms, a number of which were similar to those of the Markov and Kostov cases. She

developed a fever and backache with severe headache and malaise which lasted for a long time.

However, with all due respect, you really have to take her story with a certain pinch of salt, coming

after the Markov/Kostov affair.

389

Despite his skepticism about Mrs. Hoppett’s story, Crompton noted, “I believe that it probably is the case that

this instrument has been used not on numerous occasions but certainly on a number of occasions, other than on

these two men.” He added, that these other cases had “not been detected.”

390

During the same presentation, Dr.

Robin Keeley of the London Metropolitan Police Laboratory stated that the pellet’s platinum-iridium alloy is

biologically inert, so that it could remain inside the body without causing inflammation.

391

This would reduce

chances of the pellet being detected.

382

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, pp. 84-85.

383

Lawrence K. Altman, “Huge Medical Team Treated Algerian,” New York Times, December 28, 1978, p. A11.

384

Jim Hoagland, “Algerian Leader Ill, Treated in Moscow,” Washington Post, October 21, 1978, p. A13, and Ronald Koven,

“Algerian Deathwatch,” Washington Post, December 13, 1978, p. A30.

385

“Algerians Told Boumediene Is Sick and Unable to Work,” New York Times, November 20, 1978, p. A6.

386

Lawrence K. Altman, “Huge Medical Team Treated Algerian,” New York Times, December 28, 1978, p. A11.

387

Carl Sifakis, Encyclopedia of Assassination (New York: Facts On File, 1991), p. 122.

388

Stewart Tendler, “Police see Mr Markov’s brother for clues in killing,” Times (London), November 28, 1978, p. 2.

389

Dr. Rufus Crompton and Dr. David Gall, “Georgi Markov--Death in a Pellet,” Medico-Legal Journal, Volume 48 (1980), p.

60.

390

Crompton and Gall, “Georgi Markov--Death in a Pellet,” pp. 60-61.

391

Crompton and Gall, “Georgi Markov--Death in a Pellet,” p. 61.

Following the reports of Markov’s death in September 1978, another Bulgarian dissident, Stefan

Bankov, also claimed to have experienced a mysterious attack of a similar nature. Bankov told a French

newspaper, L’Aurore, that the incident took place during a 1974 airplane flight between Seattle, Washington,

and London. During the flight, someone violently bumped into Bankov. He told reporters, “He [the assailant]

didn’t apologize for bumping into me and I immediately experienced a terrible feeling of cold, beginning of

paralysis and difficulties in breathing.” He says that he was hospitalized after the trip and was ill for several

days.

392

Case 1979-02: Zimbabwe guerrillas, November 1979

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology attributes the following incident to November 1979.

Rhodesian officials publicly accused nationalist guerrillas of responsibility for the spread of anthrax

in 12 districts. Twenty people reportedly died from the disease, which also affected cattle. The

incident has not been confirmed and may in fact have been Rhodesian propaganda.

393

Case 1976-02: Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization, 1976-1980

There is some evidence suggesting that the Rhodesian government used biological agents against

black civilians in Rhodesia and Mozambique. According to these accounts, the operation was organized by the

Central Intelligence Organization, the intelligence agency of the Apartheid government of Ian Smith.

394

The CIO drew on the services of Robert Symington, a professor of anatomy at the University of

Rhodesia. He recruited other members of the faculty and some students into his program to develop chemical

and biological agents. In 1975, the researchers tested their new agents on detainees.

The dissemination of the agent was the responsibility of Inspector Dave Anderton, chief of the

“Terrorist Desk.” He used members of the Selous Scouts, an antiterrorist group made up mostly of captured

members of the black nationalist guerrilla armies. According to a researcher who interviewed former members

of the CIO, they were responsible for the following operations:

“bacteriological agents” as yet unidentified which were used to contaminate boreholes, rivers, and

other water sources. There are several cases of deaths attributed to drinking water and Henrik Ellert

[a former CIO official] recounts one incident in which the Ruya River was infected with an

unidentified biological agent in 1976. This incident corresponds to a cholera epidemic along the

Ruya River in Mozambique in which fatalities were reported. In Mozambique, the water supply of

the town of Cochemane was poisoned by Selous Scouts. The CIO later reported 200 deaths in

Cochemane attributed again to cholera.

anthrax bacterium which was introduced into rural areas of Western Zimbabwe, resulting in

several hundred human deaths.

395

In 1979 and 1980, there were 10,738 documented cases of human anthrax in Rhodesia, resulting in 182 deaths.

In contrast, during the previous 29 years there were only 334 cases.

396

Most researchers believe that the anthrax

epidemic was a natural outbreak. The extent of the outbreak resulted from the collapse of public health and

veterinary medicine programs due to the civil war.

397

392

“Other Bulgarians claim poison umbrella attacks,” Tucson Citizen, September 15, 1978, p. 10A, and “2 more report being

stabbed with umbrellas,” Arizona Republic, September 16, 1978, p. A26 (city edition). The original report is Jacques Chambaz, “Les

Parapluies de Sofia,” [“The Umbrellas of Sofia”], L’Aurore, September 15, 1978, p. 16a.

393

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

394

Meryl Nass, “Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread?,” PSR Quarterly, December 1992, pp.

198-209, Meryl Nass, “Zimbabwe’s Anthrax Epizootic,” CovertAction, Number 43, Winter 1992-93, pp. 12-18+, and Brickhill,

“Zimbabwe’s Poisoned Legacy,” CovertAction, Number 43, Winter 1992-93, pp. 4-11+.

395

Brickhill, “Zimbabwe’s Poisoned Legacy,” p. 8. The following account appears in H. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War:

Counter-insurgency and guerrilla war in Rhodesia 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), p. 113:

During 1976 a group of [Selous] Scouts moved into the Ruya wild-life area near the Mozambique border. At

several points along the Ruya river they introduced measured quantities of bacteriological cultures into the

water. Whether any fatalities resulted from these experiments is not known but it did correspond with a reported

epidemic of deaths among people living on the banks of the Ruya river in Mozambique. The deaths were

officially attributed to cholera.

396

Nass, “Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980, pp. 199 and 202, and Nass, “Zimbabwe’s Anthrax Epizootic,” p. 13.

397

See James C. Pile, John D. Malone, Edward M. Eitzen, and Arthur M. Friedlander, “Anthrax as a Potential Biological

Warfare Agent,” Archives of Internal Medicine, March 9, 1998, as taken from http://www.ama-assn.org. The Rhodesian medical

A December 10, 1998 article that appeared in the Harare Financial Gazette, the Zimbabwe

government has opened an investigation into the claims, according to a statement by the country’s Health

Minister, Dr. Timothy Stamp. Stamp told the newspaper, “It is true that we are researching into the activities of

Rhodesian security agents during the liberation struggle and that they may have used bacteriological warfare.”

The newspaper also indicated that a former Rhodesian army office. Colonel Lionel Dyck said, “Poison was

used on clothes, but other forms of germ warfare, no. The war was not fought honorably and techniques used

by both sides were not honorable. Cholera was also used, mostly in Mozambique.”

398

Case 1971-01: KGB (Alexander Solzhenitsyn), August 1971

In 1992, a Russian newspaper, Sovershenno Sekretno (Top Secret) published a story claiming that the

KGB attempted to kill Alexander Solzhenitsyn as the noted author was standing at a department store candy

counter in Novocherkassk on August 8, 1971. KGB Lt. Col. Boris Ivanov, a member of the team allegedly

involved in the plot, recalled, “The whole operation lasted two or three minutes. The man left the shop and our

boss started to smile. Outside, he said, quickly but firmly, ‘It’s all over. He won’t live much longer.”

399

Solzhenitsyn told the Russian journalists that he was feeling well, and that he and a friend “visited the

cathedral and the shops.” He then gave the following account of subsequent events

I don’t remember any injection, I certainly didn’t feel it, but by mid-morning the skin on my left

side suddenly started to hurt a great deal. Towards evening (we had stopped to see people we

knew), I continued to deteriorate and had a very large burn. The following morning I was reduced

to a terrible state: my left hip, left side, stomach and back were covered with blisters, the largest of

which were 15 centimeters in diameter.

400

Solzhenitsyn’s wife told a Western reporter that he had “a strange, inexplicable disease” and that it took him

months to recover. For long periods, he was barely able to get out of bed or write. Doctors who examined

Solzhenitsyn could not figure out what had happened to him, although some surmised that he had suffered

from a severe allergic reaction. According to the Russian article, after consulting with a respected Russian

toxicologist, it was determined the substance used was probably ricin.

401

Oleg Kalugin confirms the reports that an attack was made against Solzhenitsyn. He states that the

KGB’s Operational and Technical Directorate “had a laboratory that invented new ways of killing people, from

poisons that could be slipped into drinks to jellies that could be rubbed on a person to induce a heart attack. A

KGB agent rubbed such a substance on Alexander Solzhenitsyn in a store in Russia in the early 1970s, making

him violently ill but not killing him.”

402

Kalugin does not indicate what poison was used in the jelly.

Case 1969-01: John R. Hill, March 1969

On March 19, 1969, Joan Robinson Hill died in a small suburban hospital in the Houston area. Within

days of the death, Ash Robinson, father of the dead woman, became convinced that her husband, Dr. John R.

Hill, a plastic surgeon, had murdered her. Dr. Hill’s relations with his wife were strained due to his on-going

affair with Ann Kurth, which he had previously promised to terminate. It appears that Joan Hill was

contemplating a divorce at the time of her death. Dr. Hill married Ann Kurth about three months after Joan

Hill’s death, but the two were in divorce court within four months.

403

Without Ash Robinson’s tenacity, wealth, and political resources it is highly unlikely this case would

have been investigated, much less prosecuted. Robinson made a fortune as an independent oilman, and was one

of Houston’s leading citizens. Therefore, his influence kept the case alive, even when the prosecutors doubted

that any evidence existed to warrant a criminal investigation.

community, despite the war, extensively studied the outbreak. See, for example, See J.C.A. Davies, “A Major Epidemic of Anthrax in

Zimbabwe, part I,” Central African Journal of Medicine, December 1982, pp. 292-298, and J.C.A. Davies, “A Major Epidemic of Anthrax

in Zimbabwe, part II,” Central African Journal of Medicine, January 1983, pp. 8-12.

398

“Zimbabwe probing warfare gem use by colonial govt,” Reuters, December 10, 1998, 7:41 a.m. Eastern.

399

David Remnick, “KGB Plot to Assassinate Solzhenitsyn Reported,” Washington Post, April 21, 1992, p. D2.

400

Remnick, “KGB Plot to Assassinate Solzhenitsyn Reported,” p. D1.

401

Remnick, “KGB Plot to Assassinate Solzhenitsyn Reported,” p. D1.

402

Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 180.

403

This account of the Hill case is based largely on Thomas Thompson, Blood and Money (Garden City, New York: Doubleday

and Company, 1976).

The evidence to support a charge of murder was tenuous at best. Three autopsies failed to clarify the

cause of Joan Hill’s death. Since she had died within 24 hours of her admission to the hospital, state law

required an autopsy. For reasons that were never clarified, Joan Hill’s body was embalmed within a few hours

of her death before an autopsy could be performed. The initial autopsy by the hospital pathologist identified the

cause of death as pancreatitis, a conclusion which was clearly flawed and that the pathologist revised within

days of his finding.

404

The coroner, who stated that the cause of death was hepatitis, performed a second autopsy soon

thereafter. The coroner discounted septicemia as the cause of death, since blood tests performed at the time of

Joan Hill’s hospital admission did not detect any infection. Unfortunately, the specimens were discarded after

her death, and no attempt was made to culture the blood. The coroner apparently was unaware that it was not

uncommon to get negative results from such tests even when patients were septicemic.

405

After the third

autopsy, he changed his official opinion and attributed her death to a “fulminating infectious process.”

406

Considerably later, a grand jury ordered a third autopsy. Dr. Milton Helpern, who was the chief

medical examiner for New York City, performed the last autopsy. Dr. Helpern concluded that Joan Hill died

from a widespread infection, identifying massive damage to organs throughout the body characteristic of

overwhelming septicemia. However, Dr. Helpern also concluded that it would be impossible to determine the

actual cause of death, since the embalming process killed any organisms that might have been present.

407

Ann Kurth also made some spectacular charges against Dr. Hill. During the trial, she testified that Dr.

Hill spent time in her apartment before his wife’s death. In the week before Joan Hill’s death, Ann Kurth

discovered something peculiar in her apartment.

… I went into the bathroom. And the door had been closed. There was a gooseneck light over the

side of the basin, and there were three petri dishes there with red something in them and little dots

of something in that …

I really didn’t get much of a look, because Dr. Hill came up behind me and said, ‘Oh, I am doing an

experiment and this room is supposed to stay warm.’ He had this little gooseneck light over them.

He backed me out of there and closed the door, and I really didn’t think about it.

408

According to Ann Kurth, she also found some pastries in her refrigerator, which apparently were the

same ones that Dr. Hill subsequently gave to his wife. Ann Kurth also claimed that Dr. Hill told her that he

deliberately infected his dead wife. She recalled the statement as follows.

I really didn’t want it to be this way. It didn’t really have to be this way, but Joan would never have

given me a divorce. Ash was going to see to that. So I took every kind of human excretion I could

find. I saved feces, urine from patients, pus from a boil off somebody’s neck, and I mixed them all

together and I grew cultures in those petri dishes … And I first gave her the pastries and that did

not do anything. Then I gave her some ipecac, and she threw up everything but her toenails …. And

she was so sweet about it, She was begging me to do something for her …. So I gave her a shot. I

gave her some broad-spectrum antibiotic, and I mixed in some of this culture in liquid suspension

… and that did it ….

409

Hill was never officially charged with the alleged murder. Rather, the state charged him with murder

by omission, which essentially held that he was acting as his wife’s physician and had failed to take

appropriate steps to treat her. The trial against Dr. Hill was brought to an abrupt end when the judge ordered a

mistrial over statements made by Ann Kurth. Under Texas law, wives (even former wives) were not able to

testify against their husbands. The Judge allowed Kurth to testify on certain specific issues, but she made

statements that went beyond those limits, and so the judge felt compelled to end the trial.

Dr. Hill was never retried. In 1972, a man allegedly hired by Joan Robinson Hill’s father, Ash

Robinson, murdered him. Robinson was never formally charged with the crime, apparently because of his age

and ill health.

The scanty evidence supporting a murder charge in this case is evident. It might be possible to clarify

the cause of death using modern analytic tools, such as PCR, which could identify DNA present in tissues

404

Thompson, Blood and Money, pp. 119, 124.

405

Thompson, Blood and Money, p. 124, 133.

406

Thompson, Blood and Money, p. 169.

407

On Dr. Helpern’s role in the case, see Thompson, Blood and Money, pp. 152-165, 182-188.

408

Thompson, Blood and Money, p. 232.

409

Thompson, Blood and Money, p. 235.

removed during the autopsies left by any dead pathogens. Presumably, if such tests identified multiple

pathogens, it would suggest deliberate infection along the lines alleged by Ann Kurth.

Case 1966-01M: Mario Jascalevich, 1966

Mario Jascalevich, a surgeon, allegedly poisoned five patients at Riverdell Hospital in Bergenfield,

New Jersey, during 1966. Prosecutors claimed that he injected the patients with tubocurarine, a form of curare.

Jascalevich was suspected of poisoning patients of a surgeon who was new to the hospital; he allegedly viewed

the new doctor as a threat to an extremely lucrative practice. An initial investigation by local law enforcement

officials was inconclusive, but following a series of New York Times reports of the case, the investigation was

reopened more than ten years later. In 1978, a New Jersey jury acquitted Jascalevich of the crimes. Jascalevich

subsequently lost his New Jersey medical license for unrelated acts, and returned to Argentina.

410

Case 1961-01: “J.L.”, October 1961

According to an outbreak investigation reported in the New England Journal of Medicine, 23 U.S.

Navy personnel (22 officers and one enlisted man) were stricken with Hepatitis A, possibly as a result of a

deliberate contamination of food served at an officer’s mess. Following a careful study of the outbreak, the

CDC concluded that one of the food handlers contaminated potato salad that he prepared on October 26, 1961.

This individual, who had a history of psychological problems, apparently was ill with Hepatitis A at the time of

the contamination. The investigators believed that he contaminated the salad at the time he was preparing it.

411

At the time, the investigators apparently believed that “J.L.” might have deliberately contaminated the food by

urinating into it. Contemporary authorities tend to discount this mode of transmission, since the current belief

is that Hepatitis A is extremely difficult to transmit through urine.

412

Because Hepatitis A has a lengthy incubation period, the first case was not reported until November

18. The bulk of the cases emerged between November 25 and 30. It was not until December 5 that the CDC

investigation was initiated. The careful records kept by the military aided the investigation. It was possible to

identify the officers who ate at each meal. There were even records of when jars of salad dressing were taken

from storage, making it possible to determine when new batches of the potato salad were prepared. It would

have been considerably more difficult to conduct a similar investigation in a setting in which less accurate

records were available.

The outbreak occurred at Cecil Field, a naval air station located near Jacksonville, Florida.

Subsequent investigation determined that the suspect, identified only as “J.L.” in the journal article, had a

history of psychiatric problems. Prior to the outbreak, he had been diagnosed as schizophrenic with a

recommendation that he be discharged from the Navy.

413

While there is reasonable evidence to support the belief that “J.L.” did urinate into the dressing, it is

not evident that he understood that doing so would transmit disease. Indeed, it is not even clear that he knew

that he had a communicable disease. In addition, even if “J.L.” knowingly contaminated the food with the

intention of transmitting his hepatitis A, it is uncertain that the route used could transmit the disease. It remains

possible that the food was actually contaminated by accident because of poor hygiene.

For these reasons, it appears doubtful that this case meets the definition of a biological agent incident.

Case 1957-01: Brazilian Indian Protection Service (SPI), 1957-1965

Brazil’s Indian Protection Service, known by its Portuguese initials as SPI, reportedly used biological

agents as part of a campaign of genocide against Brazilian aborigines.

414

The allegations were contained in a

report issued by Brazil’s Attorney General in March 1968, the so-called Figueiredo Report. Consisting of

twenty volumes and 5,115 pages, the report “found evidence of widespread corruption and sadism, ranging

410

For a discussion of this case, see Matthew Lifflander, Final Treatment: The File on Dr. X (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979)

and Myron Farber, Somebody Is Lying: the Story of Dr. X (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982).

411

Joseph, P.R., Millar, J.D., and Henderson, D.A., “An Outbreak of Hepatitis Traced to food contamination,” New England

Journal of Medicine, July 22, 1965, pp. 188-194.

412

Electronic communications, Dr. Thomas Török, August 1, 1997, and Dr. Shellie A. Kolavic, July 15, 1997. Telephone

interview, Dr. J.R. Joseph, August 19, 1997. According to Dr. Joseph, Alexander Langmuir, director of the Epidemic Intelligence Service,

cautioned the CDC investigators about drawing any firm conclusions about the mode of transmission.

413

Telephone interview, Dr. Carter S. Bagley, M.D., July 16, 1997.

414

Catherine Caufield, In the Rainforest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 12. According to Caufield, “The SPI was

disbanded in 1967, after a government investigation revealed that Indian agents had practiced genocide by deliberately introducing

smallpox, influenza, tuberculosis, and measles into Indian groups and had joined with speculators and landowners in systematic murder

and robbery of their charges.” Paula DeSutter brought this case to my attention after finding a mention of it on the Internet.

from the massacre of whole tribes by dynamite, machine guns and sugar laced with arsenic to the removal of

an 11-year-old girl from school to serve as a slave to an official of the Service.”

415

Smallpox, influenza, tuberculosis and measles allegedly were spread in the Mato Grosso area from

1957 to 1963. Moreover, it appears that tuberculosis was spread in the northern part of the Amazon Basin in

1964 and 1965. According to one investigator, diseases “were deliberately brought into Indian territories by

landowners and speculators utilizing a metizo previously infected.”

416

The commission was unable to confirm

reports that two tribes of Pataxo Indians, located in Bahia State, were injected with smallpox.

417

Although strong evidence supports the contention that biological agents were deliberately spread

among the aborigines, the mode of transmission appears not to fit the case definition used in this study. Only if

strong evidence existed that some of the victims were deliberately injected would the case definition be

satisfied.

Case 1949-01: Toshima Hospital Outbreak, November 1949

The Toshima Metropolitan Hospital, located in Tokyo, experienced a substantial outbreak of typhoid

in November 1949. The outbreak was traced to food served at the hospital. In all, 20 people became ill from

consuming the contaminated food, including both hospital employees and members of their families. In

addition, another 20 people contracted the disease from those originally infected. Police reportedly believed

that a hospital intern was responsible for the outbreak, but lacked the evidence needed to mount a

prosecution.

418

Case 1947-01: “Zionist” terrorists, 1947-1948

On July 22, 1948, the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee submitted a thirteen-page report to the

United Nations accusing Palestinian Jews of using biological agents against Egypt and Syria. According to the

document, “For several years the Zionists have planned and prepared for the use of bacterial warfare. To that

end, they set up laboratories in Palestine. The Jews plan to use this inhuman weapon against the Arabs in the

Middle East in their war of extermination.” The report contended that there was “some” evidence to link

Palestinian Jews to cholera outbreaks in Egypt in November, 1947, and in Syria “about February, 1948.”

419

In addition, the report noted that on May 28, 1948, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense issued a

communiqué claiming that the Egyptian military had captured four “Zionists” who were attempting to

contaminate wells around Gaza with “a liquid which was discovered to contain the germs of dysentery and

typhoid.” The Palestinian Arab Higher Committee Report claimed that one of the perpetrators confessed to the

plot, which the Egyptian government planned to communicate to the International Red Cross.

420

According to

another source, two Israeli soldiers were involved in the plot: David Horeen and David Mizrachi. Both were

caught by Egyptian forces in May 1948, and were hanged three months later. This account indicates that to

Rachel Katzman, Horeen’s sister, said, “I met one of his commanders in a lecture in Jerusalem. I asked him

whether my brother had really attempted to poison wells. ‘These were the weapons we had,’ he said, ‘and

that’s that.” This account also claims that the Israelis poisoned the water supply of the Arab town of Acre,

causing a major outbreak, and other Arab villages, to prevent the villagers from returning, citing military

historian Uri Milstein as a source.

421

The cholera outbreaks in Syria and Egypt received extensive attention in the international press. The

first reports of the Egyptian outbreak date appeared on September 25, 1947.

422

By the time the final cases

appeared in January 1948, 10,262 people died, about half of those contracting the disease. At the time,

415

Paul L. Montgomery, “Killing of Indians Charged in Brazil,” New York Times, March 21, 1968, p. 1.

416

“Germ Warfare Against Indians is Charged in Brazil,” Medical Tribune and Medical News, December 8, 1969, as quoted in

Shelton H. Davis, Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 10-

11.

417

Paul L. Montgomery, “Killing of Indians Charged in Brazil,” New York Times, March 21, 1968,p. 8.

418

This account is derived from an unpublished article by Masaaki Sugishima, Associate Professor at the Asahi University

School of Law, who based his account on press reports.

419

Thomas J. Hamilton, “Arab Assails Idea of Minority Shifts,” New York Times, July 24, 1948, p. 3.

420

Thomas J. Hamilton, “Arab Assails Idea of Minority Shifts,” New York Times, July 24, 1948, p. 3.

421

Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (London: VISION Paperbacks, 1997), pp.

114-116.

422

“Cholera outbreak near Cairo,” Times (London), September 26, 1947, p. 4.

Egyptian health officials told the World Health Organization that the disease reached Egypt from India, which

had suffered a massive outbreak the previous summer.

423

There were at least two additional allegations that the outbreak resulted from human intervention. In

October 1947, a “well-known radio commentator,” accused the Soviet Union of responsibility for the outbreak.

Theodor Rosebury and Elvin A. Kabat flatly rejected this allegation in a letter to the New York Times. The two

were involved with the U.S. biological warfare program during the Second World War.

424

In addition, at about

the same time Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was accusing the British of causing the outbreak in order to

distract the Egyptian people from the upcoming withdrawal of British forces from Egypt. It is unclear whether

the Muslim Brotherhood believed that the British deliberately introduced the disease, or if they thought the

response to the outbreak was deliberately inadequate.

425

The outbreak in Syria was much smaller, apparently limited to two towns about 60 kilometers south

of Damascus. The first report of the outbreak appeared on December 21.

426

The Syrian army formed a cordon

sanitaire around the villages: only health care providers, food convoys, and a water train were allowed into the

villages. Ultimately, the outbreak was contained, and there were only 44 cases, including 18 deaths.

427

There was an allegation that the outbreak resulted from intentional contamination. According to a

report that appeared in a French-language newspaper published in Beirut, Orient, the Damascus police arrested

several Zionist Jews who employed cholera to disrupt the mobilization of the “People’s Army” being created

to intervene in Palestine. The New York Times account, however, states that “official quarters” did not confirm

the allegation.

428

Case 1942-02: Polish resistance, December 1942

Himmler told Hitler in a December 4, 1942 report that the Germans had just discovered a laboratory

in a safe house used by the Polish underground. He added that they found “three flasks of typhus baccilli,

seventeen sealed rubber tubes presumably containing bacteria, and one fountain pen with instructions for use

for spreading bacteria.”

429

In September 1943, a Polish Liaison Officer informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff

that Polish forces had killed “a few hundred” Germans using “typhoid fever microbes and typhoid fever

lice.”

430

Another source, a member of the Polish underground during the Second World War, claims that the

State Institute of Hygiene, apparently located in Warsaw, Poland, was used by the Polish resistance, then

known as the Union for Armed Resistance (ZWZ). According to this account, the German Gestapo received

anonymous letters denouncing people for various purposes. In many cases, the letters were written to settle

grudges, but the fake charges were sufficient to get the victims arrested by the Germans. To put a halt to this

practice, the staff of the Institute of Hygiene prepared anthrax cultures, and infected fake anonymous letters

that were sent to the Gestapo. When Gestapo agents began to suffer from the symptoms of cutaneous anthrax,

they started throwing away anonymous letters without opening them. The source gives no date for the

incident.

431

423

New York Times, January 27, 1948, p. 7.

424

New York Times, October 19, 1947, section 4, p. 10.

425

“Cairo sprayed against Cholera,” Times (London), October 7, 1947, p. 3, and “Cholera in Egypt unabated: Anti-British

accusations,” Times (London), October 8, 1947, p. 3. Egypt’s Under-Secretary for Health was dismissed from the government for claiming

that the British caused the outbreak due to a failure to implement a quarantine. The Muslim Brotherhood also claimed that the British sent

cholera vaccine that had passed the expiration date to poison the Egyptian people.

426

“Cholera reported in Syria,” New York Times, December 22, 1947, p. 5.

427

“Syria moves quickly to stamp out cholera,” New York Times, December 24, 1947, p. 7, “U.S. Group in Syrian Cholera

Aid,” New York Times, January 3, 1948, p. 28.

428

Dana Adams Schmidt, “Cholera spreads to Syria, Lebanon,” New York Times, December 23, 1947, p. 13.

429

From a report that Himmler gave to Hitler, according to David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 463.

Irving claims that the Gestapo also discovered from captured documents that the laboratory had handled 20 pounds of arsenic. In addition,

he cites a Gestapo report to Hitler that the Soviet NKVD had given instructions for use of arsenic against Germans in occupied Soviet

territory. The reference to this source came from Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of

Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 89.

430

From a document in the records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as quoted in Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing,

p. 89. Typhoid cannot be transmitted by lice, suggesting that the source meant louseborne typhus. See Benenson, pp. 502-510.

431

Jan Nowak, Courier from Warsaw (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), pp. 62-63. Milton Leitenberg brought this

reference to my attention.

Case 1942-01: British SOE (against Reinhard Heydrich), May 27, 1942

According to Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, Czech agents used British-supplied hand grenades

filled botulinum toxin to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich. The basis of this claim is an alleged assertion by Paul

Fildes, the British scientist who was responsible for work on botulinum toxin at Porton Down, Britain’s

biological warfare research center. Long after the event, Fildes reportedly told several scientists that he “had a

hand” in the killing of Heydrich. In particular, he told one scientist that the Heydrich killing “was the first

notch on my pistol.”

432

In October 1941, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) initiated a plot to assassinate

Heydrich, who had just been named Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia. Working with the Czech

government in exile, the British put together a team of agents who were flown into Bohemia on December 29,

1941. They brought with them two specially-modified versions of a standard British hand grenade, which

Harris and Paxman believe were adapted to carry botulinum toxin.

It was not until May 27 that the assassination team had an opportunity to kill Heydrich. On that day,

the Czech team—armed with submachine guns and the modified grenades—ambushed Heydrich’s car as he

was driving near Prague. One of the grenades was thrown at the car after the submachine gun jammed, and at

least some fragments from it injured Heydrich.

433

Harris and Paxman believe that fragments were contaminated

with botulinum toxin and that he died on June 4, 1942 from the effects of botulinum poisoning.

Some experts have cast doubt on this account. The historian M.R.D. Foot, who wrote the official

history of SOE operations in France, and probably knew as much about SOE as anyone, doubted that a poison

was used. “Rumour has it that the grenade was poisoned. There is no need to believe this; Prague’s wartime

suburban gutters were not clean. And the grenade fragments carried filth enough to kill him once embedded in

his insides.”

434

Callum MacDonald, who wrote a comprehensive history of the plot to kill Heydrich, discounted

the Harris and Paxman claims for two reasons. First, he argued that fragments from the grenade that hit

Heydrich also wounded one of the assassins, yet the attacker survived the attack. Second, he believed the toxin

could not have survived during the six months that the assassins were in Czechoslovakia before they used the

grenade.

435

G.B. Carter, who worked at Porton Down in the 1980s and researched the Harris and Paxman

allegations, rejected MacDonald’s arguments. According to Carter, experience suggests that an explosion can

destroy the toxin on some fragments but not others. Hence, it was perfectly possible that poisoned fragments

hit Heydrich, while poison-free fragments hit his attacker. In addition, he contended that there is no reason to

doubt that the toxin could have survived. Nevertheless, his investigations revealed no evidence to support the

story. He determined that Fildes undertook no pertinent research on botulinum toxin until after the

assassination. Since he argues that the symptoms of botulinum poisoning can mimic those of other diseases

that might infect wounds, he draws no conclusions from the symptoms that Heydrich suffered. Others have

noted that the grenade fragments passed through the door of Heydrich’s car and that dirt and other debris

contaminated his wounds. Finally, Erhard Geissler, who has undertaken an extensive review of the German

sources, also found little evidence to support the idea that the assassins used botulinum. Accordingly, as Carter

notes, “Until further evidence emerges, the matter remains obscure.”

436

Case 1940-01X: Egyptian “gangster”, 1940s?

In October 1947, an Egyptian newspaper reported that “a few years ago” an Egyptian gangster used

typhoid culture stolen from “the Government chemical laboratories” as part of a plot to murder insured victims.

The test tube was taken with the assistance of a laboratory technician.

437

432

Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New

York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 88-94.

433

For a comprehensive history of the entire plot to kill Heydrich, see Callum MacDonald, The Killing of SS

Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich (New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989).

434

M.R.D. Foot, SOE: An outline history of the Special Operations Executive, 1949-1946 (Frederick, Maryland: University

Publications of America, 1986), p. 200.

435

Callum MacDonald, The Killing of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, p. 227.

436

See the stories that appeared in 1996 issues of ASA Newsletter: Dr. Benjamin Garrett, “The CW Almanac: April 1996,” 14

June 1996, issue 96-3, p. 9, G.B. Carter, “The Legend of Fildes and the Heydrich Assassination,” 16 August 1996, issue 96-4, p. 8, Jiri

Matousek, “A BTX-bomb for Reinhard Heydrich? Doubts and Questions Still Remain,” 11 October 1996, issue 96-5, p. 8, Erhard

Geissler, “More about Heydrich Assassination,” 5 December 1996, issue 96-6, p. 10. Richard Price kindly supplied me with copies of

these articles.

437

“Epidemic due to lost flask?” Egyptian Gazette, October 3, 1947, p. 3, citing a story that appeared in the Wafd-controlled

newspaper, Sowt El Umma.

Case 1930-02X: German doctor, about 1930

A German-language medical journal published in1930 reported on the case of a physician who

attempted to commit suicide by injecting himself with tetanus toxin. He recovered when he was given tetanus

antitoxin after his symptoms were identified.

438

Case 1930-01X: Hungarian Artist, about 1930

Writing in 1940, Charles Thompson described an incident case that “occurred about ten years ago.”

A Hungarian artist was tried for attempting to murder his wife by means of typhoid and cholera

germs. The cholera medium in his possession was found to have lost all activity through having

been kept too long, while the typhoid culture, though quite a virulent one, failed to kill the victim.

The discovery of the crime was made through his attempts to obtain cultures from a private

laboratory and demanding virulent strains.

439

Thompson gave no additional details and provided no source.

Case 1917-01: German sympathizers, July 1917

In July 1917, it was discovered that certain brands of courtplaster being sold in the United States were

contaminated with tetanus. Courtplaster is an adhesive plaster that was used to cover small wounds, something

like a Band-Aid. Itinerant peddlers in several states were found to be selling tetanus-contaminated

courtplaster.

440

On July 28, 1917, the Department of Justice issued an official statement about the case.

The Department of Justice, without sharing in any sensational view as to the manner in which

sticking plaster or courtplaster became infected, states that some of the samples submitted and

analyzed have been thereby shown to contain tetanus germs. The public is consequently cautioned

against purchasing this remedy except from approved sources, the warning being particularly

directed against purchases in small packages from street peddlers and venders.

441

It was suspected at the time that German-Americans sympathetic towards Germany in the war were

responsible for the contaminated material. The New York State Department of Health’s issued a statement

through the State Defense Council that specifically referred to the allegation.

This warning comes close on the heels of the circulation of stories that Germans have sent agents

throughout the United States to spread such diseases as tetanus and typhoid by means of poisoned

courtplaster.

442

There is no indication that any such connection was ever established or that any prosecutions resulted.

Case 1910-02X: Pancho Villa, 1910s?

According to a description that appears in the autobiography of the novelist William Burroughs,

supporters of Pancho Villa used botulinum toxin against the Mexican federal troops. He describes the events as

follows:

Fill a water canteen to the top with freshly cooked and drained green beans. Close it and put aside

for several days. A few slivers of rotting pork are then added, and the canteen sealed tightly. Ten

incubators are buried underground. After seven days most will be swollen, indicating a thriving

botulism culture.

Can be smeared on any fruit, meats, or vegetables, dabbed on thornbushes and fragments of glass.

Guerrilla children sniped sentries with pottery shards or with obsidian chips dipped in botulism. A

little ingenuity. There are many ways and it takes such a little to do the Big Job.

443

438

Reported in Thomas A. Gonzales, Morgan Vance, and Milton Helpern, Legal Medicine and Toxicology (New York: D.

Appleton-Century Company, 1940), p. 611.

439

C.J.S. Thompson, Poisons and Poisoners: With Historical Accounts of Some Famous Mysteries in Ancient and Modern

Times (London: Harold Shaylor, 1940). The first edition of this study was published in 1930, so the episode could have occurred any time

during the 1920s or 1930s.

440

According to a statement by the U.S. District Attorney for Kansas City, Fred D. Robertson, at least one brand of courtplaster

being sold by peddlers was found to be contaminated. He indicated that tests of the courtplaster using guinea pigs suggested that the

material was sufficiently contaminated to cause harm to humans but not to kill someone. See “Tetanus Germs Found in Sticking Plaster,”

New York Times, July 29, 1917, p. I, 1. A subsequent report from Freeport, Illinois, indicated that courtplaster being sold by a peddler there

was found to be contaminated. “Tetanus Germs in Plaster,” New York Times, July 31, 1917, p. 5.

441

Quoted in “Tetanus Germs Found in Sticking Plaster,” New York Times, July 29, 1917, p. I, 1.

442

Quoted in “Tetanus Germs Found in Sticking Plaster,” New York Times, July 29, 1917, p. I, 1.

Case 1909-01: Bennett Clark Hyde, November 1909

On February 9, 1910, Bennett Clark Hyde, a surgeon living in Kansas City, Missouri, was indicted for

the alleged murder of Colonel Thomas H. Swope, one of Kansas City’s founding fathers. Thus began what one

writer called “one of the most amazing and puzzling poison cases to be found in history”.

444

The Hyde case is

also probably the most famous criminal case in Kansas City’s history. In 1996, the Kansas City Star called the

case “Kansas City's litigation of the century”.

445

Its notoriety arose from the prominence of the victims, Hyde’s

close relations to the alleged victims (he was married to one of Swope’s nieces), and the bitter legal fight that

led to one civil trial and three criminal trials. Ultimately, however, Hyde was never convicted.

446

Colonel Swope is best remembered today for donating the 1,300 acres that became Kansas City’s

Swope Park, the second largest urban park in the United States. (When he died, the park was valued in excess

of $2 million.)

447

Even after such acts of philanthropy, Swope died with a fortune of just under $2 million.

448

In 1909, Colonel Swope, then 82-years old, lived in Independence, Missouri, about 20 miles outside

Kansas City, along with his brother’s widow, Mrs. Logan Swope, and her children. Swope’s will divided the

bulk estate among his ten surviving heirs, meaning his sister-in-law and her children were named in the will.

The will stipulated that if any of them were to die, the assets designated for that person were to be redistributed

among the remaining heirs. James Moss Hunton, a cousin, was named as the trustee and administrator of the

will.

Among the beneficiaries of the will was Frances Hyde, one of Logan Swope’ daughters. Frances

married Hyde in 1907 over the strong objection her mother. Despite Mrs. Swope’s views, Colonel Swope liked

Hyde, and helped the newly weds buy and furnish a house in Kansas City, where Hyde had a profitable

practice.

In September 1909, Hunton became ill, and Hyde was asked to look after him. According to Hyde,

Hunton was suffering from apoplexy, and determined that it was necessary to bleed him to reduce his blood

pressure. During the bleeding, Hyde took six pints of blood. On October 1, 1909, Hunton died. Subsequently,

the state claimed that Hyde essentially allowed Hunton to bleed to death.

Only two days later, on October 3, Colonel Swope became ill. Hyde was called in to look after the old

man. According to the testimony of a nurse, Hyde gave Colonel Swope a capsule. Twenty minutes later,

Colonel Swope turned blue and suffered convulsions. He died soon thereafter. The state alleged that he was

given a mixture of strychnine sulfate and potassium cyanide, relying on the different effects of the two poisons

to prevent a diagnosis of the cause of death.

Some weeks later, a typhoid epidemic broke out in Colonel Swope’s house. The first to become ill

was Mrs. Logan Swope. On December 2, one of the nieces also showed signs of typhoid. Around December 3,

one of Colonel Swope’s nephews, Chrisman Swope, became ill with typhoid. On December 4, three servants in

the household became sick. The next day, a visitor to the household, Mildred Fox, was stricken. Another niece,

Sarah Swope, became ill on December 9, followed by one of her sisters, Stella, on December 11. The last

member of the household to become ill was Lucy Lee Swope, who was traveling abroad and only returned

home four days before she became ill. All recovered, except one of Colonel Swope’ nephews, Chrisman.

Although the young man appeared to be getting better, he was suddenly seized with convulsions and died on

December 6, 1909.

449

After the death of Chrisman, one the attending nurses became suspicious, and threatened to quit

because “people are being murdered in this house.” This led Mrs. Swope to give a Dr. G. T. Twyman charge of

the case. Twyman investigated and could find no obvious cause for the typhoid outbreak. Consequently, Mrs.

Swope brought her concerns to the attention of the trustee for her brother-in-law’s estate. He launched a series

of investigations. A bacteriologist was employed to review conditions in the house. He also could find no

443

Quoted in Benjamin Weissman, “Dream Control,” Los Angeles Times, Book Review, p. 15. The alleged use of botulism

toxin by Pancho Villa’s followers is mentioned in passing in Uncle Fester, Silent Death, Revised and Expanded 2

Edition (Port

Townsend, Washington: Loompanics Unlimited, 1997), p. 93.

444

Edward H. Smith, Famous Poison Mysteries (New York: The Dial Press, 1927), pp. 176. I am indebted to Jason Pate, Center

for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for bringing this case to my attention.

445

Brian Burnes, “Turning back the clock on justice UMKC law school re-creates trial in death of philanthropist Thomas

Swope,” Kansas City Star, January 13, 1996, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.kcstar.com.

446

Smith, Famous Poison Mysteries, p. 176.

447

“Thomas H. Swope,” New York Times, October 4, 1909, p. 9.

448

“$118,000 for Mrs. Hyde,” New York Times, November 8, 1912, p. 22.

449

“Two Rich Men Dead, Murder is Charged,” New York Times, January 14, 1910, p. 2.

obvious reason for the outbreak. The water used in the house was not infected. This led the bacteriologist to

suspect that the disease was being brought into the house.

Especially suspicious were the circumstances under which Lucy Lee Swope became ill. She became

ill only four days after returning from a trip abroad, although it was thought that the incubation time was ten

days. As it happened, Hyde had traveled to meet here on the East coast to bring her back to Independence.

Later, she recalled being given a foul tasting drink of water by Hyde during the trip home.

By this time, the family was firmly convinced that something was wrong. An exhumation order was

granted, and autopsies were performed on the dead men. Toxicological tests were conducted, which

demonstrated that strychnine was present in the remains.

Hyde had access to typhoid organisms, according to testimony given to the grand jury that indicted

Hyde. In September 1909, Hyde had lunch with Edward L. Stewart, a pathologist and bacteriologist. Hyde

asked for Stewart’s assistance in working on bacteria. Stewart agreed, and on November 10 prepared six

cultures for Hyde:

• No. 1: Bacillus anthrax

• No. 2: Bacillus pyocyanous

• No. 3: Bacillus prodigissis

• No. 4: Bacillus staphycoceus albus

• No. 5: Bacillus typhoid

• No. 6: Diphtheria (later proved not to be diphtheria)

Stewart delivered the cultures to Hyde on November 11 or 12. After the outbreak of typhoid in the Swope

family, Stewart became suspicious. Stewart went to Hyde’s office on December 14, and discovered that the

entire top surface of the culture tube for the typhoid organisms had been “swept clean”. According to Stewart,

“there were enough germs taken out to inoculate the whole of Kansas City.” He removed the tube and locked it

up. The next day he replaced it with a similar tube so that Hyde would not get suspicious. Stewart subsequently

went to meet with Hyde at the latter’s office on December 27, and noted that this time there was a stroke

through the culture in the tube containing the diphtheria. Because the bottom of the tube was cracked, Stewart

took that tube away with him. At that time, Hyde told Stewart that he had “just fooled around a bit” with the

cultures.

450

Hyde’s trial lasted for a month. The lead attorneys were highly respected figures in the Missouri legal

community. The Swope family hired the prosecutor, while Frances Hyde used her money to pay for an

extremely expensive defense. According to one newspaper account, the legal bills for the defense totaled more

than $75,000 by late 1911. Ultimately, the prosecution prevailed, and the jury voted to convict the defendant,

although the first ballot was eight to four in favor of acquittal.

On April 11, 1911, the Missouri Supreme Court issued a ruling overturning the conviction. According

to the court, the evidence that Hyde was involved in the typhoid epidemic was inconclusive. Moreover, the

court held that the evidence for the presence of poison in the case of Colonel Swope was marginal, and that the

old man could have died of “senile debility” or “uraemic” poisoning.

451

Recently, legal experts who have

looked into the case appear to agree that the autopsies and subsequent analyses were seriously mishandled.

452

A second trial began in November 1911, but a mistrial was declared when the one of the sequestered

jurors escaped from the hotel where he was being lodged by climbing through a transom and jumping 15 feet

from a fire escape. When he returned to the court four days later, the presiding judge declared that the juror

was insane and declared a mistrial.

453

A third trial held in 1912 ended in a hung jury. The County Prosecutor intended to bring the trial to

court yet again. The trial was again delayed. In January 1917, a judge decided that enough was enough and

450

“The Grand Jury Testimony,” Kansas City Star, April 24, 1910, p. 4A. Generally, grand jury information is permanently

secret. In this case, a transcript of the testimony became public because one of the prosecutors lost a copy, which found its way into the

hands of the defense.

451

“Swope Poison Case Must Be Retried,” New York Times, April 12, 1911, p. 7.

452

Burnes, “Turning back the clock on justice,” Kansas City Star, January 13, 1996.

453

“Hyde Juror Flees,” New York Times, December 12, 1911, p. 4, and “Hyde Juror Back; Is Insane,” New York Times,

December 15, 1911, p. 10.

dismissed the case.

454

Thus, Hyde was never convicted or acquitted of the alleged murders. The state never

legally established that he was responsible for the typhoid outbreak in the Swope household.

455

Case 1900-01X: Deaths in Malawi, unknown dates

Some have asserted that castor beans, which contain the toxin ricin, have been involved in numerous

murders. It has been possible to identify only one claim that appears based on substantive data. According to a

comprehensive survey of poisonous plants located in East Africa, “There have been many cases in Malawi of

unwanted offspring having been murdered by the inclusion of the seed in food.” One of the co-authors of this

study was at one time the Botanist in Charge, East African Herbarium, Nairobi, Kenya, and he drew on those

records in writing his account. Unfortunately, he gives no other details of the alleged incidents.

456

454

“To Try Hyde a Fourth Time,” New York Times, December 19, 1913, p. 3, and “To Drop Case Against Hyde,” New York

Times, January 3, 1917, p. 4.

455

Smith, Famous Poison Mysteries, p. 187.

456

Bernard Verdcourt and E.C. Trump, Common Poisonous Plants of East Africa (St. James’s Place, London: Collins, 1969), p.

60.

Chapter 6:

Threatened Use

Threatened Use (Probable or Known Possession)

This category includes cases in which the perpetrators threatened to use biological agents, and

subsequent investigations confirmed that they possessed or probably possessed biological agents. This category

includes cases in which the perpetrators never implemented planned attempts to use biological agents. It also

includes cases in which the perpetrator’s intentions were kept secret.

Case 1998-06: Iraqi terrorism in UK, March 1998

On March 18, 1998, the Home Office circulated an “all-ports warning” that Iraq might attempt to

smuggle chemical or biological weapons into the United Kingdom. The confidential memorandum was sent to

Customs and Excise, the Special Branch, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Defence. According to press

reports, the alert contained the following language.

Iraq may launch a chemical and biological attack using materials disguised as harmless fluids.

Could officers therefore be alert for any items which may contain harmful substances. Particular

attention should be given to containers of any size holding liquids with specific characteristics.

457

Press reports suggest that British authorities were worried that the suspect materials might be

smuggled into the country inside bottles disguised as liquor bottles, perfume sprayers, or cigarette lighters. The

report apparently was based on intelligence information, originally obtained prior to Christmas in 1997.

458

According to the report that made the alert public, a March 24 story in a British tabloid, The Sun, the threat was

directed at the United States, Britain, and other NATO countries that might support military operations against

Iraq.

459

The press reports led the Blair government to issue several clarifying comments. The Home Secretary,

Jack Straw, made the following statement to the parliament.

It is right to take sensible measures. But it is unnecessary to be alarmist. But our information is that

there is no specific threat to the UK. There is no evidence to indicate that any attempt has actually

been made to smuggle anthrax into this country. There is also no evidence that such an attempt at

smuggling might be in prospect.

460

The Iraqi government claimed that the whole story was “silly and baseless.”

461

Case 1997-01: Thomas Leahy, January 1997

Thomas Leahy, a resident of Janesville, Wisconsin, was arrested on April 28, 1997 and charged with

possession of ricin as a weapon in violation of federal law. He was indicted on May 15, 1997 by a federal

grand jury. A superceding indictment, containing three counts, was issued on September 17, 1997. Count 1 was

identical to the May 15 charge. Count 2 charged Leahy with possession of nicotine as a weapon. Count 3

457

As quoted in Philip Webster, Richard Ford, Michael Evans, and Stewart Tendler, “Anthrax alert on duty-free spirits,” Times

(London), March 24, 1998, as it appeared on the newspapers web site, http://www.sunday-times.co.uk.

458

Webster, et al., “Anthrax alert on duty-free spirits,” Times (London), March 24, 1998.

459

“World must be constantly wary of Baghdad–Blair,” Reuters, March 24, 1998, 12:42 p.m.

460

John Morrison, “UK plays down Iraq anthrax scare,” Reuters, March 24, 1998, 11:47 a.m.

461

Hassan Hafidh, “Iraq Denies Smuggle Anthrax to Britain,” Reuters, March 24, 1998, 04:33 p.m.

charged him with possession of a delivery system in the form of the mixture of nicotine and DMSO in a spray

bottle.

462

On October 28, 1997, Leahy entered a guilty plea to the first count, admitting that he possessed the

ricin, that he knew it was a weapon, and intended to use it as a weapon.

463

On January 7, 1998, the U.S. District

Court in Madison, Wisconsin sentenced Leahy, to 151 months in prison with no possibility of parole. In giving

this sentence, the judge stated that he believed Leahy was dangerous. The judge increased the length of the

sentence beyond that specified in the federal sentencing guidelines because of the lethality of the poisons that

Leahy possessed and the judge’s belief that Leahy essentially possessed a weapon of mass destruction.

464

Leahy has appealed the length of the sentence, arguing that the judge abused his discretion when he increased

sentence beyond the limits specified by the sentencing guidelines.

465

The U.S. Court of Appeals agreed with the

defendant’s lawyers that the original sentence was excessive, and ordered the trial judge to reconsider his

sentence.

466

The origins of the case date to November 23, 1996, when Leahy was arrested for allegedly shooting

his 13-year-old stepson in the face. At the time, Leahy’s wife, Debora Ann Leahy, informed police that he

talked about poisoning using bacteria and poisons. She indicated that Leahy had “many books and manuals in

reference to poison,” that he had threatened to poison family members, and that he claimed to have substances

that could “kill without a trace.”

467

On December 3, 1996, she gave the Janesville police several plastic bags

which contained bottles of poisons and other chemicals, some books, a number of items that appears to indicate

an interest in biological agents. Specifically, the police inventory indicates that Leahy had biological growth

media, petri dishes, a book called Procedures for the cure and handling of bacteria and fungi, and a collection

of biologicals. Among the agents in Leahy’s possession were several vaccines and toxoids (including for

Clostridium perfringens). This material posed a problem for the police. According to a Janesville Police

Department Incident Report, “If there is any chance these substances are hazardous there is no safe place for

their keeping and they will be destroyed.”

468

On January 9, 1997, Leahy’s wife again approached the Janesville Police Department concerning

Leahy’s activities. According to the FBI, she told the police that Leahy “had many books and manuals

referring to poison and creating bacterial strains to make poison.” She also told the police that Leahy was

growing materials on petri dishes, which he claimed to her “are capable of killing people without a trace.” On

January 13, 1997, a detective from the Janesville Police Department contacted the FBI, and informed them of

Leahy’s activities.

469

Press reports suggest that the police initiative resulted from the continued complaints of

Leahy’s wife.

470

She was sufficiently concerned about the contents of their former apartment that she had

convinced their landlord to let her move into another apartment.

471

462

Letter from John W. Vaudreuil, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney, Western District

of Wisconsin, August 18, 1998.

463

Press Releases, Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin, April 28, 1997, May 15,

1997 and October 28, 1997. I am grateful to Myra Longfield in the U.S. Attorney’s office for providing copies of the first two press

releases.

464

Press Release, Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin, January 8, 1997.

465

Letter from John W. Vaudreuil, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney, Western District

of Wisconsin, August 18, 1998.

466

Kevin Murphy, “Sentence to be reduced in toxin case,” Journal Sentinel (Milwaukee, Wisconsin), February 23, 1999, as

found on the newspaper’s World Wide Web site at http://www.jsonline.com.

467

Kathleen Ostrander, “Janesville man charged with possession of toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, April 29, 1997, at

http://www.onwisconsin.com. Leahy entered a guilty plea on October 14, 1997 to charges associated with the shooting of his stepson. See

Kathleen Ostrander, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 15, 1997.

468

As attached to the indictment against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager,

U.S. Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin.

469

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

470

Kathleen Ostrander, “Janesville man charged with possession of toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, April 29, 1997, and

Kevin Murphy, “Judge orders man held for toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 2, 1997. Additional coverage of the case appears in

the reporting of the Beloit Daily News, available from its web site at http://www.beloitdailynews.com.

471

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

On January 17, 1997, the FBI, the Janesville police, and the hazardous materials team of the Madison

Fire Department searched Leahy’s apartment and a garage storage area.

472

Leahy’s wife, who had keys to the

apartment and the garage, let them into the sites.

473

According to statements made by Assistant U.S. Attorney

John Vaudreuil, a massive amount of material was seized. “The volume of evidence in various searches is

more than anything I can recall in my time here. Boxes of equipment, poisons and unknown substances would

fill the jury box in this (court) room.”

474

Among other items found in Leahy’s possession were three six-ounce bags and five and one-half 7-

ounce bags of caster beans.

475

The search also turned up two pickle jars with “rotted vegetable in clear liquid

solution” and two pickle jars with an “unknown clear liquid/residue on bottom.” These might have been an

effort to produce botulinum toxin. In addition, the agents found a 400-milligram bag with Foxglove digitalis

seeds, a book Bacterial Infections of Humans, and a guidebook to venomous animals and poisonous plants.

476

This material was shipped to the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory, located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

477

Following these discoveries, the FBI interviewed Deborah Leahy and learned that her husband

claimed that he could “never have too many poisons.” In addition, she said that Leahy had claimed “that he

could make poisons that were organic in nature and which would break down in the human body so that the

cause of death could not be determined and these poisons would not show up in the victim’s blood.”

478

Another informant told the FBI that Leahy claimed to possess bacteria “to be utilized to kill his

enemies via the United States Postal Service.” Leahy told the informant that he had airborne bacteria “that he

would mail to his enemies, so that when they opened the envelopes the bacteria would become airborne and

infect the victims.” He also allegedly asserted that he could to put “killer viruses” on razor blades that he

intended to attach to envelopes mailed to his enemies. He hoped that when his enemies opened their mail, they

would cut themselves on the razor and become infected.

479

Authorities also interviewed Leahy’s stepson, Dillon Leahy. According to Dillon, during the summer

of 1996 he first discovered his stepfather wearing a gas mask and a white plastic gown. Leahy also talked to his

stepson about weapons, and showed him his stocks of chemicals and biologicals. At one point, Leahy showed

him a poison mixed with DMSO, which he used to kill a mouse. Finally, Dillon told authorities that Leahy

threatened his own mother, and that he claimed to have “killed people before.”

480

For reasons that are unclear, the evidence in the case was not analyzed during the following three

months. Immediately following the April 23, 1997, B’nai B’rith incident (see page 110 for a discussion of that

incident), for reasons that are not clear, the FBI began to take a closer look at Leahy’s activities. As a result,

the Hazardous Materials Response Unit at the FBI’s Laboratory tested items found in the January 17 search.

They discovered ricin in a small bottle and a “pulverizer/mixer.”

481

Subsequent reports indicate that the vial

proved to contain 0.7 grams of 4 per cent pure ricin. The pestle apparently had been used to grind the castor

472

Kevin Murphy, “Judge orders man held for toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 2, 1997.

473

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

474

“Man faces second charge in toxin possession case,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), September 10, 1997, at

http://www.startribune.com.

475

Exhibit 2 of Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S.

Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin.

476

Exhibit 2, Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S.

Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin.

477

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

478

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

479

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

480

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas C. Leahy, Defendant-Appellant, No. 98-

1176, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, May 26, 1998. These details were drawn from the presentence report

prepared after Leahy’s conviction.

481

Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney,

Western District of Wisconsin.

beans that are the source of ricin. According to law enforcement officials, that was enough ricin to kill 125

people.

482

On April 26, 1997, the FBI raided a storage locker rented by Leahy and made additional discoveries.

Among the items found were 13 plastic petri dishes with “unknown cultures” and 9 glass jelly jars with

“unknown substances.” On that same day, the FBI searched Leahy’s apartment and found a number of books

demonstrating an interest in poisons.

483

Finally, they obtained laboratory equipment and supplies from the

apartment where Leahy’s wife was living. Among the more interesting items were an incubator, pipettes,

instructions for rehydrating biological cultures, growth media for bacteria, and plastic tissue culture dishes.

There was a box labeled “Intro to Natural Genetic Engineering.” He apparently also had some biological

cultures, including E. coli.

484

Tests were made of 27 samples taken from the petri dishes and jelly jars and sent

to the IIT Research Institute in Chicago, Illinois. The only organism detected in the samples was an avirulent

strain of C. botulinum.

485

The laboratory analyst believed that Leahy was probably trying to produce the toxic

form of the organism.

486

Based on this evidence, Leahy was arrested April 28, 1997 and was charged with possession of a

toxin for use as a weapon. At that time, federal officials alleged that Leahy had claimed that he intended to

produce lethal airborne bacteria that he could use to kill people by mailing packages to them. A federal

magistrate determined that there was sufficient basis to support the allegations against Leahy, and ordered that

he be held without bail.

487

A federal grand jury indicted Leahy on May 15 on a single count of possessing a

toxin for use as a weapon.

Additional laboratory tests reportedly indicate that Leahy possessed other poisons as well. On

September 9, 1997, Vaudreuil told reporters that Leahy would soon be indicted on a second charge for

possession of a toxin. According to Vaudreuil, police discovered three spray bottles containing a mixture of

nicotine and DMSO (dimethyl sulfoxide). Vaudreuil asserted that three sprays of the mixture would kill

someone.

488

According to Leahy’s lawyer, he takes medicines to treat schizophrenia and has “perceived enemies,

real or unreal.” Leahy’s sisters reportedly told police that he was dangerous and they feared he might try to kill

them. Accordingly, they refused to allow their addresses to appear on police reports. Similarly, Leahy’s mother

was frightened of him, and initially refused to testify in court from fear that he would harm her.

489

Case 1996-04: Michael Just, May 1996

In May 1995, Michael Just initiated a product contamination blackmail scheme by acquiring a

pathogen, Yersinia enterocolitica, from a catalogue supply house.

490

Just was heavily in debt from failed

482

Kevin Murphy, “Judge orders man held for toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 2, 1997, and “Man faces second charge

in toxin possession case,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), September 10, 1997. These press reports put the ricin purity at 5 percent,

and says that there was enough ricin to kill 100 people. The purity is given as 4 percent in subsequent statements by prosecutors, who also

changed the estimate of the number of lethal does to 125. See Press Release, Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S. Attorney for the

Western District of Wisconsin, October 28, 1997.

483

Exhibit 4, Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S.

Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin.

484

Exhibit 3, Complaint against Thomas Leahy, April 26, 1997, provided by the Office of Peggy A. Lautenschlager, U.S.

Attorney, Western District of Wisconsin. For some reason, Leahy also had animal vaccines and toxoids.

485

John Vaudreuil, electronic communication, December 30, 1997.

486

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas C. Leahy, Defendant-Appellant, No. 98-

1176, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, May 26, 1998. This view was drawn from the presentence report

prepared after Leahy’s conviction.

487

Kevin Murphy, “Judge orders man held for toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 2, 1997.

488

“Man faces second charge in toxin possession case,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), September 10, 1997. For sources

on DMSO, see footnote 496 on 99. The inventory of items seized on January 17 from Leahy’s apartment and garage includes “1 plastic

container—unknown reddish colored liquid (mixture of nicotine sulfate and DMSO?).”

489

Kevin Murphy, “Judge orders man held for toxin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 2, 1997.

490

Y. enterocolitica causes diarrhea. Contaminated chocolate milk, tofu, and undercooked pork have transmitted it.

Significantly, it can grow even when refrigerated in storage containers with little free oxygen. There are more than 50 strains of the

organism, many not pathogenic. See Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition

(Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 524-527. According to a 1999 CDC calculation, Y. enterocolitica was

responsible for an estimated 96,368 cases of infection a year in the United States, about 90 percent through foodborne transmission. Most

of the cases resulted from consumption of contaminated pork. About half a percent of those infected died from the disease. See Paul S.

Mead, et al., “Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, September-October 1999, pp. 607-625.

business ventures, and attempted to extort £250,000 from five British dairies by threatening to contaminate

their milk with the Y. enterocolitica. He had a degree in microbiology and virology from Nottingham

University. He sent threatening letters to the companies on several occasions. In one letter, he sent a milk

carton to a company that was contaminated with a dye to demonstrate that he could inject substances into

cartons without the tampering being evident. In a subsequent package, he sent test tubes containing Y.

enterocolitica cultures.

In response to Just’s demands, the companies deposited money in an anonymous Austrian bank

account. When Just attempted to withdraw money from the account, however, Austrian police arrested him. He

was tried in Austrian courts and sentenced to three years in prison on a charge of serious blackmail.

491

Just’s

wife, Nora Just, was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison for her part in the plot.

492

Case 1993-05: Dwayne Kuehl, March or May 1993

An Escanaba, Michigan businessman, Dwayne Kuehl, was tried in December 1999 on charges of

plotting to use ricin to murder a building inspector. Kuehl admitted that he planned to murder the official, Jim

O’Toole, and that he considered using ricin to poison the building inspector. O’Toole was closing buildings

that Kuehl owned and thus depriving him of rent revenues. According to Kuehl’s account, “I was in the

process of making the poison. I was almost done.” He planned to smear the ricin on the doorknob of a rental

property that O’Toole was scheduled to inspect. In courtroom testimony, Kuehl claimed, “ I didn’t end up

putting any poison there.” According to other accounts, however, he actually went through with the attempt. A

former girlfriend and a former employee told the court that Kuehl told them that he had gone through with the

attempt. Other testimony suggested that he actually told people that he had gone through with the attempt.

Prosecutors claimed that the attempt was made in March 1993, while Kuehl claimed that it occurred in May

1993. The discrepancy in the date was significant, because the statute of limitations in Wisconsin for attempted

murder is only six years and police arrested Kuehl in April 1999.

493

The jury acquitted Kuehl. However, federal authorities charged him with possession of ricin. He pled

innocent to the federal charges.

494

On March 27, 2000, he pleaded guilty to charges of possessing ricin. He was

sentenced to three years and 10 months of prison time and fined $10,000.

495

Case 1992-03: Minnesota Patriots Council, May 1992

In May 1992, Collete Baker informed the Swift County Sheriff’s office that her husband, Douglas

Allen Baker, possessed a substance “that would kill a person on contact.” At that time, she also filed a

complaint against him for threatening to kill her with a shotgun. She later brought a coffee can to the

authorities to support her story. Inside the can were a baby food jar and a canister containing the solvent

dimethyl sulfoxide, commonly known as DMSO.

496

FBI testing determined that the baby food jar contained

ricin.

497

Also in the coffee can was a note with the following text:

491

Sarah Boseley, “Man held over threats to poison food,” Guardian (London), July 9, 1996, p. 4, Lin Jenkins, “Blackmailer

threatened to poison dairy foods,” Times (London), August 28, 1996, p. 4, and Steward Tendler, “Coded Times messages used to trap

blackmailer,” Times (London), July 9, 1996, p. 1.

492

Adrian Lee, “Wife who connived in plot to blackmail food firms is jailed,” Times (London), January 29, 1997, p. 8.

493

“Businessman denies trying to poison Escanaba’s housing inspector,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, December 11,

1999, AM cycle. See also “Jury selection begins for trial in Delta County,” October 25, 1999, a report found at http://www.msnbc.com and

attributed to WLUC, an NBC affiliate in Marquette, Michigan.

494

Associated Press State and Local Wire, December 13, 1999, BC cycle, and Associated Press State and Local Wire,

December 17, 1999, BC cycle.

495

“Businessman admits to making poison”, Detroit News, March 31, 2000, and “Pub owner gets 3 years in prison,” Detroit

News, August 2, 2000, both articles found at http://detnews.com.

496

See Jonathan B. Tucker and Jason Pate, “The Minnesota Patriots Council (1991),” pp. 159-183, in Jonathan B. Tucker,

editor, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Agents (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). Wayne

Wangstad, “Trial begins for men accused of possessing deadly poison,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 22, 1995, p. 1D. A discussion of

how a terrorist might use DMSO in this fashion appears in Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism (Lexington, Massachusetts:

Lexington Books, 1982), p. 112. For a scientific discussion of DMSO, see “Dimethyl Sulfoxide,” pp. 1429-1431, in Matthew J. Ellenhorn,

et al., editors, Ellenhorn’s Medical Toxicology: Diagnosis and Treatment of Human Poisoning, 2nd Edition (Baltimore: Williams &

Wilkins, A Waverly Company, 1997). According to Ellenhorn, DMSO has been used to enhance the absorption of a large number of

drugs, including insulin, antibacterial agents, and local anesthetics.

497

Wayne Wangstad, “2 Minnesota men first to be convicted under Biological Weapons Act,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, March 1,

1995, p. 3B.

100

Doug, Be extremely careful! After you mix the powder with the gel, the slightest contact will kill

you! If you breathe the powder or get it in your [sic] eyes, your [sic] a dead man. Dispose all

instruments used. Always wear rubber gloves and destroy them also. Good hunting!! P.S. Destroy

this note.”

498

The fingerprints of a second man, Leroy Charles Wheeler, also were found on the coffee can.

499

This provided law enforcement officials with the evidence needed to conclude an investigation that

actually began a year previously. In May 1991, Scott Loverink, informed the Douglas County Sheriff’s office

that Henderson belonged to a tax-protest group known as the “Patriots Council” and that they were talking

about bombing a federal office building and murdering a sheriff’s deputy using the ricin. According to

information that Loverink provided at the trial, Henderson called the ricin “Maynard,” and intended to mix the

ricin with DMSO and Aloe Vera to enable it to penetrate the skin.

500

The name refers to Maynard Campbell,

who sold them the book of directions and the castor beans that were the source of the ricin.

501

During the investigation, the FBI set up a wiretap, which caught one of Wheeler’s sons telling

someone that his father kept stocks of beans and ammunition buried in his yard. In addition, an informant told

Deputy U.S. Marshall William Ott that Douglas Baker put out a “contract” on Ott. Apparently, Ott was

responsible for serving the court papers in a judgment against a friend of Baker’s.

502

The two were indicted and arrested in August 1994 for violating the Biological Weapons

Antiterrorism Act of 1989. No explanation was provided for the time required to bring the case before a grand

jury.

503

Baker and Wheeler were convicted after a jury trial.

504

They both received 33 month sentences.

505

In September 1996, a federal appeals court ruled two to one that Baker deserved a new trial, accepting

his lawyer’s contention that his conviction was tainted by the inclusion of evidence that only implicated

Wheeler.

506

Two other conspirators, Dennis Bret Henderson and Richard Oelrich, were indicted by a federal grand

jury in August 1995. They were accused of violating the Biological Weapons and Antiterrorism Act of 1989.

Specifically, Henderson and Oelrich were accused of purchasing in April 1991 castor beans and the ricin-

making instructions from a man in Ashland, Oregon.

507

In addition, Oelrich was accused of talking about

murdering a deputy U.S. Marshall using the ricin. Oelrich and Henderson were co-owners of a carpet cleaning

business.

508

Henderson and Oelrich were convicted at their trial.

509

Henderson received a sentence of four years

in prison followed by three on probation.

510

Case 1990-03: Iraqi terrorism, 1990-1991

William Burrows and Robert Windrem claim that inspectors for the United Nations (presumably

working for the United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM) discovered evidence that Iraq developed

498

Wayne Wangstad, “Trial begins for men accused of possessing deadly poison,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 22, 1995,

p. 1D.

499

Wayne Wangstad, “Trial begins for men accused of possessing deadly poison,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 22, 1995,

p. 1D.

500

Wayne Wangstad, “2 Minnesota men first to be convicted under Biological Weapons Act,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, March 1,

1995, p. 3B.

501

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), Maynard Campbell, who lived in Ashland, Oregon, wrote two

books, Catalogue of Silent Tools of Justice and Kingdoms At War. In 1994, he was given a ten-year federal jail sentence for resisting arrest

in 1992. He was murdered in prison in 1997. SPLC reported that Campbell was a tax protester, had anti-Semitic beliefs, and was involved

in Posse Comitatus, an anti-government movement that flourished in the late 1970s and 1980s. See the entry on Campbell at the SPLC

web site, http://www.splcenter.org.

502

“Tax protesters charged with plot to blow up building, poison officials,” Grand Forks Herald, February 17, 1995, p. 6A.

503

“Tax protesters charged with plot to blow up building, poison officials,” Grand Forks Herald, February 17, 1995, p. 6A.

504

“Jury convicts two of intending harm,” Grand Forks Herald, March 1, 1995, p. 7A.

505

“Man gets three years for poison possession,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 2, 1995, p. 2B.

506

Molly Guthrey, “New trial ordered for man convicted of terrorism,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, September 28, 1996.

507

“Two face charges in poison case,” Grand Forks Herald, August 6, 1995, p. 5C.

508

Wayne Wangstad, “2 Minnesota men first to be convicted under Biological Weapons Act,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, March 1,

1995, p. 3B.

509

“Men convicted of producing deadly poison,” Grand Forks Herald, October 26, 1995, p. 4B.

510

“Man sentenced for having toxin,” Grand Forks Herald, January 21, 1996, p. 4A.

101

plans to use its biological agents for “terrorist activities.”

511

They provide no details of the alleged plans, and

do not identify the source of their information.

A Russian press report, written by a “special correspondent,” appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda on

January 25, 1991, and claimed that Iraq had a “network of secret agents in Europe prepared to use chemical

and bacteriological bombs.” The article cites as its source a report appearing in the Egyptian newspaper Al-

Ahbar. The intended targets allegedly were airports and airline offices, factories, schools, railroads, oil

refineries, and hospitals treating wounded soldiers. Specifically, the story claimed that the Iraqis had targeted a

refinery in Rotterdam described as the world’s largest refinery and media targets, especially the BBC.

512

Case 1984-03: Kevin T. Birch and James B. Cahoon, November 1984

On November 21, 1984, the FBI arrested two Canadians at the Buffalo, New York, Federal Express

office when they picked up a shipment of what they thought was Clostridium botulinum. In fact, the FBI had

substituted an “inert substance” for the C. botulinum culture before it was shipped by the American Type

Culture Collection because it had reason for suspicions concerning the order. At the time of the arrest, FBI

Special Agent John Thurston said that the shipment could have been used to produce enough C. botulinum “to

wipe out a whole city.”

513

The case developed on September 24, 1984, when someone claiming to be Thomas Plaxton, a vice

president at ICM Sciences, placed an order for 500-grams of freeze-dried Clostridium tetani. The material was

delivered to a Federal Express office in Cheektowaga, New York, a suburb of Buffalo, where someone

identifying himself as B. Bones picked it up.

514

The illicit purchase became known when a copy of the shipping invoice was sent to ICM Science by

Federal Express. ICM Science Ltd. was a small Canadian supplier of biological cultures located in

Mississauga, Ontario. The company’s president and owner, Serge Julien, contacted the American Type Culture

Collection, which provided him with the letter ordering the culture. It had a fake ICM Sciences letterhead, and

Julien contacted the police. In addition, the FBI was alerted of the illicit purchase.

Approximately a month after the first order was placed, Thomas Plaxton ordered more material,

including both C. tetanii and C. botulinum. The same fake ICM Sciences letterhead was used. As previously

noted, a harmless substance was substituted for the pathogen. The FBI then arrested the two men who came to

pick up the order on November 21, 1984.

Further investigation determined that the two suspects were Kevin Birch, a Bell Canada employee

who worked as a marketing supervisor, and James Cahoon, who was a senior consultant responsible for

assessing loan applications with the Ontario Development Corporation. Cahoon reportedly analyzed a loan

application from ICM Sciences.

According to an FBI statement, the two men acquired the material “for personal gain” and were not

involved in a terrorist plot.

515

One press report suggests that the two “intended to kill a racehorse in an

insurance fraud scheme.”

516

Another account implies that they intended to kill a harness race horse that failed

to perform well.

517

The two were indicted by a federal grand jury on April 18, 1985 on charges that they committed

telephone fraud and that they conspired to commit telephone fraud.

518

The two were accused of obtaining the

511

William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World

(New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), p. 49.

512

A. Shumilin, “Husayn’s Secret Weapon,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, January 25, 1991, p. 3, as translated in Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, Foreign Report: Soviet Union, January 25, 1991, FBIS-SOV-91-017, p. 16.

513

Margaret Hammersley, “Canadians Held In Purchase of Deadly Bacteria,” Buffalo News, November 23, 1984, p. A1, and

“FBI still searching for motive in botulism smuggling case,” Sun (Vancouver), November 26, 1984, p. A10.

514

“2 Canadians held in U.S. over bacteria,” Sun (Vancouver), November 24, 1984, p. A7.

515

“Bacteria terrorism ruled out,” Sun (Vancouver), November 30, 1984, p. A14, and Zuhair Kashmeri, “Quick reaction by

Mississauga lab foiled botulism scheme, police say,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), November 30, 1984, pp. M1, M3.

516

Karl Vick, “Man gets hands on bubonic plague germ, but that’s no crime,” Washington Post, December 30, 1995, p. D1.

517

Margaret Hammersley, “Two Canadians Are Indicted in Bacteria Case,” Buffalo News, April 18, 1985, p. B5, and

Associated Press, December 2, 1985, PM cycle. This was confirmed by Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph M. Guerra, III, in a telephone

interview, February 26, 1998.

518

Margaret Hammersley, “Two Canadians Are Indicted in Bacteria Case,” Buffalo News, April 18, 1985, p. B5, and

Associated Press, April 18, 1985, AM cycle.

102

biological cultures under false pretenses. They negotiated a plea bargain agreement, and pled guilty to the

charges. On December 2, 1985, each was fined $1,000.

519

Case 1972-01: R.I.S.E., January 1972

On January 18, 1972, the Chicago police arrested two teenagers who were reportedly plotting to infect

the Chicago municipal water system with Salmonella typhi, the organism that causes typhoid fever. The two

men charged in the plot were Steven Pera, 18, and Allen C. Schwander, 19. Pera and Schwander were students

at Chicago City College. Police believed that the two were “within a few days” of contaminating the Chicago

water system.

520

The Chicago police had arrested Schwander in September 1971 for theft and possession of stolen

property, in November 1971 for sexual delinquency, and for burglary on January 13, 1972. Pera was a C

student who had dropped all his courses, except biology, which gave him access to a laboratory at Chicago

City College’s Amundsen-Mayfair campus. Pera also had volunteered to work at a laboratory at Rush-

Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center “to gain additional knowledge of biology,” but he had been ejected

from it after his activities alarmed officials at the hospital. According to the hospital’s account, “it became

evident that he had been growing cultures in the laboratory that were not part of the research activities, and

these cultures were destroyed.”

521

Illinois State’s Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan said that Pera and Schwander had created a white racist

organization called “R.I.S.E.” In a public statement, Hanrahan indicated that “Members of ‘RISE’ were

allegedly to be inoculated and immunized, enabling them to survive … and to form the basis of a new master

race. Water filtration plants in the Midwest were allegedly to be infected with typhoid and their deadly

bacteria.”

522

Chicago police believed that Pera and Schwander had only begun to recruit members to their

organization, and had seven or eight members. Two of these new recruits, apparently alarmed at what Pera and

Schwander planned to do, informed police of their activities on January 16, 1972. At that time law,

enforcement authorities mounted a heavy guard over the city’s two main water treatment facilities. In addition,

a hunt was initiated for Pera and Schwander, and the two were arrested at Schwander’s home two days later.

The two informants told police that they had each received two injections to protect them against typhoid, and

were supposed to receive a third at the time that they decided to report the plot.

Subsequent analyses apparently confirmed that the two had possession of quantities of S. typhi at the

college laboratory and at Schwander’s apartment. There were initial concerns that the two also had botulinum

toxin.

523

Another account also suggests that the two had diphtheria cultures as well.

524

Subsequent tests,

however, indicated that the two did not have any botulinum toxin.

525

Bail for the two was initially $250,000, but that was subsequently lowered to $50,000 for Pera and

$40,000 for Schwander. Pera and Schwander subsequently skipped bail and fled to Cuba. According to an FBI

statement, the two hired a small plane to take them from Jamaica to Cuba in early May 1972.

526

The Cubans

later arrested Schwander and sentenced him to six years in prison for “counterrevolutionary activities.”

527

Pera returned to the United States in late 1974, and voluntary surrendered. After initially pleading not

guilty, he negotiated a plea agreement with the Cook County District Attorney’s office. On June 20, 1975, Pera

was sentenced to five years probation. On January 7, 1977, Pera’s attorney filed a motion requesting that the

probation be terminated, which apparently happened in a court hearing on February 4, 1977.

528

519

Associated Press, December 2, 1985, PM cycle, and Karl Vick, “Man gets hands on bubonic plague germ, but that’s no

crime,” Washington Post, December 30, 1995, p. D1.

520

Ronald Koziol, “Tighten Water Plant Guard After Poison Scare Arrests,” Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1972, pp. 1, 6,

Andrew H. Malcolm, “2 Youths Charged With Plot to Poison Water of Chicago,” New York Times, January 19, 1972, p. 18, and Gene

Bludeau, “Two in Chicago Accused of Plot to Poison Water,” Washington Post, January 19, 1972, p. A3.

521

Ronald Koziol, “Tighten Water Plant Guard After Poison Scare Arrests,” Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1972, p. 6.

522

Ronald Koziol, “Tighten Water Plant Guard After Poison Scare Arrests,” Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1972, p. 1.

523

Jerry Crimmins, “Bond Cut Denied in Poison Plot, Chicago Tribune, January 26, 1972, section 1A, p. 16.

524

“Diphtheria cultures found in plot case,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1972, p. 20.

525

Jerry Crimmins, “Two in Germ Plot Sought in 3 States,” Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1972, section 1A, p. 1.

526

“2 Sought in Plot to Poison Water,” Washington Post, May 23, 1972, p. A7.

527

“Cuba jails Chicago water plotter,” Chicago Tribune, p. 3, and Jerry Crimmins, “Cuba will free me: water plot suspect,”

Chicago Tribune, July 11, 1973, p. 1B.

528

This information comes from the archives of the Office of the Circuit Court Clerk of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, People

vs. Pera et al., case 72-475 seq.

103

It is not known what happened to Schwander. The outstanding warrant was quashed on March 22,

1983, apparently due to the statute of limitations.

Case 1960-02: CIA (against Lumumba), September 1960

In 1960, the U.S. government was concerned that Patrice Lumumba might exploit the political

instability in the former Belgian Congo to gain political power there. Assassination was one method explored

to eliminate this perceived political threat. Among the assassination tools considered were poisons supplied to

the CIA Station Officer. According to the Station Officer, on September 26, 1960 he was supplied with “rubber

gloves, a mask, and a syringe” along with the unnamed biological poison. The object was to place the poison

on something that Lumumba would put into his mouth, “whether it was food or a toothbrush.” The poison was

never used. It appears that by early October the poison was reaching its expiration date, the point where it

would lose its potency. According to one account, the material was dumped into the Congo River by October

5, 1960.

529

Case 1960-01: CIA (against Castro), 1960-1961

Congressional investigators identified at least two plots to assassinate Castro that involved use of

biological substances.

530

In the first instance, on August 16, 1960 cigars contaminated with botulinum toxin

were given to a CIA official by the organization’s Office of Medical Services. According to the congressional

account, “The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting

one in his mouth.” There is no evidence to indicate whether an attempt was made to give the cigars to Castro.

A second attempt took place in March-April 1961, and involved a batch of botulinum toxin pills

designed to dissolve in water. The plot involved organized crime figures working with the CIA to assassinate

Castro. Castro was known to frequent a particular restaurant, and a Cuban in the pay of the mobsters worked

there. The CIA produced an initial batch of pills, but since they did not dissolve in water, a second batch had to

be prepared. This batch dissolved as needed, and testing with monkeys determined that the pills “did the job

expected of them.” According to one of the mobsters involved in the plot, “As far as I remember, they [the

pills] couldn’t be used in boiling soups and things like that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but

they couldn’t last forever…. It had to be done as quickly as possible.” The plot was never executed, for reasons

that are not altogether clear. One source claimed that Castro stopped visiting the targeted restaurant, while

another said that the Cubans needed authorization to use the poison and it was never given.

A third plot involved a CIA agent known by the codename “AM/LASH.” According to the

congressional investigations, the agent approached his contacts at the CIA and requested assistance in

assassinating Castro. To satisfy this request, a poison pen device was produced. The device contained a

hypodermic needle so small that the victim would not feel the penetration. The CIA, however, did not supply a

poison, and the agent was advised to use Blackleaf-40, described by the congressional account as “a deadly

poison which is commercially available.”

531

Case 1952-01: MGB (against Tito), late 1952

In 1993, General Dimitrii Volkogonov, a military historian and then an advisor to Russia’s President

Boris Yeltsin, reported that documents in Soviet archives proved that the Soviet Union considered

assassinating Joseph Broz Tito. Marshall Tito, the wartime leader of Yugoslavia’s communist resistance

forces, broke with Stalin and the Soviet Union in 1948. According to the accounts uncovered by Volkogonov,

Stalin became increasingly angered by Tito’s policies, and criticized the head of the MGB (predecessor of the

KGB), the notorious Lavrenti Beria, for failing to remove Tito from power. In late 1952, Beria ordered his

subordinates to explore options for killing Tito.

532

529

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 24-25, 29-30. Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly Secrets: The

CIA-Mafia War Against Castro and the Assassination of J.F.K. (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), pp. 28-29, claim that the agent

was a disease “indigenous to that area,” without citing any sources.

530

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 73, 79-82, 88-89.

531

Blackleaf-40 is a solution of 40% nicotine extracted from tobacco leaves.

532

Anne McElvoy, “Archives prove Stalin wanted Tito killed,” Times (London), June 12, 1993, p. 15, and “Soviet Plan to

Assassinate Tito Told,” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1993, p. A12. I first came across this story in Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers:

The Secret World of Biological Warfare (London: VISION Paperbacks, 1997), p. 37.

104

To execute the murder, Beria recruited an agent, I.R. Grigulevich, known by the code name Max. At

the time, Max had managed to insinuate himself as a special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and

Yugoslavia. He was a seasoned operative: he had participated in the 1940 murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico.

Beria’s minions developed several alternative schemes by which Max could murder Tito. One option called for

Max to obtain a private meeting with Tito, during which Max would activate a mechanism secreted in his

clothes that would release enough plague to kill everyone present. To protect Max, he was to be treated with

“an anti-plague serum in advance.” Other options did not involve biological agents. The remaining options

relied on other techniques. A second option relied on use of an unspecified poison gas, which was to be

released upon opening of a jewel box. Finally, consideration was given to providing Max with “a silent

mechanism concealed as a personal item” that fired a bullet.”

533

The plan was forwarded to Stalin. It is not known if Stalin formally approved the document, but

apparently some preliminary preparations were made to implement the proposal, since Max was directed to

write a “farewell letter” to his wife in the event of his capture. In any case, the operation never proceeded after

Stalin’s death in March 1953.

534

Case 1944-01: British SOE (against Hitler), June 1944

According to documents released by the Public Record Office, the British considered assassinating

Adolph Hitler during the Second World War. The plot originated with Special Operations Executive (SOE).

SOE was the organization created by the British to conduct covert operations against the Germans. The plans

were never implemented.

535

The primary focus of the British plans appears to have involved use of a sniper to kill Hitler at

Berchtesgaden, his retreat in the Bavarian mountains. The British also considered using a bomb to destroy

Hitler’s train. Alternative plans involved putting an unidentified poison into either Hitler’s food or the water

supply of his railroad car. Someone also suggested that a poisoned dart fired from a specially modified

fountain pen could be used. These methods were rejected for practical reasons. Someone might eat the

poisoned food before Hitler. Similarly, Hitler probably would drink bottled water, not water taken from a

railroad car tap. Finally, the use of a poison dart was considered too risky for the operative responsible for

operating the device.

536

Some consideration was given to use of a biological agent. One of the ideas discussed involved

contaminating Hitler’s clothes with anthrax. The anthrax was to be smuggled into Germany inside a fountain

pen, eyeglasses, or false teeth. The available evidence suggests that these ideas were rejected at a relatively

early stage. They were not incorporated into the final report that outlined the alternative approaches

recommended for use in an assassination.

537

Threatened Use (No Known Possession)

This category includes cases in which the perpetrators threatened to use biological agents, but

subsequent investigations determined that they did not possess biological agents. This category also includes

cases in which it seems unlikely that the perpetrators possessed biological agents although no definitive

533

This account is based on a translation of the original document describing the proposed operation. It originally appeared in

the Russian newspaper Izvestiia, June 11, 1993, and was translated by Natasha Shur and published in “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,”

Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Number 10, March 1998, p. 137. I am indebted to Professor Joshua Lederberg for bring

this document to my attention. Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 173, describes a conversation about this

incident with a KGB liaison officer. According to Alibek’s source, a dry powdered form of plague was produced in the late 1940s for use

in assassinations.

534

Based on the editor’s note accompanying “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” Cold War International History Project

Bulletin, Number 10, March 1998, p. 137.

535

A copy of the report prepared by SOE outlining the plans given serious consideration is reproduced in Operation Foxley:

The British Plan to Kill Hitler (London: PRO Press, 1998). For press coverage of the reports, see “Britain Planned to Kill Hitler,”

Associated Press, July 23, 1998, 6:27 a.m. EDT, and “British agents plotted to kill Hitler in 1944,’ Reuters, July 22, 1998, 1:39 p.m.

Eastern time.

536

Michael Evans, “Britain’s secret plot to assassinate Hitler revealed,” Times (London), July 23, 1998, as found at

http://www.sunday-times.co.uk.

537

Michael Smith, “Britain planned to kill Hitler with anthrax,” Daily Telegraph (London), July 23, 1998, as found at

http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Significantly, anthrax does not appear in the final assassination plan reproduced in Operation Foxley: The

British Plan to Kill Hitler, suggesting that the mission planners rejected use of biological agents at an earlier stage. Mark Seaman, who

wrote an introduction to Public Records Office publication of the plan, also does not mention anthrax.

105

determination was ever made. It also includes some cases in which the perpetrator’s allegedly planned to

employ biological agents but never made any public threats. Anthrax hoaxes that occur in the United States,

which have become extremely common since 1998, are found in the next section.

Case 2000-08: Biological threat (against potteries), June 2000

Two potteries in East Liverpool, Ohio, were sent letters that contained a green, moldy substance. The

targets were Pioneer Pottery, which makes apothecary jars, coffee mugs, and other items using traditional

patterns, serving ware, and W.C. Bunting, which decorates quality pottery produced in the East Liverpool area,

including items produced by Pioneer. An employee of Bunting took the letter that they received back to the

post office. Postal employees apparently were concerned that it might be an anthrax threat, leading them to

notify the local fire department. The post office was evacuated, and three people were decontaminated. One of

the owners of Bunting apparently believed that he knew who was responsible for sending the letters, but it is

unclear anyone was charged for the incident. Press reports do not indicate whether a note giving an explicit

threat was included in the envelope. Authorities indicate that the envelopes did not contain anthrax, but suspect

that it may have contained talcum powder or cornstarch.

538

Case 2000-07: Klingerman Virus, May 2000

According to e-mail messages widely circulated on the Internet, an organization known as the

Klingerman Foundation was mailing blue envelopes containing sponges contaminated with a pathogen known

as the Klingerman virus. According to the e-mail alert, 23 people have been infected by the virus, including

seven who died.

539

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Internet warning is a

hoax.

540

Even though the Klingerman virus is a hoax, it has caused a number of emergency responses by

people fearful that they have been exposed to it. For example, Geraldine Emanuel received an envelope that

she feared might contain the Klingerman virus on May 20, 2000. Two days later, she called authorities. The

Palm Beach County Sheriff’s office, precipitating a response that also involved the local bomb squad,

hazardous materials, and the U.S. Postal Service inspectors.

541

This case is included as a threat, and not as a hoax, because of the extent to which people apparently

believed in the reality of the danger and because it caused actual response operations.

Case 1999-66: Ricin threat (against federal judge, September 1999

James Kenneth Gluck was arrested in Tampa, Florida, on November 5, 1999 for allegedly threatening

two Colorado state judges with ricin. In September 1999, Gluck reportedly sent a threatening, eight-page letter

to Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Daniel Taubmann. In that letter, Gluck apparently claimed that he had the

ability to kill 10,000 people using ricin, and implied that he could use ricin to kill everyone in the Jefferson

County Administration and Courts Facility. The letter also reportedly claimed that ricin was “a quintessential

American weapon for ‘making a killing’ (literally) without any responsibility because it cannot be determined

who used it and it cannot be determined where it came from."

542

Press accounts suggest that Gluck was angry about two clashes with Jefferson County officials.

543

1997, a Jefferson County judge ruled against Gluck on a zoning dispute related scrap materials stored on some

property he owned. In 1989, he was fined for illegal possession of a dead barn owl.

544

An FBI hazardous

materials team searched the Tampa house where he was living. Gluck had a makeshift laboratory. The FBI told

538

“FBI Enters Case of Two Suspicious Mailings,” Dayton Daily News, June 14, 2000, p. 4B, and “Anthrax ruled out in

suspicious mailings,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, June 14, 2000, BC cycle.

539

“E-Mail Warning About Virus Is Hoax, Health Officials Say,” New York Times, December 23, 2000. p. B8.

540

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “False E-Mail Report about ‘Klingerman Virus’,” May 17, 2000, as found at

http://www.cdc.gov. See also U.S. Postal Service, “False ‘Klingerman Virus’ E-Mail Rumor,” May 25, 2000, as found at

http://www.new.usps.com.

541

“Internet hoax spurs woman to call bomb squad about mailed envelope,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, May 23,

2000, BC cycle.

542

Ace Atkins, “Man denies threatening with poison,” Tampa Tribune, November 9, 1999, Florida/Metro section, p. 1

543

Peggy Lowe, “Toxin suspect denied monitor,” Denver Post, November 9, 1999, p. B-2, Peggy Lowe, “Ex-Boulder man

arrested for toxin threat,” Denver Post, November 8, 1999, p. B5, Pat Leisner, “No bond in case of alleged terrorist threat,’ Miami Herald,

November 9, 1999, as found at http://www.herald.com.

544

Jose Patin O Girona and Janet Leiser, “Toxin threat leads FBI to search, arrest,” Tampa Tribune, November 7, 1999,

Florida/Metro section, p. 1, and “New hearing ordered in ‘junk’ fight,” Rocky Mountain News, August 8, 1997, p. 43A.

106

a U.S. Magistrate that he had simple laboratory equipment, unspecified books on toxicology, and the

Anarchist’s Cookbook. According to FBI Agent Francis Gallagher, “there is no evidence that any refined ricin

existed within the residence.”

545

Case 1999-77: Diazien Hossencofft, September 1999

On October 6, 1999, a federal grand jury indicted Diazien Hossencofft on a charge of threatening to

give the government of China the code for a virus that “would kill the entire population except for a few

people.” Hossencofft apparently believed that his son, who had been given up for adoption, was being

subjected to experiments by the government.

546

At the time, Hossencofft was a suspect in the disappearance of

his estranged wife. Subsequently he was charged with murdering her.

547

Hossencofft had a long record of telling bizarre stories about his activities. Reportedly, he told a

friend that he worked for the CIA and developed for them a virus that the government plans to put into the

world’s water supply in 2007 to kill two-thirds of the world’s population.

548

Case 1999-76: Robberies with HIV threats in Vancouver, August 1999

The Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, police reported that a man attempted to rob three people at

automatic teller machines on 22 and 23 August 1999. Reportedly, a 25-year-old white male approached the

victims while brandishing a syringe filled with a red colored liquid. The robber claimed that the syringe

contained HIV contaminated blood. In one case, the assailant told a victim, “Excuse me sir. I really hate to do

this, but I have AIDS and this a syringe with AIDS-tainted blood.” One of the incidents occurred on August

23, while the other two took place on the previous day.

549

According to a report by the Vancouver Sun, such incidents are relatively common. Writing in early

1998, the newspaper quoted a Vancouver police officer who indicated that the city had suffer a spate of such

attacks in the past two months, including two on February 8, 1998. In many cases, the robbers did not even

bother to fill the syringe with a red liquid, because people understood that even a used needle might be

contaminated with HIV.

550

Case 1999-64: World Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders, April 1999

Ahmed Salama Mabruk, the military operations chief of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, told the Arabic

newspaper Al-Hayah that the World Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders “has biological and

chemical weapons which it intends to use in operations against US and Israeli targets.”

551

In a follow-on story,

the newspaper reported, “a prominent fundamentalist residing outside Egypt has revealed that these weapons

have been purchased from Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union over the past two years.”

This unnamed individual also reportedly said, “Plans had been developed to distribute quantities of these

weapons to elements belonging to the front in several states for use when necessary against US and Israeli

targets in case of the failure to carry out operations against these targets through the use of explosives and

conventional weapons.”

552

545

Many Gonzales, “Agents find nerve gas materials,” Rocky Mountain News, November 7, 1999, p. 14A.

546

Guillermo Contreras, “Man Accused of Telephone Threats,” Albuquerque Journal, October 6, 1999, p. B2, “Lawyer says

client wanted assurance of son’s safety,” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 25, 1999, p. B-3, and Guillermo Contreras, “Woman Missing

2 Weeks,” Albuquerque Journal, September 24, 1999, p. B1. This case was brought to my attention by Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana

McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 172.

547

Joline Gutierrez Krueger, “Missing wife's husband charged with murder,” Albuquerque Tribune, November 18, 1999, p. A1.

548

Rick Maese, “Hossencofft’s life story reads like a sci-fi tale,” Albuquerque Tribune, October 5, 2000, p. A1.

549

Kim Bolan, “Police seek thief who threatened bank customers with syringe,” Vancouver Sun, August 24, 1999, p. B5. This

episode was brought to my attention by Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism

Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The

Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p.171.

550

“Police Warn of Bandits Armed with Syringes,” Vancouver Sun, February 10, 1998, p. B1.

551

Mohammad Salah, “Al-Zawahiri Aide Tells Al-Hayah: We Have Biological Weapons,” Al-Hayah (London), April 19, 1999,

p. 1, as translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

552

Mohammad Salah, “Fundamentalist Source: Bin-Laden Front Purchased Chemical Weapons from Eastern Europe,” Al-

Hayah (London), April 20, 1999, p. 1, as translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. See also “Jihad obtained bio-chemical

weapons from ex-Soviet bloc,” Agence France Press, April 20, 1999, 07:59 GMT,

107

Case 1999-71: Chechen interest in biological weapons, February 1999

According to Russian newspapers, in February 1999 a Chechen separatist military leader, Salman

Raduyev, threatened to forcibly acquire biological weapons from Russian laboratories involved in the Soviet

biological weapons program unless the Russian government released two women sentenced for participation in

a terrorist attack. The Chechen also claimed that they would use radiological weapons against the Russians.

The Russian government reportedly increased security at certain biological laboratories in reaction to the

threat.

553

Subsequently, Russian press reports suggested growing concerns regarding Chechen interest in

biological weapons. The Russian Interior Minister, Vladimir Rushaylo, claimed that instructions for use of

biological weapons had been discovered on Chechens captured in Dagestan. He told reporters, “Abstracts from

instructions on the use of bacteriological weapons were found on killed Chechen bandits who took part in the

attack on Dagestan last August and September.”

554

Other reports also appeared suggesting that the Chechens may possess biological agents. According to

Izvestia, Valery Manilov, Senior Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, claimed that a disease outbreak

among Chechen forces was caused by mishandling of biological weapons.

555

Subsequently, Chechen officials

claimed that epidemics among their forces resulted from Russian use of biological agents.

556

Insufficient

information is available to evaluate the veracity of any of these claims.

557

Case 1999-70: Theft using “HIV-contaminated” syringe, January 1999

According to a story that originated with the Croatian news agency HINA, a currency exchange in

Zadar, Croatia was robbed of 500 German marks by a man who threatened a clerk with a syringe that the

robber claimed was filled with HIV. Police indicated that they had no way to confirm if the perpetrator might

have possessed an HIV contaminated fluid.

558

Case 1999-68: Threat against milk producer, March 1999

According to a report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office, someone found or received a

note claiming that milk, apparently produced by a specific plant, was contaminated with a biological agent.

The allegation was reported to the state agriculture department, which initiated an investigation that also

involved state and local law enforcement and public health organizations. In addition, the FBI opened a

criminal investigation. The allegedly contaminated milk was sequestered, and the producer voluntarily halted

production. Within 12 hours, investigators determined that there was no contamination. As of October 1999, no

one had been charged in the case.

559

Case 1999-75: Christian Millenarian Groups, Throughout 1999

According to a compilation of chemical and biological terrorism incidents, the U.S. government

reportedly warned the Israeli government that certain Christian groups might use biological weapons. The full

account reads as follows:

US security forces allegedly warned their Israeli counterparts that Christian millenarian groups

could use biological weapons for an attack in Israel during 2000. Such groups have supposedly

553

Valentina Lezvina, Andrey Bagrov, and Sergey Gorbatov, “Moscow Preparing for Biological War with Chechnya,”

Kommersant [Moscow], February 17, 1999, p. 1, both translated from the Russian by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

554

Andrei Chitov, “Russia Rushailo ends visit to USA over terrorism, crime,” TASS, October 29, 1999, and British

Broadcasting System, “Biological warfare instructions found on Chechen rebels—interior minister,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,

November 1, 1999.

555

Dmitry Koptev, “Federal Forces all but admit presence of Biological Weapons in Chechnya,” Izvestia, August 12, 2000, p.

3, as reported in Agency WPS, August 16, 2000.

556

“Chechen commander denies plans to disrupt election, condemns Russia’s dirty war,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, 16

August 2000, as found on the Internet and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, August 16, 2000.

557

The Chechen threats and the Russian claims of Chechen interest in biological weapons, were brought to my attention by

Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National

Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 163, 172.

558

“Man robbed exchange office threatening with AIDS syringe,” Associated Press, January 6, 1999, 07:46 Eastern Time. This

incident was brought to my attention by Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism

Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The

Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 162.

559

General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination,

GAO/RCED-00-3, p. 5.

108

been purchasing poisons and bacteria from a variety of sources and have been seeking scientists

and engineers to help in the development of “a doomsday weapon.”

560

Case 1998-31: HIV threat (against Emmpak Foods), December 1998

According to press reports, a Milwaukee meat products company, Emmpak Foods, was the target of a

threat to contaminate its products with HIV.

561

The incident began when a local law enforcement agency

received a telephone call telling it where to find a threat note. The letter, found on December 8, 1998,

apparently indicated that a terrorist group had contaminated meat products with HIV. A substantial response

was mounted involving local, state, and federal agencies. According to an account of the incident provided by

the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the FBI and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Office of

Inspector General searched the plant.

562

The local police department assisted the criminal investigation. More

than 800 people were interviewed during the investigation. In addition, a risk assessment was conducted by

Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), supported by the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), to determine the extent of

the potential danger to the public. Press accounts suggest that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

became involved in the investigation, although it is unclear in what capacity. The Wisconsin Department of

Health and Family Services and other state and local agencies were a part of the investigation.

After a three-day investigation, a U.S. Department of Agriculture spokesman declared, “At this point,

we have no reason to express to you any concerns that public health has been compromised.” The Wisconsin

Department of Health and Family Services reported that, “We did not feel that there was a viable threat.”

Consequently, Emmpak Foods was allowed to resume shipments of food. The GAO reports that as of October

1999, no perpetrator had been identified and the case remained open.

Case 1998-10: Republic of Texas, June 1998

On July 1, 1998, law enforcement officials arrested three men in Olmito, Texas, on charges of

threatening to use biological agents against federal officials. Johnnie Wise, 72, Jack Abbott Grebe, Jr., 43, and

Oliver Dean Emigh, 63, were arrested at mobile home by a team comprised of agents from the FBI, the Texas

Department of Public Safety, the U.S. Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the McAllen police, and

the Cameron County Sheriff’s Department. According to an FBI official, the men “had sent threatening

documentation to several federal agencies regarding the use of these weapons of mass destruction.” FBI

spokesman refused to comment on the motivation of the suspects.

563

The Brownsville Herald reported that the

three men were members of the Republic of Texas, a militant group that believes that Texas should be an

independent nation.

564

According to the arrest affidavit, only unsealed by a federal magistrate judge on July 13, 1998, the

investigators were hunting for biological agents when they searched the homes of the three perpetrators.

According to the search warrant, among the items sought were containers thought to contain HIV-infected

blood, rabies virus, and anthrax spores. In addition, federal agents were looking for instruction manuals,

written threats, and production equipment. Authorities reportedly seized a syringe and a container marked

560

Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving

Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 161.

561

Jesse Garza, “Threat made on products at Emmpak Foods,” Journal Sentinel (Milwaukee), December 11, 1998, as found at

the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.jsonline.com, “Threat of mean contamination unsubstantiated, authorities say,”

Associated Press, December 11, 1998, as found at the Journal Sentinel’s World Wide Web site. Additional details of this incident are

provided in General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination,

GAO/RCED-00-3, p. 4. Although the GAO report does not identify the target of the threat or the agent involved, the details provided

clearly indicate that it is describing this case.

562

It is unclear why the search for contaminated product did not appear to involve the Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety

Inspection Service, the federal agency responsible for monitoring food safety. As such, it had both legal authorities to prevent distribution

of potentially contaminated meat products, as well as personnel with considerable experience in conducting such investigations when no

intentional contamination is suspected.

563

Dane Schiller, “Valley threats land 3 in jail: Use of biological weapons feared,” San Antonio Express, July 1, 1998. All

references to this paper are from its World Wide Web site, http://www.expressnews.com. See also, Madeline Baro, “FBI mum on

biological weapons arrests,” Associated Press, July 2, 1998, 10:05 a.m. EDT.

564

Karisa King, “Alleged plot involved anthrax, HIV and rabies,” Brownsville Herald, July 14, 1998. All references to this

newspaper are from its World Wide Web site, http://www.brownsvilleherald.com.

109

“DMSO”.

565

Subsequent reports, however, indicate that investigators discovered nothing that could be used to

prepare biological agents, and found no indications that the trio had attempted to acquire such agents.

566

Press reports indicate that Emigh wrote a letter, “Declaration of War,” which promised to “bring

utmost grievous harm to federal agents and their families.” The affidavit also recounted the text of a message

allegedly sent by Wise an Grebe to FBI Director Louis Freeh:

Your FBI employees and their families have been targeted for destruction by revenge. We, the

people are extremely mad and will not accept the inequities any longer. Non-traceable, personal

delivery systems have been developed to inject bacteria and/or viruses for the purpose of killing,

maiming and causing great suffering. Warn all concerned so that they may protect themselves and

be made aware of this threat to themselves and their families. Good Luck.

567

Other officials who received threatening messages included local, state, and federal officials. Cameron County

Judge Migdalia Lopez, who apparently was the first intended victim. State officials reportedly included Texas

Attorney General Dan Morales and the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety. Federal officials

targeted included U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Director of the U.S. Secret Service, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, the Director of the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the Director of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.

President Bill Clinton’s family also was threatened.

568

The case was tried in October 1998. Wise and Grebe were convicted by a jury of sending two

threatening e-mail messages, one to the IRS and the other to the DEA. The two men were acquitted of all other

charges. Emigh was acquitted of all the charges.

569

The two men were given a sentence of more than 24 years

in prison followed by 60 months of supervised release.

570

Case 1998-34: HIV Hoax, April 1998

An unidentified perpetrator spread rumors that the meat at a Pittsfield, Maine grocery store, Bud’s

Shop ‘n Save, had been deliberately contaminated with HIV. An investigation by state and federal agencies

was conducted involving the federal Department of Agriculture, the Maine State Police, and the state Attorney

General’s Office. According to a State Police official, the investigation determined that “there is no factual

basis to the allegations.” According to the store’s owner, “Our biggest concern was our customers. Even when

it’s not true, a rumor like this can raise havoc with a business. There’s nothing worse than losing the

consumer’s confidence.”

571

Case 1998-08: Palestine Islamic Jihad, April 1998

On April 8, 1998, a Jordanian newspaper, Al-Bilad, reported that Asad Bayud At-Tamimi, a leading

figure in “Islamic Jihad-Jerusalem,” talked about the possibility of using biological warfare at a memorial

service for Muhyuddin Ash-Sharif, the bomb maker who was reportedly murdered by a competing group

within Hamas. According to the newspaper report, “Tamimi elaborated that the Islamic movements had finally

learned the secret that would allow them to defeat their enemies by using weapons of mass destruction.” The

account also noted, “Tamimi stressed how easy and simple it is to get such weapons. He clearly mentioned the

furor created earlier by the British government regarding Iraq’s capability of spreading germ warfare all over

the world by means of cosmetics.”

572

565

Dane Schiller, “Anthrax, HIV are suspected in Valley plot,” San Antonio Express, July 13, 1998, and “Three accused in

biological weapons plot appear in court,” Associated Press, July 14, 1998, 00:52 CDT.

566

Karisa King, “Defense team seeks evidence being used in killer cactus case,” Brownsville Herald, October 14, 1998.

567

Karisa King, “Alleged plot involved anthrax, HIV and rabies,” Brownsville Herald, July 14, 1998.

568

Karisa King, “Alleged plot involved anthrax, HIV and rabies,” Brownsville Herald, July 14, 1998.

569

Madeline Baro, “Two men convicted in biological weapons case,” Associated Press, October 30, 1998, 0114 EST.

570

Madeline Baro, “Men sentenced to more than 24 years each in biological weapons case,” Associated Press, February 5,

1998, 1544EST.

571

Brenda Seekins, “Meat contamination at Pittsfield untrue,” Bangor Daily News (Bangor, Maine), April 13, 1998.

572

Israel's Business Arena, Apr 13, 1998, as found in http://www.globes.com.il, citing a report that appeared in the Jordanian

newspaper, Al-Bilad. A copy of the original article and a translation was provided by David Schenker, then a Senior Researcher at the

Investigative Project. See Mahmud Khalil, “At-Tamimi alludes to the use of germ warfare, and Netanyahu on the top of the hit,” Al-Bilad,

April 8, 1998.

110

Case 1998-50: Lawrence A. Maltz, April 1998

According to the FBI’s annual terrorism report for 1998, the bureau arrested Lawrence A. Maltz on

April 8, 1998 on charges of threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction. According to this account of the

incident, Maltz made “implied threats involving biological, chemical, and nuclear devices over a twenty year

period.” Among the recipients of the threat were the President, members of Congress, the Director of the FBI,

the Department of State, and the Internal Revenue Service. Maltz was a manic depressive trained as a

physicist. The FBI apparently discounted the threats because of his mental health. Over time, however, his

threats became more specific. Because of concerns that Maltz was increasingly likely to resort to violence, and

because of evidence that he was probably capable of producing sarin nerve agent, the Bureau opened an

intensive investigation into his activities. In September 1998, Maltz was sentenced to 16 months in federal

prison and three years of supervised probation after pleading guilty to a charge of mailing threatening

communications. He also paid a $3,000 fine.

573

The nature of his biological threats is unclear from the available account. Nor is it evident when they

were made.

Case 1997-11: Ricin threat against “Retail Store Chain”, December 1997

A Federal Bureau of Investigation report on terrorism contains the following comments on a ricin

threat:

In December 1997, a retail store chain in Oklahoma was notified that ricin (a biological toxin) had

been placed in and on items in a number of stores. The perpetrators requested $75,000 in exchange

for information on which items were contaminated. However, investigation revealed no evidence of

ricin in the stores.

574

No additional information has been located concerning this incident.

Case 1997-04: PKK, August 1997

In September 1997, the British newspaper Guardian published a story that purported to be the results

of an interview with a man who claimed to have been a bomb-maker for the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist group.

Their source, Seydo Hazar, a 31-year-old Kurd, gave details of the activities of the PKK, claiming that they

were receiving assistance from the Greek government, and that they were considering use of chemical and

biological agents. Hazar specifically asserted that PKK could culture E. coli and C. botulinum, and considered

contaminating beaches with E. coli. The newspaper claimed that his reports were confirmed by Western

intelligence sources.

575

Case 1997-05: Counter Holocaust Lobbyists of Hillel, April 1997

A package was delivered in the Wednesday, April 23, 1997, mail to the international headquarters of

the B’nai B’rith, a Jewish organization located in Washington, D.C. Although B’nai B’rith was closed for

Passover, a mail clerk was working to sort through the incoming mail. The clerk put aside this package because

the postmark was impossible to read, an indication of a potentially suspicious package, and because the address

did not identify a specific recipient. When the clerk examined the package the next morning, there was a red

liquid seeping out of it with an “ammonia-type” smell. At that point, the clerk alerted the organization’s

security chief. Together, they put the envelope into a trashcan, which they moved to a grassy area in front of

the building. At that point, around 10:30 a.m., the security chief called 911.

576

The result was a massive response. The District police department’s bomb squad examined the

envelope, and concluded that it was not an explosive device. Upon opening the package, the police discovered

573

Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit,

Terrorism in the United States 1998, no date, p. 6. There appears to have been no press coverage of this incident, but it is possible to

identify letters to the editor that Maltz sent to newspapers in New Jersey.

574

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1997, no date, as found at the FBI’s web site,

http://www.fbi.gov.

575

Shyam Bhatia, “Bomber on the run has no place to hide,” Observer, September 28, 1997, p. 14. See also Shyam Bhatia

Naxos and Leonard Doyle, “Poison bomber offers secrets for Sanctuary,” Observer, September 28, 1997, p. 1, and “PKK member says

splinter group planning chemical attacks, Agence France Presse, September 28, 1997, 27:23 GMT. All sources are from the Lexis-Nexis

database. The author is indebted to Jason Pate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, for

bringing this case to his attention and providing the references.

576

Sara Horwitz, “FBI Sends Alert to Jewish Groups, Package in D.C. Incident Called Threatening but Not Toxic,” Washington

Post, April 26, 1997, p. C1.

111

that it contained a broken petri dish swathed in plastic bubble wrap. The petri dish had a label with the word

“anthracis” written on it. Included in the package was a business envelope containing a two page, typed,

unsigned letter attributed to an unknown group calling itself the Counter Holocaust Lobbyists of Hillel. The

letter reportedly described the included material as a “chemical weapon”.

While trying to determine what was in the package, District authorities blocked off a two-block area

in the heart of the downtown area for nearly nine hours. By 5:00 p.m., officials had determined that the

substance did not contain anthrax, but it was not until 8:00 p.m. that people were allowed to leave. Traffic was

snarled in downtown. The people working in the building were prevented from leaving, and nearby roads were

cordoned off. Initial tests were made at the site, apparently using rapid identification kits developed by the U.S.

Navy’s Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI).

577

These tests proved negative for a set of commonly

accepted biological warfare agents (probably including anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, ricin, and SEB). The

package was taken from the B’nai B’rith headquarters to the laboratories of the Naval Medical Research

Institute (NMRI), located in Bethesda, Maryland, at the Naval Medical Research Center.

According to press reports, laboratory investigation confirmed that the material in the package was

agar, a common laboratory growth media. Routine culture techniques revealed only Bacillus cereus, a common

household organism that is known to be pathogenic only under limited conditions involving poorly prepared

foods, such as recooked rice.

578

B. cereus is closely related to B. anthracis. According to one microbiology account, studies of the

DNA of the two organisms shows that they are so similar “that they should be considered to belong to a single

species.” This opens the possibility that the perpetrator may have believed that the organism present was B.

anthracis.

579

Case 1997-12: Neil Francis Roberts, March 1997

On June 25, 1997, Neil Francis Roberts, an accountant at a Coca-Cola distribution plant in Akron,

Ohio, pled guilty to a charge of tampering with consumer products. Roberts apparently approached plant’s

human resources director in March 1997 and claimed to have placed an unspecified substance in a batch of soft

drink. He had worked for the company for ten years when he made the threat. Roberts reportedly played a

videotape that showed him contaminating the product, and threatened to send a copy of the tape to the press

unless he was paid an unspecified amount of money over a six-year period.

580

The threat was investigated by the FBI and the Food and Drug Administration’s Office of Criminal

Investigations. Within a week, they determined that there was no evidence of contamination.

581

Testing

subsequently determined that 14 bottles and 5 bags of product were adulterated with sugar water. The

contamination took place sometime between 1994 and December 31, 1996.

582

Roberts was indicted for extortion and product tampering on May 8, 1997 by a federal grand jury. On

June 25, he pled guilty to a charge of product tampering and in return the U.S. Attorney’s office dropped the

extortion charge. He was sentenced to one year and one day in prison.

583

The General Accounting Office categorizes this case as an instance of bioterrorism, and claim that

Roberts suggested that he put a biological substance into the product.

584

Press reports, however, suggest that he

never identified the nature of the contaminant, so the basis for the GAO’s classification is unclear.

577

Michael Powell and Allan Lengel, “Chemical Alert Traps Workers in Buildings, Discovery of Leaking Package at B’nai

B’rith Turns Into Nine-Hour Ordeal in D.C.,” Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p. A1.

578

Sara Horwitz, “B’nai B’rith Package Contained Common Bacteria, Involved Tests Were Needed to Identify Substance; ‘It

Was Nothing Harmful,’ FBI Says,” Washington Post, April 29, 1997, p. B2. B. cereus infections are rarely fatal, and usually last for only

24 hours. See Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American

Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 188-189.

579

Bergey’s Manual of Determinitive Bacteriology, p. 1112. See also, CRC Handbook of Microbiology, p. 321. Dr. Dave

Huxsoll drew my attention to this literature and pointed out its implications in this case.

580

Debra Dennis, “Employee Admits Tampering with Coke,” Plain Dealer, June 27, 1997, p. 1B, and Debra Dennis, “Coke

Worker Indicted by U.S.; Charges include Extortion, Tampering,” Plain Dealer, May 9, 1997, p. 1B.

581

General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination,

GAO/RCED-00-3, p. 4.

582

Debra Dennis, “Employee Admits Tampering with Coke,” Plain Dealer, June 27, 1997, p. 1B.

583

“Coca-Cola Tampering,” Plain Dealer, September 5, 1997, p. 4B, and “Former Coca-Cola Official Sentenced,” Associated

Press, September 4, 1997, 11:12 Eastern Time.

584

General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination,

GAO/RCED-00-3, p. 4.

112

Case 1996-03: Tokiyuki Asaoka, August 1996

On September 4, 1996, the Japanese police arrested Tokiyuki Asaoka on suspicion of attempting to

extort ¥60 million (estimated at the time to equal US$550,000) from the Yamazaki Bakery. He allegedly

threatened to contaminate their product by injecting them with body fluids infected with E. coli bacteria.

585

According to press reports, he sent a threatening letter to the company on August 26. He ordered the

company to display a cellular telephone number in the window of a company store. The number was put out on

September 3. When he called the number, police were able to trace the connection, and identify the caller.

After his arrest, Asaoka confessed to the extortion.

586

Case 1996-07: Hiroaki Chiku, August 1996

On August 18, 1996, someone called a Seven-Eleven Umeshima 2-chome store located in Tokyo and

warned that he had placed poisoned bread in the store. A search revealed a package with a message that said,

“Beware, O-157. Eat it and you’ll die.” It was signed “Shin Kitsuneme no Otoko” (meaning the new fox-eyed

man). Subsequent analysis failed to identify the presence of any pathogens. The next day, the Seven-Eleven

Japan Company received a letter threatening to place food poisoned with E. coli O-157 H7 on the shelves of its

store unless the company paid an extortion of ¥120 million. The letter reportedly said, “O-158 would be the

most appropriate poison today.” On the 22

and 23

someone made 21 telephone calls to the company

demanding payment. At the request of police, the company agreed to make the payment. A suspect was

arrested on the 24

while attempting to collect the extortion payment. The alleged perpetrator was a 51 year-

old “corporate executive” who was attempting to pay off a ¥30 million debt.

587

Case 1996-08: Justice Department, March 1996

An animal rights group calling itself the Justice Department sent envelopes allegedly containing razor

blades covered with HIV-infected blood to fur retailers in Canada. The envelopes included a letter and a

second, sealed envelope that supposedly contained the contaminated razor blades. The letter contained the

following message.

588

Fur is dead. And hopefully so are you. We placed these razor blades (coated with AIS infected

blood, by the way) in the hopes of eliminating scum like yourself from the earth. There is no excuse

for the fur trade. This is war and in war, people die. Enough animals have been killed, now it’s your

turn.

You have been marked.

You have six months to shut down your business. After that you will start receiving [sic] explosive

devices which WILL kill you.

This is not a joke.

According to the letter, similar packages were sent to 87 retailers. Authorities identified only a few of the

stores that allegedly received the packages. Several Canadian media outlets also were recipients.

It was unclear if the razor blades were contaminated with HIV-infected blood, but, even if that were

the case, experts believed that the HIV could not have survived. Accordingly, the letters posed no threat.

Case 1996-01: German blackmailers, January 1996

A German prosecutor in Essen reported in April 1996 that unidentified blackmailers had threatened to

contaminate food with venom taken from cobras, mambas, and other poisonous snakes unless they were paid

DM 400 million (about US$ 264 million) in diamonds. The threats were first made in January. Reportedly, the

585

“Blackmail food scare,” Guardian (London), September 5, 1996, p. 13, and “Police Arrest Man They Say Threatened to

Spread Deadly Bacteria,” Associated Press, September 4, 1996. The Guardian story is based on AP reporting, so the two stories are

essentially drawn from the same source.

586

“Police Arrest Man They Say Threatened to Spread Deadly Bacteria,” Associated Press, September 4, 1996.

587

“Executive arrested in O-157 extortion attempt,” Mainichi Daily News, August 25, 1996, “Man Suspected of Trying to Use

Food Poison Scare in Extortion Scam,” Associated Press, August 24, 1996, 06:18 Eastern time, and Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic

News Wire, August 24, 1996. All sources are from the Lexis-Nexis database. The author is indebted to Jason Pate, Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, for bringing this case to his attention and providing the references.

588

Pete McMartin, “Anti-fur group sends death threat,” Vancouver Sun, March 9, 1996, p. A17, Larry Pynn, “Police warn fur

retailers about mail-terror threat,” Vancouver Sun, March 8, 1996, p. B3, and “Police warn fur dealers to watch for letters with bloody

razor blades,” Edmonton Journal, March 8, 1996, p. A4,

113

demands were sent to food manufacturers on computer disks. According to the German newspaper Bild

Zeitung, the threats were kept secret until April when the prosecutor held a meeting with the senior managers

of sixty European companies to discuss the threat.

589

Case 1995-06: Biological weapons threats against Latin American cities, April 1995

Paraguay’s president, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, told reporters that several embassies in Washington,

D.C., received letters that threatened to launch biological weapons attacks against several cities in Latin

America. The letters, which were sent from California, were not attributed. According to Wasmosy, the letter

provided a list of cities being targeted, and mentioned several biological agents, cholera, typhoid, malaria, and

yellow fever.

590

Case 1995-04: Barry Dixon, November 1995

Barry Dixon, a onetime warehouse worker, attempted to extort £100,000 from Sainsbury’s, a UK

supermarket chain, by threatening to contaminate food with HIV-infected blood. Dixon reportedly sent a letter

to Sainsbury’s headquarters in November 1995 making the threat. In the letter, Dixon wrote, “Don’t tell the

police. If this goes to the papers it would read ‘Aids and HIV--everyone’s favorite ingredient.’” He also sent

two syringes filled with blood, which proved to come from a pig. In the letter, he told the company that HIV-

contaminated blood would be placed in the stores. The letter added, “Imagine the horror on your customers’

faces when they see this Aids blood next to fresh meat, bread and cheese.” He was sentenced to four years in

prison for the crime. A second man implicated in the plot was acquitted.

591

Case 1995-05: Frank Riolfo, October 1995

In October 1995, Frank Riolfo, a former member of the Royal Army Medical Corps, was sentenced to

eight years in jail for attempting to blackmail the Tesco supermarket chain. Riolfo told the company that he

had AIDS, and threatened to contaminate food at its stores unless the chain agreed to give him a bank debit

card allowing him to withdraw sums of money. The company supplied Riolfo with such a card. He was

arrested after withdrawing £7,000 using the card.

592

Case 1994-02: Michael Norman and Alexander Taylor, January 1994

In January 1994, two men attempted to extort £12 million from three British supermarket chains,

Safeway, Sainsbury’s, and Tesco.

593

The two co-conspirators, Michael Norman and Alexander Taylor, sent

letters demanding payment of a “tax” to aid small businesses. Unless paid the money, the two threatened to

contaminate foods that were purchased and eaten by customers without further cooking.

According to a letter sent to one of the chains, “There are a small number of our members who are

tested HIV positive. We can have the supply of infected fluid whenever and we can deliver this to the produce

in your store.” The letter claimed to be from a group that called itself Action in the Community. Other letters

apparently threatened to contaminate food products with bacteria and chemicals.

After the stores contacted police about the threats, policemen posing as supermarket executives

negotiated payment of a ransom with the two men. Eventually, they were given £475,000, and then were

arrested for extortion. Taylor pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to five years in prison. Norman was

convicted and received eight years.

After his arrest, Norman claimed to the police that a mystery novel, The Banker, written by Dick

Francis, was the inspiration for the plot.

594

589

“Blackmailers threaten to spike food with snake venom,” Guardian (London), April 16, 1996, p. 11, and “World Briefly:

Blackmailers threaten to poison food supply,” Orange County Register, April 17, 1996, p. A13.

590

“Paraguay: Chemical Warfare Planned by Terrorists, President Warns,” Inter Press Service, April 28, 1995. I am grateful to

Jason Pate, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for drawing my attention to this material.

591

“Blackmail pair ‘made Aids threat to store’,” Times (London) September 18, 1996, p. 6, “Man cleared,” Times (London),

September 21, 1996, p. 9, Adrian Lee, “Store blackmailer sent Aids threat,” Times (London), December 17, 1996, p. 4, “Store blackmailer

jailed,” Times, December 18, 1996, p. 2.

592

“Ex-soldier jailed for Tesco food blackmail,” Times (London), October 14, 1995, p. 3, and “Blackmailer jailed for 8 years,”

Financial Times, October 14, 1995, p. 7.

593

Catherine Milton, “Aids plot denied by man on blackmail charge,” Times (London), November 2, 1994, p. 3, “Blackmail

plot,” Times (London), December 3, 1996, p. 2, “Police foiled plot to poison foods,” Independent, December 3, 1994, p. 4.

594

“Store blackmail pair sent to jail,” Financial Times, December 3, 1994, p. 4.

114

Case 1994-01: Animal Liberation Front, January 1994

Ron Purver reports, without providing attribution, that in January 1994 a group calling itself the

Animal Liberation Front (ALF) mailed “a number of postal devices containing fragments of hypodermic

needles, which it claimed had been infected with the HIV virus.” His account does not say in what country the

needles were mailed.

595

This incident does not appear on the list of Animal Liberation Front activities

maintained by the Animal Liberation Frontline Information Service.

596

Case 1992-04: “The Terminator”, September 1992

An unknown extortionist, who signed his letters as “The Terminator”, threatened that he would

contaminate products at the Budgens supermarket chain with HIV unless he was paid £300,000.

597

In the third

letter that he mailed, which was sent to the Daily Mirror, the blackmailer claimed that he had placed HIV-

contaminated products in nine of the chains 100 stores.

As far as is known, the perpetrator was never identified.

Case 1992-01: Animal Aid Association, January 1992

Ron Purver indicates that on January 15, 1992, British Columbia News received a report that “the

Animal Aid Association (AAA) had injected ‘Cold Buster’ bars with the AIDS virus to protest the use of

animals in research and the diversion of funds from AIDS research.”

598

An Internet listing of Animal Liberation Front activities, maintained by Animal Liberation Frontline

Information Service, contains the following passage:

1/1/92-AB; Animal Rights Militia claims to have poisoned 87 Canadian Cold Buster Chocolate

bars in Edmonton and Calgary because of the University of Alberta vivisector Larry Wang's 16

years of experiments on rats that led to the invention of the bar. Production halted and bars pulled

from store shelves across Canada, $250,000 damage. -A.R.M.

599

A newsletter produced by the Canadian Intelligence Service states that this incident involved oven cleaner, not

a biological agent.

600

The Animal Liberation Frontline Information Service listing includes no incident similar

to the one reported by Purver.

Case 1991-02: Threatening the Kelowna, BC, water supply, January 1991

Ron Purver reports that on January 25, 1991 Canadian authorities received a letter that contained a

threat to pollute the water supply of the town of Kelowna, British Columbia, with “biological contaminates.”

According to Purver, the incident was “associated with the Gulf War.” He reports that security at the water

system was enhanced due to the threat, but law enforcement agencies never identified who made the threat.

601

Case 1989-01: Robin Smith, May 1989

In September 1989, Robin Smith was sentenced to five years in prison by a Scottish court for an

extortion scheme involving more than £600,000. Starting in May 1989, Smith sent letters to a number of

companies threatening to contaminate their products with HIV-infected blood. At least some of the extortion

letters were signed “the Bogyman”. In all, he threatened five companies, including two food chains, Safeway

and Littlewoods, and several consumer products companies, including Proctor and Gamble and Vidal Sassoon.

Police traced a telephone call that he made to one of the companies, and arrested him.

602

595

Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 38. For a discussion of ALF, see Rachel Monaghan, “Animal Rights and

Violent Protest,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 106-116.

596

Taken from http://www.envirolink.org/ALF/doa/nadoa94.html.

597

Nicholas Watt, “Blackmail letters warn of HIV plot,” Times (London), October 6, 1992, p. 3, David Connett, “Supermarket

threatened by HIV blackmailer,” Independent (London), October 6, 1992, p. 3.

598

Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 34.

599

Taken from http://www.envirolink.org/ALF/doa/nadoa92.html.

600

G.D. Smith, “Militant Activism and the Issue of Animal Rights,” Commentary Number 21, Canadian Security Intelligence

Service, April 1992, found at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com21e.html.

601

Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 34.

602

Kerry Gill, “Shop blackmailer gets five years for food poison threat,” Times (London), September 29, 1989, p. 3,

“‘Bogeyman’ jailed for extortion attempts,” Guardian (London), September 29, 1989, p.5, and “Poison food blackmailer gets 5 years,

Daily Telegraph, September 29, 1989, p. 3.

115

Case 1984-01: Peter Vivian Wardrop, January 1984

On January 16, 1984, the Queensland’s State Premier, Joh Bjelke-Peterson received a letter

threatening to spread foot-and-mouth disease unless prison reforms were implemented within twelve weeks.

Specifically, the anonymous letter said that wild pigs would be infected with the disease, which would then

spread to cattle and sheep.

603

In response, the State Premier offered an A$45,000 reward and the Cattleman’s

Union in Queensland offered an A$450,000 reward for evidence leading to the arrest of the extortionist.

604

The

State Premier later increased the reward to A$75,000.

605

The perpetrator turned out to be a 37-year old

murderer serving a life sentence in Townsville’s Stuart Jail, Peter Vivian Wardrop.

606

In December 1984, Queensland’s premier said that he had received a similar letter, also threatening to

spread foot-and-mouth disease unless prison reforms were instituted within three months.

607

Case 1983-01: Montgomery Todd Meeks, October 1983

On January 30, 1985, a jury in Orange County, Florida, convicted Montgomery Todd Meeks, a 19-

year old high school senior, of attempted murder and solicitation to murder in connection with a plot to kill his

father using ricin toxin. On March 7, 1985, Orange County Circuit Court Judge Lawrence Kirkwood sentenced

him to three years in prison, 50 years probation, and 200 hours of community service during every year of

probation, for plotting to murder his father using ricin. In addition, the judge specified that Meeks was to

obtain psychiatric treatment, and ordered him to pay the costs of the trial (estimated at about $10,000). Meeks

was eligible for parole in 18 months, but if he violated the terms of parole the Judge indicated that Meeks could

face 17 to 22 years in prison.

608

Meeks was extremely intelligent. According to Judge Kirkwood, he had an IQ of 147. However, he

had failed a course in his senior year in high school, and never graduated. His father, Prentice Meeks, owned a

mobile home dealership in Orange County.

609

According to testimony at his trial, Meeks openly discussed murdering his father during the spring of

1983. After conducting research on poisons at the University of Central Florida’s library, he settled on ricin as

his agent of choice. Meeks purchased the ricin from a company in Louisville, Kentucky, known as Aardvark

Enterprises. The company apparently produced ricin for commercial uses. On October 21, 1983, one of Meek’s

classmates, Robert Peterson, flew to Louisville to pick up the ricin, paying $200 for it. Peterson, however, was

convinced by friends who knew of the plot not to give the ricin to Meeks, and, upon returning to the Orlando

International Airport, emptied the vial of ricin into a toilet at the airport and refilled it with water. The county

sheriff’s office was informed of the plot at that time.

610

On October 24, Peterson gave the vial supposedly containing the ricin to Meeks. The next day, Meeks

told Peterson that he had poured the substance into a glass of water that his father was about to drink. That

same day, the sheriff’s office informed the elder Meeks about the plot. Prentice Meeks and his wife moved out

of the house that day, telling their son that they were going on a trip. On November 2, 1985, Meeks was

arrested on a charge of solicitation to murder.

611

At his trial, Meeks admitted to pouring the contents of the vial into a glass of water and a water

pitcher being served to his father. He claimed, however, that he gave up the plot and poured out the poison

603

Tony Duboudin, “Australian livestock threatened,” Times (London), January 21, 1984, p. 5, and Reuters, January 20, 1984,

PM cycle.

604

Reuters, January 22, 1984, BC cycle.

605

Reuters North European Service, January 24, 1984.

606

Tony Duboudin, “Murderer in court over virus threat,” Times (London), February 22, 1984, p. 5.

607

Reuters, December 5, 1984, PM cycle.

608

Louis Trager, “Meeks gets 3-year term for trying to poison father,” Orlando Sentinel, March 8, 1985, p. D-1, and Associated

Press, March 7, 1985, AM cycle. According to Judge Kirkwood, the sentencing guidelines called for a 12 to 17 year term, but he gave a

lower sentence in response to the requests for a shorter sentence by Meeks’ father, the prosecutors, the jury, and the probation office

investigating officer.

609

Trager, “Meeks gets 3-year term,” Orlando Sentinel, March 8, 1985, p. D-11.

610

Elaine Bennett and Jonathan Susskind, “Police charge teen with attempting to kill father,” Orlando Sentinel, November 3,

1984, p. C1.

611

Bennett and Susskind, “Police charge teen,” Orlando Sentinel, November 3, 1984, pp. C1, C11.

116

before his father drank any of the water. The prosecution argued that Meeks intended to carry out his murder

plot. The jury clearly rejected the defense position.

612

According to the prosecutor, Buck Blankner, Meeks stood to gain substantially from the death of his

father. He stood to earn several hundred thousand dollars as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy and would

have inherited his father’s mobile home business.

613

The defense argued that Meeks’ father abused his first

wife and that the memory of his actions led to the murder plot.

614

Case 1982-01: William Chanslor, April 1982

On August 3, 1982, a jury in Houston, Texas, convicted William Chanslor, a Texas attorney, of

plotting to murder his wife, Sue Chanslor. Chanslor was accused of planning to poison her with ricin toxin. Sue

Chanslor was paralyzed from the waist down due to a stroke she suffered in 1979.

615

Chanslor was a past

president of the Houston Trial Lawyers Association and played on the University of Texas football team.

616

In 1981, Chanslor placed advertisements under the alias John G. Thomas, in paramilitary journals,

including Soldier of Fortune and Gung-Ho, for an “expert in poisons & chemical agents with access to same.”

In those magazines he saw an advertisement for the How to Kill volumes written by John Minnery, a Canadian

living in Ontario. Chanslor purchased the volumes, and then got into touch with Minnery. Between October

1981 and April 1982, the two had about six telephone conversations. Initially, Chanslor apparently evidenced

an interest in using poisons to kill animals. He asked Minnery for advice on cyanide and questioned him about

the availability of shellfish toxins. Eventually, however, he told Minnery that he intended to murder a 42-year

old partially paralyzed woman, and asked for help in obtaining poison. He apparently told Minnery that the

medical examiner in his small town would never detect use of an unusual poison.

617

Minnery, alarmed by Chanslor’s request, informed the Ontario Provincial Police of the request.

According to his testimony, he also was aware of the ads placed by Chanslor. The Ontario police recorded at

least one of the telephone calls. The two finally met on April 8, 1982 at a lounge in the Toronto airport. Joining

the two was Keith Symons, an Ontario policeman who posed as someone who could supply poisons. During

the hour-long conversation, which Symons taped, Minnery and Chanslor discussed possible poisons that could

be used. Most were rejected because they would leave identifiable traces. Eventually they settled on ricin.

618

At that time, the Canadian authorities were unaware of Chanslor’s identity. Based on wiretaps, they

apparently were aware that Chanslor was calling from Texas, but they had no other information about him. The

Canadian authorities took Chanslor’s fingerprints off a glass he drank from. This information enabled the

authorities to identify Chanslor.

619

About two weeks later, Symons flew to Houston and met with Chanslor in a hotel at the airport.

During the meeting, which was videotaped by the Houston police, Symons gave Chanslor two “Ricin” tablets

(which actually contained vitamin C), a surgical mask and gloves, and tweezers to handle the “poison”.

Chanslor paid $2,500 for the poison. Chanslor also asked Symons to obtain poison for use in another murder.

After Chanslor left the hotel, the police arrested him.

620

During the trial, Chanslor claimed that his wife was despondent and wanted to die to get out of her

misery. This assertion was supported by dramatic testimony given by his wife. Prosecutors cast some doubt on

the accuracy of her testimony. According to police witnesses, on the day of Chanslor’s arrest she denied asking

612

Bennett and Susskind, “Police charge teen,” Orlando Sentinel, November 3, 1984, pp. C1, C11, and “Teen on trial in attempt

on dad’s life,” Miami Herald, January 24, 1985, p. 2B.

613

Trager, “Meeks gets 3-year term,” Orlando Sentinel, March 8, 1985, p. D11, and Associated Press, March 7, 1985, AM

cycle.

614

Trager, “Meeks gets 3-year term,” Orlando Sentinel, March 8, 1985, p. D11, and United Press International, January 30,

1985, AM cycle.

615

This account is based largely on “Case of the Willing Victim,” Newsweek, August 16, 1982, p. 27, and “Poison Plot: A

kaleidoscope of deception,” Time, August 16, 1982, p. 43. In addition, Houston Post coverage of the trial was reviewed. Jim E. Lavine,

who prosecuted the case for the Harris County District Attorney’s office, clarified some of the details in a telephone interview on February

27, 1998.

616

Associated Press, August 3, 1982, PM cycle.

617

Minnery’s role is described in United Press International, April 23, 1982, PM cycle. For his testimony at the trial, see Mary

Flood, “Lawyer sought advice on poison method, expert testifies,” Houston Post, July 28, 1982, p. 2A.

618

The testimony of Judson and Minnery at Chanslor’s trial is recounted in United Press International, July 28, 1982, AM

cycle.

619

Mary Flood, “2

poisoning allegedly planned,” Houston Post, July 29, 1982, p. 22A.

620

Flood, “2

poisoning allegedly planned,” Houston Post, July 29, 1982, p. 22A.

117

for help in committing suicide, and Chanslor was captured on tape telling Minnery that his wife was not

willing to commit suicide.

621

In the end, it took the jury only three hours to reach a guilty verdict. Prosecutors asked for a 16-20

year sentence. Possibly swayed by the pleas of Sue Chanslor during the sentencing hearing to treat her husband

leniently, the jury gave Chanslor to a three-year jail sentence and a $5,000 fine. A state judge rejected a request

for a new trial.

622

The conviction was overturned on appeal, based on a conclusion by the appellate court that the trial

judge erred in his instructions to the jury. In a 9-0 decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the

trial judge should have instructed the jury to consider a lesser offense of aiding a suicide. According to the

appellate court, “The jury could have reasonably believed that that if (Chanslor) was guilty at all he was guilty

only of aiding a suicide.” At the time, the district attorney’s office indicated that it intended to retry the case.

623

Before he could be brought to trial again, Chanslor pled guilty and was given probation.

624

Case 1980-02X: Tamil “militants”: 1983-1987?

According to an account of the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka, a Tamil militant group issued a communiqué

threatening to wage biological warfare against the Sinhalese-dominated government of Sri Lanka. The text of

the message, as reported by this source is as follows.

The Ceylon Government has announced that it will get the help of the devil to fight the

terrorists—that is to subjugate the Tamil race. It is now quite apparent to the whole world that the

Government is doing exactly that by its diabolical acts against innocent Tamils. Hence it is quite fit

and proper for the Tamils to counter the Government in a similar manner, and with this object in

view, we have formed an operation squad to wage total war against the Government in all parts of

Ceylon. One strategy is to wage a biological war which we believe will cripple Ceylon in a few

years. Doctors and scientists have got over their scruples and now working on methods to

implement the following:

1. Sending qualified volunteers to bring infected material, cultures and infected water snails to

spread Bilbariasis (River Blindness) in the canals and reservoirs of the Mahaweli at several points.

It may take some time before infected people come to the hospitals, but by that time the damage

will have been achieved.

2. Similarly, bring infected material and mosquitoes to spread Yellow Fever in the South, where the

carrier mosquito is already found.

3. A Tamil in South America has already volunteered to supply infected material for rubber trees

(Leaf Curl) not presently found in Ceylon. It is hoped to wipe out the rubber plantations by

spreading the infection at widely separated points.

4. Arrangements are being made to send competent volunteers to collect infected tea to propagate

diseases not presently found in Ceylon tea plantations. Diseases not found in Ceylon tea bushes are

prevalent in Assam.

Other activities such as poisoning water supplies of the army in the North and East, continuing the

overseas propaganda to halt tourism and investment in Ceylon, will continue on an intensified

scale. We have little doubt that unborn Sinhalese generation will curse the folly and wickedness of

the government which will make Ceylon a cursed land shunned by the world. History will record

the just demands of the Tamils and diabolical actions and policy of the Ceylon Government.

Actions speak louder than words.

625

Which Tamil secessionist organizations made the threat is not specified. There were five main Tamil

groups, the most famous being the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), usually known as the Tamil

621

Mary Flood, Chanslor found guilty of plotting to poison his wife,” Houston Post, August 4, 1982, p. 1A.

622

Mary Flood, “Jury gives Chanslor 3 years in jail, fine, “ Houston Post, August 5, 1982, p. 1A, and United Press

International, January 18, 1983, AM cycle.

623

Jane Elliott, “Poison plot conviction reversed,” Houston Post, July 11, 1985, p. A1.

624

Telephone interview, Jim E. Lavine, February 27, 1998.

625

Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), pp. 51-52. I am indebted

to Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security

Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, PRAC Paper No. 16, May 1996, pp. 53-54, for

bringing this reference to my attention.

118

Tigers. In addition, there were numerous smaller groups, most with only a transitory existence. One such

group, the Tamil Eelam Army, claimed in early 1986 that it contaminated Sri Lankan tea with potassium

cyanide in an apparently successful attempt to disrupt exports of this commodity.

626

Most of the major Tamil groups received substantial assistance from the government of India. The

available histories of the conflict suggest that officials of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s

CIA-equivalent, provided funding, training, and weapons to the Tamil groups. In addition, the groups were

allowed to operate relatively freely in Tamil Nadu, the Indian state across the water from Sri Lanka with a

predominantly Tamil population. It is likely that the involvement of the Indian government would have had an

impact on the tactics pursued by any of the Tamil groups, even those that the Indians did not support. On at

least one occasion, the Indians allowed the LTTE to suppress a rival group because it paid insufficient attention

to New Delhi’s wishes.

627

The communiqué does not necessarily reflect a highly refined knowledge of biological agents.

Schistosomiasis, also known as bilharziasis or snail fever, is caused by one of several species of Schistosoma

worms that infect the blood and livers. The disease is spread when people are exposed to Schistosoma larvae

that have contaminated water. The larvae grow in snails, which are essential to the natural life cycle of the

disease. The disease is found in Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Southeast Asia. It has been

eradicated from Japan.

628

The authors of the communiqué may have confused bilharziasis with another disease, Onchocerciasis,

also known as river blindness, which is caused by a different species of parasitic worms, Onchocerca volvulus,

which create nodules under the skin or near bones. The female worms produce offspring, known as

microfilaria. Blindness results when the microfilariae invade the eyes. The worms are found in areas of

Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America, as well as a large part of sub-Saharan Africa. The

worms are spread by the bites of one of several species of blackflies of the genus Simulium. Control measures

concentrate on eliminating the blackflies.

629

Yellow fever is a viral disease of the genus Flavivirus spread by one of several mosquito species of

the Aedes genus. The most common species believed involved in yellow fever transmission is Aedes aegypti,

which is found in tropical regions of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Yellow fever has never been

identified in Asia. Between 1986 and 1991 there was an outbreak in Nigeria that resulted in 20,000 cases,

including 4,000 deaths.

630

Case 1970-05X: Red Army Faction, 1970s

There are numerous allegations that members of the Red Army Faction received training in biological

warfare or were interested in using it. According to a story that appeared in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily,

“Several press agencies report that West German terrorists—the remnants of the Baader-Meinhof group (Red

Army Faction)—are preparing to use bacteriological weapons. At least 13 terrorists are being trained in a camp

south of Beirut, which is run by FPLP [probably PFLP], the most radical Palestinian terror organization.” The

account claims that “Western security agencies treat this information with skepticism.”

631

Jeffrey Simon also

reports, “A few years earlier, the Baader-Meinhof gang had threatened to poison water in 20 West German

towns if three radical lawyers were not allowed to defend a comrade who was on trial.” He does not cite any

sources for this allegation, but the report was contained in the “RAND Chronology of International

Terrorism”.

632

626

“Sri Lanka Denies Report Of Tainted Tea Exports,” New York Times, January 5, 1986, p. I-5, and “U.S. Holds Up Sri

Lankan Tea After Rebels Warn of Cyanide,” New York Times, January 7, 1986, p. A4.

627

There is a substantial literature on the Sri Lankan troubles, and on the role of the Indians in supporting the Tamil groups. The

author consulted three: Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag,

1994), Edgar O’Ballance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88 (Washington: Brassey’s (UK), 1989), and M.R.

Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka, from boys to guerrillas (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1994). The Tamil Tigers gave their soldiers cyanide

capsules to take if captured. O’Ballance (pp. vii, 126) estimates that 300 killed themselves in this way.

628

Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American

Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 417-421.

629

Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, pp. 336-339.

630

Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, pp. 519-524.

631

“Lebanon: Bacteriological Warfare Training By Terrorists?” Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, May 18, 1979, p. 1. Bruce

Hoffman provided a copy of this article from the archives of the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

632

Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities, RAND

Corporation, December 1989, p. 8, and Jeffrey Simon, electronic communication, August 24, 1998.

119

Another source claims that “an unconfirmed report denied by authorities” alleges that “domestic

terrorist elements, possibly hard-core RAF members, were planning to attack the Federal Research Institute for

Animal Virus Diseases in Tuebingen [Germany] in order to steal highly infectious viruses.” The story claims

that “the targeted facility was secretly photographed by unidentified persons planning the attack.” The source

of the allegations is never identified in the account.

633

Finally, there is a claim that during some unspecified period the Baader-Meinhof gang threatened to

send anthrax through the mails. The account does not specify the intended targets, nor does is clarify whether

the terrorists intended to mail some kind of dissemination device or if they only intended to send contaminated

letters.

634

Case 1979-01: Aliens of America, July 1979

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, in July 1979 “An individual claiming

membership in Aliens of America threatened to contaminate the U.S. consulate in Munich with Legionnaires

Disease bacteria.”

635

Case 1978-02: Tucson Extortionist, September 1978

Early in September 1978, the mayor of Tucson, Arizona received two letters threatening to “spread a

plague” in that city unless certain conditions were met.

636

Press accounts suggest that he intended to use fleas to

spread the disease, although those reports do not clarify whether it was clear from the letters that Yersinia

pestis, the organism that causes bubonic and pneumonic plague, was mentioned.

The extortionist reportedly wanted a payment of $500,000, demanded that the city provide free food

for poor people, and insisted that the Kino Community Hospital resumed providing free abortions for indigent

patients.

637

An unsuccessful attempt was made to pay the money. Following directions given by the

extortionist, on September 14, a police officer went to a phone booth in the North Side of Tucson. He received

the first of several telephone calls that directed him to different pay phones. The perpetrator, however, never

appeared, so no payment was made.

638

The mayor, Lewis C. Murphy, believed that the letters were the work of a “crank.” He told reporters,

“We’re paying absolutely no attention to it, as far as I know … The police may have a slightly different

reaction because they get nervous so easily.” According to Murphy and police officials, the letters were poorly

typed with numerous misspelled words. For this reason, one law enforcement official told a reporter, “It’s a

prank. I wouldn’t get too excited about it. The possibility of pulling this thing off is very, very remote.”

Nevertheless, law enforcement officials took the threat sufficiently seriously to mobilize a task force consisting

of about 25 people drawn from the Tucson Police Department, the Pima County Sheriff’s Department, the

Narcotics Task Force, and the FBI.

639

Press reports differed on whether the plague threats were linked to the threat earlier in the year to

spread typhoid.

640

The letters were typed using a different typewriter than used in the April extortion attempt.

641

633

Risk Assessment Weekly, May 19, 1989, p. 3. Bruce Hoffman provided a copy of this article from the archives of the RAND-

St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

634

Richard Charles Clark, Technological Terrorism (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1980), p. 137. The complete

reference is the following: “We recall also the threat made by the Baader-Meinhof gang to spread anthrax through the mails of West

Germany.”

635

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

636

The dates on which the letters were written do not appear in press accounts. According to “New extortion try threatens

Tucson with bubonic plague,” Arizona Daily Star, September 15, 1978, p. 1B, however, they were sent “in the past two weeks,” citing

police and city officials.

637

“Tucson police discount plague plot,” Arizona Republic, September 16, 1978, p. B2.

638

Mark Kimble, “Mayor calls plague threat ‘crank’,” Tucson Citizen, September 15, 1978, p. 1C.

639

Mark Kimble, “Mayor calls plague threat ‘crank’,” Tucson Citizen, September 15, 1978, p. 1C.

640

The Tucson Citizen says “Police officials and Murphy say they don’t think the letters were written by the same persons,” in

Mark Kimble, “Mayor calls plague threat ‘crank’,” Tucson Citizen, September 15, 1978, p. 1C. In contrast, the Arizona Daily Star is

equally definitive that the threats were the work of the same people. See “New extortion try threatens Tucson with bubonic plague,”

Arizona Daily Star, September 15, 1978, p. 1B.

641

“New extortion try threatens Tucson with bubonic plague,” Arizona Daily Star, September 15, 1978, p. 1B.

120

Case 1978-01: Tucson Extortionist, April 1978

In early April 1978, the mayor of Tucson, Arizona received an anonymous letter threatening to

contaminate the city’s water system with typhoid. The letters demanded a payment of $750,000.

642

Mayor

Lewis C. Murphy told reporters that the letter specifically mentioned the city’s water fountains, while an FBI

source claimed that the letter threatened the water system itself.

643

The city government immediately brought the FBI into the case. The FBI had jurisdiction because of

the use of U.S. mails to send the letter. A task force with more than 200 people was put together in response to

the threat, drawing from the Tucson Police Department, the Pima County Sheriff’s Office, the Pima County

Attorney’s Office, and the FBI.

644

The letter ordered the city to insert a classified advertisement with the following language into the

city’s two major newspapers: “Wanted to buy—any car manufactured before 1900. We pay top dollar.” The ad

was run from April 8 through April 14.

645

A second letter was then received, which ordered the city to send a

female police officer to a phone booth to await a telephone call with further instructions. On April 17, 1978,

the city attempted to comply with these directions. A police officer went to the specified telephone, and

awaited further instructions. She received a series of telephone calls, which directed her to move from one pay

telephone to another. Eventually, she arrived as instructed at a particular telephone but received no additional

messages.

Another attempt was made to comply with the demands on April 21. The police went through the

same routine, moving from one pay telephone to the next. Finally, a package of money was left at the spot

demanded by the perpetrator, although not the $750,000 demanded. The site was monitored to see if anyone

would claim the money, but nobody showed up. Approximately 100 law enforcement officials participated in

the operation. In addition, the police requested the telephone company to attempt to trace the telephone calls.

Tucson did not normally need to add chlorine to its water at that time.

646

Although city officials

doubted that the perpetrators could contaminate the city’s water system, Tucson’s Department of Water and

Sewers developed contingency plans, apparently including reserve stocks of chlorine and other chemicals.

647

The water was entirely drawn from wells. The system was spread out over 1,200 square miles, stretching from

Catalina, which was 15 miles north of Tucson, to Corona de Tucson, which was 15 miles southeast. There

were 2,400 miles of underground pipe, 300 wells, 101 pumping stations, and 83 storage facilities. The six

largest storage tanks stored 99 million gallons of water.

648

It appears that the perpetrators were never identified.

Case 1977-01: Unknown, March 1977

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, in March 1977 “A U.S. advertising firm

received a letter alleging the discovery of a lethal bacterium capable of contaminating the fresh water of

nuclear-armed nations.”

649

Case 1977-03: Unnamed extortionists, 1977

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, “Extortionists threatened to put botulism

toxin in Miami's water supply” sometime in 1977.

650

642

Accounts of this case appear in John Rawlinson and Tom Beal, “Letter demands $750,000 for water safety,” Arizona Daily

Star, April 22, 1978, p. 1A, and Mark Kimble, “Extortionist threatens city’s water supply,” Tucson Citizen, April 22, 1978, p. 2A. The two

newspapers differ on some of the details. According to the Arizona Daily Star, the letter was delivered on April 7. The Tucson Citizen

dates it to April 9.

643

John Rawlinson and Tom Beal, “Letter demands $750,000 for water safety,” Arizona Daily Star, April 22, 1978, p. 1A

644

Mark Kimble, “Extortionist threatens city’s water supply,” Tucson Citizen, April 22, 1978, p. 2A.

645

Mark Kimble, “Extortionist threatens city’s water supply,” Tucson Citizen, April 22, 1978, p. 2A.

646

John Rawlinson and Tom Beal, “Letter demands $750,000 for water safety,” Arizona Daily Star, April 22, 1978, p. 1A.

647

Mark Kimble, “Extortionist threatens city’s water supply,” Tucson Citizen, April 22, 1978, p. 2A.

648

Mark Kimble, “Extortionist threatens city’s water supply,” Tucson Citizen, April 22, 1978, p. 2A.

649

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

650

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

121

Case 1976-01: Stephen Grant Morton, June 1976

From October 13, 1975 through January 1, 1977, extortion letters were sent to approximately 250

companies around the United States demanding that substantial payments be made to a bank in Matamoros,

Mexico. The letters were attributed to “B.A. Fox” and “J. Foxworth.” However, FBI investigations determined

that the accounts identified in the letters did not exist.

651

In June 1976, letter bombs were sent to at least 18 of

the threatened companies. Several people were injured when some of the devices exploded.

652

In addition, at least four letters were mailed containing ticks.

653

One letter was sent to the Combined

Insurance Company of America, located in Colorado. It was accompanied by a letter making the following

statement: “The secret is that B.A. Fox has a fine bacteria lab, well stocked with various types of bacteria,

viruses, germs--ranging from simple staph type infections up to and including rabies.”

654

Another tick letter

was sent to Mobile Chemical Company’s plastic division.

655

One was sent to FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley.

According to the Tulsa, Oklahoma postmaster, “three or four” letters carrying ticks were sent to recipients in

that area. He indicated, however, “They were just mashed. By the time they got through the canceling

machines and equipment they were dead.”

656

Federal authorities believed that it was highly unlikely that the ticks could transmit disease. According

to an FBI statement, “Laboratory examinations of some of these ticks have been conducted to determine if they

constitute a health hazard. Preliminary results of these tests indicate that the chances of these ticks transmitting

any infectious diseases to humans are extremely remote.”

657

It was determined that the ticks were not

infected.

658

On July 14, 1977, Stephen Grant Morton was indicted in Denver, Colorado, by a federal grand jury on

extortion charges. According to the indictment, Morton mailed more than 250 threatening letters, including

four containing ticks. Morton also was charged with poisoning drugs at grocery stores in Colorado Springs and

with contaminating foods at grocery stores in Houston.

659

The case against Morton was dismissed at the request of the government.

660

Case 1975-01: Polisario, February 1975

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, sometime in February 1975 “Polisario

reportedly contacted the ETA (a Spanish Basque nationalist group) to plan the poisoning of water supplies of

Paris, Madrid, Rabat, and Nouakchott with cholera viruses. This action would be in retaliation for the policies

of France, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania regarding Western Sahara.”

661

Case 1974-03: “Middle East firm”, 1974

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, sometime in 1974 “a Middle East firm

was reported to be engaged in the development of means of poisoning the Jordan River sources by bacteria.”

662

651

Whit Sibley, “Indictment Charges Letter-Bomb Threats,” Denver Post, July 15, 1977, p. 2, “Bombs Mailed to Firms; One

Injures Four Workers,” Washington Post, June 15, 1976, p. C9, Edward C. Burke, “Extortion Note Preceded Letter Bombs,” New York

Times, June 17, 1976, p. 24, and John M. Goshko, “Letter Bombs Tied to Extortion Ring,” Washington Post, June 16, 1976, p. A1.

After briefly describing this incident, one source also claims, “There had been earlier reports of a “germ letter” written on paper

impregnated with deadly bacteria that would infect the recipient.” It is unclear whether the source intended to link this allegation with the

sender of the tick-infested letters, or if this was a totally different case. Brian M. Jenkins and Alfred P. Rubin, “New Vulnerabilities and

the Acquisition of New Weapons by Nongovernment Groups,” p. 228, in Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy, editors, Legal Aspects of

International Terrorism (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1978).

652

“Terrorism by Mail,” New York Times, June 20, 1976, p. IV-3.

653

Sibley, “Indictment Charges Letter-Bomb Threats,” p. 2.

654

Edward C. Burke, “Extortion Note Preceded Letter Bombs,” New York Times, June 17, 1976, p. 24

655

“2nd Mailing of Ticks Reported,” New York Times, June 17, 1976, p. 24.

656

“Postal Ticks Discounted by FBI As Health Peril, Kelley Gets One,” Washington Post, June 19, 1976, p. A16.

657

“Postal Ticks Discounted by FBI As Health Peril, Kelley Gets One,” Washington Post, June 19, 1976, p. A16.

658

“Terrorism by Mail,” New York Times, June 20, 1976, p. IV-3.

659

Sibley, “Indictment Charges Letter-Bomb Threats,” p. 2, “Extortion Suspect Freed on Bond,” Denver Post, July 16, 1977, p.

3, “Denver Man Accused of Mail Threats Involving Bomb and Live Ticks,” New York Times, July 16, 1977, p. 6.

660

According to information provided by the Office of the Court Clerk, U.S. District Court, Denver, Colorado, March 10, 1998.

661

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology for identifying this incident.

662

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

122

Case 1974-02: Legion of Nabbil Kadduri Usur, 1974

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, sometime in 1974 “The ‘Legion of

Nabbil Kadduri Usur’ (of which nothing else is known) distributed leaflets in Germany demanding money and

threatening to release bacteria if their demands were not met.”

663

Case 1973-01: The German “mad scientist”, November 1973

In November 1973, German press reports indicated that a “mad scientist” had threatened to use

anthrax and botulinum toxin against targets in Germany. According to press accounts, on November 8, 1973 an

unidentified biologist sent an English-language extortion letter to the office of Chancellor Willy Brandt, and

perhaps to other senior government officials. The extortionist threatened to contaminate the water supplies of

German cities, to place “biological bombs” in synagogues and in stores and hotels owned by Jews, and to mail

letters infected with pathogens to politicians. He demanded a payment of DM 22 million (about $8.5 million)

in “atonement money” for the killing of five Palestinian terrorists during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Some of

the letters were signed “The Commander in Chief of the Legion.”

664

Press reports indicate that the German government took the threats extremely seriously. Police guards

were placed around water reservoirs and regular water samples were taken. In addition, press accounts

suggested that the Germans mounted a massive manhunt to track down the perpetrators. The German public

reacted by buying large quantities of bottled water.

German press accounts also indicated that the police were hunting for an unnamed biology professor

who lived in Hamburg, who, it was claimed, was trying to flee to Denmark with his female laboratory

assistant. German and Danish border police, however, denied that they were looking for any such person.

It is not known if the alleged “mad scientist” was ever identified and arrested, or if the whole incident

was a hoax.

Case 1970-06X: Poisoner of Los Angeles water supply, no date

Neil C. Livingstone alleged in a 1982 book that the FBI and Los Angeles police arrested someone

“who was preparing to poison the city’s water supply with a biological poison.” No date or other particulars are

provided.

665

No such episode is listed in the chronology that Douglass and Livingstone prepared for their 1987

book.

666

Threatened Use (Anthrax Hoaxes)

This section includes all incidents that involved threats involving anthrax that suggest no likely

possession of the agent by the perpetrator. All these cases occurred in the United States. Anthrax hoaxes in

other countries are described in the previous category.

Case 2000-10: Anthrax threat (against Florida industrial park), November 2000

The Cape Coral Industrial Park received a letter that claimed to contain anthrax. A white powder was

found in the envelope, but tests conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicated that it

contained nothing harmful. Fourteen people were exposed to the envelope and sent to the Cape Coral Hospital

for treatment. The Cape Coral Fire and Rescue hazardous materials team responded to the report, as did the

Cape Coral Police and the FBI.

667

663

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

664

“Bonn silent on postal germs story,” Times (London), November 22, 1973, p. 1, “Scientist held in germ blackmail case,”

Times (London), November 23, 1973, p. 6, “Hunt for ‘mad scientist’ concentrates on Hamburg,” Times (London), November 24, 1973, p.

5, John M. Goshko, “‘Mad Scientist’ Threatens Germans,” Washington Post, November 25, 1973, p. A14.

665

Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 112, states “the

Los Angeles police, acting in conjunction with FBI agents, arrested a man who was preparing to poison the city’s water supply with a

biological poison.”

666

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, pp. 184-187.

667

“Lab tests show ‘anthrax’ powder in letter is hoax,” St. Petersburg Times, November 28, 2000, p. 5B.

123

Case 2000-09: Anthrax hoax (misidentified item), September 2000

Police investigating a pipe bomb in Palm Bay, Florida, discovered a plastic container labeled

“anthrax”. The 19-year-old occupant told authorities that the jar was filled with a muscle enhancer that he was

trying to keep friends from using.

668

Case 2000-06: Anthrax threat (against University of Pennsylvania Jewish group), April 2000

The director of the University of Pennsylvania Hillel Foundation received an anthrax threat letter on

April 20, 2000. The envelope contained a powder and a threat letter. The letter, which contained an anti-

Semitic diatribe, asserted that the powder was anthrax. After the director made contact with the powder, he

contacted authorities. A response was mounted by the University of Pennsylvania Police, the Philadelphia Fire

Department, the FBI, the University’s Office of Environmental Health, and members of a federal counter-

terrorism task force. The powder was not anthrax or a chemical hazard.

669

Case 2000-05:Anthrax hoax (US Post Office mailbox), March 2000

On March 30, 2000, a postal worker discovered a package in a Lincoln, Nebraska mailbox labeled

“anthrax”. The postal employee took the package back to his post office, and law enforcement and public

health officials were notified. A jar filled with a white powder was found inside the package. Preliminary tests

suggested that the material was not anthrax, but it was sent to the Nebraska State Public Health Laboratory,

located in Omaha.

670

Case 2000-04:Possible biological threat (against IRS service center), March 2000

On March 23, 2000, the Ogden IRS Service Center received an envelope that proved to contain an

unidentified blue powder. Three employees exposed to the powder appeared to break out in a rash, possibly

because of the exposure. Ultimately, 10 people were sent to a hospital for treatment. The powder was sent to a

laboratory at the Dugway Proving Grounds, which is located in Utah. The envelope reportedly also contained a

threatening letter, but no details were made public. Tests determined that the substance was not a known

pathogen or poison.

671

Case 2000-03: Anthrax threat (against Fredonia High School), March 2000

A 15-year-old student was arrested on March 6, 2000 on charges of making bomb and anthrax threats

against Fredonia High School, located in the town of the same name in the Buffalo, New York area. According

to the press account of the incident, the threats were made on March 2 and March 3, but it is unclear which

threats were made on which day. There is no information on how the threats were transmitted.

672

Case 2000-02: Anthrax threats (in Milwaukee area), January 2000

On January 14, 2000, the FBI arrested Micky A. Sauer on charges of mailing threatening

communications. Authorities believe that he sent 17 threats, including 16 involving threats of anthrax use. The

letters, which were delivered January 5-18, 2000, were received by two schools, a grocery store, two women’s

clinics, and other locations. He was sentenced to 21 months in prison on September 26, 2000.

Case 2000-01: Anthrax threats (against abortion clinics), January 2000

On January 3, 2000, abortion clinics located across the United States began receiving anthrax threat

letters. It appears that the clinics all received the same threat letter. The white envelopes were post-marked

December 30, 1999 in Cincinnati, Ohio, and had a return address that corresponded to an abortion clinic in

Indianapolis, Indiana. The letters apparently all contained the same typewritten text.

You will die in less than 24 hours from exposure to the anthrax on this letter. There is simply no

other way to get rid of you., we’re sorry.

668

Mike Strobe, “Bay area agencies train against biological terror,” The Tampa Tribune, September 17, 2000, p. 1.

669

Jonathan Margulies, “U. Penn Hillel receives death threat in hate mail,” Daily Pennsylvanian, April 25, 2000, and Jonathan

Margulies, “Students feel safer as crime decreases,” Daily Pennsylvanian, June 1, 2000, as found at http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com.

670

Tanya Eiserer, “Lincoln Officials Await Results On Package Labeled ‘Anthrax’,” Omaha World-Herald, March 30, 2000, p.

16, and “‘Anthrax’ Jar Was a Hoax, Officials Say,” Omaha World-Herald, April 1, 2000, p. 14.

671

Matthew Ott, “Letter Powder Seen As an IRS Threat,” Associated Press, March 23, 2000, 1:04 PM, and “IRS Powder

Harmless,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 25, 2000, as found at http://www.sltrib.com.

672

“Teen Arrested on Threat Charges,” Buffalo News, March 7, 2000, p. B5.

124

In addition, it appears that the letters were addressed to the “Security Director” at the clinics. According to one

source, the threatening letters were sent to abortion clinics in 21 states, including Alabama, Connecticut,

Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, New

York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin, as

well as the District of Columbia.

673

It appears that several of the letters were misdirected. One letter was delivered to a Pinkerton Security

Services office in Knoxville, Kentucky. There was a Planned Parenthood office below the Pinkerton office.

674

Similarly, it appears that a Social Security Administration office in the Bronx received one of the letters. A

Planned Parenthood office was in the same building.

675

A social services agency in Richmond, Virginia, The

Daily Planet, also got one of the letters. Planned Parenthood previously ran an abortion clinic at the same

location.

676

Case 1999-59: Anthrax threat (against high school), December 1999

The Bedford North Lawrence High School was closed on Monday, December 13, 1999, after an

unidentified man called the school at 7:25 a.m. and claimed to have contaminated it with anthrax. The school

district decided to cancel classes for the day after consulting with local, state, and federal authorities. Classes

resumed the next day.

677

Case 1999-62: Anthrax threat (against high school), November 1999

On November 20, 1999, a note was found in the Fredonia High School claiming that the school was

contaminated with anthrax., Police arrested an unidentified juvenile the next day.

678

Case 1999-55: Anthrax threat (against Department of Energy site), November 1999

On November 8, 1999, an employee at the administrative offices of a one-time uranium processing

plant in Fernald, Ohio, found a note attached to a coffee cup, “Anthrax sample. Do not touch.” The people in

the building were evacuated, and other employees were not allowed in the building. The analysis was

conducted by an Environmental Protection Agency laboratory, which determined that afternoon that no anthrax

was present in the cup. The investigation was turned over to the FBI.

679

Case 1999-78: Anthrax threat (against Providian Bancorp Services), October 1999

On October 29, 1999, an employee working in the mailroom of the Providian Bancorp Services office

in Concord, New Hampshire noticed that an envelope sent through the automated mail opener released a cloud

of particles. The office processes credit card payments. Further examination revealed that it contained a small

package the size of a sugar packet containing with Spanish printing on it. The packet was sealed in a plastic

bag and put aside. Subsequently, the employee put his finger in his mouth and got a bitter taste. Worried that

the packet may have contained something harmful, he notified authorities.

The Concord Fire Department activated its hazardous materials response unit. The team

decontaminated five employees who were exposed to the envelope, and turned the envelope over to the state

laboratory for further analysis. Reportedly, the envelope was taken by the came out of an envelope when put

off a An envelope On 29 October, an employee at a bank in Concord, New Hampshire, opened an envelope

containing an unidentified white powder.

680

673

“Clinics Begin Year with Spate of Anthrax Hoaxes,” Anti-Abortion Violence Watch, January 19, 2000, Number 22, p. 2.

This source claims that the letters were post-marked December 29, but some news reports put the date at December 30.

674

Don Jacobs and Scott Barker, “Anthrax Scare: Pinkerton manager being treated after getting letter apparently meant for

Planned Parenthood,” Knoxville News-Sentinel, January 4, 2000, p. A4.

675

Philip Messing, “Anthrax Scare at SS Office,” New York Post, January 4, 2000, p. 26.

676

Mark Bowes, “Testing fins letters claiming to contain anthrax were hoaxes,” Richmond Times Dispatch, January 12, 2000, p.

B-6.

677

“Students Sent Home,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, December 13, 1999, AM cycle.

678

“Juvenile Arrested in Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, November 20, 1999, p. 5B.

679

“Building evacuated because of anthrax scare,” Associated Press, November 8, 1999, 5:54 PM EST.

680

“Authorities investigate possible anthrax scare,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, October 29, 1999, AM cycle,

“Probe continues,” New Hampshire Sunday News, October 31, 1999, p. A3, and “Anthrax scare,” The Union Leader, October 30, 1999, p.

A5. This incident was brought to my attention by Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD

125

Case 1999-53: Anthrax threat (against Kentucky Educational Television), October 1999

On October 12, 1999, a package containing an unidentified organic substance was opened in the

mailroom of the offices of Kentucky Educational Television in Lexington, Kentucky. According to an

accompanying letter, the substance was anthrax. The employees in the building were isolated in the building

from 10:30 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. The material in the package tested negative for anthrax.

681

Case 1999-52: Anthrax threat (against U.S. Post Office administrative office), September 1999

An envelope containing an anthrax threat was opened on September 13, 1999 at a U.S. Post Office

administrative office in Robinson, Pennsylvania. Nine people working in the office were decontaminated, and

then transported to Ohio Valley General Hospital. No evidence of anthrax was detected.

682

Case 1999-54: Anthrax threat against Truman Library, August 1999

The Truman Library in Independence, Missouri received an anthrax hoax letter on August 16, 1999.

The note, described by an FBI agent as “a rambling letter; it didn’t make a lot of sense,” was written in three

languages, German, Swedish, and Greek. After opening the letter, and attempting to translate it, the staff of the

library concluded that it contained an anthrax hoax. Local authorities were notified at about 3:20 p.m. The

building was quarantined, and 70 people were kept in the building until authorities concluded that it posed no

threat. The people were allowed to leave at 5:00 p.m.

683

Case 1999-60: Anthrax threat (against internet service provider), August 1999

An Internet service provider located in downtown Seattle received an envelope containing a white

powder. Tests by the Seattle Fire Department gave “inconclusive results,” according to an unnamed

government official. Subsequent tests by the Washington state Department of Health determined that the

substance was not anthrax. Based on the appearance of the material, however, authorities were convinced that

the threat was a hoax. Three people were exposed to the package, but none were treated. The FBI was

investigating the case.

684

Case 1999-57: Anthrax threat (against Proctor and Gamble), August 1999

An anthrax hoax letter was mailed from Seattle to a Cincinnati, Ohio, office of Proctor and Gamble. A

powdery substance was found in the envelope. The letter said that the company would receive more packages

if it continued to use animals for testing.

685

Case 1999-56: Anthrax threat (against Aldi’s grocery store), July 1999

On the morning of July 28, 1999, employees at a Kansas City grocery store found a duffel bag

containing a note that was thought to be an anthrax threat. Authorities were notified, and at least four

employees were decontaminated. The store was reopened that afternoon.

686

Case 1999-58: Anthrax threat (against Planned Parenthood), July 1999

The Planned Parenthood Association of Northwest/Northeast Indiana received an anthrax threat letter

on July 2, 1999. After opening it, a staff member called the Merrillville police. The Merrillville police and FBI

Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The

Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 172.

681

Patricia Lynch Kimbro, “KET building quarantined for anthrax scare in mail,” Herald-Leader (Lexington), October 13,

1999, and Patricia Lynch Kimbro, “Anthrax scar is lesson for Lexington,” Herald-Leader (Lexington), October 14, 1999, as found at the

newspaper’s Web site, http://www.kentuckyconnect.com/heraldleader/.

682

“Postal workers treated after anthrax threat,” Associated Press, September 14, 1999, AM cycle, and “Anthrax threat

investigated,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 16, 1999, p. B-4.

683

Trisha L. Howard, “Anthrax scare closes Truman Library,” Kansas City Star, August 17, 1999, p. B3, and Trisha L.

Howard, “False alarm on anthrax,” Kansas City Star, August 17, 1999, p. B1.

684

Rebecca Cook, “FBI Investigates mysterious white powder mailed to Seattle Internet Business,” Associated Press State and

Local Wire, August 13, 1999, PM cycle.

685

“Anthrax Hoax Postmarked in Seattle,” August 12, 1999, as found at http://dailynews.yahoo.com.

686

Kevin Hoffman, “Officials respond to anthrax threat at store,” Kansas City Star, July 29, 1999, p. B2, and “Abandoned

duffel bag at store contained letter with ‘threats of anthrax’,” Associated Press, State and Local Wire, July 28, 1999, BC cycle.

126

agents went to the scene to investigate the threat, which appeared to have been mailed locally. Hazardous

materials and fire teams were put on alert, but not activated.

687

Case 1999-42: Anthrax threats (against Nassau County, New York, courthouses), June 1999

Letters claiming that the recipients had been exposed to anthrax were delivered on June 15, 1999 to

two courthouses in Nassau County, New York: the 1

District Court (Hempstead) and the County Court

Building (Mineola). According to authorities, the letters contained a message, written using letters cut from

newspapers and magazines, that indicated, “Congratulations. You’ve been infected with anthrax.” The

envelopes were addressed using a computer printer.

688

The letter in the Hempstead courthouse was discovered about 1:00 p.m., and the other was found

about an hour later. The buildings were sealed off for several hours after the letters were discovered. During

that time, the air conditioning systems were turned off to ensure that the anthrax would not spread if any were

present. Officials from the local police and fire departments and the FBI reacted to the threats. Tests on the

spot indicated that no anthrax was present, and people were allowed to leave the buildings about three hours

after the letters were found.

Case 1999-45: Anthrax threat (against Planned Parenthood clinics, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 1999

Two clinics in Cincinnati, Ohio, received anthrax threats on June 2, 1999. The clinics, operated by

Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio and Northern Kentucky, received letters claiming to have been

contaminated with anthrax. The letters were turned over to the FBI for examination. Both letters were sent

from Columbus, Ohio.

689

Case 1999-51: Anthrax threats (against Catholic college and high school), May 1999

The alumni office at LeMoyne College, a Jesuit-run college located in Syracuse, New York, received

an anthrax threat letter on May 17, 1999. On the same day a similar letter was delivered to Bishop Sudden

High School, also in Syracuse. The FBI is investigating the case.

690

Case 1999-41: Anthrax threat (against Mentor, Ohio, high school), May 1999?

The Mentor High School, in Mentor, Ohio, reportedly received an anthrax threat letter during the last

few weeks of the school year. According to a press report, a secretary opened a letter that contained a message

claiming that it had been contaminated with anthrax. The FBI and the local police, fire, and public health

departments responded to the incident. In addition, the CDC provided advice on how to respond to the

incident. Five employees and two students were isolated for several hours.

691

Case 1999-38: Anthrax threat (against Madison, Tennessee, library), May 1999

On May 15, 1999, library employees discovered an envelope in a book returned to the night

repository at the Madison Public Library, in Madison, Tennessee, containing a note claiming that the envelope

was tainted with anthrax. The employees contacted the city fire department, which sent its hazardous materials

unit to the library. In addition, health department officials responded to the event.

On May 19, Joseph M. Calvert, Jr., confessed to police that he was responsible for the incident. Five

days later, May 24, after further investigation, the man was arrested and charged with making a threat to use a

weapon of mass destruction. The man lived with his grandmother, who claimed that he had confessed to the

crime because he could not afford a place to live and wanted to get sent to prison. According to a spokesman

for the FBI’s Nashville office, “The FBI doesn’t take confessions on their face value. There has to be

supporting evidence.”

692

687

Associated Press State and Local Wire, July 5, 1999, PM cycle.

688

Al Baker and Chau Lam, “A Scare at Two Nassau Courts,” Newsday, June 16, 1999, p. A4, and Robert Gearty, “Anthrax

threats Heeded,” Daily News (New York), June 16, 1999, p. 9.

689

“Planned parenthood gets anthrax threat,” Beacon Journal (Akron, Ohio), June 3, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s World

Wide Web site, http://www.ohio.com/, and Al Andry, “FBI helps probe threats at Planned Parenthood,” Cincinnati Post, June 3, 1999, as

found at the paper’s web site, http://www.cincypost.com.

690

Sue Weibezahl, “Letter Hoax a Real Ordeal for Opener,” Post-Standard (Syracuse, New York), May 21, 1999, p. A1. I am

indebted to Leonard Cole for bringing this case to my attention.

691

Andrea Simakis, “Administration Relieved School is Out,” Plain Dealer (Cleveland), June 13, 1999, p. 1B.

692

Beth Warren, “Police Arrest Madison Man in Library Anthrax Scare,” Tennessean (Nashville), May 25, 1999, p. 2B.

127

Case 1999-37: Anthrax hoax (Brooklyn, New York), May 1999

On May 13, 1999, emergency medical technicians entered an apartment in Brooklyn, New York, and

discovered an unidentified dead man, possibly killed by a drug overdose. They also found a package of drain

cleaner marked “radioactive”, an empty oxygen tank labeled “anthrax”, and three red tubes with “TNT” written

on them. The next day, a team of police and fire officials returned to the building, and evacuated everyone in

the building where these items were discovered, as well as the three buildings that surrounded it. A fire

department hazardous materials unit recovered the items from the apartment. All were discovered to be

harmless.

693

Case 1999-40: Anthrax threat (against Sharonville, Ohio, anti-pornography group), April 1999

On April 30, 1999, a letter containing a white powder was delivered to the offices of the Citizens for

Community Values (CCV), a Sharonville, Ohio, anti-pornography organization. When the envelope was

opened, about a teaspoon of the powder spilled from the envelope. There was a letter in the envelope, but its

contents were not reported in press accounts of the incident. Two officers on the first floor of the building

where CCV had its offices were evacuated, and the Greater Cincinnati Hazardous Materials Unit

decontaminated three CCV employees. Subsequent analysis determined that the powder was baking soda.

694

Case 1999-61: Anthrax threat (against Blackfeet tribal offices), April 1999

The offices of the Blackfeet tribal council received an anthrax threat on April 19, 1999. The threat

was sent in an envelope with a greeting card and the message, “You have been exposed to anthrax, die, die,

die.” Unidentified granules also were in the envelope. The substance tested negative for anthrax, but was sent

to “a laboratory in Maryland” for further testing.

695

Case 1999-36: Anthrax hoax (Lake Worth, Florida, law office), April 1999

A letter containing an unidentified white powder was opened in the offices of a Lake Worth, Florida,

law office, on April 14, 1999. Also in the envelope was a folded, blank piece of paper. Initially, authorities

thought that it might be cocaine. When it proved negative for that drug. The Sheriff’s deputy who responded to

the event reported feeling a “tingling” sensation on his tongue, and the law firm’s employee’s began to feel

itchy. At that point, the hazardous materials team was sent to the scene, and the Sheriff’s deputy and six law

firm employees were decontaminated and sent to the JFK Medical Center for treatment. They were given

antibiotics and released.

696

Case 1999-35: Anthrax threat (against Intel Corporation), April 1999

A letter sent to an Intel Corporation office in Rio Rancho, New Mexico, contained a note claiming

that whoever opened the envelope would be infected with anthrax. There was no powder in the envelope.

Local, state, and federal officials were notified of the letter.

697

Case 1999-27: Anthrax threat (Dunkirk High School, Chautauqua County, New York), April 1999

On May 7, 1999, police arrested Jessica Lane, a 17-year-old student on a charge of third-degree false

reporting of a threat. The arrest was made in connection with an anthrax threat letter delivered to a faculty

member of Dunkirk High School in Chautauqua County, New York, on April 16, 1999. According to the letter,

it was contaminated with anthrax. The high school was locked down for 2 _ hours. Because a teacher from the

high school visited the middle school, the middle school also was affected. The letter and people who came

into contact with the letter were tested for the presence of anthrax. All the tests were negative. Authorities

suggested that others in addition to Jessica Lane might be arrested.

698

693

Sean Gardiner, “Toxic Scare Evacuation in B’klyn,” Newsday, May 15, 1999, p. A34.

694

Lew Moores and Earnest Winston, “Mysterious powder empties office,” Cincinnati Enquirer, May 1, 1999, p. B2, “Office

Evacuated,” Cincinnati Post, May 3, 1999, p. 11A, and “Powder Harmless,” Cincinnati Post, May 28, 1999, p. 19A.

695

“Lab tests show substance wasn’t anthrax,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, April 22, 1999, BC cycle.

696

Lillian Weis, “7 Taken to Hospital After Powder Scare,” Palm Beach Post, April 15, 1999, p. 6B.

697

“Virus Letter Didn’t Deliver on Threat,” Albuquerque Journal, April 15, 1999, p. 1.

698

“Dunkirk School Gets Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, April 17, 1999, p. 4B, “No Anthrax Found at Dunkirk School,”

Buffalo News, April 22, 1999, p. 4C, and “Teen Held in Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, May 8, 1999, p. 5C.

128

Case 1999-34: Anthrax hoax (against Logan, Utah, grocery store), April 1999?

Two men reportedly marked a load of milk at a grocery store in Logan, Utah, with the word “anthrax”

as a practical joke. Several gallons of milk were destroyed as a result. An Assistant U.S. Attorney for Utah

indicated that the men did not have the criminal intent to justify a prosecution, and so they were not charged.

699

Case 1999-33: Anthrax threat (against Grand Rapids, Michigan abortion clinic), April 1999

The employees at a Planned Parenthood office in downtown Grand Rapids, Michigan turned over a

suspicious package that appeared to contain a powdery substance to authorities on April 13, 1999. The package

was turned over to the FBI after it had been X-rayed by local police to ensure that it was not an explosive

device.

700

Case 1999-49: Suspected biological agent threat (against IRS Service Center), April 1999

Suspicions that two letters with dark stains on them might be contaminated with some hazardous

substance led officials to quarantine the Internal Revenue Service’s Kansas City Service Center the facility for

three hours on April 21, 1999. Employees reportedly detected a smelly, slimy substance on the letters, leading

them to implement emergency procedures. The air handling system in the building was shut down, and local

emergency response organizations were contacted. No hazardous materials were detected on the letters, but the

Kansas City hazardous materials response team decontaminated 38 employees. Approximately 2,000 IRS

employees were in the building while it was quarantined. Authorities apparently treated the incident as a

possible hazardous materials threat, including potential involvement of a biological agent such as anthrax.

701

Case 1999-48: Anthrax threat (against county courthouse, Biloxi, Mississippi), April 1999

On April 19, 1999, the Harrison County Sheriff’s Department discovered a note “threatening the

deployment of anthrax” while investigating a bomb threat against the Harrison County Courthouse in Biloxi,

Mississippi. The threat was classified as a hoax.

702

Case 1999-47: Anthrax threat (against individual in Lewisville, Texas), March 1999

On the morning of March 6, 1999, the occupant of a house in Lewisville, Texas, opened a letter

addressed to a former resident and discovered an anthrax threat. After being called about the threat, the

Lewisville Police Department notified the FBI, which activated the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force.

The task force concluded that the threat was a hoax. The motive for the threat was not known.

703

Case 1999-65: Anthrax threat (against high school), March 1999

On March 12, 1999, an anthrax threat was discovered written on a note found in a classroom at

Hamburg Senior High School. The school was located in Hamburg, New York, a town outside of Buffalo.

According to an FBI official, “It didn’t even rise to the level of a hoax.” The school remained open. At the end

of the day, students were sent home with a letter that told parents that the threat was assessed as “extremely

minimal.” It advised parents that the students should shower, that their clothes should be washed, and that they

should be alert for signs of illness.

704

Case 1999-32: Anthrax and Ebola hoax (at Pittsburgh International Airport), March 1999

Jason Anthony Chippich was detained at the Pittsburgh International Airport on March 26, 1999,

when he placed two vials on a U.S. Airways ticket counter labeled “anthrax” and “Ebola”. According to a

county official, “It was a practical joke.” According to authorities, the perpetrator was an intern at Children’s

Institute of Pittsburgh, where Chippich also worked. The culprit “said it was her last day of work at the

institute, and she decided to play a joke on Chippich. She put ground-up cereal in one of the vials, ground-up

699

“Anthrax Suspects Will Not Be Charged,” States News Service, April 14, 1999, 6:20 AM ET.

700

“Grand Rapids clinic wary of mail package,” Associated Press, April 15, 1999, as found at http://www.detnews.com.

701

Matt Campbell, “Suspicious mail disrupts IRS center,” Kansas City Star, April 22, 1999, p. B1. I am indebted to Leonard

Cole for bringing this case to my attention.

702

“Anthrax report treated as a hoax,” Associated Press (State and Local Wire), April 21, 1999, BC cycle. I am indebted to

Leonard Cole for bringing this case to my attention.

703

“Anthrax letter in Lewisville a hoax, FBI reports,” Dallas Morning News, March 7, 1999, p. 34A. I am indebted to Leonard

Cole for bringing this case to my attention.

704

“Anthrax Threat Said to be a Hoax,” Buffalo News, March 13, 1999, p. 5C.

129

antacids in the other, labeled them anthrax and Ebola and slipped them into his coat pocket.” County police

and FBI detained Chippich and his sister, who was accompanying him, at the airport for five hours.

705

Case 1999-31: Anthrax threat (against Southern Baptist Convention), March 1999

An anthrax threat letter was opened at the offices of the Southern Baptist Convention in Nashville,

Tennessee, on March 5, 1999. A secretary, who found a note claiming that it was contaminated with anthrax

spores, opened the letter. A Nashville fire fighter who responded to the report, and who handled the letter, and

four employees were decontaminated and given antibiotics. The FBI took the letter for further analysis.

706

Case 1999-30: Anthrax threat (against Lumberton, North Carolina, dialysis clinic), March 1999

An unidentified individual placed a telephone call to the Lumberton Dialysis Clinic in Lumberton,

North Carolina, claiming that anthrax was present in the clinic. The call, placed at 10:00 a.m. on March 4,

1999, led authorities to quarantine the 50 people then in the clinic for 3 _ hours. Local authorities responded to

the call, and the hazardous materials teams of the Lumberton Fire Department decontaminated the room with a

bleach solution. The people in the clinic were not decontaminated, but were advised by local health officials to

go home and take showers to clean off any possible contamination. The FBI took samples from the clinic for

further testing, but assessed the incident as a probable hoax.

707

Case 1999-28: Anthrax threat (against offices of Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah), March 1999

An anthrax threat letter was discovered on March 3, 1999 in the Church Office Building of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Salt Lake City, Utah. The envelope was opened at about 9:57

a.m. in the mailroom, and was found to contain a letter claiming, “Congratulations, You’ve been exposed to

anthrax.” Three employees were decontaminated at the scene, and taken to University Hospital for medical

treatment. The letter was taken to the University of Utah for testing. Officials declared the letter a hoax.

708

Case 1999-26: Possible anthrax threat (Planned Parenthood clinic, Chicago, Illinois), March 1999

A suspicious package received in the mail by a Planned Parenthood clinic in Chicago, Illinois, was

found to contain a vial of liquid when bomb squad technicians X-rayed it. The incident apparently was treated

as a bomb threat, but was considered a possible biological threat after the initial examination.

709

Case 1999-29: Anthrax threats (against Blanca, Colorado, town officials), February 1999

In mid-February several anthrax threat letters were sent to the elected town officials in Blanca, a small

town of 125 families in southern Colorado. The letters were tested in a “military laboratory,” which determined

that no anthrax was present. The FBI is investigating the threats. According to press reports, this small town

has been wracked by a bitter political dispute, suggesting that the enemies of the town officials sent the

letters.

710

Case 1999-25: Anthrax threat (Honolulu, Hawaii), February 1999

The Honolulu, Hawaii, office of the state Department of Motor Vehicles was closed on February 24,

1999, due to an anthrax threat letter. An administrator at the facility opened the letter. He notified authorities

some time later, about 11:00 a.m., after hearing about the incident at the Ala Moana Center the previous day

705

Lawrence Walsh, “Airport police grab vials, detain 2,” Post-Gazette (Pittsburgh), March 27, 1999, and Lawrence Welch,

“Airport officials weren’t amused,” Post-Gazette (Pittsburgh), March 28, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s web site, http://www.post-

gazette.com.

706

Leon M. Tucker, “Southern Baptist office receives anthrax scare in letter,” Tennessean, March 6, 1999, as taken from the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.tennessean.com.

707

Jennifer Fuller, “Clinic receives anthrax threat,” Fayetteville Observer-Times (North Carolina), March 5, 1999, as found at

the paper’s web site, http://www.fayettevillenc.com.

708

“Latest Anthrax Scare Called Hoax,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 4, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s web site at

http://www.sltrib.com, and Lois M. Collins and Jennifer Dobner, “An anthrax threat at LDS offices,” Deseret News, March 3, 1999, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.desnews.com.

709

“Planned Parenthood clinic receives suspicious package,” Associated Press, March 16, 1999, 4:39AM EST.

710

Kit Miniclier, “Blanca: Town weathers stormy politics,” Denver Post, June 12, 1999, p. B4.

130

(see page 133). The office was closed from 11:45 a.m. through 1:30 p.m., until local police and fire officials,

along with the FBI, determined that there was no threat.

711

Case 1999-24: Chemical and biological threats (U.S. Capitol), February 1999

According to a Capitol Police spokesman, “Several Congressional offices had received threats

contained in them indicating that the recipient had been exposed to a biological hazard.”

712

The spokesman also

indicated, “We have received one letter which is exactly like those which have been received elsewhere in the

United States, claiming exposure of the recipient to anthrax. In addition, another individual has sent several

members of Congress letters which indicate the recipient has been exposed to a chemical or biological

agent.”

713

Case 1999-23: Anthrax threat (man in Gwinnett County, Georgia), February 1999

At 3:30 a.m. on February 10, 1999, a man in Gwinnett County, Georgia, received a phone call from

someone who said that an anthrax bomb had been placed in his mailbox. Nothing was found in the mailbox.

714

Case 1999-22: Anthrax hoax (Spring Hill, Florida, car wash), February 1999

On February 24, 1999, a milk bottle with the word “anthrax” written on it was found at a car wash in

Spring Hill, Florida. The plastic bottle was filled with a clear liquid. According to a press report, a customer

discovered the container in a trashcan. A sheriff’s deputy who responded to the call reportedly poured some of

the liquid onto the ground. The car wash was closed off, and traffic was routed around the adjoining street for a

period of time. Based on conversations with the CDC and FBI, local authorities determined that the substance

was unlikely to be anthrax. Subsequent analysis determined that the container was filled with water and

urine.

715

A similar incident occurred on March 20, 1999, when another milk jug was discovered with the word

“anthrax” written on it. The container was discovered by a Spring Hill man, who picked it up while cleaning up

debris near his apartment. He only noticed the writing after picking it up the jug. He put it in the back of his

pick-up truck, and called the offices of the Fernando Sheriff. The man was directed to drive to an open field,

where deputies packaged it. The container was turned over to the FBI for further investigation.

A third incident, apparently related, took place on March 25, 1999, in a deserted area of Spring Hill. A

milk jug marked with the word anthrax was discovered by a jogger at about 10:00 a.m. Three additional

containers were found about 200 feet away with references to Jim Morrison and the Doors written on them

with what appeared to be the same marker and handwriting. The FBI removed it around 12:40 p.m.

On July 4, 1999 an elderly man who had found one of the earlier containers found a fourth jug. It had

“anthrax:” written on it, along with additional references to the Doors. The jug was empty, but as precaution

the area where it was found was decontaminated with bleach.

Case 1999-21: Suspected anthrax threat (Atlanta Federal Courthouse), February 1999

On February 18, 1999, a suspicious package, reportedly filled with an unidentified powder, was found

at the loading dock of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta, Georgia. The address was, United FBI Lab, World

Court of Appeals.

716

711

Crystal Lau and Mary Adamski, “Second ‘anthrax’ letter arrives in Honolulu,” Honolulu Star Bulletin, February 24, 1999,

Rod Ohira, “Islanders get crash course on anthrax”, Honolulu Star Bulletin, February 24, 1999, Terence Lee, “Terrorism controls found

lacking, Honolulu Star Bulletin, March 2, 1999, as found at the paper’s Web site, http://www.starbulletin.com.

712

Amy Keller, “Livengood Warns House Offices About Anthrax Threat,” Roll Call, February 18, 1999.

713

Laura Dunphy, “Capitol Police probe anthrax threats,” The Hill, February 10, 1999, p. 1.

714

Scott Marshall, “Law and Order: No evacuation needed after anthrax threat,” Atlanta Constitution, February 13, 1999, p. 7JJ

(Gwinnett County extra).

715

Graham Brink, “Anthrax scare closes car wash,” St. Petersburg Times, February 25, 1999, p. 1, Graham Brink, “Anthrax

scare exposes lack of training,” St. Petersburg Times, February 28, 1999, p. 1, Robert King, “Hernando County has another anthrax scare,”

,” St. Petersburg Times, March 21, 1999, p. 3B, Graham Brink, “County, FBI officials investigate anthrax false alarm in Spring Hill,” St.

Petersburg Times, March 26, 1999, p. 1, and Graham Brink, “’Anthrax’ hoax grows with another bottle found in Spring Hill,” St.

Petersburg Times, July 7, 1999, p. 2.

716

“Mystery parcel to U.S. Court sent to FBI lab,” Atlanta Constitution, February 19, 1999, p. 5C.

131

Case 1999-20: Anthrax threats against abortion clinics, February 1999

In late February 1999, more than 30 anthrax threat letters were sent abortion clinics in all parts of the

United States. A few of the letters went to other targets, either because of support for abortion or due to

mistakes in the addresses. It appears that most, if not all, of the letters were postmarked in Lexington,

Kentucky.

717

Laboratory tests showed that none of the letters contained anthrax.

On February 18, it appears that anthrax letters were received in Asheville, North Carolina, Charleston,

West Virginia, Cincinnati, Ohio, Manchester, Vermont, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Portland, Oregon, Rapid City,

South Dakota, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and Washington, D.C.

Femcare, a woman’s clinic in Asheville, North Carolina, received a box containing an anthrax threat

on February 18. After the package was opened, and the threatening note was discovered, it was put into a

sealed plastic bag.

718

An abortion clinic in the Charleston, West Virginia, area, Kaneohe Surgicenter, received a

letter with the message, “Anthrax. Have a nice death.” The letter was sent from Lexington, Kentucky.

719

woman’s health clinic, Cincinnati Woman’s Services, located in Walnut Hills, discovered an anthrax threat

letter at 11:00 a.m. on February 18. Four employees in the facility were decontaminated and given antibiotics.

Preliminary tests indicated that no anthrax was present.

720

A Planned Parenthood clinic in Manchester, Vermont, received an anthrax threat letter on February

18. The letter was opened at 11:45 a.m. by an employee, and was found to contain a white powder and a

threatening note. The powder tested negative for anthrax.

721

The Summit Health Clinic, a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, abortion clinic also received an anthrax threat

letter on February 18. Fire fighters using so-called “Smart Tickets” to test for the presence of anthrax received

a positive indication for the presence of anthrax. A test on a second ticket, using a control solution, also

indicated a positive result, suggesting possible problems with the first test. It took 12 hours to confirm that no

anthrax was present, relying on tests made at a laboratory in Maryland.

722

A Planned Parenthood clinic in Portland, Oregon, received an anthrax threat letter, but did not open it.

After recognizing that the letter was similar to anthrax threat letters sent to other clinics, employees notified the

FBI of the letter.

723

Clinics in two cities in South Dakota, Rapid City and Sioux Falls, also received letters on

February 18.

724

In Washington, D.C., the Washington Surgical Center received a package on February 18 with a label

claiming that it contained anthrax. The Washington, D.C. fire department recovered the package and placed it

in container for transport. It was then taken to the Naval Medical Research Institute for examination.

725

On February 19, threat letters were received in Birmingham, Alabama, Des Moines, Iowa,

Minneapolis, Minnesota, Portland, Maine, St. Johnsbury, Vermont, and St. Paul, Minnesota. In addition, a

Nashville, Tennessee, clinic received a letter that was mistakenly identified as a threat.

726

A Birmingham, Alabama, clinic, New Woman All Woman Healthcare, turned over to the FBI an

unopened letter that was similar to those delivered elsewhere. According to an FBI spokesman, “We really

717

Angela Galloway and Adrienne Lu, “Del. Clinic receives anthrax hoax letter,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 23, 1999, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.phillynews.com.

718

“Clinic in Asheville received anthrax threat,” Winston-Salem Journal, February 20, 1999, as found at

http://www.journalnow.com/, Valerie Honeycutt, “Threats postmarked Lexington,” Herald-Leader (Lexington, Kentucky), February 20,

1999, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.kentuckyconnect.com, and “Official: Clinic Threats from Ky.,”

Associated Press, February 20, 1999, 6:41 AM ET.

719

Malia Rulon, “Charleston abortion clinic receives letter with anthrax threat,” Associated Press, February 24, 1999. Reports

that a Charleston, South Carolina, clinic was involved appears to be a mistake.

720

Tanya Bricking and Tim Bonfield, “Anthrax threat mailed to local clinic,” Cincinnati Enquirer, February 19, 1999, as found

at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://enquirer.com.

721

Mark Hayward and Denis Paiste, “Planned Parenthood gets anthrax scare,” Union Leader (Manchester, New Hampshire),

February 19, 1999, “Anthrax hoax exposed, clinic set to reopen, Union Leader (Manchester, New Hampshire), February 22, 1999, as

found at the paper’s Web site, http://www.theunionleader.com.

722

“Abortion clinic gets anthrax threat,” Journal Sentinel (Milwaukee), February 19, 1999, and Jessica McBride, “Field test

didn’t rule out anthrax,” Journal Sentinel (Milwaukee), March 2, 1999, both from the paper’s Web site, http://www.jsonline.com.

723

“Portland clinic gets fake anthrax threat,” Oregonian, February 25, 1999, as found at the paper’s Web site,

http://www.oregonlive.com.

724

“Official: Clinic Threats From Ky,” Associated Press, February 20, 1999, 6:40 a.m. EST.

725

“Abortion Clinic Gets Threatening Package,” Washington Post, February 19, 1999, p. B2.

726

Kathy Carlson, “Letter no threat to abortion clinic,” Tennessean, February 27, 19999, as posted on the newspaper’s Web

site, http://www.tennessean.com.

132

don’t know [if the letter is one of those threatening anthrax], but we think it probably is.” The letter was

recovered by a hazardous materials team and sent to a Virginia laboratory for testing.

727

A Des Moines, Iowa,

Planned Parenthood clinic received an anthrax threat letter on February 19. The letter arrived that morning, and

caused the clinic to shut down for two hours. An estimated 10 people were evacuated from the facility,

including some patients.

728

A Minneapolis, Minnesota, Planned Parenthood clinic received an anthrax threat on February 19. The

letter was turned over to the FBI, and the Minnesota Department of Health determined that no anthrax was

present.

729

A Planned Parenthood clinic in Portland, Maine, received an anthrax threat letter. The letter was not

opened, because clinic employees were suspicious of the return address, which named a laboratory not used by

the clinic, and had a Lexington, Kentucky postmark. Aware that other abortion clinics had received anthrax

threat letters, the envelope was turned over authorities. Laboratory tests demonstrated that no anthrax was

present.

730

A Planned Parenthood clinic in St. Johnsbury, Vermont, received an anthrax threat letter, apparently

similar to the one sent to the clinic in Portland, Maine.

731

A St. Paul, Minnesota, Planned Parenthood clinic

also received an anthrax threat letter. When tested by the Minnesota Health Department, no anthrax was

identified.

732

On February 22, anthrax threat letters appeared at clinics in Atlanta, Georgia, Billings, Montana,

Charleston, West Virginia, Cranston, Rhode Island, Kansas City, Missouri, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Salt Lake

City, Newark, Delaware, Utah, and Spokane, Washington. A clinic in Albany, New York, may have received a

letter on that date, but threw it away.

733

An anthrax threat letter was delivered to a National Organization for

Women chapter in New York City.

734

Similarly, the National Abortion Rights Action League in Washington,

D.C., also reportedly received an anthrax threat.

735

At 10:30 a.m. on February 22, Compassionate Services, the administrative arm of Atlanta Northside

Family Planning Services, received a package with a return address marked “PAACO Surgical Instruments.”

This return address was associated with at least a dozen previous anthrax threat packages. Aware of the

connection, employees at the facility, located in Sandy Springs, left the envelope unopened and turned it over

to authorities. The office building was evacuated for three hours.

736

A Planned Parenthood clinic in Billings,

Montana, reportedly received an anthrax letter on February 22.

737

A Planned Parenthood center in Wood

County, near Charleston, West Virginia, received an anthrax threat on February 22.

738

The Women’s Medical

Center in Cranston, Rhode Island, received an envelope similar to those sent to abortion clinics around the

727

“Birmingham clinic among those receiving anthrax letters, “ Associated Press, February 20, 1999, 12:36 Eastern.

728

Valerie Honeycutt, “Threats postmarked Lexington,” Herald-Leader (Lexington, Kentucky), February 20, 1999, as found at

the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.kentuckyconnect.com, and “Anthrax scare forces clinic evacuation,” report issued by

KTIV-4, a television station in Sioux City, Iowa, and found at http://www.msnbc.com.

729

Wayne Wangstad, “Germ threat to Planned Parenthood ruled hoax,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 20, 1999, as found at

the newspaper’s Web site, http://www.pioneerplanet.com,/ and “Twin Cities Women’s Clinics Receive Threats,” WCCO, posted February

19, 1999, 5:45 p.m., as found at http://www.wcco.com.

730

“Suspect letter to Portland clinic part of hoax,” Press Herald (Portland, Maine), March 4, 1999, as found at the paper’s Web

site, http://www.portland.com, Dale Vincent, “Vermont, Maine clinics get anthrax threat letters,” Union Leader (Manchester, New

Hampshire), February 20, 1999, from the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.theunionleader.com, and “Anthrax hoaxes hit

Maine,” Bangor Daily News, March 3, 1999, from the newspaper’s Web site, http://www.bangornews.com.

731

Dale Vincent, “Vermont, Maine clinics get anthrax threat letters,” Union Leader (Manchester, New Hampshire), February

20, 1999, from the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.theunionleader.com.

732

Wayne Wangstad, “Germ threat to Planned Parenthood ruled hoax,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 20, 1999, as found at

the newspaper’s Web site, http://www.pioneerplanet.com,/ and “Twin Cities Women’s Clinics Receive Threats,” WCCO, posted February

19, 1999, 5:45 p.m., as found at http://www.wcco.com.

733

“Anthrax Letter Scare,” States News Service, February 24, 1999, as found at http://dailynews.yahoo.com.

734

Beth Gardiner, “Anthrax threats at women’s clinic, NOW office,” Associated Press, February 23, 1999, 10:12 PM.

735

Ruth E. Igoe and Mark Morris, “Kansas City is not alone in dealing with anthrax hoax, Kansas City Star, February 23, 1999,

as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.kcstar.com.

736

Brad Schrade, “Anthrax scare empties offices hit by ’97 bomb,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, February 23, 1999, as found

at http://www.accessatlanta.com.

737

Bill Morlin, “FBI Investigates valley anthrax threat,” Spokesman-Review, February 23, 1999, as found at

http://www.spokane.net/, includes this city in a list of Planned Parenthood clinics targeted with anthrax threat letters on February 22.

738

Malia Rulon, “Abortion clinic receives letter with anthrax threat,” Associated Press, February 24, 1999.

133

country. It was turned over to authorities without being opened. Preliminary tests did not identify any

anthrax.

739

A Planned Parenthood clinic in Kansas City, Missouri, received an anthrax threat letter on February

22. The letter had a Kentucky postmark. Twenty-seven people were decontaminated, including seven

firefighters. Two people were treated at hospitals, one because of an adverse reaction to the bleach used in the

decontamination. The response to the incident involved about 100 people and took five hours.

740

In Newark, Delaware, a Planned Parenthood clinic was the recipient of an anthrax threat letter. The

letter was contained in a manila envelope, and had a West Virginia return address for a nonexistent surgical

supply company. As with other letters, it contained the words, “Have a nice death.” No one was quarantined,

decontaminated, or treated at the clinic, although the person who opened the letter immediately washed her

hands. The clinic was closed until the next day.

741

Another Planned Parenthood clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah, was the target of an anthrax threat. One

person was given antibiotics as a precaution, but tests indicated that anthrax was not present.

742

On February 22, a Christmas card was delivered to a dentist’s office in Spokane County, Washington.

The envelope was addressed to the “Director of Medical Operations, South 20 Pines,” which was the building

that contained a Planned Parenthood clinic. The envelope was almost certainly meant for the clinic, but it

received all its mail through a post office box. According to initial press reports, the envelope contained a

powder, but subsequently authorities said that there was no powder and no threats were made.

743

On February 23, 1999, anthrax threats were delivered to clinics in Honolulu, Hawaii, New York, New

York, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Queen’s Medical Center, located in the Ala Moana Building in

Honolulu, Hawaii, was the target of an anthrax threat letter on February 23. Five people in the clinic were

treated at a hospital, and three floors of the building were evacuated. The letter was taken to the state’s Public

Health Laboratory, located in Pearl City, and tested negative.

744

That same day, the Eastern Women’s Center in

New York, New York, received a letter claiming to have been contaminated with anthrax.

745

Women’s Health

Services, an abortion clinic in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania also received an anthrax threat letter on February 23.

Three people were decontaminated.

746

A Planned Parenthood clinic in Boise, Idaho, received an anthrax threat letter on February 25. There

was powder in the envelope, and three people were exposed to it. No anthrax was present.

747

Case 1999-19: Anthrax threat (Yemen), February 1999

An otherwise unknown group, identifying itself as the “Army of Suicidals, Group No. 66, Bin Laden

Militant Wing,” issued a statement threatening to kill American and British citizens in Yemen unless they left

within 12 days. According to the letter, “If you stay, then you’ve chosen death …. We’ll make you pay for

every drop of Arab and Muslim blood you shed since the Crusades.” The letter apparently stated that all those

739

Richard Salit, “Anthrax threats are keeping clinics on heightened alert,” Journal (Providence, Rhode Island), February 28,

1999, as found at the paper’s Web site, http://www.projo.com.

740

Oscar Avila and Cristine Vendel, “Planned Parenthood is first KC target of anthrax threats,” Kansas City Star, February 22,

1999, as found at http://www.kcstar.com,

741

Angela Galloway and Adrienne Lu, “Del. Clinic receives anthrax hoax letter,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 23, 1999, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.phillynews.com.

742

Jennifer Dobner, “Anthrax scare at S.L. clinic,” Deseret News, February 23, 1999, and “Brown stuff on letter to S.L. clinic

isn’t anthrax,” Deseret News, February 24, 1999, as taken from the newspaper’s Web site, http://www.desnews.com.

743

Bill Morlin, “FBI Investigates valley anthrax threat,” Spokesman-Review, February 23, 1999, and Bill Morlin, “No anthrax

found in card sent to clinic,” Spokesman-Review, February 26, 1999, as found at http://www.spokane.net/.

744

“Building evacuated after doctor’s office receives anthrax threat,” Associated Press, February 23, 1999, 10:13 PM, Crystal

Kua and Mary Adamski, “Second ‘anthrax’ letter arrives in Honolulu,” Star-Bulletin (Honolulu), February 24, 1999, and Rod Ohira,

“Islanders get a crash course on anthrax,” Star-Bulletin (Honolulu), February 24, 1999, as found at the paper’s Web site,

http://starbulletin.com.

745

Beth Gardiner, “Anthrax threats at women’s clinic, NOW office,” Associated Press, February 23, 1999, 10:12 PM.

746

Kim Burger, “Abortion clinic target of deadly anthrax threat,” Tribune-Review (Pittsburgh), February 24, 1999, and Torsten

Ove, “Scare tactics: Harmless envelope similar to those sent to clinics in 30 cities,” Tribune-Review (Pittsburgh), February 24, 1999, as

found in the paper’s Web site, http://www.triblive.com, and “A new anthrax threat letter found to be a hoax,” Associated Press, February

24, 1999.

747

“Anthrax Hoax Letter Writer Sought,” States News Service, March 1, 1999, as found at http://dailynews.yahoo.com.

134

remaining in Yemen after the deadline would be attacked with anthrax. The letter reportedly was delivered to a

Yemeni newspaper by fax from London.

748

Case 1999-18: Anthrax threat (Los Angeles Times Offices, Los Angeles), February 1999

Several square blocks of downtown Los Angeles were shut down on February 12, 1999, when the

main offices of the Los Angeles Times received a letter that claimed contain anthrax. Included in the envelope

was a small quantity of a gray powder.

749

Case 1999-17: Anthrax threat (against State Department, Washington, D.C.), February 1999

An envelope containing what were claimed to be anthrax pellets was delivered to the State

Department building in Washington, D.C. The letter was opened on the seventh floor of the building, the same

floor that contains the offices of the Secretary of State. According to the State Department spokesman, “At 11

a.m. … a letter was received in which pellets fell out of the letter an there was a note saying by opening this

letter the openers were being hit by anthrax.” The FBI, the D.C. Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the D.C.

police responded.

750

Case 1999-16: Anthrax threats (against offices in multiple cities), February 1999

Several apparently related anthrax threats were made on February 5, 1999. In all the incidents it

appears that letters were found claiming that plastic bags found in the envelopes contained anthrax. According

to one account, the letter was “rambling” and the unknown substance was in double plastic bags. One of the

letters was sent to the offices of the Washington Post in Washington, D.C. Another was delivered to the Old

Executive Office Building next to the White House. A third letter was sent to the NBC News bureau in Atlanta,

Georgia, and a fourth was found at the U.S. Post Office in Columbus, Georgia.

751

Two additional envelopes,

apparently similar, arrived the next day at the Old Executive Office Building and the U.S. Court of appeals.

752

In addition, it appears that an anthrax threat letter was received on February 8 by “an unnamed federal

agency,” according to a press report. In addition, a spokesman for the Capitol Police reported, “We have

received one letter which is exactly like those which have been received elsewhere in the United States,

claiming exposure of the recipient to anthrax.” The delivery date for the last threat was not specified.

753

Case 1999-15: Anthrax threat (against East Aurora, New York, school), February 1999

The Main Street School in East Aurora, New York, was closed on February 5, 1999, after a note was

found on the front door of the school at 5 a.m. The building was searched to determine if the threat was real. A

seventh-grade student was arrested for making the threat.

754

Case 1999-14: Anthrax threat (against Lackawanna, New York, school), February 1999

On February 2, 1999, the Lackawanna, New York, police arrested two students for making an anthrax

threat in a phone call to 911. The call was made at 3:07 p.m., and claimed that the Lackawanna High School

748

“Yemen Steps Up Security After West Threatened With Attack,” Agence France Press (Northern European Service),

English, February 20, 1999, 1201 GMT, and “Unknown group warns Americans, Britons to leave Yemen,” Associated Press, February 16,

1999, 1119 ET.

749

“Anthrax Hoax at Times Building Disrupts Traffic,” Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s

World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com, and “Los Angeles Times sealed off because of anthrax scare,” Associated Press, February

12, 1999, 6:14 PST.

750

Toni Marshall, “Anthrax hoax gets attention of State,” Washington Times, February 10, 1999, p. A11, and “Anthrax Hoax

Received at State Department,” Reuters, February 9, 1999, 3:01 ET.

751

Maria Elena Fernando, “Anthrax Hoaxes Are Sent in Mail,” Washington Post, February 5, 1999, p. B8, Jack Warner,

“Anthrax threat appears to be hoax,” Atlanta Constitution, February 5, 1999, p. 1C, Jack Warner, “NBC Workers air complaints about

showers,” Atlanta Constitution, February 6, 1999, p. 2B.

752

“Two More Anthrax Threats Arrive by Mail in D.C.,” Washington Post, February 6, 1999, p. B2. The original story claimed

that the threat was received at the D.C. Court of Appeals, but that was subsequently corrected to the U.S. Court of Appeals. “Corrections,”

Washington Post, February 10, 1999, p. A3.

753

Laura Dunphy, “Capitol Police probe anthrax threats,” The Hill, February 10, 1999, as found at the publications web site,

http://207.152.182.86.

754

“Boy petitioned to court over anthrax threat,” Buffalo News, February 17, 1999, p. 5B, “East Aurora school shut after

anthrax threat warning,” Buffalo News, February 5, 1999, p. 4B, and “Success seen in meeting new standards,” Buffalo News, February 12,

1999, p. 5B.

135

had been contaminated with anthrax. The telephone call was traced to a pay telephone and local police

identified the perpetrators as two 14-year-old students of the Lackawanna Middle School.

755

Case 1999-13: Anthrax threat (against Cattaraugus County, New York, school), February 1999

Three students at the West Valley Central School, Cattaraugus County, New York, were arrested on

February 5, 1999, on charges of making an anthrax threat at their school. The students, two 13-years old and

one 12, typed a message and placed it in the school. The County Sheriff’s Department and the FBI arrested the

three.

756

Case 1999-12: Anthrax threat (against Alden, New York, business), January 1999

At 6:00 p.m. on January 25, 1999, someone called a business in Alden, New York, and claimed that

there was anthrax in its building. Emergency crews responded to the threat, and took several hours to

determine that no anthrax was present. The call apparently came from a pay telephone.

757

Case 1999-11: Anthrax threat (against grocery store), January 1999

A Jubilee food store in East Aurora, New York, was closed on January 22, 1999, after an employee

found a letter stuck in the store’s back entrance supposedly contaminated with anthrax. The letter was opened

when the first employees arrived at around 6:00 a.m., and the store and about one-third of the surrounding

shopping center was cordoned off as authorities investigated. About ten people were kept in the building,

including store employees and at least one delivery person who was present when the envelope was opened.

758

Case 1999-10: Anthrax threat (against Niagara County, New York, high school), January 1999

On January 21, 1999, the assistant principal of the Newfane High School in Niagara County, New

York, was given a note claiming that the school was threatened by anthrax. Initially, county sheriff’s deputies

quarantined the school, but eventually closed the school and allowed the students to go home. Two students

were arrested in connection with the incident, one 13 and the other 14. Federal officials recommended that the

two be tried under state laws for falsely reporting a threat, which is a misdemeanor under New York law.

759

Case 1999-09: Anthrax threat (against West Seneca, New York, town hall), January 1999

On January 21, 1999, an operator at the West Seneca, New York, town hall, received a telephone call

during the lunch hour claiming that anthrax spores were in the building’s ventilation system. There were 43

people in the building at the time. Eventually, the threat was discounted, because the building uses a hot water

heating system. Nevertheless, the town hall was closed until 6:00 p.m. while the threat was being evaluated.

Some people working in the building were shifted to a nearby hockey rink in the middle of the afternoon, but

remained quarantined.

760

Case 1999-08: Anthrax threat (against Erie County, New York, middle school), January 1999

On January 19,1999, the Iroquois Middle School in Elma, New York, located in Erie County,

received a letter with a handwritten note that read, “Anthrax may be in the building—this is a warning not a

threat.” The note was read around 8:30 a.m., and school officials promptly notified authorities. The middle

school was quarantined. This meant that about 700 students were kept in the school, including some students

from the connected intermediate school who were holding classes in the middle school. A hazardous materials

team searched for evidence of anthrax in the ventilation system, but came up empty. Ultimately, the students

were allowed to leave at around 6:20 p.m.

761

755

“Boys’ anthrax threat prompts warning,” Buffalo News, February 3, 1999, p. 4B.

756

“3 more held in anthrax threats,” Buffalo News, February 6, 1999, p. 5C.

757

Peter Simon and Thomas J. Prohaska, “Student at Iroquois High Charged in Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, January 26,

1999, p. 5B.

758

Mike Levy and Elmer Ploetz, “Anthrax Letter Threat Closes Jubilee Foods Store,” Buffalo News, January 22, 1999, p. C4.

759

Mark Levy and Elmer Ploetz, “2 Students Arrested in Anthrax Threat at Newfane High,” Buffalo News, January 22, 1999, p.

4C.

760

Mark Levy and Elmer Ploetz, “2 Students Arrested in Anthrax Threat at Newfane High,” Buffalo News, January 22, 1999, p.

4C, and Mike Levy and Elmer Ploetz, “Anthrax Letter Threat Closes Jubilee Foods Store,” Buffalo News, January 22, 1999, p. C4.

761

Elmer Ploetz, “Anthrax Scare Forces School to Isolate Students,” Buffalo News, January 21, 1999, p. 1B.

136

The next week a 15-year old tenth grade student was arrested in connection with the incident. He told

authorities that he wanted to get out of classes. The case was handled in juvenile court given the defendant’s

age, but authorities planned to ask restitution to cover the costs of the incident and intended to seek the

maximum criminal penalty possible. The student pleaded guilty to the charge.

762

He was placed on probation

for one year, required to perform 25 hours of community service, and ordered to pay the school district $1,500

as restitution.

763

Case 1999-07: Anthrax threat (against California hospital), January 1999

On January 21, 22, and 23, an unidentified man made a series of telephone threats against the Arcadia

Methodist Hospital in Sierra Madre, California. The called claimed that anthrax would be disseminated into the

hospital’s air handling system. One call claimed, “in five minutes a bomb will go off in one of the units, and

anthrax is in the system.” On January 23, the calls were traced to a home in Sierra Madre. The next day,

Christopher J. McCoy, the 24-year-old son of the house’s owners, was arrested on charges of threatening to use

a weapon of mass destruction. According to authorities he denied having made the threats, and told FBI agents,

“I don’t have the technology. It was only words.”

764

Case 1999-06: Anthrax threat (against Riverside County, California, restaurant), January 1999

On January 19, 1999, a Pizza Hut in Palm Desert, a town in Riverside County, California, received a

telephone threat claiming that the restaurant had been contaminated with anthrax. Firefighters investigated the

threat and found no evidence of contamination.

765

Case 1999-05: Anthrax threat (against U.S. Attorney’s Office, Buffalo, New York), January 1999

On January 14, 1999, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Buffalo, New York, located in the Federal Center

in the downtown area, received a letter claiming to have been contaminated with anthrax. According to

authorities, the letter, which was postmarked in Rochester, New York, was smeared with an unknown

substance and had a message written on it indicating, “You have just been exposed to anthrax.” There was no

indication that the letter was tied to any ideological grievance, although it may have been tied to two letters

previously sent to the U.S. Attorney’s office in Rochester.

Firefighters began responding to the threat at 12:22 p.m., and deployed around a dozen fire trucks and

other emergency response vehicles to the scene. In addition to the Buffalo fire department, the Buffalo police

department, the Erie County hazardous materials team, and medical personnel from the Erie County Medical

Center were sent to the scene. In all, about 100 people were involved in the response.

Authorities closed off the area around the building and about 200 people in the building were detained

for several hours. Only the 4 people who came into direct contact with the open letter were decontaminated.

Tests performed at the Erie County Medical Center determined that the letter was not contaminated with

anthrax.

766

Case 1999-04: Anthrax threat (against Cathedral City, California, store), January 1999

At 5:10 p.m. on January 14, 1999, an employee of Cathedral City, California, Target store notified

police that the store had received a telephone call claiming that the building was contaminated with anthrax.

The building was evacuated and searched, but authorities found no evidence of anthrax and identified no

suspicious containers. The store was reopened at 7:00 p.m. The Cathedral City police and fire departments

were investigating the incident, as was the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

767

762

Peter Simon and Thomas J. Prohaska, “Student at Iroquois High Charged in Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, January 26,

1999, p. 5B, “Teen in Kin’s Custody after Denying Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, January 27, 1999, p. 5B, and “Sentencing Set for

Student in Iroquois Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, February 12, 1999, p. 5B.

763

Matt Gryta, “Teen sentenced in school anthrax scare,” Buffalo News, June 2, 1999, p. 4B.

764

“Man Charged in Anthrax Phone Calls to Hospital,” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 1999, as found in the newspaper’s

World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com.

765

“Bogus anthrax call clears pizza store,” Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), January 20, 1999, p. B3.

766

Lou Michel, “U.S. Office is Threatened with Anthrax,” Buffalo News, January 15, 1999, p. 1C, Dan Herbeck, “Federal

Office here hit by Anthrax Threat,” Buffalo News, January 16, 1999, p. 1C, Dan Herbeck, “No Anthrax Found on Letter to Federal

Facility,” Buffalo News, January 19, 1999, p. 1B.

767

“Store evacuated after phoned-in anthrax threat,” Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), January 15, 1999, p. B3.

137

Case 1999-03: Anthrax threat (against U.S. Attorney’s Office, Rochester, New York), January 1999

On January 14, 1999, two employees at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Kenneth B. Keating Federal

Building in Rochester, New York, opened letters that contained messages claiming that the letters were

contaminated with anthrax. The two employees were taken to the decontamination unit of the Rochester

General Hospital and given antibiotics. The letters were postmarked in Rochester.

768

Case 1999-02: Anthrax threat (against Oregon library), January 1999

At about 3:00 p.m. on January 13, 1999 the switchboard at the Tualatin, Oregon, City Hall received a

telephone call claiming that anthrax had been released in the Tualatin Public Library. The library was in the

City Hall building, and as a result the library and city offices were evacuated and closed until January 15. The

hazardous material team of Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue took environmental samples, which failed to

indicate the presence of anthrax. The FBI was called in to investigate the threat.

769

Case 1999-44: Anthrax threat against auto dealership, Los Angeles, California, January 1999

At 7:00 a.m. on January 11, 1999, Los Angeles police received a report that anthrax had been released

at an auto dealership on Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, California. Authorities blocked off the street for

90 minutes while evaluating the threat. The incident was declared a hoax.

770

Case 1999-43: Anthrax threat against Ocala Regional Medical Center, Florida, January 1999

On January 3, 1999, a telephone caller claimed that the emergency room of the Ocala Regional

Medical Center had been contaminated with anthrax. The call, which was received at 1:00 p.m., led officials to

close the emergency room for four hours and divert all emergency cases to the Munroe Regional Medical

Center. Although the FBI, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the local public health

department assessed that the threat was a hoax, the hospital implemented emergency response plans for the

emergency department. The rest of the hospital was not affected.

771

Case 1999-50: Anthrax vial (Far North Dallas, Texas), January 1999

On January 10, 1999, a man walking on a sidewalk in Far North Dallas, Texas, discovered a vial with

a sticker with writing that suggested the vial contained anthrax. According to the man who picked up the vial,

the sticker contained a message stating, “This is not a joke. Do not open this. This bottle contains anthrax.”

772

Case 1999-01: Anthrax threat (against Orange County, California, High School), January 1999

An anthrax threat was directed against Gilbert-East High School in Anaheim, California, on January

4, 1999. A telephone call was received at the school just before noon claiming that anthrax had been released

into the ventilation system. Additional calls were sent to the school. According to an Anaheim Police officer,

the person making the call “did sound young, and we’ll be looking at whether he is a student.” Police and Fire

Department hazardous materials personnel sealed off the area around the school for nearly three hours. About

20 students and 100 school employees were at the school at the time. A threat assessment determined that “the

threat lacked credibility.” Authorities searched the building, and found nothing.

773

768

“2 at federal building treated after opening ‘anthrax’ letters, Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, New York), January 14,

1999, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.rochesternews.com.

769

“Library closes after anthrax threat,” Oregonian, January 14, 1999, as found at http://oregonlive.com, and “Anthrax “threat

at Tualatin City Hall,” Associated Press, January 15, 1999, 3:39 a.m. EST.

770

“Anthrax,” City News Service, January 11, 1999, and Donna Kelley and Charles Feldman, “Anthrax Hoaxes Causing Very

Real Problems for Authorities,” CNN Today, January 12, 1999, 1:39 p.m. Eastern Time, transcript number 99011208V13. I am grateful to

Jason Pate, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for calling my attention to this incident.

771

Carlos E. Medina, “Anthrax threat shuts down ORMC emergency room,” Star-Banner (Ocala, Florida), January 4, 1999, as

found at http://www.starbanner.com. “Threatens biological attack,” United Press International, January 4 ,1999, pus the incident at the

Munroe Regional Medical Center. I am grateful to Jason Pate, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for calling my attention to this

incident.

772

Jason Sickles, “Containing dangerous rumors,” Dallas Morning News, March 1, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s World

Wide Web site, http://www.dallasnews.com.

773

H.G. Reza, “1

O.C. Anthrax Hoax Quarantines Anaheim School,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1999, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://latimes.com, and Marla Jo Fisher, “Scare highlights busing problem,” Orange County Register,

January 5, 1999, as found at the paper’s web site, http://www.ocregister.com.

138

Case 1999-39: Anthrax threat (against Victorville, California, Wal-Mart), January 1999

A telephone caller told a 911 dispatcher that anthrax was present in a Wal-Mart in Victorville,

California. The call, made at 7:25 a.m. on January 2, 1999, caused the store to be evacuated while the local

hazardous materials team evaluated the threat. The store was reopened about 9:30 a.m., after an investigation

failed to identify the presence of anthrax.

774

Case 1998-44: Anthrax threat (against Rochester, New York, U.S. Attorney’s office), December 1998

On December 31, 1998, an employee at the U.S. Attorney’s office, located in the Rochester, New

York, federal building, opened a letter that allegedly contained anthrax. According to the Chief U.S. District

Judge, the letter claimed, “You have now been infected by the anthrax virus, smile.” The woman was taken to

the Rochester General Hospital, where she went through the decontamination unit and was treated with

antibiotics. The Monroe County health department sent the letter to another hospital for testing. No anthrax

was detected.

775

Case 1998-43: Robert Peterson (anthrax threat), December 1998

At 1:30 p.m. on December 29, 1998, the 911 operators at the Newark, California, police department

received a 911 emergency telephone call from WorldPac, a local auto parts shipping company, claiming,

“There’s 400 people here in this building, and anthrax has been released.” The telephone call was taped, which

was turned over the Bay Area Counter-Terrorism Task Force, a combined operations force drawn from federal,

state, and local law enforcement agencies in the San Francisco area. Hazardous materials teams were sent to

the company’s warehouse, and no evidence of anthrax was discovered. Law enforcement officials played the

tape for company management, who identified the caller as Robert Alinea Peterson, a 43-year old employee.

Peterson reportedly was considered an erratic worker, had made threats against a fellow employee earlier in the

year, and also had stated that he wanted to kill one of his supervisors. According to a co-worker, he asked

about how to obtain anthrax the day before allegedly making the threatening telephone call. Law enforcement

officials claim that he admitted making the call, apparently so that he could go home to get heart medicine.

Peterson was arrested on December 29. On December 31, a U.S. Magistrate decided that Peterson could

remain free on a $50,000 personal recognizance bond. He was scheduled for arraignment on January 19, 1999

in Oakland, California. He was represented by a public defender.

776

Case 1998-42: Anthrax threat (against Palmdale, California, grocery stores), December 1998

The Lancaster station of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s office received a telephone call at 2:40

p.m. on December 26, 1998 threatening to release anthrax into the ventilation system of a building in Palmdale

(also in Los Angeles County). At 4:55 p.m. a second call claimed that the intended target was the Ralphs

grocery store in Palmdale. A third call was received at 5:20 p.m. alleging that an Albertson’s grocery store was

targeted. All the telephone calls apparently were made by the same man, and originated at pay telephones.

Sheriff’s deputies responded to both threats, along with fire and other emergency personnel. Customers in the

stores were given a hazardous agent exposure pamphlet.

777

Case 1998-41: Anthrax threat (against Wal-Mart), December 1998

At 7:44 p.m. on December 28

1998, the California Highway Patrol received a telephone call claiming

that anthrax had been released at 4:00 p.m. in a La Quinta, California, Wal-Mart store. Approximately 200

people were in the store at the time, but authorities estimated that 2,000 people had passed through the store

since the time of the claimed release. People in the store were detained in the garden section for around 2_

hours. They were not decontaminated, but were advised of the symptoms of anthrax and were told to shower

774

“Victorville: Anthrax empties store,” Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), January 4, 1999, p. B2.

775

Jon Hand, “Secretary treated after anthrax scare,” Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, New York), January 1, 1999, as

found at the paper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.RochesterNews.com, “Letter Claims to Contain Lethal Anthrax Bacteria,” New

York Times, January 1, 1999, as found at http://proquest.umi.com, and “Anthrax Scare a Hoax,” WHEC-TV, Rochester, New York, from

http://www.msnbc.com.

776

E. Mark Moreno, “Worker in court over anthrax call,” San Jose Mercury News, January 1, 1999, as found at the newspaper’s

World Wide Web site at http://www.mercurycenter.com, and Bill Wallace, “Hayward Man Charged in Anthrax Scare,” San Francisco

Chronicle, January 1, 1999, p. A13, as found in the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.sfgate.com.

777

Don Jergler, “Series of anthrax scares hits Valley,” Antelope Valley Press, December 29, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s

World Wide Web site at http://www.avpress.com.

139

and wash their clothes. No evidence of anthrax was discovered, and at 8:45 a.m. the next morning Riverside

Sheriff’s Department declared the incident a hoax.

778

Case 1998-40: Anthrax threat (against Palm Desert department store), December 1998

At 10:20 a.m. on December 24, 1998, a telephone caller to the Mervyn’s Department Store in Palm

Desert, California, claimed that the store had been contaminated with anthrax. The response involved the

Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, Fire Department, Hazardous Materials Team, and the county’s

Department of Environmental Health. The Corona Hazardous Materials Team and the FBI supported them. In

response, the people in the store were quarantined and decontaminated by the Riverside County Hazardous

Materials Team. Some 229 people, including shoppers and store employees, were decontaminated. At the same

time, environmental samples were taken to determine if anthrax was present in the store.

779

Case 1998-38: Anthrax threat (against Pomona, California, dance club), December 1998

At 11:50 p.m. on Saturday, December 26, 1998, an unidentified man called the Pomona Police

Department and claimed that a “significant quantity” was about to be disseminated into a dance club.

Authorities closed off the club, and kept 800 employees and patrons in the building for four hours while the

Los Angeles County Fire Department’s hazardous materials team and personnel from the FBI’s Domestic

Terrorism Task Force checked for indications of anthrax. Tests were completed by the following Monday, and

revealed no signs of anthrax.

780

Case 1998-37: Anthrax threat (against office building), December 1998

At 10:15 a.m. on December 23, 1998, a telephone caller threatened to release a “biological agent” in a

Time Warner Cable Company building in Chatsworth, California. About 200 people were evacuated from the

building and detained until 4:15 p.m. when they were permitted to go.

781

Case 1998-36: Anthrax threat (against Van Nuys courthouses), December 1998

Just after 11:00 a.m. on December 21, 1998, an unidentified caller told a 911 operator, “I have

something to tell you—anthrax has been released in the Van Nuys courthouse.” Authorities sealed off two

courthouses, the old and new Superior Court buildings, and evacuated some 1,500 to 2,000 people from the

buildings. The Presiding Superior Court Judge ordered a court emergency, and closed down the operations of

the court until December 23. Los Angeles County Health Department officials detained the evacuated

individuals outside the courthouses. FBI agents and other Health Department officials searched the buildings to

take biological samples. The samples were taken to the county’s public health laboratory, which failed to

identify the presence of anthrax. By 4:00 p.m., authorities concluded that the threat was a hoax, and the people

evacuated from the building were released. Nevertheless, they were advised to take simple precautions,

including watching for signs of flu, which might be early symptoms of inhalation anthrax, and to take showers

to remove any possible contamination.

782

778

Marlowe Churchill, “Taking anthrax threats in stride,” Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), December 28, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.press-enterprise.com, and “Another anthrax threat,” Press-Enterprise,

December 30, 1998, and “Region’s eighth anthrax threat this month also turns out to be a hoax,” Associated Press, December 29, 1998,

00:00 PST.

779

Jacquie Paul, “Anthrax scare declared hoax,” Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), December 28, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.press-enterprise.com, and Jacquie Paul, “Anthrax threat forces Wal-Mart evacuation,”

Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), December 29, 1998, p. B3.

780

“Anthrax Scare Disrupts Club,” Washington Post, December 28, 1998, p. A12, as found at http://www.washingtonpost.com,

and “Nightclub Anthrax Threat Proves to Be Another Hoax,” Los Angeles Times, as found at http://www.latimes.com, and “Another

Anthrax Scare in California,” Associated Press, December 28, 1998, 0932EST.

781

Andrew Blankstein and Solomon Moore, “Anthrax Threat Forces Evacuation,” Los Angeles Times, December 24, 1998, and

“Nightclub Anthrax Threat Proves to be Another Hoax,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1998, as found in the newspaper’s World Wide

Web site, http://www.latimes.com. The two sources disagree on the number of people evacuated. The figure used came from the more

recent article.

782

Andrew Blankstein, “Anthrax Scare Forces Evacuation of Courts,” Los Angeles Times, December 22, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com, and “Anthrax Scare forces Quarantined,” Associated Press, December 21,

1998, 8:25 a.m. EST.

140

Case 1998-35: Anthrax threat (against federal courthouse), December 1998

Around 1:30 p.m., on December 18, 1998, a clerk of the court at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in

Woodland Hills, California, received a telephone call claiming that the building had been contaminated with

anthrax. The U.S. Marshal’s Office contacted the Los Angeles Fire Department at 2:10 p.m., initiated a

substantial response involving more than 100 people from the fire and police departments. Burbank Boulevard

was shut down, causing serious traffic problems. Tests determined that no anthrax was present.

783

Case 1998-33: Anthrax threat (against former wife), December 1998

Around 10:30 a.m., December 18, 1998, an employee at the Westwood Village, California, offices of

the Executive Parking Company opened an envelope containing a letter with a message claiming that the paper

had been contaminated with anthrax. According to one press report, a woman received a letter from her ex-

husband with the message, “You have been exposed to anthrax.”

784

A response effort consisting of FBI, Los Angeles County, and Los Angeles City officials responded to

the incident, including both fire and public health officials. Portions of the building were evacuated, its

ventilation system was turned off, and the employees in the office suite where the letter was delivered were

decontaminated and quarantined. They were initially decontaminated in the basement by a hazardous materials

team drawn from the county health department. When tests made on the site failed to show the presence of

anthrax, around 1:00 p.m., the employees were taken to the UCLA Medical Center. At the medical complex,

they were decontaminated again and given medical treatment. They were quarantined there for a period.

According to a spokesman for the Los Angeles Police Department, the response involved about 150

people and cost $500,000.

785

Case 1998-32: Anthrax threat (against Perris School District), December 1998

On December 14, 1998, the director of special education of the Perris School District, located in

southern California, opened a letter that contained the message, “You’ve been exposed to anthrax.” Inside the

envelope was a piece of gauze cloth with brown flakes on it. Initially, those present at the site were

quarantined, and several hours later they were decontaminated. It appears that 21 people were decontaminated

as a result of the threat, including 18 school district employees, two firefighters, and a mail carrier. Five

employees were sent to the Riverside County Regional Medical Center for treatment. Sheriff’s deputies from

Riverside County, the county’s hazardous materials team, FBI agents, and postal inspectors conducted the

initial response.

786

Case 1998-29: Anthrax threat (Texas post office), December 1998

At 12:45 a.m. on December 4, 1998, a postal worker at the Coppell, Texas, U.S. Postal Service bulk

mail center discovered a 4-inch long vial with the phrase, “You have just been contaminated by anthrax,”

written on it. Although there were 450-500 employees at the facility, only six were in the area where the vial

was discovered. The vial was discovered inside an all-purpose container located in an area closed to the public.

The vial did not appear to have been prepared for mailing, but it could have originated in a mailbox. The

facility contacted 911, and members of the FBI’s regional terrorism task force responded. The vial was

removed and the arms and hands of the six employees were washed with bleach and water. Authorities doubted

783

Sue Fox and Scott Glover, “Anthrax Scare Forces Building to Be Evacuated,” Los Angeles Times, December 19, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com., and “91 People Held After Anthrax Scare,” Associated Press,

December 19, 1998, 7:37 p.m. EST.

784

Josh Meyer and Matea Gold, “Anthrax Hoax Alarms Workers in Westwood,” Los Angeles Times, December 18, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com. See also, “Another anthrax hoax frightens office,” Sacramento

Bee, December 18, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.sacbee.com, and a December 17, 1998, news

report, “Westwood Anthrax Scare Phone, Says FBI,” Channel 2, the CBS affiliate in Los Angeles, California, at

http://www.channel2000.com/.

785

Sue Fox and Scott Glover, “Anthrax Scare Forces Building to Be Evacuated,” Los Angeles Times, December 19, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com..

786

Steve Fetbrandt, “Anthrax threat holds 21 in Perris,” Press-Express (Riverside, California), December 15, 1998, as found at

the newspaper’s World Wide Web site at http://www.inlandempireonline.com. See also “Anthrax Threat Received; 20 People

Quarantined,” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com. See

also the December 14, 1998, news report, “21 Decontaminated After Anthrax Scare,” the Channel 2, the CBS affiliate in Los Angeles,

California, at http://www.channel2000.com/.

141

that the vial contained anthrax even before testing it, but the vial was sent to an FBI laboratory in Washington,

D.C., for testing.

787

Case 1998-28: Anthrax threat (against anti-abortion activist), November 1998

On November 23, 1998, Jeff White, the director of Operation Rescue California, an anti-abortion

group, received a letter with the message “You have been exposed to anthrax.” White, who operates from his

home in Twin Peaks, California, phoned 911 after reading the message. He apparently also called the FBI.

Subsequently, White told reporters, “I wasn’t too concerned about it. (Investigators) didn’t walk in the masks.

The FBI said they were 100 percent confident” that there was no anthrax in the letter. There was no powder in

the envelope. The FBI took custody of the letter as part of their investigation.

788

Case 1998-27: Anthrax Threat (at Pembroke Pines, Florida, post office), November 1998

On November 21, 1998, a mail sorter working in a Pembroke Pines, Florida, discovered an envelope

with a threatening phrase, “Congratulations, you have been exposed to anthrax,” written on it. The Pembroke

Pines Police Department, the Broward County Sheriff’s Office, the Broward County Hazardous Materials

Response Team, and the FBI responded. Authorities evacuated the building, and three postal workers were

taken to a hospital. The threat proved to be a hoax.

789

Case 1998-26: Anthrax Threat (against Virginia Beach school), November 1998

On November 13, 1998, the Tallwood High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia, received a telephone

threat claiming, “There will be an anthrax bomb on Monday at Tallwood High School.” The message indicated

that, “People will die. That is all.” It concluded with obscenities. The caller left the message on an automated

answering system sometime between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., but no one listened to it until 7:30 p.m. School

administrators contacted police, who arrived at the school at about 8:00 p.m. Soon thereafter the local fire

department arrived. Over one hundred people watching a play were evacuated from the school. A search of the

building was started, which was expected to continue until the next morning.

790

Case 1998-25: Anthrax Threat (against Virginia antiabortion activist), November 1998

On November 13, 1998, an antiabortion activist in Chesapeake, Virginia, was the recipient of an

anthrax threat letter. According to a press account of the incident, the man picked up the envelope from his

post office box, and opened it outside the post office. After reading the note inside, he contacted the local fire

department, which also informed the FBI and the Virginia Department of Emergency Services. The FBI

refused to indicate whether any substance was contained in the envelope, but did state that there was no

exposure to a dangerous substance.

791

Case 1998-24: Anthrax Threat (against Miami Beach magazine), November 1998

On November 18, 1998, a receptionist at a Miami Beach magazine, Ocean Drive, opened a letter

containing an anthrax threat and a white powder. According to the magazine’s publisher, “It says ‘if you’ve

opened this, you’ve been exposed to anthrax’ and then a four letter word I am not going to repeat.”

792

The letter was delivered to the office at 10:30 a.m., but was not opened until 1:30 p.m. A white,

granular substance, apparently similar to salt, poured out of the envelope onto the lap of the receptionist.

787

Domingo Ramirez, Jr., “Anthrax threat hits postal hub,” Star-Telegram (Fort Worth, Texas), December 4, 1998, as found at

the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.star-telegram.com, and Jason Sickles, Dalles Morning News, December 5, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.dallasnews.com.

788

Ryan Slattery, “Anthrax threat hits anti-abortion activist,” Press-Express (Riverside, California), November 24, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.inlandempireonline.com. This incident was also mentioned in the California

headlines produced by the States News Service, as found on November 24, 1998 at http://dailynews.yahoo.com.

789

“Anthrax scare disrupts postal facility in Pines,” Miami Herald, November 22, 1998., as found in the newspaper’s World

Wide Web site, http://www.herald.com, and “Another anthrax scare in South Florida,” undated report, as found at http://www.msnbc.com/,

on November 22, 1998.

790

Steve Stone, “100 evacuated from Tallwood High after anthrax threat,” Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, Virginia), November 14,

1998, p. B3.

791

“Anthrax exposure threat sent to Chesapeake post office box,” Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, Virginia), November 13, 1998, p.

B9, and Steve Stone, “100 evacuated from Tallwood High after anthrax threat,” Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, Virginia), November 14, 1998,

p. B3..

792

Jim Loney, Miami Beach anthrax scare was a hoax,” Reuters, November 18, 1998, 11:53 Eastern Time.

142

Accompanying it was a handwritten note with the anthrax threat. The receptionist called the emergency 911

number, but the operator told them to contact the Dade County’s hazardous waste department. Because they

were unable to find a number for that office, someone else called the Center for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia. CDC referred the matter to the FBI, and within a few minutes an FBI

agent was on the scene. Soon after, local police and fire personnel arrived. Nineteen people who worked in the

office, along with 7 response personnel, were taken to the Mount Sinai Medical Center for decontamination.

After consultations with Army and FBI officials, the hospital treated the victims with ciprofloxacin, an

antibiotic that the military recommends for treatment of anthrax. Officials from the Miami-Dade County

Health Department recorded the identity of the individuals treated so that they could be contacted and given

follow-on treatment if it was determined that they had been exposed to anthrax.

By 9:00 p.m., the FBI was

confident that the substance was not anthrax.

793

According to the FBI, this was the 19

anthrax hoax in the past six months.

794

Case 1998-23: Anthrax threat (against Alexandria Middle School), November 1998

According to press reports, two 14-year-old students at the Alexandria Middle School, located in

Alexandria, Indiana, a small town outside Indianapolis, attempted to perpetrate an anthrax hoax. They

reportedly put cinnamon in an envelope and enclosed a note claiming that the recipient had been exposed to

anthrax. The two boys apparently wanted to shut down the school. According to the Assistant Superintendent,

“They wanted to see the firemen in the special suits and the helicopters overhead.” The words “anthrax” and

“exposed” were misspelled in the note, reducing its credibility. Based on advice from FBI, school

administrators and local police decided not to shut down the school. According to school officials, one of the

perpetrators might be expelled for one year and the other suspended for at least five days.

795

Case 1998-22: Anthrax Threat (against Shelbyville Middle School), November 1998

On November 13, 1998, three students allegedly placed an envelope supposedly containing anthrax on

the desk of a teacher at the Shelbyville Middle School in Shelbyville, Indiana. The students apparently emptied

a medicine capsule into the envelope, and included a message that said the material was anthrax. A teacher

discovered the envelope at 8:50 a.m. Students in the classroom were quarantined, along with a fireman who

examined the envelope, while most of the others were sent to the school gymnasium while the incident was

being investigated. According to the local emergency management director, authorities believed the threat was

a hoax, because the purported anthrax did not have the expected consistency. The three students allegedly

responsible for the incident were arrested. One of them reportedly admitted to participation in what was

intended as a joke.

796

Case 1998-21: Anthrax Threat (against Bloomington, Indiana, courthouse), November 1998

On November 12, 1998, the court clerk’s office at the Justice Building in Bloomington, Indiana,

received a threatening letter that purportedly contained anthrax. The building was evacuated for over an hour.

The material was taken to the Bloomington Hospital, which determined that it was not anthrax.

797

Case 1998-20: Anthrax Threat (against bank branch, Indianapolis), November 1998

Around 4:30 p.m. on November 10, 1998 a piece of paper referring to anthrax was discovered at a

branch of Bank One in Indianapolis. No suspicious substances were seen. The building was evacuated, and

then searched by the Indianapolis Fire Department. Around 6:00 p.m. the Fire Department declared the

building safe.

798

793

Luisa Yanez, Dana Calvo, and Deborah Ramirez, “Anthrax hoax at magazine sends 26 to hospital, snarls South Beach,”

Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), December 18, 1998, as posed on the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.sun-sentinal.com/.

794

Yanez, Calvo, and Ramirez, “Anthrax hoax at magazine,” Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), December 18, 1998.

795

Diane Frederick, “Boy could be suspended r a year for anthrax hoax,” Indianapolis Star/News, November 17, 1998, as found

at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com.

796

Michael Stone, “3 students suspected in threat at school,” Shelbyville News (Indiana), November 13, 1998, and John Clark,

“Middle schoolers angry over threat,” Shelbyville News (Indiana), November 14, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site,

http://www.shelbtnews.com.

797

Jodi Burck, “Juvenile charged in hoax at school,” Herald-Times (Bloomington, Indiana), as found at the newspaper’s World

Wide Web site, http://www.hoosiertimes.com.

798

John Masson and John R. O’Neill, “FBI pleads for an end to anthrax hoaxes,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 11, 1998,

as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com.

143

Case 1998-19: Anthrax Threat (against Warren Central High School), November 1998

At 9:00 a.m. on November 11, 1998, a letter was delivered to the Warren Central High School in

Warren Township, Indiana, which according to the school superintendent, “appears to be an anthrax threat.”

The hazardous materials team from the Warren Township Fire Department removed the envelope and sealed it.

The school was not evacuated.

799

Case 1998-18: Anthrax Threat (against Bloomington High School), November 1998

Around noon on November 10, 1998 a teacher at Bloomington High School South in Bloomington,

Indiana, discovered a letter on the floor outside the main office. It was addressed to the school principle. The

words “Open ASAP” also were written on the envelope. Inside the envelope were white crystals, purportedly

anthrax. The threat was written on notebook paper. The letter was tested by Bloomington Hospital, which

determined that anthrax was not present.

800

On November 12, a 16-year old student was arrested in connection

with the incident. He was charged with intimidation and false reporting.

801

Case 1998-17: Anthrax Threat (against Seymour, Indiana, Wal-Mart), November 1998

An anthrax threat letter was delivered on November 10, 1998, to a Salin Bank branch located in a

Wal-Mart store near Seymour, Indiana. According to a press report, dozens of people were evacuated from the

store. The Seymour Fire Department responded to the threat.

802

Case 1998-16: Anthrax Threats, November 1998

On November 10 and 11, 1998, a number of churches and anti-abortion organizations or individuals

received letters postmarked in Fort Worth, Texas, on 5 or 6 November claiming to contain anthrax.

803

One of the letters was sent to the office of Saint Matthew’s parish in Washington Township, Indiana.

According to the Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, the letter stated, “You have been exposed to anthrax.”

Six people working in the offices were quarantined, decontaminated by firefighters and transported to Wishard

Memorial Hospital in Indianapolis. At the hospital, they were decontaminated again and then treated with

antibiotics. Authorities also ordered the evacuation of 481 students and teachers from the adjacent Saint

Matthew’s Catholic School. No powder was detected in the envelope, leading authorities to doubt that the

threat was credible. Nevertheless, FBI officials, who took custody of the letter, indicated that it would be sent

to a laboratory to determine if anthrax was present.

804

A second letter was sent to Pro-Life Action League, an anti-abortion group located in Chicago,

Illinois. Although there were seven people in the office when the letter arrived, none were decontaminated or

treated. The envelope had a Texas postmark, as did the one sent to Indiana.

805

On November 11, 1998, a similar letter was delivered to the Redeemer Lutheran Church in Rochester,

New York. The pastor opened the letter at 11 a.m., but only notified police at 6:45 p.m. Two other people

handled the letter in the intervening period. The police notified the Rochester Fire Department’s hazardous

materials team, which went to the church and picked up the letter. The three people who came into contact with

the letter were taken to the Rochester General Hospital, where they were decontaminated, quarantined in an

799

John Masson and John R. O’Neill, “FBI pleads for an end to anthrax hoaxes,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 11, 1998,

as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com.

800

John Masson and John R. O’Neill, “FBI pleads for an end to anthrax hoaxes,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 11, 1998,

as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com.

801

“Authorities arrest teen-ager in phony anthrax threat,” Associated Press, November 12, 1998, and Jodi Burck, “Juvenile

charged in hoax at school,” Herald-Times (Bloomington, Indiana), as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site,

http://www.hoosiertimes.com.

802

John Masson and John R. O’Neill, “FBI pleads for an end to anthrax hoaxes,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 11, 1998,

as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com.

803

“Letters from FW test negative for anthrax,” Dallas Morning News, November 15, 1998, p. 42A, and Jason Sickles, “Threats

were sent from FW,” Dallas Morning News, November 11, 1998, p. 40A. I am indebted to Jason Pate, Monterey Institute for International

Studies, for bringing these references to my attention.

804

Thomas P. Wyman, “For 2nd time in 11 days, letter claims to contain anthrax,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 10,

1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com. and John Kelly, “Anthrax Threat Clears Ind. School,”

Associated Press, November 9, 1998, 8:36 p.m.

805

John Kelly, “Anthrax Threat Clears Ind. School,” Associated Press, November 9, 1998, 8:36 p.m.

144

isolation ward, and treated with antibiotics. The church was sealed off pending the completion of tests to

determine if anthrax was present.

806

Another letter, also mailed from Texas, was sent to a Carrollton, Georgia anti-abortion activist Neal

Horsley. Horsley had gained notoriety for maintaining a World Wide Web site that identifies physicians who

provide abortion. Some pro-abortion activists believe it served as a hit list for militant anti-abortion activists,

and the FBI was investigating Horsley’s activities. According to Horsley, the letter included the words, “You

have been exposed to anthrax,” and identified the strain of anthrax allegedly contained in the envelope.

Horsley immediately resealed the envelope and took it to the Carrollton Police Department. The police triple-

wrapped the envelope without looking at and contacted the FBI. Horsley was taken to the Tanner Medical

Center, where the West Georgia Regional Hazardous Materials Team decontaminated him.

807

An anthrax threat letter arrived on November 10, 1998 at the offices of the Kansas Area United

Methodist Foundation in Wichita, Kansas.

808

Another letter arrived that same day at the Ridgeview Baptist

Church in Knoxville, Tennessee. Two people were given antibiotic treatment as a precaution.

809

unidentified organization in Boston also was the recipient of one of the letters on 10 November.

810

Case 1998-14: Anthrax Threats (Against Abortion Clinics), October 1998

On October 30 and 31, 1998, eight abortion clinics in Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee

received threatening letters claiming that a powdery substance found in the envelopes was anthrax. Three of

the clinics were in Louisville, Kentucky. Three Indiana clinics were targeted: in Indianapolis, New Albany, and

Scottsburg. The other clinics were in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Wichita, Kansas. All the letters were sent from

Cincinnati, Ohio, and contained no return address.

811

Around 1:00 p.m. on October 30, an employee of a Planned Parenthood clinic in Indianapolis,

Indiana, opened an envelope that reportedly contained a letter and a brown powder. According to press reports,

the short letter claimed, “You have just been exposed to anthrax.” Upon reading the letter, the clinic employee

resealed the envelope, while another placed it into a biohazard bag. They then placed an emergency call to 911,

initiating a massive response process. Two police officers responded to the call. They were followed by

Indianapolis police officers, who cordoned off the area around the clinic, and fire department personnel,

including paramedics with ambulances and approximately a dozen members of the fire department’s hazardous

materials response team. The clinic and the people in it, which included staff and patient, were quarantined. In

addition, stores in the shopping center where the clinic is located were closed by authorities. A sample of the

substance in the envelope was taken to an Indiana Public Health Department laboratory for testing, but up to 72

hours were needed to culture the sample to determine if it contained anthrax.

812

Reportedly, authorities believed that 31 people might have been exposed, including two policemen,

two firefighters, the mail carrier, approximately 11 clinic employees, and clinic patients. The hazardous

materials response team set up a decontamination tent in the parking lot of the shopping center. People were

told to undress and place their belongings in plastic bags, were then given a ten minute shower in the

decontamination tent, and were then dressed in surgical scrubs. They were then transferred to one of three area

hospitals for treatment. Another decontamination line was set up in the ambulance bay at Wishard Memorial

Hospital, where 13 people were taken for treatment. The patients were given another shower and were dressed

in hospital gowns and booties, sheets, and blankets. They were then transported by security vehicles to another

part of the hospital, where they were treated with antibiotics. They were not moved through the hospital to

minimize chances of secondary contamination.

813

806

Alan Morrell and Jilaine Burley, “‘Anthrax’ letter sent to church in the city,” Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, New

York), November 11, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.rochesternews.com.

807

Diane Lore, “Abortion foe reports anthrax threat,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, November 11, 1998, ass found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.accessatlanta.com.

808

“FBI probes another threat of anthrax contamination,” Wichita Eagle, November 11, 1998.

809

“Anthrax may have tainted letter,” Chattanooga Times, November 12, 1998, p. B4. I am indebted to Jason Pate, Monterey

Institute for International Studies, for bringing this incident to my attention.

810

Jason Sickles, “Threats were sent from FW,” Dallas Morning News, November 11, 1998, p. 40A. I am indebted to Jason

Pate, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for bringing this reference to my attention.

811

Rick Callahan, “Feds Seek Bomb Threat Letter-Sender,” Associated Press, November 2, 1998, 4:01 a.m. EST.

812

Stephen Beaven, “Anthrax threat probed,” Indianapolis Star-News, October 31, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World

Wide Web site, http://www.starnews.com.

813

Beaven, “Anthrax threat probed,” Indianapolis Star-News, October 31, 1998, and Jenny Labalme and John Masson, “FBI

says anthrax threat was hoax,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 1, 1998.

145

Two clinics in Louisville, Kentucky, received envelopes on October 30. A third clinic received a letter

the next day. After reading the letter on October 30, an employee at the Women’s Health Service Clinic sealed

the letter into a container. The worker, and the postal employee who delivered the envelope, were taken to the

University of Louisville Hospital, and one of them—probably the clinic worker— received antibiotic

treatments. Tests on the material in the envelope were conducted at the University of Louisville Hospital

indicated that the material was not anthrax. Reportedly, the samples were sent to the U.S. Army Medical

Research Institute for Infectious Disease, Fort Detrick, Maryland, for additional analysis.

814

The third envelope

was delivered to the EMW Women’ Surgical Center. The letter was placed on the desk of the clinic’s executive

director, who notified the FBI and postal inspectors when she noted that it fit the profile of the threatening

letters highlighted in press reports the previous day. FBI agents packaged the envelope in a bag designed to

handle hazardous materials and removed it.

815

The Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health received one of the envelopes in the mail around noon

on October 30. The clinic apparently contacted the E-911 center after opening and reading the letter. What

happened next is unclear, but press reports suggest that Knoxville’s police chief was dissatisfied with the

handling of the case, and ordered an investigation into the procedures followed in responding to the threat.

Initial reports do not indicate whether the clinic reported the anthrax threat in its initial report, or if the E-911

employees passed on the nature of the threat, or if the police officer sent to investigate the threat was aware of

the alleged anthrax contamination. It appears that the responding officer did not appreciate the nature of the

threat, because no steps were taken at the time to notify federal authorities. The letter was confiscated by the

police, and was sealed at the clinic by a crime scene technician. It was not until 7:15 p.m., however, that the

clinic was sealed off, when Knoxville Fire Department’s Hazardous Materials Team was asked by the FBI to

“put up crime scene tape.” Knoxville police assisted the fire personnel in posting warning notices. It is unclear

what steps were taken to provide medical treatment to people who may have been exposed to the suspected

anthrax. The FBI sent the envelope to its Hazardous Materials Response Unit laboratory in Quantico, Virginia,

for analysis. The unit did not expect to have results until sometime on the afternoon of November 2.

816

Postal workers found a similar letter addressed to a Planned Parenthood clinic in New Albany,

Indiana, and confiscated it before it could be delivered. The material in the envelope was analyzed on the

evening of October 31 by the University of Louisville Hospital, which determined that it was not anthrax. In

addition, there were concerns that one of the envelopes was sent to a clinic in Bloomington, Indiana, but

subsequent investigation determined that it was an ordinary business envelope.

817

A Wichita, Kansas, clinic received an envelope with a Cincinnati postmark on October 31. An alert

clinic employee, aware of the threatening letters received at the other clinics the previous day, did not open the

letter and called 911. The fire department’s hazardous materials team and the Wichita police responded. The

local authorities contacted the FBI. According to an FBI agent, “It wasn’t opened at all. Just looking at it

through back lighting, it does not look like there is any type of powder in there at all.” The letter was sent to a

laboratory in Washington to be opened.

818

Initial tests conducted October 30 on several of the envelopes indicated that the threats were a hoax.

Additional tests, completed by the afternoon of Saturday, October 31, were conducted at the U.S. Army

Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and confirmed that at least four of the

envelopes contained no infectious diseases. The results of tests on the remaining envelopes were expected at

the beginning of the next week.

819

According to an FBI official, “We now know that these letters appear not to

be what they're claiming to be, but just because it's not anthrax doesn't mean it's not a crime. It's a crime

nonetheless to threaten to use a weapon of mass destruction.”

820

814

Thomas Nord, “Abortion clinics sent anthrax threat,” Courier-Journal (Louisville), October 31, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.courier-journal.com.

815

Grace Schneider, “FBI: Anthrax threat to clinics was a hoax,” Courier-Journal (Louisville), November 1, 1998.

816

Jamie Satterfield, “Keith orders probe into response to anthrax threat,” Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 1, 1998, as

found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.knoxnews.com.

817

Nord, “Abortion clinics sent anthrax threat,” Courier-Journal (Louisville), October 31, 1998.

818

Robert Short, “Tiller’s clinic receives threat of anthrax contamination,” Wichita Eagle, November 1, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.wichitaeagle.com.

819

Press accounts indicated that tests were conducted at the University of Louisville Hospital and by the Indiana State

Department of Health. In addition to the tests at USAMRIID, press accounts suggested that the FBI laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, also

would be conducting tests to determine the nature of the substance.

820

Rick Callahan, “Feds Seek Bomb Threat Letter-Sender,” Associated Press, November 2, 1998, 4:01 a.m. EST.

146

On November 2, a similar envelope was delivered to the Center for Choice, an abortion clinic located

in downtown Toledo. The owner of the clinic identified the envelope at 4:15 p.m., placed it in a plastic bag, put

the bag on the sidewalk outside the clinic, and contacted authorities. It appears that she did not open the letter.

The people who came into contact with the letter, including the clinic owner and two employees, were taken to

the St. Charles Mercy Hospital for decontamination and treatment. No evidence of contamination was detected

on those individuals. The streets around the clinic was closed off for four hours until the letter was recovered

by the Toledo Fire Department’s hazardous materials unit. The letter was taken by the FBI for further

analysis.

821

Another Knoxville abortion clinic, the Volunteer Medical Center, also received one of the letters on

November 2. According to an FBI spokesman, “From the outward appearance [it] appeared to have originated

from the same source.” The letter was turned over to the FBI, and was sent to USAMRIID for analysis.

822

Following the anthrax threats, the Justice Department organized a multi-agency federal task force to investigate

recent attacks on abortion clinics, including the anthrax threats as well as the murder of a doctor who

performed abortions and 22 incidents in which someone released a chemical irritant, butyric acid, at clinics in

the South.

823

According to press reports, response personnel in both Louisville, Kentucky, and Indianapolis,

Indiana, had recently received training in responding to incidents involving chemical and biological agents.

824

As a result of the earlier scares, the U.S. Postal Service warned its mail handlers to look for suspicious

packages. At 9 a.m. on Saturday, October 31, a postman in Shelbyville, Indiana, discovered that a package

addressed to the W.S. Major Hospital was covered by a brown stain that appeared to result from a leak.

825

Although the package was mailed in Shelbyville, and did not fit the profile of the anti-abortion letters, the

postman notified his superiors about the suspicious package. Concerned that the package also might contain

anthrax, the post office activated its crisis management plan and evacuated the 31 postal employees working in

the building. The postal authorities notified the local fire department, which in turn notified the hazardous

materials team from nearby Columbus, Ohio, the FBI, the Shelbyville police, and the state fire marshal’s

office. Ambulances were readied in case they might be needed.

In the meantime, the postal employees, tired of waiting outside in the cold. Went to the nearby

Knights of Columbus hall to wait out events. Authorities, concerned that any contamination might have spread

to the hall, quarantined the postal employees and ten people who were in the Knights of Columbus hall, either

working there or eating the hall’s breakfast buffet. One person who left the hall before it was quarantined was

tracked down and warned not to have contact with anyone else.

The post office was sealed off for five hours until authorities determined that the stain was caused by

coffee. The package was an invoice sent from a local Holiday Inn to the hospital.

Case 1998-30: Anthrax threat (against teacher), October 1998

On October 21, 1998, Stacy Johnson, an elementary school teacher in Riverside, California, received

a package similar to those sent to three families in Colorado at about the same time. The envelope was

postmarked in Oxnard, California, and contained a thank you card. The front had the words “Thank You.” On

the inside were the words, “An agent will contact you about this anthrax sample.” Enclosed was an unopened

moist towelette packet. Johnson contacted the FBI when she received the package, who put her in touch with

the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. The material was turned over to the postal inspectors, who told her that it

contained nothing but a damp towelette. Neither Johnson nor her husband have any involvement with abortion

821

Ignazio Messina, “Abortion-clinic threat appears to be a hoax,” Blade (Toledo, Ohio) November 3, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.toledoblade.com.

822

Randy Kenner, “Knox women’s clinic gets fake bomb in mail,” Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 3, 1998.

823

Blaine Harden and Roberto Suro, “FBI Seeks Man in Buffalo Sniper Case,” Washington Post, November 5, 1998, p. A3.

824

The Indianapolis hazardous materials response team took part in an exercise simulating an anthrax release only three weeks

before. See Labalme and Masson, “FBI says anthrax threat was hoax,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 1, 1998. The Louisville-

Jefferson County Crisis Group had spent “several months” discussing how to respond to chemical and biological terrorism. See Andrew

Melnykovych, “Louisville crisis team was prepared for threat like ‘anthrax’ letter,” Courier-Journal (Louisville), November 1, 1998.

825

The account of this incident is based on John Silcox, “Post Office exercises caution with letter,” Shelbyville News (Indiana),

November 2, 1998, as found at the newspapers World Wide Web site, http://www.shelbynews.com, Tanya Bricking, “Workers endure

anthrax scare,” Cincinnati Enquirer, November 1, 1998, a found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://enquirer.com, and

Labalme and Masson, “FBI says anthrax threat was hoax,” Indianapolis Star-News, November 1, 1998.

147

or anti-abortion groups. The incident is being investigated by the Postal Inspection Service under laws that

prohibit the mailing of threatening communications.

826

Case 1998-13: Unknown perpetrator, October 1998

On Monday, October 12, 1998, a woman living in Highlands Ranch, Colorado, told the Douglas

County sheriff’s office that on the previous Saturday she had received a letter claiming that a moist towelette

packet in the envelope was contaminated with anthrax. The family was told to go to their family physician for

antibiotic treatment, and the family’s house and car were ventilated by the Arapahoe-Douglas County

hazardous materials response team to minimize the chances of contamination.

827

The previous week two other

families living in Colorado Springs received similar letters.

828

According to a U.S. Postal Inspector, the three

envelopes were mailed on the same day in early October from a small town in central California. On October

15, three members of the FBI’s Hazardous Material Response Unit flew to Denver to examine the packets.

829

Tests of the packets indicated that they were not contaminated with anthrax. They were transported to the FBI

laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, for additional analysis.

830

The case is being investigated by the FBI and U.S. postal inspectors. The county sheriff’s department,

the Colorado Department of Public Health and the Tri-County Health Department also were involved in

responding to the letters.

831

Case 1998-49: Anthrax threat (in Amarillo, Texas), October 1998

Sometime in October 1998 an unidentified woman in Amarillo, Texas, received an anthrax threat in a

letter with a California postmark.

832

Case 1998-48: Anthrax threat (against Catholic Church, Cheektowaga, New York), November 1998

A third letter was sent to the Queen of Martyrs church in Cheektowaga, New York, a suburb of

Buffalo. A hazardous materials team decontaminated seven people who were in the rectory, along with a

policeman and postal deliveryman. The potentially exposed individuals were treated with antibiotics. The

church was quarantined pending the results of tests of the letter by the U.S. Army Medical Institute for

Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). Unlike the other envelopes, this one had an Illinois postmark.

833

Case 1998-45: Anthrax threat (in San Diego, California, hotel), August 1998

In August 1998, an anthrax threat was left beside a pay telephone in the lobby of the Sheraton Harbor

Island Hotel in San Diego, California. The note claimed, “This phone has been infected with anthrax.” A

service worker at the hotel discovered the note and notified the Harbor Police. A coordinated response was

mounted through the local antiterrorism team, and included the local police, fire department and hazardous

materials team, under the leadership of the FBI.

834

826

Tina Dirmann, “Riverside Teacher Target of Anthrax Mail Hoax,” Los Angeles Times, December 4, 1998, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com, and Mark Acosta, “Anthrax hoax puzzles Riverside teacher,” Press-

Enterprise (Riverside, California), December 2, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site at

http://www.inlandempireonline.com.

827

Marilyn Robinson, “Letter with ‘anthrax’ alarms area family,” Denver Post, October 13, 1998, p. B-3.

828

Hector Gutierrez, “Two more families get mailed anthrax threat,” Rocky Mountain News (Denver), October 14, 1998, p.

12A, and Ardy Friedberg, “FBI probes anthrax scare,” Gazette (Colorado Springs), October 15, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s World

Wide Web site, http://www.gazette.com.

829

Mike McPhee, “FBI arrives to take over anthrax letter probe,” Denver Post, October 15, 1998, p. B-3.

830

“Letter didn’t have anthrax,” Denver Post, October 16, 1998, p. B-3, and Ardy Friedberg, “FBI Finds No Traces of Anthrax,

Despite Note Sent to Colorado Families” Gazette (Colorado Springs), October 16, 1998.

831

Robinson, “Letter with ‘anthrax’ alarms area family,” Denver Post, October 13, 1998, p. B-3.

832

Laura Vozzella, “Threat mail handled in Fort Worth,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, November 11, 1998, p. 1. . I am indebted

to Jason Pate, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for bring this incident to my attention.

833

John Kelly , “N.Y. Church Gets Anthrax Threat,” Associated Press, November 10, 1998, 4:50 a.m., and “Anthrax scare

closes rectory,” Newsday, November 11, 1998, p. A19, as found at the newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.newsday.com.

834

Cheryl Clark, “Alarm Sounded for silent disaster,” Union-Tribune (San Diego), February 28, 1999, as found at the

newspaper’s World Wide Web site, http://www.uniontrib.com. Interviews, March 2, 1999, with FBI Special Agent John A. Sylvester and

Dr. Michele Ginsberg, San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency.

148

Case 1998-12: Brothers for the Freedom of Americans, August 1998

According to press reports, during the morning of August 18, 1998 someone spread a white powder in

the Finney State Office Building in Wichita, Kansas, and left a note claiming that it was anthrax. Initial tests

suggested that it was not anthrax or any other toxic material. According to eye witnesses, the material looked

like baking soda or dry carpet cleaner. Law enforcement officials were investigating to determine who was

responsible for the apparent hoax.

835

The presence of the material was first noted at about 11 a.m., when it was discovered in several

elevators and spread over several floors. In response to the danger, 200 people working in the building were

evacuated and a four-block area around the building was cordoned off. Around 100 people might have been

exposed to the substance. People who had minimal exposure were kept isolated for about three hours, and were

then allowed to leave. They were told to shower and put their clothes into a plastic bag after returning home.

836

In addition, about 15 people who came into direct contact with the substance were decontaminated by a team

from McConnell Air Force Base, which set up a decontamination tent outside the building.

837

The building was

reopened on August 20. According to law enforcement officials, the perpetrator can be charged under state law

for making a criminal threat, which can result in probation for someone who has no previous criminal record.

838

According to an FBI official, “handfuls” of the substance were spread in the building. Indicating that

it was a widely available substance often found in households, he refused to specifically identify it. He did add,

“It is non-toxic, non-hazardous, and it could be found in any house.”

839

The following day, a bomb threat was sent to Wichita’s main library. According to a city police

official, the note sent to the library was similar to the one found in the state office building. However, the

official refused to confirm a possible relationship between the two cases.

840

Copies of the threat letter left at the Finney State Office Building were mailed to a number of news

organizations. On August 21, a local Wichita television station, KWCH (channel 12) received a copy of the

letter, as did a national radio talk show host, Art Bell. According to Bell, the package he received contained a

cover page and what was purported to be a duplicate of the original threat letter left in the building. It appears

that the television station received an identical package. Bell originally posted the letter on his World Wide

Web site, but removed it at the request of the FBI. Some details of the letter received by KWCH were reported

in the Wichita Eagle, and Bell described it during his August 21 radio broadcast.

841

According to Bell, the cover letter claimed that it was being sent to selected media outlets, including

CNN and the BBC. The letter said that a group called the Brothers for the Freedom of Americans (or BFA)

orchestrated the incident. According to the letter, the group was organized by people who broke away from the

Kansas militia movement and Operation Rescue because of the perceived cowardice of the existing

organizations. It claimed to be affiliated with the Christian Identify Movement, but also included two members

who came from Belfast, Northern Ireland. According to an FBI official, investigators were attempting to

determine whether this previously unknown organization actually existed, or whether it was another hoax.

842

According to press reports, the FBI put together a task force consisting of 20 agents to pursue 160

leads. Larry McCormick, the FBI Special Agent responsible for Kansas and western Missouri, told reporters

that the focus of the investigation was the threat letter. He said that the letter “just sort of rambles on about

their anti-government beliefs.” In an interview with the Wichita Eagle, Bell confirmed this depiction.

843

835

Scott Rothschild, “Unknown substance leads to evacuation,” Wichita Eagle, August 19, 1998, as found at

http://www.wichitaeagle.com.

836

Roxana Hegeman, “FBI rules out deadly anthrax in building,” Associated Press, August 19, 1998, 12:10 EDT, and

Rothschild, “Unknown substance leads to evacuation,” Wichita Eagle, August 19, 1998.

837

“Anthrax Note Evacuates Kan. Office,” Associated Press, August 18, 1998, 9:18 p.m.

838

Lori Lessner, “Threatening notes similar in evacuations,” Wichita Eagle, August 20, 1998.

839

Hurst Laviana, “20 FBI agents on hoax case,” Wichita Eagle, August 27, 1998.

840

Lori Lessner, “Threatening notes similar in evacuations,” Wichita Eagle, August 20, 1998.

841

Lori Lessner, “Groups takes credit for prank at building,” Wichita Eagle, August 21, 1998, Hurst Laviana, “20 FBI agents on

hoax case,” Wichita Eagle, August 27, 1998, and Art Bell’s World Wide Web site, http://artbell.com.

842

Lori Lessner, “Groups takes credit for prank at building,” Wichita Eagle, August 21, 1998, and Art Bell’s August 21 radio

broadcast, found at http://artbell.com.

843

Hurst Laviana, “20 FBI agents on hoax case,” Wichita Eagle, August 27, 1998.

149

Case 1998-05: Rental car in San Antonio, March 1998

On March 6, 1998, a canister marked “anthrax” was discovered inside a rental car parked in East San

Antonio. The report turned out to be a hoax.

844

The motivation of the perpetrator is not explained in the

available accounts.

Case 1998-03: Lawrence Edward Pagnano, March 1998

About noon on March 10, 1998, the employees at Recovery Technologies, a collection agency in

Phoenix, Arizona, opened an envelope that contained a mail order made out to $53.99 and a handwritten letter

claiming that the recipients had been exposed to biological agents. According to press reports, the letter

claimed, “You S.O.B.!!!! You have just been exposed to anthrax spores prepare to die.” In addition, the note

reportedly asserted, “Also a standard pestelence [sic] has been put on you and your family and your

organization and everybody associated with Smiths grocery stores.” A “black and white speckled powdery

substance” was found in the envelope.

845

In response to the threat, Phoenix police and fire officials closed Thomas Road, the street where

Recovery Technologies had its offices, from 32

to 38

Streets. In addition, people were evacuated from the

Sunshine Square shopping center and other nearby business concerns. Emergency personnel immediate

quarantined nine employees of Recovery Technology and the Phoenix policeman who responded to the call.

The ten people were undressed, hosed down to decontaminate them, and then transported to the Good

Samaritan Hospital. At the hospital they were taken to an isolation room, given a medical examination, and

given antibiotics. They were released after being interviewed by FBI agents.

846

According to an official of the Phoenix Fire Department, the incident cost his department in excess of

$7,000. In addition, other government agencies had to cover the cost of the police security at the crime scene,

laboratory tests, and the criminal investigation.

847

The FBI discovered that the envelope contained a name and return address. Based on this information,

the FBI addressed Lawrence Pagnano at his house at 11 p.m. that evening. The next day, a federal grand jury

indicted him on charges of threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction and for mailing a threatening

communication. The first charge could result in life imprisonment, while the second charge could lead to a

maximum fine of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

As of March 12, authorities had not yet determined if anthrax was present in the envelope, although

police and fire officials indicated that they were skeptical that the organism would be found. Jim Topping,

director of the Maricopa County Public Health Laboratory, indicated, “In my opinion, this is a really good

hoax.”

848

On March 13, 1998, a spokesman for the FBI’s Phoenix field office reported that the powder in the

envelope was not anthrax. According to Wesley Press, the quality assurance manager for the state laboratory

operated by the Department of Health Services, “It was one organism that can be found on any desktop or

surface of paper. We believe this organism could have been living very happily on the envelope before he even

started working with it.”

849

Case 1997-10: Anthrax threats against U.S. cities, July 1997

On July 15, 1997, a fax was sent to numerous U.S. cities claiming that terrorists intended to

contaminate the water supplies of 36 cities with “germ warfare”, including anthrax and botulinum toxin. The

fax was sent by a retired army officer, Colonel James Ammerman, who was the head chaplain at the Full

Gospel Military Chaplains, located in Dalles, Texas. Ammerman reportedly obtained the information from

unidentified sources in Phoenix, Arizona. Among the cities to receive the threat were Tampa, Florida, Atlanta,

844

“Anthrax scare prompts preparedness concerns,” Associated Press, March 17, 1998, as found at http://lasvegassun.com. The

article cites as its source Major General Paul Carlton, USAF, commander, Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

In addition, the incident is described in an undated report produced by News 4 in San Antonio, Texas, Randy Escamilla, “Rapid response

team formed,” and retrieved from http://www.msnbc.com on March 17, 1998.

845

Susie Steckner, “Arrest in anthrax threat: Collection agency got ‘tainted’ letter,” Arizona Republic, March 12, 1998. All

references from the Arizona Republic were taken from the newspaper’s web site at http://www.azcentral.com.

846

Susie Steckner and Eric Miller, “Anthrax scare sends 10 to showers, hospital: Officials respond quickly at collections

agency,” Arizona Republic, March 11, 1998, and Susie Steckner, “Arrest in anthrax threat: Collection agency got ‘tainted’ letter,” Arizona

Republic, March 12, 1998.

847

Christina Leonard, “Letter threatening anthrax called hoax,” Arizona Republic, March 14, 1998.

848

Susie Steckner, “Arrest in anthrax threat: Collection agency got ‘tainted’ letter,” Arizona Republic, March 12, 1998.

849

Christina Leonard, “Letter threatening anthrax called hoax,” Arizona Republic, March 14, 1998.

150

Georgia, and Dallas, Texas. Security was strengthened at water systems in the threatened cities. An FBI

official indicated, “We’ve evaluated the threat and we believe it to be not credible. But we notified the police

department, mayor’s office and all the appropriate people.”

850

Case 1992-02: Henry D. Pierce, March 1992

On March 2, 1992, Henry D. Pierce was arrested and charged with malicious wounding after he

sprayed ten people, including his roommates and some guests, with a liquid that he claimed was anthrax.

851

According to press accounts, Pierce became intoxicated during a party at the house he shared in Vienna,

Virginia, and began acting in a belligerent manner. At around 10:00 p.m., he brought a small glass vial and a

machete from his bedroom. He then said that the vial contained anthrax and that “If I break this, we all die in

48 hours.” At that point, he broke open the vial with the machete, and began spraying the liquid in it on the

other people in the room. One of the victims then called 911, and police officers were sent to the house to

investigate. Pierce was confrontational with the police, and an electric stun gun was used to incapacitate him.

The Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department decontaminated the people in the house at that

location before sending them to the hospital. They were kept overnight at the Fairfax Hospital and received

treatment for anthrax exposure. In addition, nine other people living in the neighborhood also went to the

Fairfax hospital for treatment. The substance was sent to USAMRIID, Ft. Detrick, Maryland, for analysis,

which showed that it was not anthrax.

850

Manuel Mendoza, “Channel 8’s anthrax report stirs the waters,” Dallas Morning News, July 18, 1997, p. 36A, “Tampa

warned f germ warfare,” Tampa Tribune, July 16, 1997, p. 2, Alfred Charles, “Security scare for city water; FBI discounts threat as hoax,”

Atlanta Journal and Constitution, July 17, 1997, pp. B6; B4. I am grateful to Colonel Edward Eitzen for bringing this incident to my

attention. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1997, no date, as found at the FBI’s web site,

http://www.fbi.gov, includes the following comments:

In the summer of 1997, a group of individuals in Florida issued a warning that the water supplies of 27 major

cities would be poisoned at a later date. Upon investigation, law enforcement identified no capability or

apparent intent by the individuals to commit the acts; the threat was assessed as a hoax.

There are differences between this account, and the one described by press reports. The FBI report refers to only 27 “major

cities” and the source of the report is placed in Florida, while press accounts mention 36 cities and identify the source as someone in

Texas.

851

Steve Bates, “Fairfax man accused of anthrax threat,” Washington Post, March 3, 1992, p. C3, “No anthrax in Tysons

Corner assault,” Washington Post, March 5, 1992, p. C5, and Patrick Boyle and Maria Koklanaris, “Party guests fear host practiced germ

warfare,” Washington Times, March 3, 1992, p. B3.

151

Chapter 7:

Possession

Confirmed Possession

This chapter includes cases in which authoritative sources confirmed that the alleged perpetrators

possessed biological agents. In these cases, no attempts or threats to use these were made.

Case 1996-02: Missing Botulinum Toxin, March 1996

A vial containing botulinum toxin was stolen from a laboratory at Florida Institute of Technology on

March 21 or 22, 1996. According to press accounts, the vial was stolen during a burglary, and apparently was

not the objective of the crime. The material had been stored in the laboratory in a locked cabinet for almost 25

years. Several days after the theft, police found it in a library book return box following an anonymous tip that

it had been deposited there.

852

There is no evidence that the toxin was stolen for criminal purposes, and its

subsequent return tends to suggest that the thief had no interest in it.

Case 1995-03: Dr. Ray W. Mettetal, August 1995

In August 1995, Dr. Ray W. Mettetal, a neurologist who trained at the University of Virginia, was

arrested in Nashville, Tennessee, for attempting to murder Dr. George S. Allen. Allen was Mettetal’s

supervisor as head of neurosurgery at the Vanderbilt University Medical Center in the 1980s while Mettetal

was a resident. Allen rated Mettetal poorly during his residency, which led Mettetal to resign from the

program. Because Mettetal was unable to become a neurosurgeon, he harbored a grudge against Allen.

853

the time of his arrest, Mettetal was near a parking space once assigned to Allen wearing a clumsy disguise that

attracted the attention of university security guards. In his possession was a large hypodermic needle filled with

boric acid and saltwater that he apparently allegedly intended to use to kill Allen.

854

Subsequent investigations revealed that Mettetal had acquired ricin, which he kept in a storage unit in

Harrisonburg, Virginia. A federal case was brought against Mettetal, according to a state law enforcement

official, because the antiterrorism legislation “is probably easier to try since they’re not dealing with such

complicated issues.” If convicted of the federal crime, Mettetal could receive up to life imprisonment and a

fine of up to $250,000, while if convicted in Tennessee courts of attempted murder he would receive no more

than a 25-year sentence.

855

Other reports claimed that Mettetal’s notebooks contained notes suggesting that he considered

soaking the pages of a book with a mixture of ricin and a solvent intended to promote movement of the toxin

through the skin.

856

Federal investigators discovered that he possessed copies of Poisoner’s Handbook, Silent

Death, Kill Without Joy, and Assorted Nasties.

857

A passage in one of the books that called ricin an excellent

poison because it was so hard to detect was checked, circled, and starred.

858

Mettetal’s case came to trial on July 27, 1998 at the U.S. District Court in Harrisonburg, Virginia. The

prosecution presented evidence that Mettetal stalked Dr. Allen, and that he created several false identities. An

852

“Botulism-causing powder stolen from lab,” Miami Herald, March 25, 1996, p. 1B, Laurin Sellers, “Botulism toxin vial

apparently returned,” Orlando Sentinel, March 26, 1996, p. D1, “Melbourne School: Please Return Toxin,” Orlando Sentinel, March 25,

1996, p. C1, and “Thieves grab toxic powder during school burglary,” Orlando Sentinel, March 23, 1996, p. D3.

853

Carlos Santos, “Neurologist to stand trial first in Virginia,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 20, 1996, p. B4.

854

Kirk Loggins, “Doctor accused of murder plot due federal trial,” Tennessean, September 7, 1996, p. 1A.

855

Kirk Loggins, “Doctor accused of murder plot due federal trial,” Tennessean, September 7, 1996, p. 1A.

856

Alan Bavley, “Castor-oil plant packs toxic punch,” Kansas City Star, December 12, 1995.

857

Lucas Wall, “Scientist says poison found in search could kill 3,900,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 29, 1998.

858

Lucas Wall, “Neurologist found guilty in toxin case, Charge included intent to kill man,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, August

1, 1998.

152

FBI official confirmed the discovery of ricin, and claimed that Mettetal had enough to kill 3,900 people.

859

After the prosecution rested, Mettetal took the stand in his own defense. He conceded that he had produced the

ricin, and that he had practiced extracting the substance since 1984. When asked why he produced the material,

he told the court, “I was just trying to see if I could make it… It seemed to satisfy some sort of emotional

outlet.”

860

He also claimed, “I never intended to use that ricin on Dr. Allen or anybody. It was purposeless, as

strange as that sounds.”

861

Mettetal was convicted of the charges.

862

On December 21, 1998, he was given a 10 year prison

sentence. He could have received a life sentence. Mettetal also faces attempted murder charges in Tennessee.

863

Case 1995-01: Larry Wayne Harris, May 1995

On May 12, 1995, about twenty law enforcement agents and firefighters raided the house of Larry

Wayne Harris. In the glove compartment of his car were three vials of freeze-dried Yersinia pestis, the

pathogen that causes bubonic and pneumonic plague. Harris had spent $300 to acquire the material from the

American Type Culture Collection in Rockville, Maryland. He was arrested for acquiring the Y. pestis using

falsified documents.

Investigators discovered a document that identified Harris as a lieutenant in the Aryan Nations. He

told reporters that he belonged to the Christian Identity Church, a religious group that preaches white

supremacy. He reportedly admitted these affiliations to his colleagues at Superior Labs, his place of

employment.

864

However, his attorney indicated that Harris dropped his affiliation with the Aryan Nation

following his arrest.

865

Harris claimed that he acquired the culture in order to develop a cure for plague. According to his

lawyer, “He wanted to write a book on antibiotics that can be used by average citizens against a germ warfare

attack.” He subsequently published a 131-page book, Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North

America.

866

In November 1995, Harris accepted a plea bargain agreement offered by federal prosecutors. The

prosecutors agreed to drop all the charges, except one count of wire fraud. In return, Harris was to get a

sentence of no more than six months in jail. A U.S. District Judge, however, rejected the agreement. Therefore,

Harris was tried.

867

On April 22, 1997, he was convicted of fraud concerning the acquisition of the Y. pestis

from ATCC. He was sentenced to 18 months probation and 200 hours of community service.

868

Under terms of

the plea bargain agreement, Harris was not allowed to acquire pathogens except in connection with

employment at an approved laboratory, and he was ordered to stop claiming that he was a one-time CIA

employee.

869

In February 1998, Harris was arrested as a result of allegations that he possessed anthrax for use as a

weapon. (The details of that case can be found on 167.) After Harris’ arrest, the Justice Department convinced

a U.S. magistrate in Las Vegas that Harris had violated his parole agreement and that there was a danger that

Harris might not show up for a court hearing in Ohio. The magistrate rejected arguments that Harris

represented a threat to the community. On March 6, Assistant U.S. Attorney Dana M. Peters presented the

government’s case to a federal magistrate. Peters argued that there were four violations of the parole

agreement. Harris possessed and experimented on pathogens. He boasted of possession of sufficient anthrax to

kill everyone in Las Vegas. He misrepresented his credentials in violation of the parole agreement by claiming

a one-time affiliation with the CIA. Finally, he failed to keep his parole officers informed of his location as

859

Lucas Wall, “Scientist says poison found in search could kill 3,900,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 29, 1998.

860

Lucas Wall, “Neurologist testifies he stalked man,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 31, 1998.

861

David Reed, “Neurologist calls plot to poison harmless,” Washington Times, July 31, 1998, p. C7.

862

Lucas Wall, “Neurologist found guilty in toxin case, Charge included intent to kill man,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, August

1, 1998.

863

Carlos Santos, “10-year term given in poison possession,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 22, 1998.

864

Robert Ruth, “Deal may be dropped in plague case,” Columbus Dispatch, April 2, 1996, p. D1. “Man suspected of buying

plague bacteria,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 17, 1995.

865

Karl Vick, “Plea Bargain Rejected in Bubonic Plague Case,” Washington Post, April 3, 1996, p. A8.

866

Robert Ruth, “Bubonic plague case trial set,” Columbus Dispatch, March 12, 1997, p. B1.

867

Robert Ruth, “Bubonic plague case trial set,” Columbus Dispatch, March 12, 1997, p. B1.

868

Robert Ruth, “Suspect in germ case won’t go to jail,” Columbus Dispatch, April 23, 1997, p. 1A.

869

Carri Geer, “Harris will stay in jail, judge rules,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, February 25, 1998, at http://www.lvrj.com.

153

required when he moved hotels during his Las Vegas visit. The magistrate rejected the first two arguments, but

accepted the last two. He then freed Harris pending a hearing before U.S. District Judge Joseph P. Kinneary,

who had sentenced Harris in 1997.

870

Harris could have received between three and nine months of jail time if

the judge determines that he violated his parole.

871

Ultimately, Judge Kinneary only extended Harris’ probation time by five months, ordered him to

perform 50 hours of community service, and required him to report in person to a probation officer every

Monday morning. In addition, the judge reiterated the earlier prohibition against Harris claiming any affiliation

with the CIA.

872

Case 1993-02: John Gunnar Linner, Texas, April 1991

In May 1991, John Gunnar Linner, a scientist working at the Cryobiology Research Center in The

Woodlands, Texas, a community about 25 miles north of Houston, was accused of attempting to poison a

subordinate by placing a known carcinogen, beta-propiolactone, into an Afrin Nasal Spray bottle.

873

addition, the victim believed that his telephone and doorknob were coated with the material. When the police

searched the alleged perpetrator’s home and office, they reportedly discovered in his possession canisters of

two poisons: tetrodotoxin and diisopropylfluorophosphate. They also found a recipe in his briefcase for

production of botulinum toxin.

874

According to Peter Speers, the district attorney in Montgomery County, Texas, “He is not your

ordinary fellow. He’s eccentric to say the least. He had a fascination with poisons generally.” Linner reportedly

kept two books on poisons on his desk, Silent Death and The Poisoner’s Handbook. A detective for the local

sheriff’s department reported that Linner was suspected of involvement in other poisonings. The detective was

investigating allegations that Linner boasted about poisoning a former roommate and apparently claimed that

he laced a colleague’s lab coat with a substance believed to cause cancer.

875

A grand jury handed down an indictment against Linner on August 8, 1991 on a charge of attempted

murder.

876

Linner was acquitted of attempted murder after a jury trial held in Conroe, a town 40 miles north of

Houston.

877

Case 1993-01: Thomas Lavy, April 1993

On April 8, 1993, Thomas Lewis Lavy, an electrician working in Valdez, Alaska, for an oil pipeline

company, was driving from Alaska to Arkansas. When he left Alaska, Canadian Customs became suspicious of

his behavior and searched his possessions. They found 4 guns, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, $89,000 in U.S.

currency, various publications, and a plastic bag with 130 grams of a white, powdery substance. According to

one account, the publications included two books, The Poisoner’s Handbook and Silent Death. Another

account suggests that he had neo-Nazi literature as well. According to U.S. officials, Lavy told the Canadians

that the bag contained a deadly poison, ricin, which he claimed to have stolen from the U.S. Army.

878

Robert Bundy, the U.S. Attorney in Anchorage, Alaska, later told a reporter, “He told two stories of

why he had the poison—one about protecting his chickens and the other about preventing people from stealing

his property. He said if a thief came onto his property, the thief would probably steal the ricin—thinking it was

cocaine. And then the ricin would kill the thief.”

879

Lavy also said that he intended to use the poison to kill

870

Robert Ruth, “Harris free; 2 charges dismissed,” Columbus Dispatch, March 7, 1998, at http://www.dispatch.com.

871

Frank Hinchey, “Anthrax criminal case dissolves,” Columbus Dispatch, March 15, 1998.

872

Robert Ruth, “Harris pleads guilty, is free: Anthrax case,” Columbus Dispatch, March 25, 1998.

873

J. Michael Kennedy, “Scientist Accused of Plot to Kill Colleague,” The Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1991, p. A4.

874

David McLemore, “Scientist reportedly spoke of poisonings,” Dallas Morning News, May 4, 1991, p. 18B, and Scott

McCartney, “Researcher Awaits Fate in ‘Mad Scientist’ Case,” Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1991, p. A8. McLemore identifies the two

poisons as tetrodotoxin and disopropylflourophosphate. McCartney mentions two substances (which he calls nerve agents): tetrodotoxin

and DFP.

875

Scott McCartney, “Researcher Awaits Fate in ‘Mad Scientist’ Case,” Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1991, p. A8.

876

“Scientist charged in nasal-spray case,” Dallas Morning News, August 9, 1991, p. 25A.

877

“Scientist acquitted of poisoning colleague at Houston-area lab,” Dallas Morning News, May 9, 1992, p. 1A.

878

John Kifner, “Antiterrorism Law used in poison smuggling case,” New York Times, December 23, 1995, Mark Hume,

“Smuggler’s lethal secret buried with him” Vancouver Sun, January 20, 1996, p. B1, and “Jailed man who hanged self defended,” Dallas

Morning News, December 30, 1995, p. 22A.

879

Michael Dorman, “Deadly poison, fatal mystery,” Newsday, January 7, 1996, p. A10.

154

coyotes that might try to kill his chickens, an explanation most law enforcement officials found difficult to

accept.

Lavy had neglected to fill out documents required to bring a large amount of money into Canada, and

the Canadian Customs officials refused to let him cross the border. They also seized the plastic bag with the

white material.

Nothing further was done about the ricin during the next two years. It was only in the spring of 1995

that law enforcement officials began to take a serious interest in the case. According to some accounts, this

reflected the involvement of an FBI agent, Thomas Lynch, who had been involved in the earlier investigations

of the Minnesota Patriots Council, a militia group accused of plotting to kill law enforcement officials using

ricin. In the fall of 1995, Lynch heard about the case after being transferred to the FBI’s Anchorage field

office. The case was brought before a federal grand jury in Anchorage, which indicted Lavy on December 12,

1995, for violating the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.

On December 20, 1995, a law enforcement team consisting of FBI agents, including six members of

the Hostage Rescue Team, and the local sheriff arrested Lavy at his farm in Arkansas. U.S. Army and Navy

personnel with expertise in chemical and biological agents supported them. According to one Justice

Department official, as quoted in press accounts, the investigation found no identifiable link with any terrorist

group, and Lavy had no poison in his possession at the time of his arrest. They found three books describing

how to make ricin, as well as a small quantity of castor beans.

880

At the time of his arrest, Lavy provided some additional information on his interest in ricin.

According to one federal official, Lavy “admitted making the ricin. He even told Lynch how he made it and

deviated from the cookbook to improve the procedure.”

881

When Lavy realized that he could be given a life sentence, he apparently became despondent. On

December 23, 1995, he committed suicide in the Pulaski County Jail in Little Rock, Arkansas. According to

the U.S. Magistrate, Jerry W. Cavaneau, the government presented no evidence to him that Lavy had any intent

to use the ricin illicitly.

882

Lavy’s lawyer claimed that the material was only seven per cent pure.

883

It is unclear why it took more than two years for a criminal investigation to unfold after the Canadians

seized the ricin. U.S. officials told reporters that the Canadian Customs informed U.S. Customs about the ricin

at the time of its seizure. The Canadians also claimed to have asked U.S. Army officials in Alaska about the

ricin, who denied any knowledge of the toxin. A Canadian Customs official told a journalist, “We didn’t know

what it was. We treated it as a suspected narcotic.” They handled it using gloves and filtered facemasks, and

stored it in a locked container. According to one account, the Canadians took several weeks to understand the

danger posed by the ricin, and then a long search was needed to find someone willing to dispose of the

material. Another account, however, suggests that it took the Canadians a month to understand that the ricin

was dangerous, and that only at that point did they put the ricin into a container designed for hazardous

materials. The material then remained in storage for nearly two years, forgotten, until the locker it was kept in

was cleaned out. At that time, a Canadian military doctor identified the material, and the Canadian government

got into contact with the United States. The ricin was transferred to the United States as evidence in Lavy’s

criminal prosecution and reportedly was stored at Ft. Detrick. Once Lavy committed suicide, the material was

sent back to Canada for destruction.

884

Probable or Possible Possession

There is no authoritative confirmation that the perpetrators ever possessed biological agents in these

cases. In these cases, no attempt was made to use or threaten use of the agents.

Case 1998-46: PKK possession of cobra toxin, June 1998

According to a Turkish newspaper report, the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) was in possession of

1,500 glass tubes with cobra poison. Reportedly, 960 of the vials, each worth $2,000, were seized from three

880

William C. Lhotka, “Suicide leaves questions in poison case,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 31, 1995, p. E1, and

“Jailed man who hanged self defended,” Dallas Morning News, December 30, 1995, p. 22A.

881

Richard Mostyn, “Stopped at border, man carried lethal toxin,” Yukon News, February 23, 1996, as taken from

http://www.yukonweb.wis.net.

882

“Inmate in toxin case is dead,” Kansas City Star, December 24, 1995. Taken from http://www.kcstar.com.

883

William C. Lhotka, “Suicide leaves questions in poison case,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 31, 1995, p. E1.

884

Mostyn, “Stopped at border, man carried lethal toxin,” Yukon News, February 23, 1996, as cited in footnote 881 on page

154.

155

PKK operatives who was attempting to sell the material. The suspects were arrested as a result of a sting

operation conducted by the Gendarmerie Regiment Command Headquarters in Istanbul Province. The material

was smuggled into Turkey from Nakhichevan, and at least some was sold to an unidentified buyer based in

Vienna, Austria. Turkish authorities believe that the PKK was conducting the operation to raise revenue.

885

Case 1997-03: James Dalton Bell, February 1997

In May 1997, the Internal Revenue Service arrested James Dalton Bell for allegedly violating at least

two federal laws, including impeding the administration of the tax code by harassing IRS personnel and using

false social security numbers to evade income taxes. Bell, a 38-year old man living in his parent’s house in

Vancouver, Washington, has a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from MIT.

Bell became a focus of IRS attention because of the February 20, 1997 seizure of his car for unpaid

taxes. Among the items discovered in the car was a document, entitled “Assassination Politics”, lists of the

names and addresses of IRS employees, material on making improvised explosives (including accounts of the

Oklahoma City bombing), and militia literature. “Assassination Politics” outlines a scheme which “would be

awarding a cash prize to somebody who correctly ‘predicted’ the death of one of a list of violators of rights,

usually either government employees, officeholders, or appointees.” The scheme envisioned using encrypted

messages and anonymous electronic cash to make it possible to pay someone for carrying out assassinations.

886

The IRS also discovered that Bell was involved in the “Multnomah County Common Law Court,” a

group that was holding “trials” of IRS and other federal officials for various alleged infringements of U.S. law.

Following a review of this material, the IRS obtained search warrants to gain entry into the homes of

Bell and a close friend of his, Robert East. Bell had various schemes for harassing the IRS. He believed it

would be possible to destroy computers by putting small nickel-coated carbon fibers in the air ducts of

buildings. Among the targets that Bell discussed were the Portland offices of the 911 emergency service. East

told authorities that the two men talked about “putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal building.”

887

Evidence collected during the searches indicated that East and Bell also explored bioterrorism.

According to someone friendly with both East and Bell, Bell had “hypothetical” conversations concerning

contamination of water. In addition, Bell apparently tried to manufacture botulinum toxin in the late 1980s. At

that time, the informant was shown containers that Bell was using in his closet in an effort to make the toxin

using green beans.

888

On February 15, 1997, East sent Bell an e-mail discussing an article on biological terrorism. He also

commented, “I believe it might be worth looking for a source of castor beans for some experiments. I’m sure

that a nefarious soul could find a buyer for some of that nasty stuff.” East followed this up with some

comments in a March 7 e-mail asking Bell, “Why don’t you see what you can find on ricin? I’m really curious

about how to extract that toxin.”

889

According to press reports, when the IRS executed the search warrant for East’s house they expected

to find sarin and anthrax.

890

Federal officials were told that Bell had manufactured small quantities of sarin.

891

It is unclear whether Bell and East intended to implement their plans. Bell claimed that his essay,

“Assassination Politics”, was “hypothetical,” and said that federal agents were “overreacting in the same way

885

“PKK’s Attempt to Sell Cobra Poison Obstructed,” Istanbul Turkiye (Ankara edition), 9 June 1998, p. 17, as translated from

the original Turkish by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. I am indebted to Jason Pate at the Monterrey Institute for International

Studies for bring this incident to my attention.

886

Affidavit, Jeffrey Gordon, Inspector, Internal Revenue Service, March 28, 1997, requesting permission from a U.S.

magistrate for a search warrant. This copy of the document was taken from the World Wide Web site of the Columbian,

http://www.columbian.com. See also John Branton, “Affidavit: Internet essay solicits murder,” Columbian, April 3, 1997, also taken from

the newspaper’s web site.

887

John Painter, Jr., “IRS says suspect discussed sabotage,” Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section, p. P-1.

888

Taken from United States v. James Dalton Bell, Complaint for Violation, May 16, 1997, Magistrate’s Docket Case No. 97-

5048M, drafted by Philipp Scott, Inspector, Internal Revenue Service. The text of the document was taken from

http://www.jya.com/jimbell3.htm on July 3, 1997. See also John Painter, Jr., “IRS says suspect discussed sabotage,” Oregonian, May 20,

1997, Metro Section, p. P-1.

889

Complaint for Violation, May 16, 1997, identified in footnote 888 on page 155.

890

John Branton, “Feds were looking for nerve gas and anthrax,” Columbian, May 18, 1997, as shown on the newspaper’s web

site

891

Taken from the criminal complaint filed by Scott, May 16, 1997, mentioned in footnote 888 on page 155.

156

they did eight years ago” during the Waco and Ruby Ridge incidents.

892

East claims that Bell was “a talker, not

a doer,” and Bell says that he is a “man of ideas, not action.”

893

On July 18, 1997, Bell entered into a plea agreement. He admitted that he tried to intimidate IRS

employees and that he was responsible for the release of the stink bomb at the IRS’s Vancouver office. He also

admitted to the use of false Social Security numbers.

894

On December 11, 1997, a Federal District Judge

sentenced Bell to 11 months in jail. He also received two to three years of probation.

895

He could have received

up to eight years and $500,000 in fines. In addition, the probation terms included more than two dozen

stipulations. During probation he was prohibited from using computers or the Internet, from fraternizing with

common-law courts or militia groups, or from coming within 200 yards of any government official’s

residence.

896

He was released from prison in April 1998.

897

Case 1996-06: Aryan Republican Army, December 1996

According to press reports, members of the Aryan Republican Army have claimed that they could

gain access to radioactive isotopes and biological weapons. Law enforcement authorities have discovered no

such items in the possession of any of the group’s arrested members.

898

Case 1983-02: “Two Brothers in Massachusetts,” 1983?

According to Douglass and Livingstone, sometime in 1983 or 1984 the FBI seized an ounce of almost

pure ricin that two brothers living in Springfield, Massachusetts, had produced and were storing in a 25-mm

film canister. They further claim that an informer tipped off the FBI about the ricin cache, and that the FBI

agents, working with someone from the EPA, took the material to MIT in a paint can. Once the FBI understood

what they had found, it was taken to the U.S. Army laboratories at Ft. Detrick, where it was destroyed.

899

information is provided on the disposition of the case. Nor is it indicated why the two acquired the ricin.

Richard Danzig, a former Undersecretary of the Navy who had considerable interest in biological

warfare issues, described a similar incident. In a July 1995 presentation, Danzig said, “We recently had an

example where a State highway patrol system is reported to have encountered ricin.” The ricin “was carried

around in the back of a police car, as I understand it, for a couple of days before it was brought in and a fairly

elaborate chain led to its analysis.” He also noted that this incident “was associated with a warfare between two

drug gangs. One of them was producing this as a weapon to be used in this context.”

900

Danzig suggests that this incident happened relatively recently, implying that it might be a different

incident than the one described by Douglass and Livingstone. Given the limited amount of information

provided by Danzig, however, it is impossible to identify the incident by date or location.

Case 1980-01: Red Army Faction, Paris, November 1980

In November 1980, a West German prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann, told reporters that individuals

associated with the Red Army Faction (RAF), a leftist terrorist group, were experimenting with biological

agents. According to Rebmann, in October 1980 the French police discovered a culture of C. botulinum,

laboratory equipment, and notes on biological agents in a Paris apartment used by members of the group. The

892

John Branton, “Federal agents ‘overreacting’ says target of raid,” Columbian, April 2, 1997, as taken from the newspaper’s

web site.

893

John Painter, Jr., “IRS says suspect discussed sabotage,” Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro section, p. P-1.

894

“Guilty plea over IRS threats,” Seattle Times, July 19, 1997, p. A6.

895

Marcia Wolf, “‘Assassination Politics’ Author Gets 11 Months,” Columbian, December 12, 1997, p. A1.

896

Michael Zuzel, “Is this just a misfit in our midst?” Columbian, December 16, 1997, p. B9.

897

John Branton, “Bell is returning home on probation,” Columbian, April 15, 1998, p. B15.

898

Bill Morlin, “The War Within,” Seattle Spokesman-Review, December 29, 1996, from the web site http://www.spokane.net/.

899

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, pp. 31-32. At one point (p. 31), the authors say the incident took place in

1983, but later (p. 186) give the date as “1983/4, Spring.” In addition, on p. 186 they also state that the ricin was taken “from an

individual.”

900

Richard Danzig, “Biowarfare: Making a Big Problem Smaller,” pp. 1-14–1-15, in U.S. Public Health Service, Office of

Emergency Preparedness, Proceedings of the Seminar on Responding to the Consequences of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, July 11-

14, 1995, Unformed Services of Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland.

157

notes were written in the hand of Silke Maier-Witt, a leading member of the RAF. Rebmann also indicated that

there was no indication that the group was planning to mount any attacks.

901

A French newspaper, Le Figaro, published additional details relating to this incident, based on a

report that originally appeared in Neue Revue Illustrierte, a publication that originated in Hamburg, Germany.

According to this account, French and German police raided a two-room apartment located on the sixth floor

of 41A Chaillot Street in Paris, France, and discovered a biological laboratory at the site. They allegedly

discovered a culture of clostridium botulinum, the organism that produces the botulinum toxin. The culture was

contained an anaerobic retort to protect the organism from oxygen.

The Le Figaro account claims that police seized “typed sheets referring to bacterial pathology” and

“publications dealing with the struggle against bacterial infection.” Writing on the margins of the typed pages

apparently was identified as belonging to Silke Maier-Witt, a known member of the RAF. According to this

account, Maier-Witt was trained as a medical assistant and “therefore possessed knowledge which is

indispensable for the manufacture of microbes.” This account further claims that the apartment was rented the

previous May by a Belgian named Jan Derek. The rent was paid three months in advance. The landlady

reported the matter to the police after noticing no activity in the apartment.

The same newspaper provided additional details, apparently from their own sources of information.

This report differed in some respects from the previous account. According to this account, the “police

headquarters in Paris” confirmed that on October 14, 1980, a police unit “entered” an apartment at 41A

Chaillot Street. In this version, the police were invited into the apartment when the tenant returned from a trip

and could not find the Belgian to whom he had sublet the apartment. Although the Belgian called himself Jan

Derek, police determined that he was really Ralf Baptiste Fridrich, a known member of the RAF. They

discovered a suitcase and five cartons in the apartment. The French police turned this over to the Germans, but

never took an inventory of the contents.

902

Joseph Douglass and Neil Livingstone give a slightly different account of the incident. They claim

that the raid took place on October 14, 1984. Moreover, in their version, the police found medical publications

relating to infectious diseases and “a bathtub filled with flasks containing cultures of Clostridium botulinum.”

The authors do not cite the source of their information, but it apparently came from intelligence sources.

903

A recent study by Terence Taylor and Tim Trevan examines the episode in considerable detail, and

casts doubt on the accuracy of the initial press reports of this incident. According to Taylor and Trevan, there is

no corroborating evidence that Maier-Witt had a medical background. Moreover, German authorities told them

that they had “no evidence whatsoever that members of the ‘RAF’ had planned or prepared an attack using

biological agents.” Finally, Taylor and Trevan assert that use of mass casualty agents would not be consistent

with RAF’s usual methods of operation.

904

Unfortunately, the Taylor and Trevan critique fails to completely discredit the original account. First,

there is nothing to suggest that the botulinum toxin was being produced to inflict mass casualties. It is equally

plausible to believe that the intent was assassination. Second, the statement they quote by the German

authorities does not deny the possibility that RAF experimented with biological agents, but only that RAF had

no evident plans to use it. Finally, the authors never followed up the Reuters report about the press conference

that it says was given by the German prosecutor Kurt Rebmann.

Case 1945-01: DIN (Judgement), early 1945

There are several English-language accounts of a Jewish resistance group that intended to use

biological agents or poisons against Germans after the end of war in Europe. Michael Elkins, a long-time BBC

correspondent in Israel, gave the first account. Michael Bar-Zohar, an Israeli novelist and popular historian

wrote the other. More recently, Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal provide a detailed account that differs in

significant respects from the others.

Elkins indicates that in early 1945 a group of Jewish resistance fighters operating in central Europe

organized a group to exact revenge on German officials involved in the mass murder of Jews. They called their

901

“W. German Terrorists Said to Test Bacteria,” International Herald Tribune, November 8-9, 1980, p. 2. This is a Reuters

report.

902

Le Figaro (Paris), November 8-9, 1980, p. 7. A translation of this story was provided by Bruce Hoffman from the archives

of the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology. It appears to have originated with the Joint Publication Research Service.

903

Douglass, Jr., and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, p. 29. Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, pp. 36-37,

located six sources that described what he believes is the same incident, including the Douglass and Livingstone version. One account,

written by the House Armed Services Committee, dates it to 1989.

904

Terence Taylor and Tim Trevan, “The Red Army Faction (1980),” pp. 107-113, in Jonathan B. Tucker, Toxic Terror:

Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000).

158

organization Dahm Y’Israel Nokeam, a biblical phrase from the Hebrew meaning “The blood of Israel will take

vengeance.” The words formed the acronym DIN, which is Hebrew for judgment. During most of 1945, the

group was involved in a variety of schemes to murder former Nazi officials. Reportedly, they killed more than

100 people during this period.

905

Sometime in late 1945, the group conceived what they called Tochnit aleph, meaning Plan A. The

objective of the plan was to kill one million Germans. To accomplish this, they decided to contaminate the

water supply of several major German cities. According to Elkins’ account, those responsible for creating the

plan stopped the operations of DIN. Most of the members of the organization were told that it was disbanding

because its job was being taken over by the Allied war crimes tribunals. Only the most ruthless and trustworthy

members were brought into the new plot.

The group attempted to place some of its members in the water treatment facilities of five major

German cities: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Nuremberg, and Weimar. They were able to place people only in

Munich and Nuremberg. At the same time, they researched methods for mass murder, looking for something

that was odorless, colorless, tasteless, and capable of retaining virulence in the water. After researching the

possibilities, they decided to inject pathogens into the water systems. Lacking anyone with the required

expertise for culturing microorganisms, the group’s leader went to Palestine to enlist the services of scientists

there.

Elkins claims that the leader approached Chaim Weizman, who was to become the first President of

Israel, and received his blessing on the project. Using his support, the group managed to obtain a quantity of

some unspecified pathogen. The leadership of the Haganah was horrified when they were told of the plan.

According to this account, Haganah supplied the resistance figure with false identity papers that would allow

him to take a British troop ship back to Europe. The Haganah then informed the British authorities that the

man was a suspicious character, which led to his arrest. The Haganah subsequently sent operatives to Europe

who informed the other members of the group that the mission was cancelled.

Bar Zohar gives a different version of the story, based on accounts of former participants.

906

The

group, which he refers to as Nakam (Hebrew for vengeance), was formed in July 1945. It included 50 people,

divided into several sections. One section was charged with organizing its European operations. Another was

responsible for fund raising, and resorted to smuggling and theft. Bar-Zohar was told that Nakam had three

plans (known as A, B, and C). Plan B was the primary plan, and focused on killing former members of the SS

and other “prominent Nazis” who were being held by the Allies in internment camps. Plan B apparently was

actually carried out, and involved poisoning of bread with arsenic that was served to Germans held in an

internment camp near Nuremberg. Plan C focused on finding and killing individual Nazis, since it was

assumed that the Allies eventually would release most of the Nazis then in custody.

Finally, there was plan A. Bar-Zohar’s source told him the following about the plot:

The Nakam leaders evolved a scheme which was disclosed to only a very few people. Much time

and money went into the preparations. We knew that if we succeeded, no other action would be

necessary. Looking back, it could be called a diabolical scheme. It was designed to kill millions of

Germans. Yes, millions, and all at the same time, men, women and children, old and young. The

main difficulty was that we wanted to kill only Germans, and at that time there were large Allied

armies and thousands of displaced persons of all nationalities still in Germany. Besides some of us

were loath to commit such a terrible deed, even against Germans.

That’s why we concentrated on plan B.

907

About two months after executing plan B on April 15, 1946, members of the group revived the dormant plan

A. The plans did not get very far, because Haganah was concerned about Nakam’s operations. According to

what Bar-Zohar was told, seized the remaining Nakam operatives and thus shut down its operations.

908

Bar-Zohar also recounts another operation, which he claims was totally separate from Nakam’s.

909

This other group, composed mainly of non-Jews, planned to contaminate the water systems of large German

cities. They apparently investigated contaminating the water supplies of Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg,

905

Michael Elkins, Forged in Fury: A true story of courage, horror … and revenge (London: Piatkus, 1996), pp. 168-169, 194-

210.

906

Michael Bar-Zohar, The Avengers (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), pp. 40-50.

907

Bar-Zohar, The Avengers, p. 47.

908

Bar-Zohar, The Avengers, pp. 55-56.

909

Bar-Zohar, The Avengers, pp. 56-57.

159

Hamburg, and Frankfurt. Eventually, they focused on Nuremberg. Some of their members went to work for the

city’s water system, and obtained detailed information on its operations. The plot called for shutting down

parts of the water system serving either the barracks of Allied troops or districts that were primarily inhabited

by non-Germans.

The group found “a scientist living overseas” who agreed to provide them with an unspecified poison.

The poison was to be brought to France by ship. The courier was a soldier who would carry the poison in his

knapsack. Unfortunately, the ship’s captain arrested the courier once the transport entered French waters. The

knapsack was thrown over the ship’s side to prevent discovery.

The group continued its efforts, and a new poison was identified. In the end, however, the project was

abandoned. Bar-Zohar heard three different explanations for the cancellation of the project: (1) the group was

concerned that too many non-Germans would be victimized by the attack; (2) German authorities got word of

the operation; and, (3) the “Resistance” (Haganah?) heard about the operation and forced them to shut it down.

Bar Zohar’s account is remarkably similar in many respects to the operation that Elkins associated with DIN

and treated as Plan A, suggesting that they in fact refer to the same incident.

Finally, Sprinzak and Zertal provide the most recent account of DIN, and the only one of the three

that is documented. Drawing on Hebrew language printed sources and on some interviews, this account

provides a substantially different version of events.

910

First, they contend that Plan A always involved use of chemical poisons, although the basis for that

claim is unclear. Second, they cite a source that contends that Weizman was told about Plan B, not Plan A.

They rely on the same source for a report that arsenic was obtained in Palestine, not a biological agent. Finally,

Sprinzak and Zertal interviewed someone who knew the scientist who allegedly produced the poison DIN

acquired arsenic in Palestine. This individual contends that the scientist in question did not have the expertise

to produce a biological agent, lending credence to the suggestion that a chemical poison was involved.

Thus, the third account claims that DIN never considered using a biological agent, and never acquired

any.

911

910

Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal, “Avenging Israel’s Blood (1946),” pp. 17-41, , in Jonathan B. Tucker, editor, Toxic Terror:

Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Agents (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000).

911

Although the Sprinzak and Zertal version of DIN is the best-documented and most thorough account available in English, it

fails to resolve the question of DIN’s potential interest in biological agents. They state, "Some analysts have speculated that Bergman

supplied Kovner with a biological agent rather than a chemical agent," and then make an argument supporting the involvement of chemical

agents. Unfortunately, they never directly address the evidence from Elkins' account, which does specifically a bacterial agent was being

sought and strongly implies (although does not specifically state) that it was obtained. Moreover, Elkins goes into great detail about the

thinking that went behind Plan A and states very explicitly that DIN's leaders concluded that only a biological could achieve the effects

that they were interested in.

According to Sprinzak and Zertal, DIN acquired only 50 kilograms of arsenic in Palestine, a quantity totally inconsistent with

Plan A. Such an amount is consistent with Plan B. However, DIN had no need to go to Palestine to acquire a common industrial poison.

After all, according to their version of events, Plan B eventually involved 18 kilos of arsenic, which DIN obtained in Europe. The notion

that a major city water supply could have been affected in any serious way with such a small quantity of agent is absurd, and Elkins' argues

that DIN understood that. He also claims that they had thought about the issue, had consulted scientific experts, and had come to

conclusion that biologicals were the only way to inflict mass casualties. The rationale that Elkins describes for adopting biologicals is so

160

overwhelmingly convincing that it impossible to believe the DIN leadership could have seriously believed that 50 kilos of arsenic would

have caused mass deaths if distributed through a water system.

Thus, the weight of evidence appears to support the thesis that Plan A almost certainly involved a biological agent, but there is

no direct evidence that DIN ever acquired a biological agent. In contrast, there is at least some evidence to suggest that DIN acquired

arsenic in Palestine.

161

Chapter 8:

Other

Possible Interest in Acquisition (No Known Possession)

These are cases in which the perpetrators expressed an interest in acquiring biological agents, but

never actually acquired the agent. In some cases, the interest was slight, while in other cases the perpetrators

actually attempted to acquire the agent. In these cases, the perpetrators also never made threats to employ

biological agents.

Case 1998-09:North American Militia of Southwest Michigan, 1998

In March 1998, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), the FBI, the IRS,

Michigan State Police, and local law enforcement agencies arrested three men belonging to a group calling

itself the North American Militia. According to federal prosecutors, the group obtained information on the

manufacture of ricin. There was no evidence that they ever attempted to acquire ricin.

912

Case 1998-11: Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), March 1998

On May 26, 1998, a Belgian radio station issued a report claiming that sometime in March 1998

Belgian authorities searched a building associated with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group in Brussels Ixelles

district of, also known as GIA (based on its name in French). According to this report, the police discovered

isolation boxes containing biological cultures “which can lead to botulism”. Presumably, this refers to C.

botulinum, the organism that produces the toxin responsible for botulism. In addition, the report claimed that

an address book was discovered that listed a laboratory in Brussels that might have been the source of the

culture.

913

The next day, a French language Belgian newspaper, La Libre, issued a report that contradicted many

elements of the earlier report, but confirmed others. La Libre claimed that both the Brussels public prosecutor

and the Gendarmerie denied the report. It claimed that a search related to the GIA was made on March 5, and

that an address book was seized at that time. The further newspaper reported that one of the investigators told

it, “the only discovery made during the operation in the Rue Wery connected with botulism are instructions

enabling the production of a toxin of this kind.”

914

Case 1998-04: Unknown “amateur scientist”, March 1998

According to press reports, the police in Lansing, Michigan, in early March 1998 considered filing

charges against an unnamed “amateur scientist” who attempted to culture anthrax from dirt taken from a cow

pasture.

915

The Ingham County health department was considering fining the man for health code violations.

According to the Ingham County Medical Director, Dr. Dean Sienko, the man was an “overzealous

microbiology student” with an interest in pathogens, but “no intent to do harm.” The man had taken courses at

a community college. According to Sienko, “There was no anthrax,” and the man had acted “more out of

curiosity about what he could do rather than malicious intent.”

912

Lisa Singhania, “Militia member admits his role in bomb plot,” Associated Press, June 2, 1998, as found at the World Wide

Web site of the Detroit News, http://www.detnews.com. In a June 11, 1998 telephone interview, Lloyd Meyer, Assistant U.S. Attorney in

the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Michigan, stated that the court was informed that the group possessed a video

tape prepared by Kurt Saxon on the manufacture of ricin.

913

Brussels La Une Radio Network, 1200 GMT, May 26, 1998, as translated from the French by Foreign Broadcast Information

Service and obtained from the service’s on-line repository.

914914

P.D.G. and F.H., “Fourteen Searched in Belgium without Arrests,” La Libre, May 27, 1998, p. 8, as translated from the

French by Foreign Broadcast Information Service and obtained from the service’s on-line repository.

915

This account is based on “Amateur Scientist Tries to Grow Anthrax,” United Press International, March 11, 1998, as found

at the web site of ABC News, http://www.abcnews.com, and in an updated form at http://dailynews.yahoo.com.

162

The incident started on Friday, March 6, when employees of a real estate company hired to sell a

house discovered a laboratory in the basement. They notified police and public health officials, who

investigated the report. According to Sienko, the laboratory had “some level of sophistication.” However, the

man’s “methods were fairly crude.” As of March 12, 1998, the Lansing police had not arrested anyone in

connection with the case, and the FBI indicated that it did not intend to investigate.

Case 1998-01: John Bernard Koch, February 1998

At 9:40 a.m. on February 5, 1998, John Bernard Koch attempted to bring what appeared to be an

explosive device into the Mecklenburg County Courthouse in Charlotte, North Carolina.

916

The device was

contained in a plastic file box, and reportedly contained two small canisters. An FBI search of Koch’s trailer

revealed that he had in interest in biological and chemical weapons, including at least one book on the subject.

As a result, it appears that law enforcement officials, including the explosive ordnance disposal personnel of

the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police, feared that the device might include chemical or biological agents.

Koch surrendered to police at 2:44 p.m., but it was not until 2:30 a.m. the following morning, the

bomb squad disarmed the device. There was no immediate indication whether in fact the device contained

chemical or biological agents.

The 31-year old man apparently was distraught over his divorce, and especially over a decision by a

judge to award custody of their two sons to his former wife.

A bail hearing for Koch was held on February 16, and the Mecklenburg District Judge required him to

pose a $2 million bond. At the hearing, Koch’s attorney claimed that the device was incapable of detonating,

pointing out that the wires in it were not connected.

917

Subsequently, the FBI reported that the device contained

no pathogenic materials, but did not clarify earlier suggestions that Koch had an interest in chemical and

biological weapons.

918

On July 8, 1998, Koch was indicted by a federal grand jury on related charges, including one count of

transporting an explosive device across state lines and three charges relating to violations of federal firearms

laws. He could be fined up to $1 million and receive up to 60 years in prison if he is convicted of all the

charges. Following the indictment, he was transferred from state to federal custody. In addition, Koch may be

charged under state laws, including alleged possession of a weapon of mass destruction and possession of a

weapon in a courthouse.

919

Case 1997-07: Osama bin Laden, 1997-1999

According to a report that appeared in an Arabic language newspaper published in Paris, Al-Watan al-

’Arabi, Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, the leading figure in the Sudanese Islamic government, hosted a meeting with

several terrorist figures, including Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden is a wealthy businessman of Saudi origin who

has became a major supporter of Islamic terrorist groups. Bin Laden is linked to a terrorist organization called

Al Qaeda. According to the report, one of the issues discussed at that meeting was funding for a biological

warfare facility.

920

The report listed a number of agenda items, including the following:

Find the necessary financing to develop the chemical and bacterial weapons factory that the

Sudanese Government has established in the Khartoum Bahri suburb of Kubar, in cooperation with

the Iraqi Government, which smuggled special materials for this factory after the end of the Gulf

War.

921

916

This account is based on Paul Nowell, “Bomb disarmed, standoff suspect in mental health facility,” Charlotte Observer,

February 6, 1998, and Diana Suchetka, “Extra precautions taken with device,” Charlotte Observer, February 6, 1998, as taken from the

newspaper’s web site at http://www.charlotte.com.

917

Gary L. Wright, “$2 Million Cash Bond for Koch,” Charlotte Observer, February 17, 1998, p. 1C, and “Bond Set at $2

million in courthouse bomb,” News & Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), February 17, 1998, from the newspaper’s web site at

http://www.news-observer.com.

918

Gary L. Wright, “FBI: Courthouse Bomb Nothing to Cause Disease,” Charlotte Observer, February 20, 1998, p. 31.

919

“Man indicted in bomb threat at courthouse,” Charlotte Observer, July 9, 1998, as taken from the newspapers Web site.

920

Al J. Venter, “North Africa faces new Islamic threat,” Jane’s Pointer, March 1998, p. 11. Based on an October 31, 1997

report that appeared in an Arabic language newspaper published in Paris, Al-Watan al-’Arabi.

921

Jilad Salim, “Secrets of al-Manshiyah,” Al-Watan al-’Arabi, October 31, 1997, pp. 22-24, as translated from the Arabic by

FBIS.

163

On August 20, 1998, responding to the terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania, the United States launched cruise missiles at the Shifa Pharmaceuticals facility in north Khartoum.

922

According to an unidentified U.S. intelligence official, the United States believed that the Shifa facility was

tied to bin Ladin.

Even though he left Sudan in 1996, we know that Bin Ladin's businesses acquire restricted, high

priced items for the Sudanese military including arms, communications, and dual use components

for chemical and biological weapons. [Emphasis added.]

923

Similarly, the George Robertson, Britain’s Secretary State for Defence, made the following statement on

August 23, 1998.

We have independent evidence ourselves that Bin Laden and others were seeking to acquire

chemical and biological weapons in order to prosecute the kind of campaign that we know they

were involved in.

924

Although these comments appear to confirm allegations of interest by Bin Ladin in biological agents,

they do not suggest an association between the Shifa facility and a possible biological weapons program.

925

U.S. government officials have released additional information suggesting that bin Laden and Al

Qaeda had an interest in nuclear and chemical weapons. According to a criminal complaint filed against

Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a senior aide to bin Laden, sometime in 1993 the group tried to acquire highly

enriched uranium “for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons”

926

In addition, the criminal complaint,

which was written by an FBI Special Agent, made the following claim:

While al Qaeda was located in the Sudan, CS-1 [confidential source 1] advises that al Qaeda and

the NIF had a close working relationship in the Sudan, working together to obtain weapons and

explosives and in an effort to develop chemical weapons.

927

In June 1998, U.S. officials again renewed allegations that bin Laden was developing chemical and

biological weapons capabilities. According to a report by ABC News, he has acquired materials needed for

production of biological ad chemical agents from sources in the former Soviet Union. The same report claimed

that bin Laden had laboratories supporting his chemical and biological weapons programs at two locations in

Afghanistan, one near Khoust and the other near Jalalabad.

928

Case 1991-03: Hamas, 1991-1993

According to Congressional testimony of Steven Emerson, an investigative journalist who focuses on

Islamic terrorist groups, the Palestinian group Hamas wanted to acquire chemical and biological weapons

capabilities. As evidence of this interest, he cites Israeli documents that record the interrogation of a senior

Hamas official, Muhammad Salah. In material submitted to a U.S. court, Salah is quoted as making the

following statements:

My task was to collect names of brothers … together with the following details: Their fields of

study, the date when they completed their studies, date of return to the occupied lands, their ability

to express them selves, military activity, and the ability to work with chemical materials … such as

remote control activation, agricultural pesticides and basic chemical materials for the preparation of

922

James Bennet, “U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets Tied to Terrorist Network,” New York Times, August

21, 1998, pp. A1, A10, and Barton Gellman and Dana Priest, “U.S. Attacks Sites in Afghanistan, Sudan,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A10.

923

Background briefing on “Terrorist Camp Strikes,” August 20, 1998, as found at http://www.defenselink.mil.

924

“Britain Has Bin Laden Evidence,” Associated Press, August 23, 1998,11:00 a.m. EDT.

925

Considerable criticism has been directed at Clinton Administration claims that the facility at al-Shifa was tied to bin Laden

and that the al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory was used by Sudan’s reported chemical weapons program. For a careful review of the

evidence, see Michael Barletta, “Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998.

926

Michael Grunwald, “U.S. Says Bin Laden Sought Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, September 26, 1998; p. A19.

927

United States of America v. Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, Sealed Complaint, Violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Sections 2332 and 2332a, September 14, 1998. Similar language appears in an indictment of four bin Laden supporters. See United States

v. Wadih el Hage, et al., Indictment, October 7, 1998, filed by the U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York. David K. Schenker, now

a Research Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, provided me with a copy of these documents.

928

John McWethy, “Bin Laden Set to Strike Again?,” ABC News, June 16, 1999, as found at http://www.abcnews.go.com on

June 17, 1999. For a report that U.S. officials believe that bin Laden was acquiring chemical and biological weapons, see David Cloud and

Carla Anne Robbins, “U.S. Intelligence Suggests Bin Laden May Strike Again,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1999.

164

bombs and explosives … and in the use of instruments to jam telephone conversations, and watches

to activate explosive charges…

[We chose them] also according to their expertise, which were chemistry, physics, poisons, military

material, and computers…. For example, in chemistry we asked him what is your specialization?

Or what is your level [in] … toxins chemistry? Can you prepare poisons?

929

Although the statement clearly suggests an interest in chemical poisons, which could mean chemical agents, it

is less clear that biological agents are mentioned. The references to toxins appear in the context of chemistry,

and the context implies that the term was being used to refer to poisons.

Case 1991-01: Doug Gustafson, 1991

In October 1990, Doug Gustafson and a companion shot at a passing automobile from their own

vehicle, killing one of the occupants of the other car. Gustafson was convicted of second-degree murder, and

sentenced to 65 years in prison. Before his conviction, Gustafson plotted to kill a prosecution key witness,

George Kerr. Gustafson recruited both his brother and sister in this plot. He and his sister discussed using ricin

to poison Kerr. According to Gustafson, his sister attempted to acquire some castor bean plants from local

nurseries, but found that the plants could only be obtained by special order. Accordingly, they resorted to a

letter bomb instead, which killed Kerr’s father when he opened it. Gustafson was convicted of the letter

bombing and sentenced to life imprisonment. His sister received a 24-year sentence and his brother a 21-year

sentence for their roles in the bombing plot.

930

Case 1985-01: Michael Swango, 1985

On October 26, 1984, the police in the small town of Quincy, Illinois, arrested Dr. Michael Swango

on a charge of aggravated assault for allegedly attempting to poison some of his fellow paramedics. In the

month before the arrest, several of Swango’s colleagues had become ill, and some of them were suspicious that

he was responsible. One of them detected a strange sweetness in the tea that he had poured from the pitcher left

standing on a table in the paramedic’s room. When several of the paramedics began to feel ill after tasting

some of the tea, someone had the presence of mind to save a sample of the liquid for later analysis. Laboratory

tests proved that the tea had contained a lethal quantity of arsenic.

When police searched Swango’s apartment, they discovered that he had collected considerable

information on poisons. There were thirteen bottles of ant poisons, including one that proved to be chemically

identical to the poison put into the tea. In addition, police discovered that Swango had books describing how to

kill people, along with a collection of poison recipe cards. On those cards, he had extracted information on how

to make several toxins, including ricin and botulinum toxin. Also discovered were castor beans, which are the

source of ricin.

931

On May 3, 1985, Michael Swango was convicted of attempting to kill six paramedics with arsenic. He

was sentenced to five years in prison.

932

He could have been sentenced to a maximum of 60 years.

933

The questions by the Quincy police about Swango’s activities led to two additional investigations into

his activities in Columbus, Ohio, one by Ohio State University and the other by the local district attorney. The

Ohio State University report outlined some of Swango’s suspicious activities during his neurosurgery residence

from July 1983 to June 1984. These suspicious apparently played a role in the decision to release him from the

program.

The Franklin County Prosecutor reported that there was circumstantial evidence linking Swango to

several deaths at University Hospital, but that there was not enough evidence to warrant a prosecution.

934

The

929

Steven Emerson, “Foreign Terrorists in America Five Years after the World Trade Center Bombing,” February 24, 1998, a

report submitted to the United States Senate, Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information.

930

Natalie Phillips, “Gustafson owns up to killing,” Anchorage Daily News, November 27, 1995, p. C1.

931

“Poison Packed Kitchen Shelves,” Newsday, October 21, 1993, p. 129, Michael J. Berens, “Swango is suspect in new

poisonings,” Columbus Dispatch, June 8, 1989, p. 1A. According to “Ohio won’t prosecute doctor: lack of evidence to tie him to patient

deaths cited,” Chicago Tribune, April 3, 1986, p. 4, the castor beans were discovered in Swango’s Columbus, Ohio, apartment. For an

extensive review of the case, see James B. Stewart, “Annals of Crime: Professional Courtesy,” New Yorker, November 24, 1997, pp. 90-

105. Stewart repeats the report that Swango was found to possess ricin, but also notes that he collected articles on the Markov case (see

Case 1978-05 on page 58).

932

“Poisoner of co-workers gets 5 years,” Chicago Tribune, August 24, 1985, p. 3.

933

“Sentencing delayed in poison trial,” Chicago Tribune, June 13, 1985, p. 3 (Midwest Final edition).

934

“Ohio won’t prosecute doctor: lack of evidence to tie him to patient deaths cited,” Chicago Tribune, April 3, 1986, p. 4.

165

Franklin County Prosecutor blamed the hospitals for failing to take appropriate steps following several

suspicious deaths involving Swango. Because of suspicions that several patients who died may have been

poisoned, seven autopsies were performed to look for signs of poisoning. While the pathologists

unsuccessfully hunted for signs of poisons, they discovered that one patient died after a gauze pad was shoved

down his throat. That death, which was then classified as homicide, occurred while Swango was on duty at the

hospital.

935

According to a 1986-press report, the autopsy performed on an elderly woman suffering from

leukemia who died during Swango’s residency period appeared consistent with ricin intoxication.

936

Swango

was never charged with any of these deaths.

It was after his dismissal from the program at Ohio State University, that Swango returned to work

part time in his hometown of Quincy, Illinois, as a paramedic.

937

His medical license, however, was rescinded

only after his 1985 conviction. After serving 30 months in prison, Swango was released. He apparently then

moved to Newport News, Virginia, where he went to work at a medical employment agency in 1989. He was

suspected of poisoning some of his coworkers, but was never charged.

938

Swango reappeared in 1992, when the

University of South Dakota admitted him as a resident in internal medicine. He was suspended after four

months when administrators learned of his tainted past through a cable television broadcast. After receiving the

report of the Ohio State University investigation, Swango was dismissed from the program.

939

In 1993, he was linked to several unexpected deaths at a Veterans Administration hospital while he

was in a medical residency at State University of New York, Stony Brook. He was removed from the residency

for failing to accurately fill out his application forms.

940

Swango then obtained a job in Zimbabwe, where he

worked at a hospital. He was suspended from that position in 1995 on suspicions that he was involved in the

deaths of some of the patients.

941

It is believed that he worked in Zambia and Namibia.

942

The government of

Zimbabwe also accused him of murdering five people, and indicated that it was interested in extraditing him.

No extradition treaty exists between the United States and Zimbabwe. According to an assistant U.S. attorney,

such an agreement was on the verge of being signed.

943

The FBI arrested Swango at Chicago’s O’Hare airport as he was returning to the United States from

South Africa. Although he used a false name in Zimbabwe, his U.S. passport was still under the name Swango.

This meant that he had to use his real name when buying his airplane ticket, and federal authorities detected his

name as a federal fugitive on the airplane’s passenger list. After his arrest, Swango was charged with illegally

prescribing narcotics to patients. This charge was based on the allegation that he had falsely obtained his

position as resident, and thus had no right to prescribe narcotics.

944

According to one account, FBI investigators believe that Swango may have been responsible for the

death of dozens of people.

945

As of June 1999, authorities were still investigating Swango’s activities,

according to James Tatum, assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. He told reporters that

some bodies might be exhumed.

946

935

“Autopsy shows crash victim a homicide,” Chicago Tribune, September 21, 1985, p. 3, “Autopsy done on Swango-treated

hospital patient,” Columbus Dispatch, November 10, 1993, p. 8D, and David Lore, “Trial set in OSU lawsuit: the hearing will be first

involving tenure of Swango,” Columbus Dispatch, October 17, 1993, p. 1B.

936

“Ohio Won’t Prosecute Doctor: Lack of Evidence to Tie Him to Patient Deaths Cited,” Chicago Tribune, April 3, 1986, p. 4.

This allegation is repeated with additional details in Stewart, “Annals of Crime: Professional Courtesy,” New Yorker, p. 98.

937

David Lore, “Swango is suspect in new poisonings,” Columbus Dispatch, June 11, 1989, p. 4B.

938

Robert Ruth, “Co-worker’s tip to police started new Swango probe,” Columbus Dispatch, June 10, 1989, p. 1A, Michael J.

Berens, “Swango talks to police in poisoning probe,” Columbus Dispatch, June 9, 1989, p. 1A, and David Lore, “Medical dragnet failed to

snag the ‘poison doctor’,” Columbus Dispatch, November 7, 1993, p. 2C.

939

The report appeared on a program called “The Justice Files.” See “Swango says South Dakota probers were misled about his

OSU residency,”, Columbus Dispatch, December 27, 1992, p. 2C, and David Lore, “OSU needs Swango’s approval to send files to

medical school,” Columbus Dispatch, December 10, 1992, p. 5C.

940

. David Lore, “Medical dragnet failed to snag the ‘poison doctor’,” Columbus Dispatch, November 7, 1993, p. 2C.

941

“Swango named in more deaths,” Columbus Dispatch, January 12, 1998, at http://www.dispatch.com.

942

Stewart, “Annals of Crime: Professional Courtesy,” New Yorker, November 24, 1997, p. 105.

943

“Swango named in more deaths,” Columbus Dispatch, January 12, 1998.

944

Robert E. Kessler, “New Charges for Poison Doctor,” Newsday, September 13, 1997, p. A3.

945

Stewart, “Annals of Crime: Professional Courtesy,” New Yorker, p. 105.

946

David Lore, “Jailed ex-doctor still under investigation,” Columbus Dispatch, June 11, 1999, as found at the paper’s web site,

http://www.dispatch.com.

166

Case 1980-03X: East German terrorist training, 1980s

According to a report that appeared in a British newspaper, the Independent, the East Germany secret

service, the Stasi, trained Iraqis, Palestinians, and others in the covert use of biological agents.

947

The story,

reportedly based on an interview with a former member of the Stasi, claims that through 1985 the training was

conducted at a secret facility outside Berlin. After that date, the training was given at camps in Iraq, Syria, and

Yemen. The story claims that the students were given training in use of anthrax and yellow fever virus.

Allegedly, they were taught to employ the agents in attacks on “wells, rivers and reservoirs or large areas of

terrain.” According to the former Stasi officer,

They were trained extensively in the use of chemical and biological weapons and also the effects

were explained in detail …. In particular they studied plans for terrorist attacks where people

congregate, such as airports, railway stations and large public gatherings

The importance of this was to achieve a demoralising effect of terrorising the population, throwing

them off balance, and throwing into confusion the entire structure of the security forces in the

individual countries.

The paper claims that the Iraqis were members of the Muhabarat secret police. The Iraqis and other foreigners

were trained in groups of 15 to 20.

Case 1974-01: The Symbionese Liberation Army, January 1974

In January 1974, police raided a safehouse operated by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and

discovered that the group possessed a volume on “Germ Warfare.” Also discovered was a manual on “Anti-

Aircraft Defenses,” suggesting that the collection of materials may not have represented the types of

capabilities the group intended to develop.

948

Although the group was known to coat its bullets with cyanide,

there is no evidence to suggest that it ever developed any biological agent capability.

949

Case 1972-02: Unnamed Middle East terrorist organization, 1972

According to the RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, sometime in 1972 “A Middle East

terrorist organization was reported to have established a scientific committee and assigned to it the task of

purchasing and/or developing chemical and/or biological sabotage agents and the delivery systems for

them.”

950

Case 1970-03: Weatherman, November 1970

In late November 1970, Jack Anderson wrote a story, reportedly based on an Customs Bureau

intelligence report, claiming that the Weatherman faction, a radical leftist terrorist group associated with the

Students for a Democratic Society, was attempting to acquire pathogens from the U.S. Army’s biological

warfare research facility at Ft. Detrick, Maryland.

951

According to Anderson, the Weatherman hoped to use an

allegedly homosexual Army officer stationed at Ft. Detrick to gain access to information and materials. His

story mentions two meetings in which this effort was discussed.

In the first meeting, described in a November 3, 1970 report, an informant to the Customs Bureau

discussed a meeting with a drug dealer who allegedly associated with individuals in the Weatherman

organization. According to the Customs informant, this Weatherman associate wanted “information on what

kind of bacteria would be effective and would bypass the filtering system of a city and would incapacitate a

population by infection for seven-to-ten days.” According to the informant, this drug dealer “stated to me that

he was merely engaged in a discussion with some SDS Weatherman as to the possibility of this.” In addition,

the informant reported that, “He asked me to contact the (homosexual) officer I know there and set him up for

947

Harvey Morris, “Crisis in the Gulf: Saddam terrorists ‘trained by Stasi’,” Independent, January 30, 1991, p. 1. I am grateful

to Cornelius G. McWright for bringing this article to my attention.

948

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Internal Security, Symbionese Liberation Army (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 7. A less specific reference is Brian M. Jenkins and Alfred P. Rubin, “New Vulnerabilities and

the Acquisition of New Weapons by Nongovernment Groups,” p. 228, in Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy, editors, Legal Aspects of

International Terrorism (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1978), citing Lowell Ponte, KABC radio

broadcast, Los Angeles, October 23, 1975.

949

A discussion of the books discovered in the hideout of Patty Hearst makes no mention of any volumes relating to biological

agents. See Philip Hager, “Guns and Bullets Among Patty’s Effects, FBI Says,” Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1975, pp. 3, 16.

950

The RAND-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology.

951

Jack Anderson, “Weatherman Seeking BW Germs,” The Washington Post, November 20, 1970, p. D15.

167

a discussion, and mentioned the possibility of the use of blackmail to induce the ‘gay’ officer in question to

cooperate.”

The second meeting between the drug dealer and the Customs informant took place several days later,

was reported in a November 11 account. According to the informant, “He (the drug dealer) suggested that I

obtain pictures and records that could be used to blackmail this officer into furnishing information as to the

nature and character of a BW weapon that (1) is capable of infection, but not fatal infection, the entire

population of a large city for seven-to-ten days, and (2) would pass through the water filtering plant of a large

city and go directly into the homes of the population.”

Following publication of the Anderson report, the U.S. Army confirmed that it had received reports

that the Weatherman organization was plotting to acquire biological agents from Fort Detrick. The Army also

indicated that the warning had been received from the Customs Bureau, and that it was based on information

provided by an informant.

952

Case 1968-01: Arab Pharmaceutical Congress, September 1968

According to the newspaper Dagens Nyheter, the Arab Pharmaceutical Congress indicated its support

for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and advocated training in biological warfare.

953

It is unclear

from this account whether the group was suggesting that the PLO undertake biological warfare training, or if

that suggestion was directed at Arab states.

False cases and hoaxes

These cases fall into several categories. First, there are some cases that never occurred, even though

they are identified by some sources as examples of biological agent use. In some instances, it is unclear if the

alleged event ever took place. In other cases, something may have happened, but if it did there is no indication

that a biological agent, as defined by this study, was not involved. This includes instances in which law

enforcement officials were unable to determine that alleged activities were in fact illegal.

Case 1999-67: Feared use of West Nile Fever by Iraq, October 1999

In October 1999, Richard Preston, a novelist and chronicler of disease outbreaks, published an article

in The New Yorker magazine suggesting that the CIA was investigating whether Iraq was responsible for

causing the outbreak of West Nile fever in the New York City area.

954

This account relied heavily on a story

written by an Iraqi defector claiming that Saddam Hussein planned to use a strain of West Nile virus to mount

biological weapons attacks. Preston drew on a story that appeared in the previous April in the London Daily

Mirror.

955

That story was based on a book authored by the defector, Mikhail Ramadan, who supposedly served

as a double for Saddam Hussein.

956

According to the newspaper account, Saddam Hussein told Ramadan about plans to use a strain of the

West Nile virus called SV1417 to stage biological warfare attacks. The newspaper story gave the following

account of the episode.

In 1997, on almost the last occasion we met, Saddam summoned me to his study. Seldom had I

seen him so elated. Unlocking the top right-hand drawer of his desk, he produced a bulky, leather-

bound dossier and read extracts from it. Immediately afterwards, I made coded notes of what he

said. The dossier holds details of his ultimate weapon, developed in secret laboratories outside

Iraq. That stage of Saddam's plan, Point One, was scheduled to be completed by mid-1998. Free of

UN inspection, the laboratories would develop the SV1417 strain of the West Nile virus - capable

of destroying 97 pc [percent] of all life in an urban environment. That would take two years, with

another year to stockpile the virus. Saddam revealed that the virus could be released with impunity

- the Iraqis would be safe. Plans were underway to distribute enough antidote to protect up to 30

million people. He said SV1417 was to be 'operationally tested' on a Third World population centre

of not less than 100,000 and no more than 250,000 people, probably in the year 2000. The target

had been selected, Saddam said, 'but that is not for your innocent ears'. Once sufficient stocks of

952

“Army Tells of Plot to Steal Bacteria From Ft. Detrick,” New York Times, November 21, 1970, p. 34.

953

“Arab Plan for Chemical War,” Dagens Nyheter, September 30, 1968, as cited in Roberta Wohlstetter, “Terror on a Grand

Scale,” Survival, May June 1976, p. 102.

954

Richard Preston, “West Nile Mystery,” The New Yorker, October 17 & 25, 1999, pp. 90-108.

955

Mikhael Ramadan, “I Was Saddam’s Double,” Daily Mail, April 6, 1999, pp. 34-35.

956

Mikhael Ramadan, In the Shadow of Saddam (London: GreeNZone Publishing, 1999), pp. 317-319.

168

virus and antidote had been gathered, the news would be conveyed to the UN, followed by a series

of ultimatums. The climax - Point Four in Saddam's dossier would be the releasing of SV1417 at

strategic points in the world.

957

The book’s account of this episode is essentially similar, but gives slightly more detail and varies in a few

important respects. The book places the fatality rate at only 90 percent, not 97 percent as claimed in the

newspaper article.

958

According to press reports, the CIA looked into the possibility that the outbreak resulted from

deliberate introduction. According to an unnamed CIA official quoted by the Washington Post, “there’s

nothing we’ve found that would support the notion at all.”

959

Subsequently, Peggy Hamburg, Assistant

Secretary of Health in the Department of Health and Human Services, said, “The data did not indicate it was a

result of terrorist action.” She confirmed that the FBI and CIA had investigated the outbreak, even though there

was skepticism about the possibility that it resulted from intentional acts.

960

Case 1999-63: Feared anthrax release (in Wichita, Kansas), December 1999

On December 17, 1999, hazardous materials teams blocked off a considerable part of downtown

Wichita, Kansas, after someone reported seeing a powder on the ground near the Finney State Office Building.

Consequently, rush hour traffic was obstructed for two hours by the street closures. The teams identified the

powder in more than 50 locations. Eventually, they discovered that the unknown substance was cooking flour

used by a group of runners, the Hash Street Harriers, to mark their running paths. They use chalk and flour to

mark the trails because they are environmentally friendly. According to a member of the group, “We’ve run

downtown probably 30 times over the last three years.”

961

Case 1999-74: Cobra venom smuggling, October 1999

According to a press report, on at least two occasions Bangladeshi police seized illicit shipments of

cobra venom. The cobra venom is collected for use in medical research. The newspaper claims that it is also

misused as an illicit drug, apparently for its psychotropic effects.

962

There is no indication from the account that

the people acquiring the cobra venom intended to use it to kill anyone.

Case 1999-73: Stolen tuberculosis, June 1999

According to press reports, a black overnight bag containing a vial of tuberculosis was stolen from the

room of a researcher staying at the Cathedral Hill Hotel in San Francisco, California. According to police, the

bag was taken during a daytime robbery. There is no evidence that the burglar knew that the tuberculosis was

in the bag or had any interest in it.

963

Case 1999-69: “Nong Jaew”, June 1999

According to a Bangkok newspaper, police suspected that a 34-year-old woman identified as “Nong

Jaew” was suspected of deliberately infecting policemen with HIV. According to these accounts, the woman’s

husband, a policeman, died of AIDS and infected her in the process. Apparently in revenge, she sought to

infect other policemen with the disease. The reports suggest that she may have slept with as many as 20

957

Mikhael Ramadan, “I Was Saddam’s Double,” Daily Mail, April 6, 1999, p. 35.

958

Ramadan, In the Shadow of Saddam, p. 318.

959

Vernon Loeb, “CIA Finds No Sign Virus Was An Attack,” Washington Post, October 12, 1999. p. 2.

960

“No evidence of bioterrorism in NY virus outbreak: official,” Agence France Press, January 6, 2000.

961

“Baking flour used to mark runners’ route mistaken for anthrax,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, December 18,

1999, AM cycle.

962

“Snake Venom,” The Independent Emerging Markets Datafile, October 29, 1999, as found in the Lexis-Nexis on-line

database. This episode was brought to my attention by Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD

Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The

Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 172.

963

“Stolen TB vial is still out there,” San Francisco Examiner, June 30, 1999, p. A5, Sabin Russell, “Stolen TB Vial Poses No

Immediate Peril,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1999, p. A15, and Jessie Seyfer, “Vial of virulent TB stolen from hotel room; police

warn of health risks,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, June 29, 1999, AM cycle. This episode was brought to my attention by

Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National

Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 170.

169

policemen, but it was not known if the allegation was accurate or if any had become infected with HIV. The

woman was a nurse, and apparently died of AIDS on June 30, 1999.

964

It is unclear over what period the alleged seductions are supposed to have occurred. This incident does

not meet the case definition used in this study, because it involves the natural transmission of disease. It is

reported here because it was included in another survey of bioterrorism incidents and because it is a relatively

typical example of a type of crime that occurs more often than sometimes recognized.

965

Case 1999-72: Theft through threat of HIV exposure, March 1999

A Cuban newspaper, Tribuna de La Habana, reportedly issued a story on March 21, 1999 that police

had recently arrested two perpetrators, Manuel Basulto and Miguel Quevedo, who threatened to infect their

victims with HIV contaminated blood by cutting themselves.

966

This method of dissemination does not meet

the criteria for a bioterrorism or biocriminal case used by this study, but the incident is mentioned because of

its mention in the other survey.

967

Case 1999-46: Feared anthrax threats (in New York), January 1999

The Colonial Village Elementary School, located in the Niagara-Wheatfield school district in Niagara

County, New York, was shut down on January 25, 1999, because of a “suspicious” package found shoved into

the front door. Employees at an obstetrics/gynecology office in Lockport, New York, found an identical

envelope. Although the envelopes were treated as hazardous, subsequent investigation determined that they

were filled with advertisements from a collection agency in Amherst, New York.

968

Case 1998-47: Feared anthrax threat (in Providence, Rhode Island), November 1998

On November 30, 1998, a Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island clinic received a suspicious package

that was treated as a possible anthrax threat. The package, which was a little bigger than a shoe box, was

delivered at about 1:00 p.m. Because it had no return address, employees at the clinic feared that it might be

one of the anthrax threat packages being sent to Planned Parenthood clinics around the country. The package

was taken outside the building, and authorities were notified. After being examined with bomb detection

equipment, it was opened and found to contain return address labels for the clinic.

969

Case 1998-39: Anthrax scare (at hospital), December 1998

On December 18, 1998, the Providence St. Joseph Medical Center in the Media District of Los

Angeles County was closed for about an hour due to fears of possible anthrax contamination. At about 8:30

p.m. a woman suffering from flu-like symptoms arrived at the emergency room of the hospital. Medical

providers initially thought that she had been in the Woodlands Hills Bankruptcy Court building, which had

been the target of an anthrax threat. The hospital notified authorities and a Los Angeles city hazardous

materials team was sent to the hospital. Further questioning, however, determined that the woman had not been

in the court building but in one next to it, and there was no chance that she had been exposed to the anthrax.

970

Case 1998-15: Ricin scare in Jacksonville, Florida, November 1998

About 8:00 a.m. on November 3, 1998 police officers at the Jacksonville’s Sheriff’s Office tested a

white powder found in a small box seized in a vacant apartment to determine if the material was cocaine.

When tested, the substance reacted in a way that suggested that it might be ricin. The box containing the

964

“Infected wife targets men in uniform in AIDS vendetta,” Bangkok Post, July 2, 1999, and “AIDS Vendetta: Embarrassed

lawmen hounded by wives over widow,” Bangkok Post, July 3, 1999.

965

Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving

Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 161.

966

“Cuban police arrest muggers using AIDS as a weapon,” Agence France Presse, March 21, 1999, 20:51 GMT.

967

Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley, & Lindsay DeFazio, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving

Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p. 168.

968

Peter Simon and Thomas J. Prohaska, “Student at Iroquois High Charged in Anthrax Scare,” Buffalo News, January 26,

1999, p. 5B. I am grateful to Jason Pate at the Monterey Institute for International Studies for calling my attention to these incidents.

969

Jonathan D. Rockoff, “Suspicious package prompts alert at Planned Parenthood,” Providence Journal-Bulletin, December 1,

1998, p. 3B. I am indebted to Jason Pate, Monterey Institute for International Studies, for bring this incident to my attention.

970

Leslie Simmons, “Anthrax scare at St. Joseph’s,” Los Angeles Times, December 26, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s

World Wide Web site, http://www.latimes.com.

170

suspected ricin powder was dropped on the loading dock of the Sheriff’s Office as it was being removed from

the building. As a result, nine people were exposed.

In response to the possible release of ricin, the Sheriff’s Office was quarantined, and the Fire and

Rescue Department’s hazardous materials team was called to decontaminate the affected area. The material

was taken to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection for testing. The nine affected employees

were transported to the trauma center of the University Medical Center. The Sheriff’s Office employees were

decontaminated with a spray of bleach and water in a wash down area outside the trauma center. Other people

coming to the hospital center was questioned to determine if they might have been exposed to the agent release

at the Sheriff’s Office. A similar process was followed at the Methodist Medical Center across the street.

The employees were kept in the University Medical Center’s trauma unit for observation, and the unit

was quarantined. The next day it was determined that the substance was not ricin, and the patients were

released

971

Case 1998-02: Larry Wayne Harris and William Leavitt, February 1998

On February 19, 1998, the FBI arrested two men, Larry Wayne Harris and William Leavitt, for

alleged violations of the Biological Weapons Antiterrorism Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 175).

Specifically, the two were indicted on two counts. The first count charged them with conspiring to possess a

biological agent for use as a weapon, while the second charged them with possessing a biological agent for use

as a weapon.

972

According to the criminal complaint, on February 18, a “citizen-informant” called the Las Vegas,

Nevada, offices of the FBI and reported that at noon Harris and Leavitt claimed to possess “military grade”

anthrax. The U.S. Attorney’s office identified the informant as a “research scientist, specializing in cancer

research.” According to the criminal complaint, the informant had two extortion convictions, but that the FBI

had no reason to suspect that he had any ulterior motive in providing this information. “It appears that his

providing information to the FBI was done simply as a citizen performing his civic duty.” Subsequent press

reports indicate that the informant was Ronald George Rockwell, president of Rife Research Lab and Rockwell

Research Company.

It appears that the informant must have called the FBI almost immediately after the meeting. At 3:15

p.m., Leavitt called the informant and set up a meeting at a restaurant for 7:00 p.m. that evening. The source

met Leavitt and Harris in the parking lot of the restaurant, where they discussed the planned tests. According to

press reports, the FBI recorded the conversation.

The FBI also identified another individual who encountered Leavitt and Harris at the Gold Coast

Hotel. This informant claimed that Harris showed him a vial wrapped in cardboard that supposedly contained

anthrax. Harris allegedly stated that the vial contained enough anthrax to “wipe out the city.”

The vials suspected of containing anthrax were not removed from the automobile until the next day,

February 19. They were securely packaged, and placed on an FBI aircraft that flew them to northern Virginia.

The plane arrived at nearly midnight. The material was then flown to Ft. Detrick, Maryland, to the facilities of

the U.S. Army Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). Although the packages were delivered

at 8:00 a.m., it was not until around noon that laboratory analyses were begun. The delay resulted in part from

the need to handle the vials carefully so that evidence, such as fingerprints, was not disturbed. Analyses

continued until the afternoon of February 21, by which time it was clear that the vials contained a non-

pathogenic strain of anthrax used in veterinary vaccines.

973

Based on the laboratory report, the Justice Department dropped the charges against both Leavitt and

Harris. Leavitt was released from prison. Harris remained in jail because of claims by the Justice Department

that he had violated the terms of his probation agreement.

971

Kathleen Sweeney and Margie Mason, “Chemical scare taken seriously,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), November 4,

1998, and “Ricin scare ends; cause investigated,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), November 5, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s

World Wide Web site, http://jacksonbille.com.

972

Details are taken from the Criminal Complaint, United States of America vs. Larry Wayne Harris and William Job Leavitt,

U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, Case No. MAF-98-2042-M-RLH, February 19, 1998, found at the web site of the Las Vegas Sun,

http://www.lasvegassun.com. Count two of the complaint accused that the two “knowingly possessed a biological agent and toxin, to wit:

anthrax and anthrax precursors, for use as a weapon.” The complaint never clarifies what toxin was involved. Nor does it clarify what was

meant by “anthrax precursor.” In addition, the second count in the criminal complaint accused the two of violating Title 18, United States

Code, Section 2, for aiding and abetting. According to the code, “Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,

counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”

973

Robert Suro and William Claiborne, “Caution Impeded Speed in Assessing Chemicals’ Threat,” Washington Post, February

24, 1998, p. A3.

171

The U.S. Attorney’s office in Las Vegas indicated that it intended to continue its investigation into the

incident. The next day, FBI agents exercised a search warrant to search Leavitt’s home. A considerable amount

of material was removed during the search. According to press accounts, not officially confirmed, a grand jury

investigation into the case was initiated.

The FBI subsequently came under considerable criticism for its reliance on Rockwell. Although the

FBI admitted that Rockwell had been convicted on extortion charges, some observers believed that they gave

his allegations far too much credence.

974

Leavitt’s lawyers claimed that Rockwell had a motive for making

false allegations. They claimed, supported in part by documents, that Rockwell made the allegations against

Leavitt and Harris only after negotiations between Leavitt and Rockwell collapsed. According to the attorneys,

Rockwell wanted a $100,000 advance payment for the machine sight unseen. The talks fell apart over this

issue, and, Leavitt’s lawyers suggested, Rockwell then retaliated by going to the authorities with the story

about the alleged activities of Leavitt and Harris.

975

Questions also were raised concerning Rockwell’s credentials as a cancer researcher. Rockwell was

unknown to scientists who specialize in cancer, and appeared to have written no scientific articles.

976

Leavitt’s

attorneys also claimed that Rockwell attempted to involve their client in research on time travel and

unidentified flying objects. According to the lawyers, Rockwell wanted Leavitt to finance this research.

977

Others who had encountered Rockwell confirmed these claims. One man who met Rockwell concluded that the

man was “a total fruitcake” based on a fifteen-minute conversation. “He said he can build flying saucers any

size you want. He said he has a plane the size of a 747 that extracts energy out of the air as it moves and flies

for hours on one gallon of gasoline.” Based on such statements, this individual concluded, “For the FBI to even

listen to this man, I’m appalled.”

978

Finally, press reports suggest that Rockwell claimed on February 12, 1998, before he made the

allegations about Leavitt and Harris, that he possessed anthrax obtained from the U.S. Army biological warfare

research facility at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah. Although Rockwell denied the allegation, a tape recording

of the telephone conversation apparently exists.

979

On March 3, Harris was returned to Ohio for a court hearing to determine if he in fact violated terms

of his parole (see page 152 for details of the parole hearing).

980

Case 1998-07: Drug dealers and ricin, January 1998

In January 1998, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sent a warning to law enforcement

agencies about the potential use of ricin toxin by operators of drug laboratories manufacturing

methamphetamine. According to the report, DEA was concerned that the ricin might be mixed in with illegal

drugs and that the ricin could poison police officials raiding drug laboratories. According to Rodney Adams, a

DEA spokesman, the warning originated in the agency’s El Paso office. It was sent to other DEA offices,

which then forwarded it to other law enforcement organizations. Adams denied that any specific information

led to the alert, “We are taking this seriously, but we don’t honestly believe there is any of this out there

yet.”

981

The reports apparently are linked to the seizure of ricin by Customs Canada in 1993 from Thomas

Lavy. (This episode is recounted starting on 153). Salt Lake County (Utah) sheriff’s detective Dave Burdett,

who reportedly looked into the story, was unable to find any instances in which drug dealers used ricin in this

974

For example, see John L. Smith, “Too bad some clients of Rockwell didn’t know a crock well,” Las Vegas Review-Journal,

February 25, 1988, and Jeff German, “FBI source’s credibility muddles anthrax probe,” Las Vegas Sun, March 7, 1998.

975

Jeff German, “One man released after anthrax turns out to be harmless veterinary vaccine,” Las Vegas Sun, February 21,

1998, and Jeff German, “FBI source made time travel, UFO research plans,” Las Vegas Sun, February 23, 1998.

976

Denise Cardinal and Art Nadler, “FBI informant’s credibility probed in anthrax arrests,” Las Vegas Sun, February 23, 1998

977

Jeff German, “FBI source made time travel, UFO research plans,” Las Vegas Sun, February 23, 1998.

978

Steve Friess, “Credibility of FBI tipster comes under scrutiny,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, February 24, 1998, as found at

http://www.lvrj.com.

979

Jeff German, “FBI tipster claimed he had anthrax,” Las Vegas Sun, March 6, 1998.

980

Robert Ruth, “Man in anthrax scare is returned,” Columbus Dispatch, March 4, 1998, as found at the newspaper’s web site,

http://www.dispatch.com.

981

J. Harry Jones, “DEA warns local police to beware of potent toxin,” San Diego Union-Tribune, January 15, 1998, as found

at http://www2.uniontrib.com.

172

way. Nevertheless, he told a journalist that, “It’s definitely taken on a life of its own.”

982

This was illustrated by

the subsequent appearance of the report in Canada.

983

Case 1997-09: Israeli Intelligence, September 1997

On September 25, 1997, two Israeli intelligence operatives attempted to assassinate Khaled Meshal, a

political activist associated with Hamas, in a botched attack in Amman, Jordan. According to press accounts,

the Israelis sprayed a synthetic opiate, Fentanyl, into his ear. Fentanyl is used as an anesthetic. The two agents

involved in the attack were captured by Jordanian security, and the Israelis were forced to divulge the nature of

the poison used in the attack. Meshal survived.

984

Some Arab sources speculated that the Israelis might have

used ricin in the attack.

985

Case 1997-08: Shigella at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, fall 1997

According to press reports, seven laboratory technicians at the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center

became infected with a strain of the shigella organism sometime in late September and early October of 1997.

Two technicians were hospitalized. The first case was diagnosed on September 20, but the majority occurred

during the first week of October.

986

The incident occurred at a time when vials of the organism were being

transferred on a cart from a freezer that was not working. The two technicians moving the organisms became

sick three days and seven days after moving the vials.

987

It appears that the subsequent victims were infected

while using a vortex machine, which is used to shake the contents of test tubes.

988

The incident was investigated by state public health officials, who invited the Centers for Disease

Control (CDC) to assist.

989

The CDC investigators reportedly argued that it was possible that the infection

resulted from deliberate spread of the disease. Investigators for the Centers for Disease Control looked into the

cases in January, 1998, contended that the organism could only survive in the open for one day. Thus, they

apparently believed that it was unlikely that other members of the staff could have become ill if the exposure

were accidental during the move. Accordingly, CDC recommended that the hospital refer the case to the state’s

attorney general’s office for further investigation. Apparently, the FBI also was brought into the case.

990

A review of the case by the hospital’s insurance company, American International Group, suggested,

however, that there was “no demonstrable evidence to support a case of intentional conduct.” Relying on

advice from Dr. Leonard Mermel of Brown University and Dr. Donald Goldman of Harvard Medical School,

the insurance investigator concluded that shigella can in fact live for days on dry surfaces and months in water.

Moreover, the investigator noted that both of the technicians claimed that none of the vials was opened during

the move, suggesting that the spread was accidental not intentional.

991

Case 1997-02: “Middle East” Terrorists in Ames, Iowa, February 1997

On March 3 and 4, 1997, Steve Quayle, a survivalist who broadcasts a shortwave radio show known

as “Blueprint for Survival,” told his listeners that some Middle East terrorists posing as veterinary students at

982

Tom Zoellner, “Urban Legend: Death-Drug Rumor Discredited, Cops Can Arrest Easier,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 6,

1998, p. A1, as found at http://archive1.sltrib.com.

983

Tom Godfrey, “Warning on Deadly Nerve Agent,” London Free Press (Ontario, Canada), March 28, 1998, as found at

http://www.canoe.ca/LondonNews. See also http://snopes.simplenet.com/spoons/faxlore/ricin.htm for a discussion of this story by the

Urban Legends Reference Pages.

984

Alan Cowell, “The Daring Attack that Blew Up in Israel’s Face,” New York Times, October 15, 1997, pp.. A1, A6.

985

See, for example, the article that appeared in an Amman, Jordan, newspaper soon after the attack: “Paper Links Toxic Ricin

to Mish’al Assassination Attempt,” al-Ra’y (Arabic), September 30, 1997, pp. 1, 17, as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (FBIS) and retrieved from its World Wide Web site.

986

Richard Saltus, “N.H. hospital probes bacteria outbreak,” Boston Globe, December 3, 1997, p. B5.

987

This account is based on “Investigation finds shigella outbreak at Dartmouth not Deliberate,” Associated Press, April 22,

1998, 13:58 report, as found on the Boston Globe World Wide Web site, http://www.boston.com/dailynews.

988

Richard Saltus, “N.H. hospital probes bacteria outbreak,” Boston Globe, December 3, 1997, p. B5.

989

Richard Saltus, “N.H. hospital probes bacteria outbreak,” Boston Globe, December 3, 1997, p. B5.

990

This account is based on “Investigation finds shigella outbreak at Dartmouth not Deliberate,” Associated Press, April 22,

1998, 13:58 report, as found on the Boston Globe World Wide Web site, http://www.boston.com/dailynews.

991

This account is based on “Investigation finds shigella outbreak at Dartmouth not Deliberate,” Associated Press, April 22,

1998, 13:58 report, as found on the Boston Globe World Wide Web site, http://www.boston.com/dailynews.

173

Iowa State University had been arrested by government agents on February 1997.

992

According to Quayle, the

alleged terrorists were in possession of seven vials containing anthrax, along with equipment needed to

disseminate the agent into the air. Quayle told a journalist with the Ames Daily Tribune that the Federal

Emergency Management Agency sent 48,000 doses of anthrax vaccine to Iowa. He also claimed that the story

was first reported during a February 28 C-SPAN broadcast of a congressional hearing, although the subject

was never mentioned at that hearing. Ultimately, a reporter who investigated the story believes that it may have

originated with an article written by an official at the Iowa Department of Public Health that described a

fictional biological attack on Des Moines, Iowa.

Case 1989-02: The Breeders, November 1989

In November 1989, a group calling itself the “Breeders” claimed that it was releasing fertile

Mediterranean fruit flies (Medflies) in southern California. In a letter sent to Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley,

other government officials, and several newspapers, the group claimed that it brought fertile Medflies into the

region “and started breeding them here.” Furthermore, the group said, “State officials have probably noticed an

increased as well as an unusual distribution of Medfly infestation in Los Angeles County since March, 1989.”

The letter demanded a halt to aerial pesticide spraying or the group would release additional Medflies.

993

According to the letter, the Breeders planned to ”make the Medfly ‘problem’ unmanageable and aerial

spraying politically and financially intolerable.” The group also stated that they could be reached with

advertisements in the Los Angeles Times, but that “we are under no obligation to reply, and our position is

absolutely non-negotiable. Every time the copters go up to spray, we’ll go into virgin territory or old Medfly

problem areas and release a minimum of several thousand blue-eyed Medflies. We are organized, patient and

determined.

994

The claim was given credence by an expert’s panel convened on December 6, 1989. A U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA) researcher asserted, “There are some peculiar things happening.” The

experts noted that they were able to identify few Medfly larvae, that most of the Medflies trapped were

females, and that the Medflies were found in only one of three types of traps used to detect infestations.

Moreover, many of the Medflies were trapped just outside previously sprayed areas. Nevertheless, the panel

concluded, “We don’t see any hard evidence [that the letter writer] has the wherewithal to do what he has

threatened.” The Chairman of the panel, an expert of the Medfly who worked for the USDA, concluded, “I

have no explanation for it, except this may be just a string of improbable events.”

995

The letter was turned over to the Los Angeles Police’s Criminal Conspiracy Section. The FBI also

became involved in the investigation. An effort was made to contact the writer of the letter. The USDA

inserted a classified ad in the Los Angeles Times with the following language: “Breeders if you’re for real send

one of your little friends. We want to talk. Call John at USDA.”

996

It is not known if any reply was received.

This case is not included in the main list because it does not fit the definition for a biological agent

used in this study.

Case 1973-02: Naples cholera outbreak, 1973

In a list of “C/B Incidents,” Douglass and Livingstone include an episode, dated November 1974,

described in the following terms: “Forty-eight people, including the head of the Naples Port Authority, tried on

charges arising from a 1973 cholera outbreak.”

997

According to press accounts, however, the cholera outbreak resulted from contaminated mussels.

Government officials were prosecuted for negligence in permitting mussels to be harvested from beds located

in waters polluted by sewage.

998

992

“Anthrax in Iowa? There Just Isn’t Any,” Omaha World Herald, March 9, 1997, p. 1B.

993

Stephanie Chavez and Richard Simon, “Mystery Letter Puts a Strange Twist on Latest Medfly Crisis,” Los Angeles Times,

December 3, 1988, p. B1 (Orange County edition).

994

Ashley Dunn, “Officials Advertise to Contact Mystery Group Claiming Medfly Releases,” Los Angeles Times, February 10,

1990, p. 3B.

995

John Johnson, “Invasion of Pesky Medfly Defies Logic, Scientists Say,” Los Angeles Times, December 30, 1989, p. B6.

996

Ashley Dunn, “Officials Advertise to Contact Mystery Group Claiming Medfly Releases,” Los Angeles Times, February 10,

1990, p. 3B.

997

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, p. 183.

998

“City officials in Naples sent to jail,” Times (London), July 10, 1976, p. 4.

174

Case 1970-02: CIA (against Cuba), March 1970

On several occasions, the government of Cuba has alleged that it was the victim of biological warfare

operations conducted by the United States. These allegations must be put in the context of the broader conflict

between the United States and Cuba. On the one hand, there is a history of attempts by the United States to

assassinate Cuban leaders and to destabilize the communist regime there.

999

On the other hand, Cuba is alleged

by the United States to have an offensive biological weapons program (see page 29). This suggests that Cuba

could be making these allegations to divert attention from its own activities.

In 1971, Cuba experienced a massive outbreak of African hog fever, which they claim was caused by

the United States. According to Cuban estimates, nearly 500,000 hogs had to be killed as a result. The Cubans

also assert, “According to the consensus of competent specialists who investigated the facts, there is no

explanation for the epidemic except sabotage.”

1000

The Cuban version of this event is reflected in one history of

U.S. covert actions against Cuba, which recounts the following story. In March 1970, an anticommunist

terrorist organization allegedly received a vial of “African swine fever virus” from a U.S. intelligence agent.

According to this account, the virus was taken by a fishing boat to Navassa Island, and was then transferred to

Cuba. The account continues, “Six weeks later Cuba suffered the first outbreak of the swine fever in the

Western Hemisphere; pig herds were decimated, causing a serious shortage of pork, the nation’s dietary

staple.”

1001

In 1980, Cuba experienced a large outbreak of dengue fever. Cuban officials claim that an anti-Castro

group known as Omega-7 was responsible for introducing mosquitoes into Cuba carrying the dengue virus.

The Cubans further allege, “It is a well-known fact that no counterrevolutionary group has access to

bacteriological weapons, which require not only special handling but also special knowledge and treatment,

and that only the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense can engage in thus type of action with White House

approval.”

1002

According to Cuban officials, 158 people were killed during the outbreak, including 101

children.

1003

Dengue is a viral disease endemic to South Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific

region. It affects mainly children. Recent outbreaks have occurred in Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, French Guiana,

Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Suriname, and Venezuela. A 1987 outbreak in Vietnam affected a reported 370,000

people. If not properly treated, fatality rates can reach 40–50 per cent. With appropriate treatment, the fatality

rate drops to only 1–2 per cent.

1004

When hemorrhagic conjunctivitis appeared in Cuba in 1981, the regime also alleged that the United

States was responsible for its introduction. Indeed, the Cuban press asserted that an outbreak of the same

disease that also appeared in Suriname could have been caused by the United States as well, “In order to justify

its presence [the disease’s presence] in the region and later introduce it into Cuba.”

1005

In May 1997, the Cuban government aired allegations that the United States deliberately spread thrips

palmi, an insect that infects plants. According to the Cuban account, the United States flew a crop duster

operated by the State Department over Cuba, and released the insects. The United States has denied the

allegation. While U.S. agricultural experts discount the Cuban allegations, the United Nations has undertaken

an investigation of the Cuban claims.

1006

999

For an example of this type of activity, see the assassination plots against Castro described on page 103.

1000

Havana International Service, May 31, 1984, as translated from the Spanish in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Daily Report: Latin America, June 4, 1984, p. Q2.

1001

Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly Secrets: The CIA-Mafia War Against Castro and the Assassination of J.F.K.

(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), p. 349.

1002

Havana International Service, September 13, 1984, as translated from the Spanish in Foreign Broadcast Information

Service, Daily Report: Latin America, September 14, 1984, p. Q6.

1003

Havana International Service, September 12, 1984, as translated from the Spanish in Foreign Broadcast Information

Service, Daily Report: Latin America, September 13, 1984, p. Q3, and Havana International Service, September 13, 1984, as translated

from the Spanish in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, September 14, 1984, pp. Q5-6.

1004

Abram S. Benenson, editor, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Sixteenth edition (Washington, DC: American

Public Health Association, 1995), pp. 131-133.

1005

Havana Domestic Service, September 9, 1981, as translated from the Spanish in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Daily Report: Latin America, September 11, 1981, p. Q1.

1006

Craig Turner, “Cuba Accuses U.S. of Waging Bug Warfare,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1997, p. A21, “Cuba Accuses

U.S. of ‘biological aggression’,” Reuters, May 5, 1997, Havana Tele Rebelde and Cubavision Networks, 14 May 97, translated from the

Spanish by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, May 14, 1997, as available at http://fbis.fedworld.gov.

175

Case 1960-03X: Minutemen, date uncertain (1964-1969?)

Robert DePugh, who founded the right-wing Minutemen organization, once discussed possible use of

biological agents with a reporter. The journalist, J. Harry Jones, Jr., who followed the activities of the

Minutemen for many years and interviewed DePugh on many occasions, gave the following account of this

interview.

I have not talked with him [DePugh] at length yet without his quite calmly and unexpectedly

volunteering some incidental tidbit designed to alarm or chill me. While discussing the relative

likelihood of nuclear or bacteriological warfare being used against the United States, DePugh, who

regarded the latter as the more logical prospect, wrinkled his brow and with seeming seriousness

said. “Do you realize that I could kill everyone in the United States except myself if I wanted to?”

“Oh? How?”

He explained he could do this with a virus developed in his own Biolab Corporation laboratory, a

veterinary drug firm he heads in Norbonne, Missouri. After immunizing himself against it, he said,

he could spread it throughout the country merely by coughing on enough outbound passengers at

Kansas City’s Municipal Air Terminal. In two weeks, DePugh said, everyone else in the nation

would be dead.

1007

Jones does not date the interview, and clearly did not take the statements seriously. Significantly,

Jones provides no indication in his history of the Minutemen that DePugh ever attempted to develop a

biological, or even that he considered acquisition of such a capability. Nor is there any reason to believe that

DePugh’s company had the capability to undertake the kinds of research that he discussed.

DePugh was arrested for his activities involving the Minutemen, and served three years in federal

prison. He was arrested in September 1991 on charges of sexual exploitation of a minor. According to law

enforcement officials, he was found to have taken nude pictures of young girls, ages 10 to 15, while pretending

to be a fashion model.

1008

Following these allegations, DePugh was indicted by a federal grand jury on several

weapons-related charges. Among the weapons he allegedly possessed were an 81mm mortar, a machinegun,

handguns, rifles, rocket propellant, and antiaircraft ammunition. A jury convicted him on three of the four

weapons charges on February 20, 1992.

1009

Case 1963-01: KGB (against Hugh Gaitskell), 1963

Douglass and Livingstone claim that the British Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, was murdered by the

Soviets in 1963. They allege that the food served to him during a function held “at the Soviet embassy” was

contaminated with an unspecified biological agent that led to “an unusual illness and death.”

1010

Peter Wright, a former MI5 (British internal security) official who was involved in the investigation

of Gaitskell’s death, provides the following account of the incident.

1011

Wright knew the labor leader

personally, and had heard about a month before Gaitskell’s death about a trip that the labor leader planned to

take to the Soviet Union.

1012

After Gaitskell died, Wright claims that MI5 was contacted by one of his

1007

J. Harry Jones, Jr., A Private Army (Toronto, Canada: Collier Books, 1969), pp. 17-18. Jones was a correspondent for the

Kansas City Star who closely followed the activities of the Minutemen from 1964. DePugh made similar statements to other journalists.

He told one reporter that his group had “a number of our own physicians and bacteriologists working on the production of biological

agents…. Most of this research goes on after hours in public and private institutions where they hold a regular job during the day and have

an opportunity to moonlight a few hours in the evening on their own.” He also told this reporter that his group was working on seven

biological agents, and that they had undertaken “the selective breeding of various pathogens to increase or decrease their virulence and

render them resistant to antibiotics.” See Eric Norden, “The Paramilitary Right,” Playboy Magazine, June 1969, pp. 103-104, 146, 242-

246, as quoted in Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and

Security Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, PRAC Paper No. 16, May 1996, pp. 52-53.

1008

Bill Norton, “Head of rightist army charged in sex case,” Kansas City Star, September 14, 1991, Diane Carroll and John T.

Dauner, “Snapshots taken at area inn: Man who faces sex charge photographed girls in Independence,” Kansas City Star, September 20,

1991, and Bill Norton and Joe Stephens, “DePugh: A trail of trusts betrayed, Failed businesses leave towns in a state of shock,” Kansas

City Star, September 20, 1991, as they appear on the newspaper’s web site, http://www.kcstar.com.

1009

John T. Dauner, “Grand jury indicts ex-leader of ultraright group,” Kansas City Star, October 8, 1991, and Tom Jackman,

“DePugh convicted on gun charges, Jury not swayed by testimony of son that the weapons were his,” Kansas City Star, February 21, 1992,

as they appear on the newspaper’s web site, http://www.kcstar.com.

1010

Douglass and Livingstone, America the Vulnerable, p. 85.

1011

Peter Wright with Paul Greengrass, Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York:

Viking, 1987), pp. 362-363.

1012

According to press reports at the time, Gaitskell never took the Russia trip Wright mentions. See “Mr. Gaitskell puts off

Moscow visit,” Times (London), December 27, 1962, p. 6.

176

physicians, who had concerns about the manner of his death. The doctor told MI5 that Gaitskell died from

what Wright calls “lupus disseminata,” which the doctor told MI5 rarely appears in temperate regions. Based

on this information, Wright met with a medical officer at Porton Down. According to this expert the cause of

lupus was not known, some people thought that a fungus might be involved, and he had no notion about how

someone might be infected with the disease.

MI5 also received a report from a high level KGB defector who had interactions with colleagues who

worked for Department 13, which was responsible for assassinations (known as “wet affairs” to the Soviets).

This defector had learned that the KGB intended to assassinate a senior West European politician so that

someone favorable to the Soviet Union could take charge. This information naturally increased British

suspicions that Gaitskell had been murdered, given that many officials in MI5 were hostile towards Gaitskell’s

Labour party successor, Harold Wilson.

1013

The British asked for assistance from the CIA. According to Wright, the CIA discovered that one (and

only one) scientific paper had appeared in the Soviet Union about lupus. It showed how a particular chemical

(which Wright does not name, but other sources indicate was hydralazine) could produce lupus symptoms in

rats, but only with enormous doses. Wright claims that this information ended the investigation. However, MI5

fruitlessly continued looking for additional cases of lupus among people who might be Soviet targets for

several years thereafter.

1014

Other sources pinpoint additional suspicious indications. According to one account, allegedly based

on information provided by Wright, Gaitskell visited the Soviet consulate to apply for a visa for his upcoming

visit to the Soviet Union. There was a lengthy delay in dealing with his application. While waiting for his

meeting, Gaitskell was served coffee and biscuits. This account asserts that it was after this visit that Gaitskell

became seriously ill.

1015

Other accounts cast doubt on Wright’s story. According to Walter Somerville, who was Gaitskell’s

consulting physician, the Labor leader did not die of Lupus. An autopsy failed to find any evidence of Lupus.

Somerville reportedly told one investigator, “It was a condition like Lupus. What he actually had was what we

call an immune complex deficiency. His immune system broke down as the cells degenerated.” However,

Somerville also recalled, “Somebody close to Gaitskell told me they feared a pill may have been dropped in his

coffee while on a visit to Poland. They hadn’t seen this happen—they were speculating … I don’t know if

somebody who had been with Gaitskell told MI5.” Somerville denied that either he or the chief medical officer

at the hospital where Gaitskell was treated ever approached MI5 about the case.

1016

Wright interviewed Somerville after receiving the CIA-supplied article on hydralazine. Somerville

cast doubt on the poisoning theory, noting that hydralazine was commercially available for the treatment of

hypertension. Furthermore, “I told them there was nothing new in what they were saying. The side-effects of

hydralazine had been well-known in the West for ten years.” He also told Wright that to poison Gaitskell with

hydralazine would have required repeated doses of the drug given over an extended period.

1017

It also appears that others in MI5 were less inclined than Wright to believe that Gaitskell had been

killed. Arthur Martin, who headed the Soviet counterintelligence branch of MI5, talked to a virus specialist

familiar with Soviet research on Lupus, who totally discounted the possibility that the Soviets might have some

poison capable of producing the disease.

1018

Gaitskell’s biographer, Philip Williams, provided the most thorough account of this episode. Based on

wide ranging interviews, Williams determined that Gaitskell complained of “rheumatic pains” in early 1962

that made it difficult for him to work in the garden. On June 13, he blacked out. During the rest of the summer

he was extremely fatigued, and by the fall was no longer able to drive because of shoulder pains. On December

7, he told friends that he was ill and had “picked something up in Paris.” His condition deteriorated, and he

1013

There are conflicting accounts of the role played by this defector, Anatoli Golitsin. For an account by someone highly

skeptical of both Golitsin and his CIA and MI5 handlers, see David Leigh, The Wilson Plot (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 79-86.

1014

Wright, Spy Catcher, p. 363. Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 78,

however, claims that the CIA discovered three articles. Pincher gives a slightly different spin on the subject. He writes, “Soviet medical

researchers had published three academic papers describing how they had produced a drug that, when administered, reproduced the fatal

heart and kidney symptoms.” Leigh, The Wilson Plot, p. 82, claims that Wright was the source of Pincher’s account.

1015

Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery, p. 77.

1016

As quoted in Leigh, The Wilson Plot, p. 82. Gaitskell arrived in Poland on August 31, 1962 and left on September 6, 1962,

after meeting with the prime minister, foreign minister, and first secretary of the communist party. See, “Poles anxious, Mr. Gaitskell

says,” Times (London), September 6, 1962, p. 5, and “Mr. Gaitskell arrives in Poland,” Times (London), September 1, 1962, p. 5.

1017

As quoted in Leigh, The Wilson Plot, p. 85.

1018

Leigh, The Wilson Plot, p. 83.

177

entered the hospital on December 15. He had a relapse soon after leaving the hospital on December 23, and

was readmitted. Thus, it is evident that the condition that ultimately killed him did not suddenly appear after

his visit to Poland in September or to the Soviet consulate in December.

1019

Following publication of Wright’s account, The Times (London) asked some poison experts (which it

did not name) about the possibility that Gaitskell was poisoned by the Soviets during a trip to Poland. The

newspaper identified hydralazine, a chemical used to treat high blood pressure, as the chemical known to

induce symptoms similar to those of Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE), the disease that killed Gaitskell.

Based on its research, however, the newspaper concluded that “a single large dose of hydralazine causes

vomiting, drowsiness and collapse, so that it would be a very risky way of murdering a visiting politician.”

Other chemicals capable of causing symptoms similar to SLE were also considered unlikely.

1020

A review of this material suggests that it is unlikely that Gaitskell was murdered. Even if he was,

however, there is no evidence to suggest that a biological agent was involved.

1019

Philip M. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), pp. 759-763.

1020

“Red herring,” Times (London), November 17, 1988, p. 15.

Appendix A:

List of Cases

181

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

I. A. Confirmed Use

1997-06 42 New Zealand farmers Illegal spreading of rabbit

hemorrhagic disease virus in New

Zealand.

August 1997 Rabbit

hemorrhagic

disease (RHD)

Criminal YES: Overwhelming evidence to

support intentional introduction of

prohibited pathogen.

1996-05 43 Diane Thompson Used Shigella taken from a hospital

laboratory to infect co-workers.

October 1996 Shigella Criminal YES: Thompson pled guilty to the

charges.

1995-02 45 Debora Green, MD Poisoned husband with ricin. August 1995 Ricin Criminal YES: Perpetrator convicted.

1994-04 47 Richard J. Schmidt Accused of injecting a former

girlfriend with HIV-infected blood.

August 1994 HIV Criminal YES: Convicted in jury trial.

1993-03 47 “Iwan E.” Accused of injecting lover with HIV-

contaminated blood.

June 1993 HIV Criminal YES: Convicted by Dutch judge.

1992-05 76 Brian T. Stewart Deliberately injected his own son

with HIV-contaminated blood.

February

1992

HIV Criminal YES: Convicted in jury trial.

1990-01 47 Aum Shinrikyo Allegedly attempted to use botulinum

toxin and anthrax.

April 1990-

March 1995

Bacillus anthracis,

Botulinum toxin,

and other

pathogens

Terrorist YES: Numerous press reports, but no

official indictment on these allegations.

1984-02 50 Rajneeshees Used biological agent to make

townspeople ill as test for plot to take

over community.

August-

September

1984

Salmonella

typhimurium

Terrorist YES: Two members of group convicted

in both state and federal courts for

participation in plot. Other members

admitted to participation, but never

tried.

1981-02 58 “Dark Harvest” Spread anthrax-contaminated soil to

send political message.

October 1981 Bacillus anthracis Terrorist YES: Press reports suggest that

anthrax was found in at least one

sample of dirt consistent with soil found

on Gruinard Island.

1978-04 58 Bulgarian Secret Police Attempt to assassinate Bulgarian

dissident Georgi Markov.

September

1978

Ricin State NO: State action. Official statements at

time of incident support theory of

Bulgarian use of ricin. Former KGB

officials admit involvement in case.

Subsequent reports consistent with

original account.

1978-03 60 Bulgarian Secret Police Attempt to assassinate Bulgarian

defector Vladimir Kostov.

August 1978 Ricin State NO: State action. Official statements at

the time support the theory of Bulgarian

use of ricin. Subsequent reports

consistent with original account.

1977-02M 60 Arnfinn Nesset Convicted of using curacit, a curare

derivative.

May 1977-

November

1980

Curacit Criminal NO: Medical case, although convicted

of murdering 22 people by a Norwegian

court.

1970-01 61 Eric Kranz, Ph.D. Used animal parasite to infect

roommates.

February

1970

Ascaris suum Criminal YES: Defendant indicted and brought

to trial for alleged use of parasite to

182

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

harm his roommates.

1964-01 61 Mitsuru Suzuki, MD Physician used shigella and

dysentery to infect up to 200 people.

December

1964-March

1966

Salmonella typhi

and Shigella

Criminal YES: Defendant indicted and brought

to trial for alleged use of pathogens.

1952-02 63 Mau Mau Use of plant toxin to kill livestock. 1950s Toxin: African

milk bush

(Synadenium

grantii)

Terrorist YES: Confirmed by scientific studies of

the incident.

1939-01 65 Kikuko Hirose Contaminated pastry used to infect

12 people.

April 1939 S. typhi and S.

paratyphi

Criminal YES: Accused convicted by Japanese

court.

1936-01 65 Tei-Seburo Takahashi Infected 17 people, killing 3, using

food contaminated with S. typhi.

March 1936-

November

1936

S. typhi Criminal YES: Convicted by a Japanese court

and sentenced to death.

1933-01 65 Benoyendra Chandra

Pandey

Use of plague to murder. November

1933

Yersinia pestis Criminal YES: Defendants convicted in court of

the offense.

1932-01 67 Japanese military Fruit infected with cholera fed to

League of Nations commission

investigating the take over of

Manchuria.

April-June

1932

cholera State NO: State action. Statement by

member of Japanese Imperial family is

the primary source of the information,

reflecting a document written by him in

the 1940s.

1916-01 67 Arthur Warren Waite Used various biological agents to

murder in-laws.

1916 Various Criminal YES: Convicted of murder and

executed.

1915-01 69 German intelligence Sabotage operations conducted by

German intelligence in neutral

countries to kill animals being

shipped to Allied countries or being

used to support Allied operations.

1915-1917 Glanders

(Burkholderia

mallei) and

Bacillus anthracis

State NO: State action. Overwhelming

evidence of these activities.

1913-01 71 Karl Hopf Infected third wife with typhus-

contaminated food. Acquired cholera

for same purpose. Also probably

killed first two wives and parents

using arsenic. May have used M.

bovis to kill two step-children

1913 S. typhi

M. bovis?

Criminal YES: Convicted by German court for

attempting to murder wife. Sentenced

to death for other murders involving

arsenic.

1912-1 71 Henri Girard Used Salmonella typhi and

poisonous mushrooms to murder

people to get death benefits from life

insurance policies. Killed two people.

1912-1918 Salmonella typhi

and poisonous

mushrooms

Criminal YES: Girard died before trial. He

allegedly admitted to crimes. Co-

conspirators were convicted.

1910-01 73 O’Brien de Lacy and

Vladimir Pantchenko

Use of diphtheria toxin to murder

O’Brien de Lacy’s brother-in-law.

1910 Diphtheria toxin

and cholera

endotoxin

Criminal YES: Defendants convicted in Russian

court for murder.

I. B. Probable or Possible Use

1994-03M 76 Orville Lynn Majors Accused of murdering six hospital 1994-1995 Possibly Criminal NO: Medical case. Unclear that Majors

183

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

patients, but could be responsible for

as many as 100 deaths. In addition

to use of potassium chloride, press

accounts allege that he may have

employed epinephrine (adrenaline).

epinephrine

(adrenaline) in

addition to

potassium

chloride.

used biological agent; not yet convicted

of any murders.

1993-04 76 Animal Liberation Front Claimed to have put HIV into a bomb 1993 HIV Terrorist YES: ???

1992-06 76 Marilyn Tan Accused of injecting Con Boland with

HIV-contaminated blood

1992 HIV Criminal NO: Judge acquitted Tan.

1990-05X 77 Unidentified woman Suicide attempt using HIV-infected

blood

1990? HIV Criminal NO: As a suicide does not meet the

case definition.

1990-02 77 Giardia in Scotland Feces containing giardia put into

apartment building water tank in

Edinburgh

June 1990 Giardia Criminal NO: No evidence that perpetrator knew

that his actions would cause a disease

outbreak.

1989-04M 77 Efren Saldivar Allegedly poisoned patients,

including using morphine (a toxin)

1989-1998 Morphine Criminal NO: Medical case also allegations still

under investigation and alleged

perpetrator not formally charged with

any crimes.

1989-03 77 Civilian Cooperation

Bureau, Republic of South

Africa

Allegedly contaminated water supply

in refugee camp in Namibia

1989 Cholera, Yellow

fever virus

State NO: State action. No confirmation of

this specific incident, but additional

details about efforts to acquire

biological materials for use in similar

types of activities revealed in hearings

by Truth and Reconciliation

Commission.

1988-01 78 Unknown Colonel Jean-Claude Paul, one-time

commander of the elite Dessalines

Battalion, was murdered by an

unspecified poison.

November 6,

1988

Unknown Unknown NO: Insufficient evidence to identify the

type of poison involved. May have been

a chemical.

1987-01 79 David Acer, DDS Dentist infected with HIV either

deliberately or accidentally infected

six patients with HIV

December

1987-1990

HIV Criminal NO: Never officially confirmed that Acer

deliberately infected his patients.

1985-02 80 Unidentified Mexican

workers

Allegedly spread parasite to protect

jobs in screwworm eradication

program.

1985? Screwworm Criminal NO: Only a single source, and account

suggests perpetrators were never

formally charged.

1981-01 80 Unknown One-time double agent for CIA (Boris

Korczak) allegedly attacked with

contaminated pellet similar to one

used against Markov and Kostov

September

1981

Ricin? State? NO: Alleged state action. Medical

accounts confirm that something

happened to Korczak.

1970-04X 82 Additional East Bloc

bioassassinations

Numerous reported instances of

assassination attempts using toxins

1970s-1980s Unknown State NO: Insufficient information.

1979-02 83 Zimbabwe terrorists White government of Rhodesia

claims that terrorists have spread

anthrax, possibly killing 20 people.

November

1979

Bacillus anthracis Terrorist NO: Insufficient information to support

allegations.

184

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

1976-02 83 Rhodesian Central

Intelligence Organization

Allegations that the former

government of Rhodesia deliberately

spread anthrax and cholera in

predominantly guerilla-controlled

areas.

1976-1980 Bacillus anthracis State NO: Insufficient information to support

allegations.

1971-01 84 KGB Reported attempt to assassinate

Alexander Solzhenitsyn using toxin-

contaminated salve

August 1971 Claimed to be

ricin

State NO: State action. Evidence marginal,

but appears to originate with former

KGB officials involved in the incident.

1969-01 84 John R. Hill. MD Allegedly murdered wife with

biological agents

1969 Probable multiple

unknown

Criminal NO: Insufficient evidence to support

allegations of bioagent use.

1966-01M 86 Mario Jascalevich, MD Allegedly murdered patients at a

hospital.

1966 Tubocurarine, a

curare

component.

Criminal NO: Medical case plus no conviction in

case.

1961-01 86 “J.L.” Hepatitis A virus contaminates food

served at officer’s mess

October 1961 Hepatitis A virus Criminal NO: No evidence that perpetrator

knowingly caused the outbreak.

1957-01 86 Brazilian Indian Protection

Service (SPI),

Used of biological agents against

aborigines in a campaign of

genocide

1957-1965 Multiple State NO: Available information suggests that

confirmed dissemination methods do

not meet case definition.

1949-01 87 Toshima Hospital Outbreak Allegation that unnamed intern

contaminated food infecting 20

people

November

1949

S. Typhi Criminal NO: Case never prosecuted,

apparently due to lack of evidence.

1947-01 87 “Zionist” terrorists Allegations that Jewish groups used

cholera and other agents against

Egypt and Syria

November

1947-May

1948

V. cholerae, S.

typhi, “dysentery”

Terrorist/

State

NO: Insufficient evidence on most

credible part of allegations.

1942-02 88 Polish resistance Use of pathogens to infect German

soldiers during World War Two

December

1942-

September

1943

Salmonella typhi Terrorist NO: Insufficient information

1942-01 89 British intelligence (SOE)

and Czech resistance

Allegation that botulinum was used

in assassination attempt against

Richard Heydrich

May 1942 Botulinum toxin State NO: Available evidence does not

support claim that botulinum toxin was

used.

1940-01X 89 Egyptian “gangster” Used stolen S. typhi culture to

murder victims in insurance scam

1940s? S. typhi Criminal NO: Insufficient information on incident.

1930-02X 90 German doctor Attempted to commit suicide by

giving himself an injection of tetanus

toxin

About 1930 Tetanus toxin Criminal NO: Insufficient information to confirm

that the case occurred as reported.

1930-01X 90 “Hungarian artist” Attempted to kill wife. About 1930 V. cholerae and

S. typhi

Criminal NO: Insufficient information to confirm

that case occurred as reported.

1917-01 90 Unknown German

sympathizers

Allegation that supplies of court

plaster, used to cover wounds, were

contaminated with tetanus by

July 1917 Tetanus Unknown NO: Available evidence does not

support claim that material was

deliberately infected.

185

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

German agents.

1910-02X 90 Pancho Villa Alleged use of botulinum toxin to

attack Federal troops during Mexican

revolution

1910s Botulinum toxin Terrorist NO: Insufficient information.

1909-01 91 B. Clarke Hyde Allegedly infected as many as 10

people with typhoid to cover up use

of poisons.

November

1909

Salmonella typhi Criminal NO: Suspect never convicted of alleged

actions, despite three trials.

1900-01X 93 Deaths in Malawi Use of castor beans (containing

ricin) to kill unwanted children.

Unknown Ricin Criminal NO: Insufficient details of cases to

permit analysis.

II. A. Threatened Use (Confirmed Possession)

1998-06 95 Iraqi terrorism Claimed plans by Iraq to use

biological agents against UK

March 1998 B. anthracis State NO: Insufficient information.

1997-01 95 Thomas Leahy Possession of toxins with apparent

intent to use them as weapons

January 1997 Ricin and nicotine Criminal YES: Convicted in U.S. federal court.

1996-04 98 Michael Just, Ph.D. Attempted extortion directed at

British dairies

May 1996 Yersinia

enterocolitica

Criminal YES: Defendants convicted in British

courts.

1993-05 99 Dwayne Kuehl Planned to use ricin to murder

building inspector

March or May

1993

Ricin Criminal YES: Defendant admitted to plot

1992-03 99 Minnesota Patriots Council Planned use of ricin toxin to murder

law enforcement officials

May 1992 Ricin Terrorist YES: Several defendants convicted in

federal court.

1990-03 100 Iraqi Terrorism Claimed plans by Iraq to use

biological agents in terrorism attacks

at time of Gulf War crisis

August 1990-

February

1991

Unknown State NO: Insufficient information.

1984-03 101 Kevin T. Birch and James

B. Cahoon

Use of pathogens to kill race horses November

1984

Clostridium

botulinum, and

Clostridium tetani

Criminal YES: Defendants convicted in U.S.

federal courts.

1972-01 102 RISE Planned use of S. typhi to

contaminate water systems

January 1972 Salmonella typhi Terrorist YES: One defendant pled guilty to the

offense.

1960-02 103 CIA Plot to kill Lumumba September

1960

Unknown State NO: State action. Confirmed by official

U.S. account.

1960-01 103 CIA Multiple plots to kill Castro 1960-1961 Botulinum toxin State NO: State action. Confirmed by official

U.S. account.

1952-01 103 MGB Plot to assassinate Tito Late 1952 Plague State YES: Confirmed by official records.

1944-01 104 British SOE Plot to assassinate Hitler June 1944 Anthrax State YES: Confirmed by official records.

II. B. Threatened Use (No Confirmed Possession)

2000-08 105 Unknown Two potteries threatened with

biological agent

June 2000 Unknown Unknown YES: Apparent threat intended to make

people believe that they were subjected

to biological attack.

2000-07 105 Unknown Internet hoax involving supposed

pathogen known as Klingerman virus

May 2000 Nonexistent Unknown YES: People apparently believed in the

existence of the danger, which led to

186

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

pathogen known as Klingerman virus real responses.

1999-66 105 James Kenneth Gluck Threatened ricin use September

1999

Ricin Criminal YES: Made threat and apparently

explored production of ricin.

1999-77 106 Diazien Hossencofft Threatened to provide virus to China September

1999

Unknown virus Criminal YES: Perpetrator clearly wanted people

to believe that he was capable of

producing material in question

1999-76 106 Unknown Threats against robbery victims with

allegedly HIV contaminated syringes

August 1999 Claimed HIV Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended robbery

victims to believed HIV was present.

1999-64 106 World Islamic Front for

Fighting Jews and

Christians

Threatened use of biological agents

against Israeli and U.S. targets

April 1999 Unknown Terrorist YES: Intention to convince West that

biological agents could be used.

1999-71 107 Chechens Threats to obtain and use biological

agents, coupled with Russian claims

that Chechens possess agents

February

1999

Claimed

biological agents

Terrorists YES: Multiple claims of possession or

interest coupled with explicit threat to

obtain and use.

1999-68 107 Unknown Claim that milk was contaminated

with biological agent

March 1999 Unknown Unknown YES: Investigated by U.S. government

agencies.

1999-70 107 Unknown Croatian thief Robbery victims threatened with

allegedly HIV contaminated syringe

January 1999 Claimed HIV Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended victims to

believe HIV was present.

1999-75 Unnamed Christian

Millenarian groups

Unspecified threats to use biological

weapons in Israel

Throughout

1999

Claimed

acquisition of

unspecified

biologicals

Terrorist NO: Despite claimed concern by U.S.

government intelligence organizations,

only one source available.

1998-31 108 Unknown HIV threat against meat packing

company

December

1998

Claimed HIV Unknown YES: No agent used, but perpetrator

intended recipients to believe HIV was

present.

1998-10 108 Republic of Texas: Johnnie

Wise, Jack Abbott Grebe,

and Oliver Dean Emigh

Threatened to use biological agents

against federal officials

June 1998 Unknown Terrorist YES: Threat confirmed, even if no

evidence of agent possession.

1998-50 110 Lawrence A. Maltz Unspecified biological threats April 1998 Unknown Criminal YES: Threatened to use biological

agents, although there is no evidence

of possession.

1998-34 108 Unknown Someone deliberately spread rumors

that meat was contaminated with

HIV

April 1998 HIV Criminal YES: Effort to make people think that

an actual incident occurred.

1998-08 108 Palestine Islamic Jihad Threatened to use biological

weapons against Israel

April 1998 Unknown Terrorist NO: Insufficient evidence.

1997-12 111 Unknown Extortion attempt involving claim that

products of a bottling plant were

contaminated with a biological agent.

March 1997 Unknown Criminal YES: Threat ultimately assessed as a

hoax, but perpetrator identified and

convicted.

1997-10 110 Unknown Threat against the water systems of

36 U.S. cities

July 1997 Anthrax and

botulinum toxin

Terrorist YES: Threats ultimately deemed not

credible, but were initially taken

seriously by government officials in

187

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

threatened cities. Actual source of

threat is unclear.

1997-04 110 PKK (Kurdish terrorist

group)

Allegation that group was

considering use of biological agents.

August 1997 E. coli and C.

botulinum

Terrorist NO: All reporting from one source of

uncertain reliability.

1997-05 110 Counter Holocaust

Lobbyists of Hillel

False claim that anthrax was sent to

B’nai B’rith headquarters in

Washington, D.C.

April 1997 Bacillus cereus,

but claimed

Bacillus anthracis

Terrorist YES: Considerable publicity of event,

but no prosecution.

1996-03 111 Tokiyuki Asaoka Extortion attempt August 1996 Claimed E. coli Criminal YES: Only one press account, but

based on official report.

1996-07 112 Hiroaki Chiku Extortion attempt August 1996 Claimed E. coli Criminal NO: Case confirmed by Japanese

police, but information received too late

to be incorporated into analysis.

1996-08 112 Justice Department Claimed that razor blades found in

envelopes contained in letters were

covered with HIV-infected blood

March 1996 Claimed HIV Terrorist YES: Perpetrators wanted recipients to

believe HIV was present.

1996-01 112 German Blackmailers Extortion attempt January 1996 Claimed Snake

venom

Criminal YES: Multiple press accounts citing

German police sources.

1995-06 113 Biological agent threats

against Latin American

cities

Threats April 1995 Claimed cholera,

typhoid, malaria,

and yellow fever

Terrorist NO: Only a single source.

1995-05 113 Frank Riolfo Extortion attempt October 1995 Claimed HIV Criminal YES: Defendant convicted in British

court.

1995-04 113 Barry Dixon Extortion attempt November

1995

Claimed Bacillus

cereus

Criminal YES: Defendant convicted in British

court.

1994-02 113 Michael Norman and

Alexander Taylor

Extortion attempt January 1994 Claimed HIV Criminal YES: Defendant convicted in British

court.

1994-01 114 Animal Liberation Front Mailing hypodermic needles

allegedly contaminated with HIV

January 1994 Claimed HIV Terrorist NO: Insufficient information. Incident

not included on Animal Liberation Front

list of its activities.

1992-04 114 “The Terminator” Extortion attempt September

1992

Claimed HIV Criminal YES: Press reports only, but based on

official reports.

1992-01 114 Animal Aid Association Claim that food bars were infected

with HIV

January 1992 Claimed HIV Terrorist NO: Insufficient information. Incident

not included on Animal Liberation Front

list of animal rights terrorist activities.

1991-02 114 Threat against Kelowna,

British Columbia water

supply

Claim that water supply of Kelowna,

BC was contaminated by a biological

material

January 1991 Unknown Terrorist NO: More information needed.

1989-01 114 Robin Smith Extortion attempt May 1989 Claimed HIV Criminal YES: Defendant convicted by court.

188

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

1984-01 115 Peter Vivian Wardrop Prison inmate tries to force

Queensland, Australia, authorities

into instituting prison reform

January 1984 Claimed hoof and

mouth disease

Criminal YES: Press coverage of incident cites

official statements.

1983-01 115 Montgomery Todd Meeks Attempted to acquire ricin to murder

father

October 1983 Ricin Criminal YES: Press reports indicate perpetrator

convicted.

1982-01 116 William Chanslor Attempted to acquire ricin to murder

wife

April 1982 Ricin Criminal YES: Press reports perpetrator

convicted.

1980-02X 117 Tamil guerrillas Threat to use biological agents

against Sinhalese and crops in Sri

Lanka by Tamil group

1983-1987? Claimed

Schistosoma

worms, Yellow

fever, Leaf Curl

(against rubber

plants), and

unspecified agent

against tea

bushes

Terrorist NO: Only one source of information on

incident.

1970-05X 118 Red Army Faction Variety of claims of interest in

biological agents

1970s Claimed Bacillus

anthracis

Terrorist NO: Insufficient information.

1979-01 119 Aliens of America Threatened to contaminate U.S.

consulate in Munich with

Legionnaires disease,

July 1979 Legionnaires Terrorist NO: Insufficient information.

1978-02 119 Tucson extortionist Threatened to spread plague-

infected fleas in Tucson, Arizona

unless an extortion payment was

made.

September

1978

Yersinia pestis Criminal YES: Press reports cite official

statements regarding incident.

1978-01 120 Tucson extortionist Threatened to contaminate Tucson,

Arizona water supply with typhoid

unless extortion was made.

April 1978 Typhoid Criminal YES: Press reports cite official

statements regarding incident.

1977-03 120 Unknown Claim that someone had discovered

a bacteria that could contaminate

water of nuclear-armed nations,

March 1977 Unknown

pathogen

Terrorist? NO: Insufficient information.

1977-01 120 Extortionist Unnamed extortionist threatened to

contaminate Miami city water supply

with botulinum toxin.

1977 Botulinum toxin Criminal NO: Insufficient information.

1976-01 121 Stephen Grant Morton Threat to spread pathogen-

containing ticks through the mails

June 1976 Unspecified Criminal YES: Substantial press coverage citing

official statements. Suspect arrested.

1975-01 121 Polisario Explored using biological agents to

contaminate water systems in major

cities.

February

1975

Cholera Terrorist No: Insufficient information.

1974-03 121 Middle East firm Allegedly sought bacteria to

contaminate Jordan River.

1974 Unknown Terrorist NO: Insufficient information.

1974-02 122 Legion of Nabbil Kadduri

Usur

Threat to release bacteria if

demands not met.

1974 Unknown Terrorist NO: Insufficient information.

189

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

1973-01 122 German “mad scientist” Threat to use botulinum toxin and

anthrax against targets in Germany

November

1973

Claimed Bacillus

anthracis and

botulinum toxin

Uncertain

(either

terrorist or

criminal)

YES: Substantial press coverage, but

evidence admittedly marginal.

1970-06X 122 Poisoner of Los Angeles

water supply

Threat to poison Los Angeles water

supply with biological poison

No date Unspecified Uncertain

(either

terrorist or

criminal)

NO: Insufficient information.

II. C. Threatened Use (Anthrax hoaxes)

2000-10 122 Unknown Anthrax threat against Cape Coral

Industrial Park

November

2000

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-09 123 Unnamed 19-year-old Falsely identified jar September

2000

Claimed B.

anthracis

None YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-06 123 Unknown Anthrax threat against University of

Pennsylvania Hillel

April 2000 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-05 123 Unknown Anthrax hoax at U.S. Post Office

mailbox

March 2000 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-04 123 Unknown Threat against IRS Service Center in

Utah treated as anthrax threat

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-03 123 Student Anthrax threat against Fredonia High

School in New York state

Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-02 123 Micky A. Sauer Anthrax threat against targets in

Wisconsin

January 2000 Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

2000-01 123 Unknown Anthrax threat against abortion

clinics in 21 states and District of

Columbia

January 2000 Claimed B.

anthracis

Terrorist YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-59 122 Unknown Anthrax threat against Bedford North

Lawrence High School

December

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-62 122 Unidentified juvenile Anthrax threat against Fredonia High

School

November

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-55 124 Unknown Anthrax threat against Department of

Energy processing plant

November

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-78 124 Unknown Anthrax threat against financial

services office

October 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES:

1999-53 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against Kentucky

Educational Television in Lexington,

Kentucky

October 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-52 125 Unknown Anthrax threat against U.S. Post

Office in Robinson, Pennsylvania

September

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

190

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

1999-54 125 Unknown Anthrax threat against Truman

Library

August 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-60 125 Unknown Anthrax threat against Internet

service provider in Seattle,

Washington

August 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-57 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against Proctor and

Gamble

August 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-56 125 Unknown Anthrax threat against grocery store July 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-58 125 Unknown Anthrax threat against Planned

Parenthood office

July 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-42 137 Unknown Anthrax threat against two Nassau

County, New York, courthouses

June 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-45 105 Unknown Two Planned Parenthood clinics in

Cincinnati, Ohio, received anthrax

threat letters

June 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-51 105 Unknown Anthrax threat letters sent to Jesuit

college and Catholic high school

May 1999 Anthrax Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipient to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-41 126 Unknown Anthrax threat against Mentor, Ohio,

high school

May 1999? Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-38 126 Unknown Anthrax threat against Madison,

Tennessee, library

May 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-37 127 Dead man Anthrax hoax in Brooklyn, New York May 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-40 127 Unknown Anthrax threat against Sharonville,

Ohio, anti-pornography group

April 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-61 127 Unknown Anthrax threat against offices of

Blackfeet tribal council

April 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-36 127 Unknown Anthrax hoax against Lake Worth,

Florida, law firm: powder in letter

suspected of being anthrax

May 1999 Suspected B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: It appears that perpetrator

wanted recipient to believe that the

powder was a dangerous substance.

1999-35 127 Unknown Anthrax threat against Intel

Corporation

April 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-27 127 Unknown Anthrax threat against Dunkirk High

School in New York

April 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-34 127 Two pranksters Milk jugs labeled “anthrax” April 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrators intended recipients

to believe anthrax was present.

1999-33 128 Unknown Suspicions that package was an

anthrax threat

April 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Unclear whether the package

was an anthrax hoax or not.

1999-49 128 Unknown Suspected hazardous materials

threat at Kansas City, Missouri, IRS

April 1999 Anthrax Unknown NO: No evidence that anyone actually

intended to threaten or imply a threat of

191

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

Service Center treated as potential

anthrax threat

biological agents.

1999-48 128 Unknown Anthrax threat against Harrison

County Courthouse, Biloxi,

Mississippi

April 1999 Anthrax Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-47 128 Unknown Anthrax threat letter sent to house in

Lewisville, Texas

March 1999 Anthrax Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipient to

believe anthrax present.

1999-65 106 Unknown Anthrax hoax at Hamburg Senior

High School

March 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-32 107 Woman put vials labeled anthrax and

Ebola in brother’s jacket, creating

incident at Pittsburgh International

Airport

March 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis and

Ebola

Hoax YES: Perpetrator intended recipient to

believe anthrax and Ebola were

present.

1999-31 129 Unknown Offices of Southern Baptist

Convention in Nashville, Tennessee,

sent anthrax threat

March 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-30 129 Unknown Anthrax threat against Lumberton,

North Carolina, dialysis clinic

March 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-28 129 Unknown Anthrax threat against offices of

Latter-Day Saints in Salt Lake City,

Utah

March 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-26 105 Unknown Suspected anthrax threat against

Planned Parenthood clinic in

Chicago, Illinois

March 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown NO: Press reports do not indicate if an

actual threat was included in the

package.

1999-29 129 Unknown Anthrax threat against Blanca,

Colorado, town officials

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-25 129 Unknown Anthrax threat against Department of

Motor Vehicles office in Honolulu,

Hawaii

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-24 130 Unknown Letters threatening congressional

offices with chemical and biological

weapons

February

1999

Unspecified Unknown YES: Perpetrators clearly wanted to

threaten use of biological weapons.

1999-23 130 Unknown Anthrax threat in Gwinnett County,

Georgia

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-22 130 Unknown Anthrax hoax at Spring Hills, Florida,

car wash: someone left a milk bottle

labeled “anthrax”

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended someone to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-21 130 Unknown A package with powder was

discovered at the loading dock of the

U.S. Court of Appeals, Atlanta,

Georgia

February

1999

Suspected B.

anthracis

Unknown NO: Press reports do not indicate

whether or not the incident involved a

threat, or whether it was just a

suspected threat.

1999-20 131 Unknown Anthrax threats against 30+ abortion February Claimed B. Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

192

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

clinics 1999 anthracis believe anthrax was present.

1999-19 133 Unknown Terrorist group in Yemen makes

anthrax threat

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-18 134 Unknown Anthrax threat against Los Angeles

Times

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-17 134 Unknown Anthrax threat against State

Department

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-16 134 Unknown Anthrax threat against multiple

targets, including government and

press offices

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-15 134 Unknown Anthrax threat against school in East

Aurora, New York

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Student YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-14 134 Unknown Anthrax threat against Lackawanna,

New York, school

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Students YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-13 135 Unknown Anthrax threat against school in

Cattaraugus County, New York

February

1999

Claimed B.

anthracis

Students YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-12 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against business in

Alden, New York

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-11 135 Unknown Anthrax threat against grocery store

in East Aurora, New York

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-10 135 Two students Anthrax threat mailed to Buffalo,

New York, high school

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-09 135 Unknown Anthrax threat called into West

Seneca, New York, town hall

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-08 135 High school student Anthrax threat sent to Erie County,

New York, middle school

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-07 136 Unknown Anthrax threat against Sierra Madre

hospital

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-06 136 Unknown Anthrax threat against Riverside,

California, Pizza Hut

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-05 136 Unknown Anthrax threat against U.S.

Attorney’s Office in Buffalo, New

York

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-04 136 Unknown Anthrax threat against Cathedral

City, California, Target store

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-03 137 Unknown Anthrax threat against U.S.

Attorney’s Office in Rochester, New

York

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-02 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against Oregon library January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-44 137 Unknown Anthrax threat against auto January 1999 Claimed B. Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

193

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

dealership in Los Angeles, California anthracis believe anthrax was present.

1999-43 137 Unknown Anthrax threat against Ocala

Regional Medical Center

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-50 105 Unknown Vial marked anthrax found on

sidewalk

January 1999 Anthrax Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipient to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-01 137 Unknown Anthrax threat against Orange

County High School

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1999-39 138 Unknown Anthrax threat against Wal-Mart in

California

January 1999 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

31998-49 107 Unknown Anthrax threat against woman in

Amarillo, Texas

October 1998 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-48 147 Unknown Anthrax threat against Catholic

Church in Cheektowaga, California

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-45 107 Unknown Anthrax threat at San Diego,

California, hotel

August 1998 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-44 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against U.S.

Attorney’s office, Rochester, New

York

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-43 138 Unknown Anthrax threat against Newark,

California, shipping company

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-42 138 Unknown Anthrax threat against grocery stores

in Palmdale, California

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-41 138 Unknown Anthrax threat against Wal-Mart in

La Quinta, California

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-40 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against California

department store

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-38 139 Unknown Anthrax threat against California

dance club

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-37 139 Unknown Anthrax threat against California

office building

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-36 105 Unknown Anthrax threat against Van Nuys

courthouses

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-35 140 Unknown Anthrax threat against federal

courthouse

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-33 140 Unknown Anthrax threat against ex-wife December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-32 140 Unknown Anthrax threat against employees of

California school district

December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: Perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-30 108 Unknown Teacher received towelette allegedly

containing anthrax

October 1998 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present. May be

194

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

related to case 1998-13.

1998-29 140 Unknown Anthrax threat at Coppell, Texas,

postal facility

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-28 141 Unknown Anthrax threat against anti-abortion

activist in Twin Peaks, California

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-27 141 Unknown Anthrax threat discovered at

Pembroke Pines, Florida, post office

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-26 141 Unknown Anthrax threat against school in

Virginia Beach, Virginia

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-25 141 Unknown Anthrax threat against antiabortion

activist in Chesapeake, Virginia

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-24 141 Unknown Anthrax threat against Miami Beach,

Florida, magazine

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-23 142 Two students Anthrax threat against Alexandria

(Indiana) Middle School

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-22 141 Three students Anthrax threat against Shelbyville

(Indiana) Middle School with

envelope purportedly containing

anthrax left on a teacher’s desk

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-21 142 Unknown Anthrax threat against courthouse in

Bloomington, Indiana

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-20 142 Unknown Note left at bank mentioning anthrax

exposure

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-19 143 Unknown Letter purportedly containing anthrax

sent to Warren Township High

School, Indiana

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-18 143 Student Anthrax threat against high school,

Bloomington, Indiana

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Criminal YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-17 143 Unknown Letter purportedly containing anthrax

sent to branch bank in Wal-Mart

November

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown YES: No biological agent present, but

perpetrator intended recipients to

believe anthrax was present.

1998-16 143 Unknown Letters purportedly containing November Claimed B. Terrorist YES: No evidence of biological agent,

195

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

anthrax sent to five locations 1998 anthracis but perpetrator(s) clearly wanted

victims to believe anthrax was involved.

1998-14 143 Unknown Letters allegedly containing anthrax

mailed to ten abortion clinics

October 1998 Claimed B.

anthracis

Terrorist YES: No evidence of biological agent,

but perpetrator(s) clearly wanted

victims to believe anthrax was involved.

1998-13 146 Unknown Mailed letters allegedly containing

anthrax-contaminated moist

towelette packages

October 1998 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown NO: No evidence of biological agent

and no information on motivation of

perpetrator.

1998-12 143 Brothers for the Freedom of

America

Claimed to have spread anthrax in a

state office building

August 1998 Anthrax Terrorist YES: Confirmed by multiple sources,

although the identity of the perpetrators

still unknown.

1998-03 110 Lawrence Edward Pagnano Claimed to have put anthrax into

letter mailed to collection agency

March 1998 B. anthracis Criminal YES: Effort made to make it appear a

biological agent was in the letter.

1992-02 150 Henry D. Pierce Claimed use of anthrax March 1992 Claimed Bacillus

anthracis

Criminal YES: Press reports only, but based on

official reports.

III. A. Confirmed Possession

1996-02 151 Unknown Theft of botulinum toxin from

university laboratory. Toxin returned

to university after publicity over theft.

March 1996 Botulinum toxin Criminal NO: No evidence that the perpetrator

even knew that botulinum was in the

stolen package.

1995-03 151 Ray W. Mettetal, MD Contemplated murder using ricin

toxin

August 1995 Ricin Criminal YES: Under indictment by U.S.

prosecutors. Not yet tried.

1995-01 152 Larry Wayne Harris Illicitly obtained Yersinia pestis

culture

May 1995 Yersinia pestis Uncertain YES: No evidence to support intended

terrorist intent, but he was convicted of

fraud in connection with acquisition of

the agent.

1993-02 153 John Gunnar Linner, Ph.D. Scientist found in possession of

several toxins, plus had recipe to

make botulinum

April 1991 Tetrodotoxin and

botulinum toxin

Criminal YES: Alleged perpetrator clearly had

interest in poisons, but was never

convicted of any criminal offense.

1993-01 153 Thomas Lavy Arrested for possession of ricin toxin April 1993 Ricin Uncertain YES: Considerable evidence to support

possession of agent, but no evidence

to prove intent.

III. B. Probable or Possible Possession

1998-46 154 PKK Reportedly in possession of cobra

toxin for resale.

June 1998 Cobra toxin Terrorist NO: Only a single source.

1997-03 154 James Dalton Bell Explored toxins as means to

assassinate IRS and other

government officials

February

1997

Botulinum toxin

and ricin

Terrorist YES: Although never tried on these

allegations, supporting evidence is

contained in court documents.

1996-06 156 Aryan Republican Army Claimed possession of radiological September Unspecified Terrorist NO: Insufficient evidence.

196

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

isotopes and biological agents 1997

1983-02 156 “Two brothers in

Massachusetts”

Allegedly possessed ricin 1983 Ricin Criminal NO: Insufficient information.

1980-01 156 Red Army Faction Police reportedly raided a safe

house in Paris, France, where a

laboratory being used to make

botulinum toxin

November

1980

Botulinum toxin Terrorist YES: German prosecutor confirmed

incident, but details remain scanty.

1945-01 157 DIN (Judgment) Plot by former Jewish resistance

fighters to put biological agents into

water supply of major German cities.

1945 Unspecified

pathogen

Terrorist NO: Insufficient information to confirm

allegation.

IV. A. Possible Interest in Acquisition (No Known Possession)

1998-11 161 Algeria’s Armed Islamic

Group (GIA)

Allegedly trying to grow C.

botulinum, but police only confirm

possession of document on how to

grow it.

March 1998 Botulinum toxin Terrorist YES: Press accounts appear to confirm

interest in biological agents.

1998-09 161 North American Militia of

Southwestern Michigan

Possessed video tape describing

techniques for manufacturing ricin.

March 1998 Ricin Terrorist NO: No evidence that group had an

serious interest in manufacturing ricin.

1998-04 161 “Amateur scientist” Attempted acquisition of anthrax March 1998 B. anthracis Unknown NO: Never actually obtained anthrax

and no indication of malicious intent.

1998-01 162 John Bernard Koch FBI feared that he had put chemical

or biological agents into bomb

February

1998

Unknown Criminal NO: No evidence that a biological

agent was in the bomb, and no

evidence of intent to make it appear

that a biological agent was involved.

1997-07 162 Osama bin Laden Claims that terrorist groups lead by

Osama bin Laden may be funding

construction of chemical and

biological warfare facility in Sudan

1997 Unknown Terrorist YES: Involvement of bin Laden

confirmed by U.S. and British

intelligence.

1991-03 163 Hamas Alleged interest in biological

weapons

≈1991 Unknown Terrorist NO: Insufficient evidence to suggest

interest in biological rather than

chemical agents.

1991-01 164 Doug Gustafson Contemplated use of ricin 1991 Ricin Criminal YES: Admitted in interview considering

use of ricin.

1985-01 164 Michael Swango, MD Researched production of ricin and

botulinum toxin, and possessed

castor beans

1985 Ricin Criminal YES: Evidence seized in connection

with investigation of crimes for which

he was convicted.

1980-03X 166 East German Stasi training Provided training in covert

employment of biological warfare to

Iraqis, Palestinians, and others

1980s “anthrax and

yellow fever virus”

Terrorist NO: Insufficient information. Only one

account available.

1974-01 166 Symbionese Liberation

Army

Possessed book on “Germ Warfare” January 1974 Unknown Terrorist YES: Press accounts based on

information released by law

enforcement officials.

197

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

1972-02 166 Middle East terrorist

organization

Unnamed organization allegedly

established a program to develop

chemical and biological warfare

agents.

1972 Unknown Terrorist NO: Insufficient Information.

1970-03 166 Weatherman Attempted to acquire biological

agents from Ft. Detrick

November

1970

Unknown Terrorist YES: Press accounts based on

information released by law

enforcement officials.

1968-01 167 Arab Pharmaceutical

Congress

Advocated training in biological

warfare

September

1968

Unknown Terrorist? NO: Insufficient information.

IV. B. False Cases

1999-67 167 None Claim that Iraq was planning to

spread West Nile Valley virus, and

may have been responsible for

outbreak in New York City

October 1999 Alleged West Nile

Valley virus

False case NO: No evidence to support allegation.

1999-73 168 Unknown Stolen tuberculosis culture June 1999 Tuberculosis Criminal NO: No evidence that perpetrator even

knew tuberculosis was included in

stolen material

1999-69 168 Nong Jaew Thai policemen June 1999 Transmission of

HIV

Criminal NO: Transmission means does not

meet case definition for inclusion in this

study.

1999-63 167 None Flour used to mark a trail by has

Street Harriers incorrectly thought to

be anthrax

December

1999

Suspected B.

anthracis

False case NO: No evidence that anyone intended

to threaten or use anthrax.

1999-72 169 Manuel Basulto and Miguel

Quevedo

Threatened robbery victims with

exposure to HIV infected blood

March 1999 Claimed HIV Criminal NO: Dissemination method does not

meet case definition for inclusion in the

study

1999-46 167 None Authorities wrongly suspected

envelopes of containing anthrax

threats

January 1999 Suspected B.

anthracis

False case NO: No evidence that anyone intended

to threaten or use anthrax.

1998-39 167 None Anthrax scare in California hospital December

1998

Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown NO: Scare based on patient’s ill-

founded fears.

1998-15 167 None Ricin scare in Jacksonville, Florida,

when police officials incorrectly

suspected that what was originally

thought to be cocaine was actually

ricin

November

1998

Suspected ricin Criminal NO: No evidence of biological agent.

1998-05 110 None Canister in rental car labeled

“anthrax” in East San Antonio

March 1998 Claimed B.

anthracis

Unknown NO: No evidence of biological agent

and no information on motivation of

perpetrator. Almost certainly a hoax.

1998-02 167 Larry Wayne Harris and

William Leavitt

Allegedly possessed B. anthracis

with intention to use as a biological

agent

February

1997

B. anthracis in

veterinary vaccine

(probably Sterne

strain)

Terrorist NO: U.S. Justice Department dropped

case

198

Case

Number

Page Perpetrator Action Date Agents

Involved

Type Included in cases

analyzed

strain)

1998-07 171 Drug dealers and ricin Claims that manufacturers of illicit

drugs were contaminating material in

their laboratories with ricin to poison

law enforcement officials

January 1998 Ricin Criminal NO: No evidence that anyone actually

has acquired ricin for this purpose.

1997-09 172 Israeli intelligence Failed assassination attempt against

Hamas activist.

September

1997

Alleged ricin, but

probably

Fentanyl, an

artificial opiate

State NO: State action, and no evidence a

biological agent was involved.

1997-08 172 None Fears of deliberate spread of

Shigella at Dartmouth-Hitchcock

Medical Center

October 1997 Shigella Unknown NO: Investigation strongly indicates

accidental contamination.

1997-02 172 “Middle East Terrorists” Alleged biological agent attack on

Ames, Iowa

February

1997

Claimed Bacillus

anthracis

Terrorist NO: No evidence of any attack.

1989-02 173 The Breeders Alleged release of Medflies in

California

November

1989

Claimed Medflies Terrorist NO: Not a biological agent.

1973-02 173 Naples cholera outbreak Episode involving cholera outbreak

in Naples

November

1974

Claimed Cholera Unknown NO: No intentional use of a biological

agent evident.

1970-02 174 CIA Operations against Cuba March 1970-

March 1997

Claimed African

swine flu virus

State NO: No evidence to support Cuban

allegations.

1960-03 175 Minutemen Claims that group was contemplating

use of biological agents

1964-1969 Unknown Terrorist NO: No evidence to suggest that group

had any real interest in biological

agents.

1963-01 175 KGB Allegations that KGB used a

biological agent to assassinate Labor

leader Hugh Gaitskell

1963 Unknown State NO: No evidence to support allegation,

and likely agent is not biological.

199

Sources

This is a partial listing of the sources consulted in researching this study. Omitted are publications

consulted that proved to have no information pertinent to the research. Also ignored are sites on the World

Wide Web, except those included through mention of a newspaper consulted by viewing a web site. Many of

the newspapers were used through on-line databases, such as NEXIS.

The secondary research was supplemented in a number of cases by primary research. Documents were

consulted in several instances, but such material is referenced only in the specific case studies. In addition,

people involved in investigating several of the cases were interviewed, and are noted in connection with the

specific case study.

Newspapers

Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana)

Anchorage Daily News

Antelope Valley Press (Palmdale, California)

Arizona Republic

Arizona Daily Star

Baltimore Sun

Blade (Toledo, Ohio)

Boston Globe

Brazil Times (Indiana)

Brownsville Herald (Texas)

Buffalo News

Charlotte Observer

Chicago Tribune

Cincinnati Enquirer

Columbian (Vancouver, Washington)

Columbus Dispatch (Ohio)

Courier-Journal (Louisville)

Daily Mail(London)

Daily Telegraph (London)

Dallas Morning News

Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, N.Y.)

Denver Post

Deseret News (Salt Lake City)

Edmonton Journal

Egyptian Gazette (Cairo)

Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville)

Gazette (Colorado Springs, Colorado)

Gazette (Montreal)

Financial Times

Globe and Mail (Toronto)

Guardian (London)

Grand Forks Herald (Minnesota)

Herald-Times (Bloomington, Indiana)

Houston Chronicle

Houston Post

Independent (London)

Indianapolis Star-News

International Herald Tribune

Japan Times

Journal Sentinel (Milwaukee, Wisconsin)

Kansas City Star

Knoxville News-Sentinel

L’Aurore (Paris)

Le Figaro (Paris)

London Free Press (Ontario, Canada)

Los Angeles Times

Miami Herald

Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

New York Herald (European Edition—Paris)

New York Times

News & Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina)

Newsday

Omaha World Herald

Orange County Register

Oregonian (Portland)

Orlando Sentinel

Philadelphia Inquirer

Plain Dealer (Cleveland)

Press (New Zealand)

Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California)

Review-Journal (Las Vegas)

Richmond Times

Rocky Mountain News (Denver)

San Diego Union-Tribune

Southland Times (New Zealand)

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

St. Paul Pioneer Press

Salt Lake Tribune

San Antonio Express

San Diego Union-Tribune

San Jose Mercury News

Seattle Spokesman-Review

Shelbyville News (Indiana)

Star of India (Calcutta)

Star-Telegram (Fort Worth, Texas)

Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul)

Sun (Las Vegas)

Sun (Vancouver)

Sunday Times (London)

Tampa Tribune

200

Tennessean

Times (London)

Times (Seattle)

Tucson Citizen (Arizona)

Union-Tribune (San Diego, California)

Vancouver Sun

Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, Virginia)

Washington Post

Washington Times

Wichita Eagle (Kansas)

Yukon News

Wire services, Television

AAP

Agence France Presse

Associated Press

CNN

Deutsche Presse-Agentur

Reuters

Reuters North European Service

United Press International

Department of Defense Publications

Defense Science Board, 1997 Summer Study Task Force, DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume I:

Final Report, October 1997, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology, Washington, D.C.

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Department of Defense. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.

Medical Management of Biological Casualties (Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland: U.S. Army Medical

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, March 1996).

National Defense Panel. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21

Century, December 1997.

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Matters, and the U.S. Army

Chemical and Biological Defense Command. Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological

Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010, November 1997.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997.

Frederick R. Sidell, et al. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1997).

Books

Alibek, Ken. Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999).

Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to

Gorbachev (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).

Bar-Zohar, Michael. The Avengers (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967).

Barnaby, Wendy. The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (London: VISION Paperbacks,

1997).

Benenson, Abram S., editor. Control of Communicable Disease Manual, 16

edition (Washington, DC:

American Public Health Association, 1995).

Brackett, D.W. Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996).

Burrows, William E., and Robert Windrem. Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a

Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994).

Clark, Richard Charles. Technological Terrorism (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1980).

Davis, Shelton H. Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil (New York: Cambridge

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Index

Acer, David, 47, 96–97, 207

Aloe Vera, 118

American Type Culture Collection, 17, 120, 174

Arab Pharmaceutical Congress, 192, 220

Aryan Nation, 4, 174

Aryan Republican Army, 179, 219

Asaoka, Tokiyuki, 157–58, 216

Ascaris suum, 17, 19, 20, 74, 205

Aum Shinrikyo, 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 23, 27, 34, 39, 48, 59,

60, 57–61, 205; Tokyo subway attack, 60

Bacillus anthracis, 10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 59,

60, 70, 71, 83, 84, 85, 100, 101, 107, 155, 156, 157,

160, 161, 166, 170, 175, 178, 185, 186, 194, 195,

197, 205, 207, 208, 209, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220;

biological decay rate, 28

Bacillus cereus, 157, 216

Baker, Douglas Allen, 118

Bell, James Dalton, 120, 177, 178, 179, 219

Botulinum toxin, 10, 18, 19, 20, 59, 60, 107, 108, 109,

115, 120, 121, 122, 157, 170, 173, 175, 178, 180,

189, 205, 208, 209, 218, 219, 220

Breeders, 197, 221

Brucella suis, 20

Bulgaria, 71, 72, 73, 86, 99, 100, 205

Campbell, Maynard, 18, 118

Castor beans, 18, 32, 55, 56, 112, 116, 118, 119, 176,

178, 189, 209, 220

Catalogue of Silent Tools of Justice, 18, 118

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 53,

96, 97, 104

Central Intelligence Agency, 4, 98, 99, 122, 123, 165,

175, 198, 199, 201, 207, 209, 221

Chiku, Hiroaki, 158, 216

Cholera endotoxin, 20

Clostridium botulinum, 16, 17, 120, 180, 209

Clostridium tetani, 17, 120, 209

Cohen, William S., 3, 36

Corynebacterium diphtheria, 19

Coxiella burnetii, 20

Cuba: biological weapons program, 35

Curare, 44, 73, 104, 205, 208

Dark Harvest, 10, 11, 70–71, 205

Defense Intelligence Agency, 36

Defense Science Board, 6

DePugh, Robert, 199–200

Deutch, John, 5

Dimethyl Sulfoxide. See DMSO

Diphtheria toxin, 20, 26

Disopropylflourophosphate, 175

DMSO, 24, 117, 118

Ebola, 10, 60

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 3, 4, 9, 53, 56, 73, 114,

115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 155, 157, 167, 168,

169, 170, 171, 176, 179, 186, 190, 191, 194, 195,

198, 219

Florida Institute of Technology, 173

Foot, M.R.D., 108

Francisella tularensis, 20

Freeh, Louis, 5, 12, 13

Gaitskell, Hugh, 200–202

Garrett, Benjamin C., 98

Giardia lamblia, 20, 93, 207

Girard, Henri, 24, 26, 86–88, 206

Green, Debora, 55, 56

Gruinard Island, 70, 71, 205

Gustafson, Doug, 188, 189, 219

Harris, Larry Wayne, 4, 17, 174, 194, 218, 220

Harris, Robert, 107

Hill, John R., 104

Hitler: Hitler, Adolph, 107, 123, 124, 209, 224

HIV, 19, 20, 47, 57, 58, 96, 153, 159, 160, 161, 205,

207, 216, 217

Hopf, Karl, 85–86, 206

Hydralazine, 201, 202

Iran: biological warfare program, 36

206

Iraq: alleged bioterrorism threats, 113, 119–20, 154,

187; alleged East German training, 191; biological

warfare program, 12, 35, 36; state supporter of

terrorism, 35

Japan, 11, 60, 61, 74, 76, 81, 157, 165

Jenkins, Bryan, 37

Just, Michael, 32, 117

Kenya, 10, 77, 112

KGB, 72, 98, 101, 102, 200, 201, 205, 208, 221

Korczak, Boris, 97, 98, 99, 207

Kostov, Vladimir, 72, 73, 72–73, 98, 99, 100, 205, 207

Kranz, J.A., 17, 73, 74, 205

Lavy, Thomas, 4, 176, 177, 218

Leavitt, William, 194, 195, 220

Libya: biological warfare program, 35, 36; state

supporter of terrorism, 35

Linner, John Gunnar, 175, 176, 175–76, 218

Majors, Orville Lynn, 92

Malawi, 112, 209

Markov, Georgi, 71, 72, 71–72, 73, 98, 99, 100, 189,

205, 207

Mau Mau, 10, 11, 78, 206

Mettetal, Ray W., 173, 218

MI5, 200, 201

Minnesota Patriots Council, 18, 24, 118, 176, 209

Minutemen, 199, 200, 221. See also DePugh, Robert

Mycobacterium bovis, 206

National Defense Panel, 7

Naval Medical Research Institute, 56, 157

Nesset, Arnfinn, 73, 205

New Zealand, 51, 52, 53, 205

Nicotine, 20, 24, 117, 123, 209

NMRI. See Naval Medical Research Institute

North Korea: biological warfare program, 35, 36; state

supporter of terrorism, 35

Office of Technology Assessment, 21, 22

Omega-7, 199

Operations Executive (SOE), 107, 108, 208

Pandey, Benoyendra Chandra, 17, 26, 32, 80, 206

Pantchenko, Dr., 26, 32, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 206

Paxman, Jeremy, 107

PKK, 156

Poisoner’s Handbook, 18, 175, 176

Puja, Ma Anand, 32

Purver, Ron, 3, 45, 61, 160, 161, 180

Q fever, 10, 28, 60

Quadrennial Defense Review, 6

R.I.S.E., 11, 23, 27, 34, 121–22

Rabbit calicivirus disease, 51, 52, 53

Rabbit hemmorhagic viral disease. See rabbit calicivirus

disease

Rajneeshees, 9, 10, 11, 17, 24, 25, 34, 35, 37, 38, 48,

61–70, 205

RCD. See rabbit calicivirus disease

Red Army Faction, 166, 180, 217, 219

Republic of Texas, 153

Rhodesia, 100, 101, 207, 208

Rice blast, 20

Ricin, 4, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24, 32, 55, 56, 71, 72, 73, 98,

102, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 157, 162, 163, 164,

173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 188, 189, 190, 205, 208,

209, 217, 218, 219, 220; Boris Korczak and, 97;

Bulgarian Secret Police and, 71, 72; Debora Green

and, 55; detection of, 56; Doug Gustafson and, 188;

Drug dealers and, 195; James Dalton Bell and, 178;

lethal dose, 56; Malawi and, 112; Mau Mau and, 77;

Michael Swango and, 189, 190; Minnesota Patriots

Council and, 118; Montgomery Todd Meeks and,

162; Ray W. Mettetal and, 173; Thomas Lavy and,

176; Thomas Leahy and, 113; Unnamed perpetrators

and, 179; William Chanslor and, 163

Rickettsia prowazekii, 20

Robertson, George, 35, 187

Rye stem rust, 20

Salmonella typhi, 12, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 76, 86,

87, 121, 206, 208, 209; rejected by Rajneeshees, 37

Salmonella typhimurium, 10, 17, 20, 24, 32, 37, 205

Shigella dysenteriae, 17, 18, 55

Shigella dysenteriae 2, 53

Silent Death, 18, 19, 110, 175, 176

Smallpox, 20, 27, 105

Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 101–2

South Africa, 93, 94, 190, 207; Civilian Cooperation

Bureau, 93

South West African People’s Organization, 93

Special Operations Executive (SOE), 107, 123

Stewart, Brian T., 92–93

Sudan: alleged biological warfare program, 36; state

supporter of terrorism, 35

Suzuki, Mitsuru, 12, 18, 24, 25, 32, 74–77, 206

Swango, Michael, 189, 190, 189–90, 220

Symbionese Liberation Army, 191, 220

Syria: biological warfare program, 35, 36; state

supporter of terrorism, 35

207

Tenet, George J., 5, 13, 27

Tetanus, 208

Tetrodotoxin, 20, 95, 175

The Dalles, Oregon, 11, 48

Thompson, Diane, 54, 55

Thurmond, Strom, 36

Vibrio cholerae, 19, 20, 22, 81, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 94,

101, 109, 170, 198, 206, 208, 221

Wheat stem rust, 20

World Health Organization, 28

Yellow fever virus, 20, 94, 165, 166, 191, 207, 217, 220

Yersinia enterocolitica, 20, 32, 117, 209

Yersinia pestis, 4, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, 32, 80, 81, 167,

174, 175, 206, 217, 218

Zaire, 60

Zimbabwe, 100, 101, 190, 207

209

About the Author

W. Seth Carus is a Senior Research Professor Visiting Fellow at the Center for Counterproliferation

Research, where he is working on biological warfare issues. Prior to joining the center, Dr. Carus worked at the

Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), where he was a Research Analyst. While at the CNA, Dr. Carus directed a

study on the implications of NBC weapons on a major regional contingency in Korea. In addition, he

participated in other studies for the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific

Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Central Command.

From 1991 to 1994, Dr. Carus was a member of the Policy Planning staff in the Undersecretary of

Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Carus participated in the Clinton Administration’s

Nuclear Posture Review. Prior to joining OSD, he was a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near

East Policy.

Dr. Carus has published extensively on the proliferation issues. He has published several studies on

chemical and biological weapons proliferation in the Middle East, including two monographs, “The Poor

Man’s Atomic Bomb,”?: Biological Weapons in the Middle East (January 1991) and The Genie Unleashed:

Iraqi Biological and Chemical Weapons (July 1989). He also has published extensively on ballistic and cruise

missile proliferation, including two monographic studies for the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (1992) and Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and

Response (1990). He co-authored the first detailed description of Iraq’s Al-Husayn missile program in 1990.